Citation Nr: 1751585 Decision Date: 11/09/17 Archive Date: 11/17/17 DOCKET NO. 09-47 884 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Roanoke, Virginia THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 2. Entitlement to service connection for Parkinson's disease, to include as due to exposure to herbicides (Parkinson's disease). 3. Entitlement to service connection for a left foot disability. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Virginia Department of Veterans Services ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD M. Rescan, Associate Cousel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty with the United States Army from July 1950 to June 1955. This matter is before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal of a July 2009 rating decision and a November 2010 rating decision by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Roanoke, Virginia. This matter was previously before the Board in April 2016 and was remanded to the Agency of Original Jurisdiction (AOJ) for further development of the Veteran's claims that he served in the Korean War. The issue of entitlement to service connection for a left foot disability is addressed in the REMAND portion of the decision below and is REMANDED to the AOJ. This appeal has been advanced on the Board's docket pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 20.900(c) (2017). 38 U.S.C.A. § 7107(a)(2) (West 2014). FINDINGS OF FACT 1. PTSD cannot be attributed to the Veteran's military service due to the absence of an independently verifiable in-service stressful experience. 2. The Veteran was not exposed to herbicides, to include Agent Orange during his active military service. 3. The weight of the evidence reflects that the Veteran's Parkinson's disease was not incurred in or related to the Veteran's active service. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The criteria for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 1154, 5103A, 5107 (West 2014); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.304 (2017). 2. The criteria for service connection for Parkinson's disease have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 1154, 5103A, 5107 (West 2014); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.304, 3.309 (2017). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION I. Duty to Notify and Assist The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (2000), describes VA's duty to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2014); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a) (2016). Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5102 VA first has a duty to provide an appropriate claim form, instructions for completing it, and notice of information necessary to complete the claim if it is incomplete. Second, under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a), VA has a duty to notify the claimant of the information and evidence needed to substantiate and complete a claim, i.e., existence of a current disability, the degree of disability, and the effective date of any disability benefits. The appellant must also be notified of what specific evidence he is to provide and what evidence VA will attempt to obtain. Third, VA has a duty to assist claimants in obtaining evidence needed to substantiate a claim. This includes obtaining all relevant evidence adequately identified in the record and, in some cases, affording VA examinations. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A. In Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473, 490 (2006), the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) observed that a claim of entitlement to service connection consists of five elements, of which notice must be provided prior to the initial adjudication: (1) veteran status; (2) existence of a disability; (3) a connection between the veteran's service and the disability; (4) degree of disability; and (5) effective date. See 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a). In this appeal, the Board finds the letters dated in November 2008 and March 2010 before the July 2009 and November 2010 rating decisions provided the Veteran with notice that fulfills the provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) including notice of the laws and regulations governing disability ratings and effective dates as required by the Court in Dingess. The Board also finds that even if VA had an obligation to provide the Veteran with additional 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) notice and failed to do so this notice problem does not constitute prejudicial error in this case because the record reflects that a reasonable person could be expected to understand what was needed to substantiate the claim after reading the above letter, the rating decision, the statement of the case, the remand, and the supplemental statement of the case. See Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S.Ct. 1696 (2009). As to the duty to assist, the Board recognizes that some of the Veteran's service records were burned in a fire. In cases where service treatment records are lost, the Board has a heightened obligation to explain its findings and conclusions and to consider carefully the benefit-of- the-doubt rule. See O'Hare v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 365, 367 (1991). The Board's analysis of the Veteran's claim has been undertaken with these heightened duties in mind. In addition, the Board finds that VA has secured all available and identified pertinent in-service and post-service evidence to include reports from the Joint Service Records Research Center (JSRRC), his service treatment records, Social Security Administration Records (SSA), and VA treatment records in substantial compliance with the Board's remand instructions. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(b); Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268 (1998); D'Aries v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 97 (2008) (holding that only substantial, and not strict compliance with the terms of a remand request, is required); Dyment v. West, 13 Vet. App. 141, 146-47 (holding that there was no Stegall violation when the examiner made the ultimate determination required by the Board's remand, because such determination more than substantially complied with the Board's remand order). VA has also provided the Veteran with a VA examination in order to establish service connection for a psychiatric condition to include PTSD. The Veteran attended an examination in January 2017 and the Board finds that the opinion provided by the January 2017 VA examiner is adequate to adjudicate the claim and substantially complies with the Board's remand instructions because it was provided after the examiner reviewed the Veteran's claims file, then the examiner examined the Veteran and then the examiner provided an opinion as to the diagnosis and symptoms associated with the Veteran's disability, which was based on citations to the relevant evidence found in the claims file. Therefore, the record is now sufficient to decide the claim. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(d); Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet App 303 (2007); Steagal, supra; D'Aries, supra; Dyment, supra. Lastly, neither the Veteran nor his representative has argued that any prejudice results from the assistance provided for this appeal. See Scott v. McDonald, 789 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, (U.S. Oct. 3, 2016) (holding that "the Board's obligation to read filings in a liberal manner does not require the Board ... to search the record and address procedural arguments when the [appellant] fails to raise them before the Board"); Dickens v. McDonald, 814 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (applying Scott to an appellant's failure to raise a duty to assist argument before the Board). VA's duty to assist with respect to obtaining relevant records and an examination has been met. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c); Barr, supra. In summary, the facts relevant to this appeal have been properly developed and there is no further action to be undertaken to comply with the provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5103(a), 5103A or 38 C.F.R. § 3.159. Therefore, the Veteran will not be prejudiced as a result of the Board proceeding to the merits of the appeal. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384, 392-94 (1993). In adjudicating the claim below, the Board has reviewed all of the evidence in the VBMS and virtual VA claims files. Although the Board has an obligation to provide adequate reasons and bases supporting this decision, there is no requirement that all the evidence submitted by the Veteran or obtained on his behalf be discussed in detail. Rather, the Board's analysis below will focus specifically on what evidence is needed to substantiate the claim and what the evidence in the Veteran's claim's folders show, or fails to show, with respect to the claim. See Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Timberlake v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 122, 128-30 (2000). II. Service Connection Claims A. Psychiatric Condition To Include PTSD The Veteran contends that service connection for PTSD is warranted because he was in combat during the Korean War. Service connection is warranted where the evidence of record establishes that a particular injury or disease resulting in disability was incurred in the line of duty in the active military service or, if pre-existing such service, was aggravated thereby. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. If a condition noted during service is not shown to be chronic, then generally a showing of continuity of symptomatology after service is required for service connection if the disability is one that is listed in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a). 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b); see also Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013). In addition, service connection may also be granted on the basis of a post-service initial diagnosis of a disease, where the physician relates the current condition to the period of service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). In order to establish service connection for the claimed disability, there must be (1) medical evidence of a current disability; (2) medical, or in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) medical evidence of a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the current disability. See Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999). The requirement of a current disability is "satisfied when a claimant has a disability at the time a claim for VA disability compensation is filed or during the pendency of that claim." See McClain v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 319, 321 (2007). In addition to the general criteria for service connection, service connection for PTSD requires medical evidence establishing a diagnosis of the condition, credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred, and a link, established by medical evidence, between current symptomatology and the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). Where it is determined that the Veteran was engaged in combat with the enemy and the claimed stressors are related to such combat, his lay testimony regarding the claimed stressors is accepted as conclusive as to their actual existence, absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Where, however, VA determines that the Veteran did not engage in combat with the enemy, or that he did engage in combat with the enemy but the claimed stressor is not related to such combat, lay testimony, by itself, will not be enough to establish the occurrence of the alleged stressor. Instead, the record must contain evidence which corroborates the Veteran's testimony as to the occurrence of the claimed stressors. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.304(d), (f); West v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 70, 76 (1994). Effective July 13, 2010, VA amended 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) by liberalizing, in certain circumstances, the evidentiary standards for establishing the occurrence of an in-service stressor for non-combat Veterans. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3). The amended version of 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3) eliminates the need for stressor corroboration in circumstances in which the Veteran's claimed in-service stressor is related to the "fear of hostile military or terrorist activity." Lay statements may serve to support a claim for service connection by supporting the occurrence of lay-observable events or the presence of disability or symptoms of disability subject to lay observation. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a); Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed Cir. 2007); Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Although lay persons are competent to provide opinions on some medical issues, some medical issues fall outside the realm of common knowledge of a lay person. See Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428, 435 (2011). In evaluating the evidence in any given appeal, it is the responsibility of the Board to weigh the evidence and decide where to give credit and where to withhold the same and, in so doing, accept certain medical opinions over others. Schoolman v. West, 12 Vet. App. 307, 310-11 (1999). In this regard, the Board has been charged with the duty to assess the credibility and weight given to evidence. Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F. 3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F. 3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Indeed, the Court has declared that in adjudicating a claim, the Board has the responsibility to do so. Bryan v. West, 13 Vet. App. 482, 488-89 (2000). In doing so, the Board is free to favor one medical opinion over another, provided it offers an adequate basis for doing so. Owens v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 429, 433 (1995). Except as otherwise provided by law, a claimant has the responsibility to present and support a claim for benefits under the laws administered by VA. VA shall consider all information and medical and lay evidence of record. Where there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, VA shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; see also Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1990). In the current appeal, the Veteran claims that he was engaged in combat during the Korean War. The Board acknowledges that the Veteran's records were destroyed in in the fire in 1973. Since the majority of the Veteran's records were destroyed, the Veteran has submitted statements and photographs to VA in order to prove his stressor. Information provided by the Veteran was forwarded to the JSRRC in order to verify the Veteran's claimed in-service stressor. Subsequently, the JSRRC coordinated their research with the National Archives and Records Administration. After conducting a thorough search of all the units that the Veteran claimed that he was assigned to, the JSRRC was unable to concede that the claimed stressor event had occurred. See July 31, 2017 JSRRC memorandum. Moreover, the Board also notes that the Veteran submitted a photograph of a commemorative Korean War Service Medal that indicates that the medal was "awarded on the 50th anniversary of the Korean War." The Board finds that this medal is not credible or competent evidence that the Veteran served in Korea because it is a commemorative item and was submitted without an award citation or any other documentation to verify the Veteran's service in the Korean War. Lastly, the Veteran's DD-214 from his second period of active duty service indicates no service in Korea and the only decoration that the Veteran was awarded was the Army Occupation Medal (Germany). See 1955 DD-214. Therefore, despite efforts by VA to confirm the Veteran's allegation as to his stressor, no evidence has been uncovered which corroborates his service in Korea or his statements. In sum, the Board acknowledges that the Veteran has not received any additional psychiatric diagnoses at his VA examination and he only possesses a diagnosis for PTSD. See January 2017 VA examination. Although some physicians have accepted the Veteran's description of his in-service experience as credible evidence for diagnosing PTSD, the Board may not grant service connection for PTSD in cases such as this without supporting evidence of the occurrence of the claimed stressor. Given the lack of supporting evidence required by the law, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran's claim for service connection. Thus, entitlement to service connection for PTSD is denied. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.304. For the above stated reasons, the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, the benefit of the doubt doctrine does not apply, and the claim for entitlement to service connection for PTSD, must be denied. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. B. Parkinson's Disease Due To Herbicide Exposure The Veteran claimed that he was exposed to herbicides to include Agent Orange while in service. As noted above, in order to establish service connection for the claimed disability, there must be (1) medical evidence of a current disability; (2) medical, or in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) medical evidence of a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the current disability. See Hickson, supra. As to the Veteran's claim regarding herbicide exposure, VA laws and regulations provide that a veteran who, during active military, naval, or air service, served in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam war (i.e., January 9, 1962, to May 7, 1975), shall be presumed to have been exposed to an herbicide agent, unless there is affirmative evidence to the contrary. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1116(a)(3); 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii). The last date on which such a veteran shall be presumed to have been exposed to an herbicide agent shall be the last date on which he served in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam war period. 38 C.F.R. § 3.307. For these Vietnam war veterans, diseases associated with exposure to certain herbicide agents will be presumed to have been incurred in service even though there is no evidence of that disease during the period of service at issue. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1116; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. In addition, effective February 24, 2011, VA amended its adjudication regulations to extend a presumption of herbicide exposure to certain Veterans who served in Korea, between April 1, 1968, and August 31, 1971, in a unit that, as determined by the Department of Defense, operated in or near the Korean DMZ in an area in which herbicides are known to have been applied during that period, unless there is affirmative evidence to establish that the veteran was not exposed to any such agent during that service. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.307 (a)(6)(iv). The list of diseases associated with exposure to these herbicide agents is as follows: AL amyloidosis, chloracne or other acneform disease consistent with chloracne, type 2 diabetes (also known as Type II diabetes mellitus or adult-onset diabetes), Hodgkin's disease, ischemic heart disease (including, but not limited to, acute, subacute, and old myocardial infarction; atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease including coronary artery disease (including coronary spasm) and coronary bypass surgery; and also stable, unstable and Prinzmetal's angina), all chronic B-cell leukemias (including, but not limited to, hairy-cell leukemia and chronic lymphocytic leukemia), multiple myeloma, non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, Parkinson's disease, early-onset peripheral neuropathy, porphyria cutanea tarda, prostate cancer, respiratory cancers (cancer of the lung, bronchus, larynx, or trachea), and soft-tissue sarcoma (other than osteosarcoma, chondrosarcoma, Kaposi's sarcoma, or mesothelioma). 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(e). The diseases listed at 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(e) shall have become manifest to a degree of 10 percent or more at any time after service, except that chloracne or other acneform disease consistent with chloracne, porphyria cutanea tarda, and acute and subacute/early onset peripheral neuropathy shall have become manifest to a degree of 10 percent or more within a year after the last date on which the veteran was exposed to an herbicide agent during active military, naval, or air service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(ii). In addition, service connection for a recognized chronic disease can also be established through continuity of symptomatology. Walker, supra; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303(b), 3.309. Parkinson's disease is a chronic disease under 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a). For chronic diseases shown as such in service or within the applicable presumptive period, subsequent manifestations of the same chronic disease at any later date are service-connected unless attributable to an intercurrent cause. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). For a chronic disease to be considered to have been "shown in service," there must be a combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease entity, and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time, as distinguished from merely isolated findings. Id. When the condition noted in service or within the presumptive period is not chronic, a showing of continuity of symptomatology after discharge is required. Id. The availability of presumptive service connection for a disability based on exposure to herbicides does not preclude a veteran from establishing service connection with proof of direct causation. Stefl v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 120 (2007); see also Combee v. Brown, 34 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1994). As to a current diagnosis, the Veteran has been diagnosed with Parkinson's disease. First of all, the Board acknowledges that the Veteran has not been afforded a VA examination with respect to his claim for service connection for Parkinson's disease as due to herbicide exposure. However, the Board finds that a VA examination is not necessary in order to decide this claim. In disability compensation claims, the VA must provide a VA medical examination when there is: (1) competent evidence of a current disability or persistent or recurrent symptoms of a disability, and (2) evidence establishing that an event, injury, or disease occurred in service or establishing certain diseases manifesting during an applicable presumptive period for which the veteran qualifies, and (3) an indication that the disability or persistent or recurrent symptoms of a disability may be associated with the Veteran's service or with another service-connected disability. McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet App. 79 (2006). Here, as discussed below, the evidence of record does not establish that the Veteran was exposed to herbicides during his military service and the Veteran does not allege any other in-service event, injury, or disease. Accordingly, a VA examination is not warranted for his claim for service connection for Parkinson's disease. Turning to the Veteran's claims of herbicide exposure, the Veteran claims that he was exposed to Agent Orange when he was in Korea in 1951 and 1952 and that is what he believes caused his Parkinson's disease. See Statements in Support of Claim March10, 2010, and March 29, 2010. Although the Veteran believes that he was exposed to herbicides while in Korea, his military records show that he was never assigned to a location during a time when herbicides were present. Specifically, the Veteran's military records show that he never served in Vietnam nor is there evidence that he served in Korea or on the Korean DMZ between April 1, 1968, and August 31, 1971. Thus, the preponderance of the evidence shows that the Veteran was not exposed to herbicides, to include Agent Orange while on active duty. In addition, the available service treatment records show no evidence of Parkinson's disease during the Veteran's active military service and the post-service medical records demonstrate that this disability manifested itself several decades after the Veteran was discharged from service. In sum, the Board has considered the Veteran's lay statements but the Board finds them not to be credible or competent with respect to his claimed exposure to herbicides because they are not supported by the record, and has therefore placed no probative weight on these lay statements. See Davidson, supra. Given the lack of an in-service event, injury, or disease, specifically an exposure to herbicides in which this disability may be related, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran's claim for service connection. Thus, entitlement to service connection for Parkinson's disease is denied. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.304. For the above stated reasons, the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, the benefit of the doubt doctrine does not apply, and the claim for entitlement to service connection for Parkinson's disease, must be denied. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. ORDER Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, is denied. Entitlement to service connection for Parkinson's disease, to include as due to exposure to herbicides, is denied. REMAND Although the Board sincerely regrets the additional delay, it is necessary to ensure that there is a complete record upon which to decide the Veteran's claim so that he is afforded every possible consideration. In regards to the claim for service connection for a left foot disability, the record reflects that the Veteran has not been given a VA examination to determine the nature and etiology of this claimed condition. According to McClendon, an examination is required when (1) there is evidence of a current disability, (2) evidence establishing an "in-service event, injury or disease," or that a disease, manifested in accordance with presumptive service connection regulations, occurred which would support incurrence or aggravation, (3) an indication that the current disability may be related to the in-service event, and (4) insufficient evidence to decide the case. McClendon, supra. In this case, the Board acknowledges that the majority of the Veteran's military records were burned in the fire and he has reported to VA that he has had left foot pain for over forty years. Moreover, there is also insufficient information to properly decide this case. Thus, a VA examination should be obtained to determine the nature and etiology of this disability. While the appeal is in remand status, the AOJ should also obtain and associate with the record any outstanding VA treatment records. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(d) (West 2014). Accordingly, the case is REMANDED for the following action: (Please note, this appeal has been advanced on the Board's docket pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 20.900(c). Expedited handling is requested.) 1. Associate with the claims file the Veteran's contemporaneous VA treatment records from October 7, 2016 to the present. 2. Schedule the Veteran for an appropriate examination regarding his claimed left foot disability. If the Veteran is unable to attend an examination, have the examiner provide an opinion based on the information contained in the Veteran's claims file. After a review of the claims file, the examiner should provide answers to the following questions: (A). Does the Veteran have a left foot disability? (B). Is at least as likely as not (50 percent or greater probability) that the Veteran's left foot disability had its onset in service or is caused by or related at least in part to his active service? In providing the requested opinion, the Board has found that there is no credible or competent evidence to indicate that the Veteran served in Korea. Therefore, any statement regarding an injury to the Veteran's left foot in Korea is not competent and credible evidence regarding an in-service injury. In providing the requested opinion, the examiner should consider the Veteran's competent lay claims regarding the observable symptoms he has experienced. The VA examination report must include a complete rationale for all opinions expressed. If the examiner feels that any of the requested opinions cannot be rendered without resorting to speculation, the examiner must state whether the need to speculate is caused by a deficiency in the state of general medical knowledge (i.e. no one could respond given medical science and the known facts) or by a deficiency in the record or the examiner (i.e. additional facts are required, or the examiner does not have the needed knowledge or training). 3. Then readjudicate the Veteran's claim. If the benefit sought on appeal is not granted to the Veteran's satisfaction, a supplemental statement of the case should be issued to the Veteran and his representative and they should be afforded the requisite opportunity to respond before the case is returned to the Board for further appellate action. The appellant has the right to submit additional evidence and argument on the matter or matters the Board has remanded. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999). This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board or by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5109B, 7112 (West 2014). ____________________________________________ Michael J. Skaltsounis Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs