Citation Nr: 18140145 Decision Date: 10/02/18 Archive Date: 10/02/18 DOCKET NO. 16-10 661 DATE: October 2, 2018 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for acute alcoholism is denied. Entitlement to service connection for pancreatitis, to include as secondary to alcoholism, is denied. Entitlement to service connection for diabetes mellitus I (DM I), to include as secondary to alcoholism, is denied. Entitlement to service connection for cerebrovascular accident (CVA) or stroke, to include as secondary to alcoholism, is denied. Entitlement to service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), to include as secondary to CVA/stroke, is denied. Entitlement to a total disability rating based upon individual unemployability (TDIU) is denied. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The Veteran’s alcoholism is not service-connectable on a direct basis. 2. Pancreatitis, DM I, and CVA/stroke were not present in service and are not shown to be etiologically related to service, and are not secondary (caused or aggravated) to a service-connected disability. 3. PTSD was not present in service and is not shown to be etiologically related to service, to include as secondary to CVA/stroke. 4. The evidence of record shows that the Veteran does not meet the percentage requirements for TDIU, as there are no service-connected disabilities. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Entitlement to service connection for alcoholism is not warranted. 38 U.S.C. §§ 105, 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.1, 3.301, 3.303. 2. The criteria for service connection for pancreatitis have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131, 5013, 5103A, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309, 3.310. 3. The criteria for service connection for DM I have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309, 3.310. 4. The criteria for service connection for CVA/stroke have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.310. 5. The criteria for service connection for PTSD have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.310. 6. The criteria for entitlement to TDIU have not been met. 38 U.S.C. 1155, 7104; 38 C.F.R. 3.340, 3.341, 4.16, 4.19. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Veteran served on active duty for training from September 1970 to December 1970 and was discharged from the Army Reserves and/or National Guard in August 1985. The Veteran died in March 2017. The appellant is the Veteran’s parent. In June 2018, the Board determined the appeal as to issues of entitlement to service connection for pancreatitis, DM II, stroke, PTSD, acute alcoholism, and TDIU had become moot by virtue of the Veteran’s death. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, the surviving parent filed a request to substitute. In July 2018, the regional office (RO) recognized the Veteran’s parent as an eligible substitute claimant in the appeal. See 38 U.S.C. § 5121A. Accordingly, the appellant has been substituted for the claimant for purposes of adjudicating the claim to completion. See 38 U.S.C. § 5121A (allowing for substitution in case of death of a claimant who dies on or after October 10, 2008). Service Connection Service connection may be granted for disability resulting from disease or injury incurred or aggravated during active military service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131. Generally, service connection requires (1) the existence of a present disability, (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of an injury or disease, and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2004). An alternative method of establishing the second and third elements of service connection for those disabilities identified as “chronic” under 38 C.F.R. § 3.309 (a), such as diabetes mellitus, is through a demonstration of continuity of symptomatology. See Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 307 (2007). A claimant can establish continuity of symptomatology with competent evidence showing: (1) that a condition was “noted” during service; (2) post-service continuity of the same symptomatology; and (3) a nexus between a current disability and the post-service symptomatology. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). In addition, certain chronic disabilities are presumed to have been incurred or aggravated in service if they manifested to a compensable degree within one year of separation from service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1112; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307(a), 3.309(a). Service connection may also be established for any disability which is proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disease or injury. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.310. To prevail on the issue of entitlement to secondary service connection, there must be (1) evidence of a current disability; (2) evidence of a service-connected disability; and (3) nexus evidence establishing a connection between the service-connected disability and the current disability. See Wallin v. West, 11 Vet. App. 509, 512 (1998). Active military service includes any period of active duty for training during which the individual concerned was disabled or died from a disease or injury incurred in or aggravated in line of duty, or any period of inactive duty training during which the individual concerned was disabled or died from injury incurred in or aggravated in line of duty. 38 U.S.C. § 101(21) and (24); 38 C.F.R. § 3.6(a) and (d). It follows that service connection may be granted for disability resulting from disease or injury incurred or aggravated while performing active duty for training (ACDUTRA), or from injury (but not diseases) incurred or aggravated while performing inactive duty training (IDT). 38 U.S.C. §§ 101(24), 106, 1131. Generally, no presumptions (including the presumptions of soundness, aggravation, or for presumptive diseases) attach to periods of ACDUTRA or IDT unless “Veteran” status is attained during those periods. Paulson v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 466, 470 (1995). As to the presumption of soundness, it does not apply to a claimant who had only ACDUTRA service and who is not otherwise a Veteran. Paulson, 7 Vet. App. at 470. Even for Veterans who have achieved “Veteran” status through a prior period of active service and now claim a disability incurred only during a later period of ACDUTRA, the presumption of soundness applies only when the Veteran has been “examined, accepted, and enrolled for service” and where that examination revealed no “defects, infirmities, or disorders.” Smith v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 40, 45-46 (2010). In other words, there must be an entrance examination prior to the period of ACDUTRA (or IDT) in which the Veteran claims the disease or injury occurred; otherwise, the presumption of soundness does not attach. Smith, 24 Vet. App. at 45-46. Moreover, if the claimant has not achieved “Veteran” status through a prior period of service, then the presumption of soundness does not attach to a period of ACDUTRA (or IDT), no matter if an examination occurred prior to the period of ACDUTRA (or IDT). Id. When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant. 38 U.S.C. § 5107; see also Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1990). To deny a claim on its merits, the evidence must preponderate against the claim. Alemany v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 518, 519 (1996). 1. Entitlement to service connection for acute alcoholism The Veteran contends that his alcoholism is due to military service. Compensation cannot be awarded pursuant to 38 U.S.C. §§ 105, 1131 for a primary alcohol disability incurred during service or for any secondary disability that resulted from primary drug or alcohol abuse during service. Allen v. Principi, 237 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001). A claimant may be granted service connection for purposes of obtaining VA benefits other than compensation if entitlement to secondary service connection for drug and alcohol abuse is demonstrated pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a); see also Allen, 237 F.3d at 1368. The Veteran stated that from 1970-1980, he was in the military during the most turbulent time in the black community. He was referred to as uncle Tom, was in the military during an unpopular war, and being a black 2nd Lieutenant in Vietnam had the life expectancy of snowball in hell. He stated that alcohol became his friend. Despite this report, the Board notes that in his May 2011 Correspondence, the Veteran stated that he was not deployed to Vietnam, and there is no credible evidence to suggest that he was present there at any time during his period of active duty for training. In any event, the Board finds that service connection for alcoholism is precluded as a matter of law. Where the law is dispositive in a case, entitlement to the VA benefits sought must be denied due to the absence of legal merit. See Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 426 (1994). Accordingly, for the reasons discussed herein, the Veteran is not entitled to service connection for alcoholism. 38 U.S.C. §§ 105, 1131; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.301, 3.303. 2. Entitlement to service connection for pancreatitis, DM I, CVA/stroke The appellant contends that the Veteran’s pancreatitis, DM I, and CVA/stroke are related to the Veteran’s military service, to include as secondary to alcoholism. Regarding secondary service connection, as discussed above, the Board is denying service connection for alcoholism. As such, there is no legal basis for secondary service connection, whether it was caused or aggravated by the Veteran’s non-service-connected alcoholism; therefore, the claim for secondary service connection for pancreatitis, DM I, and CVA/stroke must be denied as a matter of law because there is no primary service-connected disability upon which secondary service connection may be granted. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a). As the Veteran has no service-connected disability that may have caused or aggravated pancreatitis, DM I, and CVA/stroke, the benefit of the doubt doctrine does not apply, and service connection on a secondary basis must be denied at law. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 (a); Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 426, 430 (1994). Regarding direct service connection, the Veteran has been diagnosed with pancreatitis, DM I, and cerebrovascular accident/stroke. As such, the first Shedden element is met. However, based on the evidence of record, the Board finds that service connection for pancreatitis, DM I, and CVA/stroke is not warranted. The Veteran’s STRs do not document treatments, complaints, or diagnosis of pancreatitis, DM I, and/or CVA/stroke. During his December 1970 Report of Medical History: ETS and February 1975 Quad examinations, the Veteran did not report having any illnesses. Regarding his DM I, during his separation and reserves retention examination, testing revealed no sugar or albumin in the Veteran’s urine. Regarding his CVA/stroke, during his separation and reserves retention examinations, the Veteran denied frequent or severe headaches, dizziness of fainting spells, and a history of head injury. He noted that he did not have any illness or injury other than those already noted, and had not been treated by clinics, physicians, healers, or other practitioners within the past five years. a. Pancreatitis In June 1991, the Veteran was admitted to the University of North Carolina Hospital. The examiner noted that the Veteran was diagnosed with recurrent pancreatitis in 1990. In November 1991, the Veteran was once again admitted to the hospital. The examiner noted a history of relapsing pancreatitis secondary to ethanol abuse and hypertension. The Veteran’s final diagnosis was alcoholic pancreatitis. Additionally, the Veteran’s VA treatment records noted a diagnosis of acute pancreatitis “in the setting of heavy EtOH use.” Based on the evidence of record, the Board finds that service connection for pancreatitis is not warranted. The Veteran’s STRs do not show complaints, treatments, or diagnoses for pancreatitis. The first medical evidence of pancreatitis was in 1990, i.e., over 20 years after his discharge from active service and five years after discharge from the reserves. The fact that there were no records of any complaints or treatment involving the Veteran’s pancreatitis for many years weighs against the claim. See Maxson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 453, 459 (1999), affirmed sub nom. Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (it was proper to consider the veteran’s entire medical history, including a lengthy period of absence of complaints). Additionally, post-service VA and private treatment records consistently state that the Veteran’s pancreatitis is related to his alcohol use. As such, there is no medical evidence of record that shows that the Veteran’s diagnosed pancreatitis is related to his active service or service in the reserves, or that the Veteran was diagnosed with pancreatitis to a degree of at least 10 percent disabling within one year after his active military service or service on the reserves. See 38 U.S.C. 1101, 1112; 38 C.F.R. 3.307, 3.309(a). As such, elements two and three under Shedden have not been met. Accordingly, the Board finds that service connection is not warranted on a direct or presumptive chronic disease. The Board has considered the Veteran and the appellant’s statements regarding the etiology of the Veteran’s pancreatitis. Although lay persons are competent to provide opinions on some medical issues, see Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428, 435 (2011), as to the specific issue in this case, a nexus between the Veteran’s pancreatitis and service, is outside the realm of common knowledge of a lay person. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 n. 4 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (lay persons not competent to diagnose cancer). Additionally, the medical evidence of record does not contain a nexus opinion by a medical professional relating the Veteran’s pancreatitis to his service. The Board notes that the Veteran was not afforded a VA examination nor was an opinion obtained for his condition; however, an examination is not warranted as the duty to assist has not been triggered. See McClendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4). Although McClendon sets a low bar, that bar has not been met here as there is no indication of a link between the Veteran’s current condition and his active service or service in the reserves. The first medical evidence of the Veteran’s pancreatitis was in 1990, i.e., 20 years after active service and five years after discharge from the reserves. The only evidence of a possible connection between the Veteran’s disability and his service are the Veteran and the appellant’s own broad and conclusory statements that the condition is related to service, and such statements are not sufficient to trigger VA’s obligation to obtain an examination or opinion. See Waters v. Shinseki, 601 F.3d 1274, 1278-79 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that conclusory lay assertion of nexus is insufficient to entitle claimant to provision of VA medical examination). In the absence of a nexus, the claim for service connection for pancreatitis is denied. In reaching the above conclusion, the Board has considered the applicability of the benefit of the doubt doctrine. However, as the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran’s claim, that doctrine is not applicable in the instant appeal. See Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990); 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b). b. Diabetes Mellitus I In May 2011, the Veteran was seen at the Durham VAMC. The examiner noted that the Veteran was diagnosed with DM I in September 2006. In March 2013, the Veteran stated that he was diagnosed with DM I in 2007. The Veteran’s VA treatment records documents testing, education, and treatment for diabetes. However, the examiners did not provide a nexus linking the Veteran’s DM I to his military service. Based on the evidence of record, the Board finds that service connection for DM I is not warranted. The Veteran’s STRs do not show complaints, treatments, or diagnoses for DM I. The first medical evidence of DM I was in 2006, i.e., over 36 years after his discharge from active service and 21 years after discharge from the reserves. The fact that there were no records of any complaints or treatment involving the Veteran’s DM I for many years weighs against the claim. See Maxson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 453, 459 (1999), affirmed sub nom. Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (it was proper to consider the veteran’s entire medical history, including a lengthy period of absence of complaints). Regarding presumptive service connection, the Board finds that service connection for DM I on a presumptive basis is not warranted as the record does not show evidence of DM I within one year of the Veteran’s separation from active duty or the reserves. As noted above, the first competent evidence suggestive of DM I was in 2006. As there is no competent evidence that the disability manifested to a compensable degree within one year of his active service or service in the reserves and was not continuous since service, a presumption of service connection under 38 U.S.C. §§ 1112, 1137 and 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307, 3.309 cannot be applied. As such, the Board finds that elements two and three under Shedden have not been met. Therefore, service connection for DM I is not warranted on a direct or presumptive basis. The Board has considered the Veteran and the appellant’s statements regarding the etiology of the Veteran’s DM I. Although lay persons are competent to provide opinions on some medical issues, see Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428, 435 (2011), as to the specific issue in this case, a nexus between the Veteran’s DM I and service, is outside the realm of common knowledge of a lay person. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 n. 4 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (lay persons not competent to diagnose cancer). Additionally, the medical evidence of record does not contain a nexus opinion by a medical professional relating the Veteran’s DM I to his service. The Board notes that the Veteran was not afforded a VA examination nor was an opinion obtained for his DM I; however, neither an examination nor an opinion is warranted as the duty to assist has not been triggered. See McClendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4). Although McClendon sets a low bar, that bar has not been met here as there is no indication of a link between the Veteran’s current condition and his active service or service in the reserves. The first medical evidence of the Veteran’s DM I was in 2006, i.e., 36 years after active service and 21 years after discharge from the reserves. The only evidence of a possible connection between the Veteran’s disability and his service are the Veteran and the appellant’s own broad and conclusory statements that the condition is related to service, and such statements are not sufficient to trigger VA’s obligation to obtain an examination or opinion. See Waters v. Shinseki, 601 F.3d 1274, 1278-79 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that conclusory lay assertion of nexus is insufficient to entitle claimant to provision of VA medical examination). In the absence of a nexus, the claim for service connection for DM I is denied. In reaching the above conclusion, the Board has considered the applicability of the benefit of the doubt doctrine. However, as the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran’s claim, that doctrine is not applicable in the instant appeal. See Gilbert, 1 Vet. App. at 55-56; 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b). c. CVA/stroke On July 14, 1998, the Veteran was admitted to the University of North Carolina hospital. The examiner stated that the Veteran had a one-day history of headache and left sided weakness. On July 17, 1998, the Veteran was diagnosed with right CVA with some left-sided hemiparesis. The Veteran’s VA treatment records document diagnosis and treatments for CVA/stroke. However, the examiners did not provide a nexus linking the Veteran’s CVA/stroke to his military service. Based on the evidence of record, the Board finds that service connection for CVA/stroke is not warranted. The Veteran’s STRs do not show complaints, treatments, symptoms, or diagnoses for CVA/stroke. The first medical evidence of CVA was in 1998, i.e., over 28 years after his discharge from active service and 13 years after discharge from the reserves. The fact that there were no records of any complaints or treatment involving the Veteran’s CVA/stroke for many years weighs against the claim. See Maxson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 453, 459 (1999), affirmed sub nom. Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (it was proper to consider the veteran’s entire medical history, including a lengthy period of absence of complaints). As such, the Board finds that elements two and three under Shedden have not been met. Therefore, service connection is not warranted. The Board has considered the Veteran and the appellant’s statements regarding the etiology of the Veteran’s CVA/stroke. Although lay persons are competent to provide opinions on some medical issues, see Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428, 435 (2011), as to the specific issue in this case, a nexus between the Veteran’s CVA/stroke and service, is outside the realm of common knowledge of a lay person. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 n. 4 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (lay persons not competent to diagnose cancer). Additionally, the medical evidence of record does not contain a nexus opinion by a medical professional relating the Veteran’s CVA/stroke to his service. The Board notes that the Veteran was not afforded a VA examination nor was an opinion obtained for his condition; however, neither an examination nor an opinion is warranted as the duty to assist has not been triggered. See McClendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4). Although McClendon sets a low bar, that bar has not been met here as there is no indication of a link between the Veteran’s condition and his active service or service in the reserves. The first medical evidence of the Veteran’s CVA/stroke was in 1998, i.e., 28 years after active service and 11 years after discharge from the reserves. The only evidence of a possible connection between the Veteran’s disability and his service is the Veteran and the appellant’s own broad and conclusory statements that the condition is related to service, and such statements are not sufficient to trigger VA’s obligation to obtain an examination or opinion. See Waters v. Shinseki, 601 F.3d 1274, 1278-79 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that conclusory lay assertion of nexus is insufficient to entitle claimant to provision of VA medical examination). In the absence of a nexus, the claim for service connection for CVA/stroke is denied. In reaching the above conclusion, the Board has considered the applicability of the benefit of the doubt doctrine. However, as the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran’s claim, that doctrine is not applicable in the instant appeal. See Gilbert, 1 Vet. App. at 55-56; 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b). 3. Entitlement to service connection for PTSD The Veteran contends that his PTSD is due to his military service, to include as due to CVA/stroke. The Veteran has been diagnosed with PTSD. As such, the first element under Shedden and Wallin is met. Regarding secondary service connection, the Veteran is not service connection for any disabilities. As such, element two under Wallin is not met. Therefore, service connection on a secondary basis is not warranted. Regarding direct service connection, the Veteran’s STRs do not document treatments, complaints, or diagnosis of PTSD. During his December 1970 Report of Medical History: ETS and February 1975 Quad examinations, the Veteran did not report having any illnesses. He noted that he did not have any illness or injury other than those already noted, and had not been treated by clinics, physicians, healers, or other practitioners within the past five years. A psychiatric condition was not noted on the separation and/or retention examinations. In July 1999, the Veteran was referred to behavior Med-FPC. The examiner noted that a year ago, the Veteran had CVA/stroke. The Veteran did not have any residual physical defects, but, he did not have emotional difficulties. The examiner noted a PTSD diagnosis, problems with depression, and lack of motivation. In September 1999, the Veteran submitted a statement to his congressman. The Veteran stated that because of his stroke, he was diagnosed with PTSD. The Veteran’s VA treatment records document diagnosis and treatments for PTSD. However, the examiners did not provide a nexus linking the Veteran’s PTSD to his military service. Based on the evidence of record, the Board finds that service connection for PTSD is not warranted. The Veteran’s STRs do not show complaints, treatments, or diagnoses for PTSD. The first medical evidence of PTSD was in 1999, i.e., over 29 years after his discharge from active service and 14 years after discharge from the reserves. The fact that there were no records of any complaints or treatment involving the Veteran’s PTSD for many years weighs against the claim. See Maxson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 453, 459 (1999), affirmed sub nom. Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (it was proper to consider the veteran’s entire medical history, including a lengthy period of absence of complaints). Additionally, the Veteran’s PTSD has been attributed to his CVA/stroke. As such, the Board finds that elements two and three under Shedden have not been met. Therefore, service connection is not warranted on a direct or secondary basis. The Board has considered the Veteran and the appellant’s statements regarding the etiology of the Veteran’s PTSD. Although lay persons are competent to provide opinions on some medical issues, see Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428, 435 (2011), as to the specific issue in this case, a nexus between the Veteran’s PTSD and service, is outside the realm of common knowledge of a lay person. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 n. 4 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (lay persons not competent to diagnose cancer). Additionally, the medical evidence of record does not contain a nexus opinion by a medical professional relating the Veteran’s PTSD to his service. The Board notes that the Veteran was not afforded a VA examination nor was an opinion obtained for his condition; however, neither an examination nor an opinion is warranted as the duty to assist has not been triggered. See McClendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4). Although McClendon sets a low bar, that bar has not been met here as there is no indication of a link between the Veteran’s condition and his active service or service in the reserves. The first medical evidence of the Veteran’s PTSD was in 1999, i.e., 29 years after active service and 12 years after discharge from the reserves. The only evidence of a possible connection between the Veteran’s disability and his service is the Veteran and the appellant’s own broad and conclusory statements that the condition is related to service, and such statements are not sufficient to trigger VA’s obligation to obtain an examination or opinion. See Waters v. Shinseki, 601 F.3d 1274, 1278-79 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that conclusory lay assertion of nexus is insufficient to entitle claimant to provision of VA medical examination). In the absence of a nexus, the claim for service connection for PTSD is denied. In reaching the above conclusion, the Board has considered the applicability of the benefit of the doubt doctrine. However, as the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran’s claim, that doctrine is not applicable in the instant appeal. See Gilbert, 1 Vet. App. at 55-56; 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b). 4. Entitlement to TDIU In May 2011, the Veteran filed a claim for service connection for loss of job. VA will grant a total rating for compensation purposes based on unemployability when the evidence shows that a Veteran is precluded, because of service-connected disabilities, from obtaining and maintaining any form of gainful employment consistent with education and occupational experience. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.340, 3.341, 4.16. Benefits based on individual unemployability are granted only when it is established that the service-connected disabilities are so severe, standing alone, as to prevent the retaining of gainful employment. If there is only one service-connected disability, it must be rated at least 60 percent disabling to qualify for benefits based on individual unemployability. If there are two or more service-connected disabilities, there shall be at least one disability ratable at 40 percent or more, and sufficient additional disability to bring the combined rating to 70 percent or more. 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a). The Veteran does not have any service-connected disabilities. Therefore, entitlement to TDIU must be denied as there are no service-connected disabilities which could be found to have caused individual unemployability. The Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, and the claim must be denied. See Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990); 38 U.S.C. § 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. MICHAEL LANE Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD T. Henry, Associate Counsel