Citation Nr: 18141116 Decision Date: 10/09/18 Archive Date: 10/09/18 DOCKET NO. 15-36 437 DATE: October 9, 2018 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) depressive disorder and unspecified personality disorder is denied. FINDING OF FACT The Veteran does not have an acquired psychiatric disorder related to service. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, depressive disorder and unspecified personality disorder, have not been satisfied. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1112, 1113, 1131, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304, 3.307, 3.309. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty from March 1994 to May 1995. The Veteran was afforded a hearing on August 18, 2016 before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge. A transcript has been associated with the file. The case comes before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) on appeal from an April 2015 rating decision by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Denver, Colorado. In its April 2015 rating decision, the RO considered three separate issues, namely entitlement to service connection for PTSD, entitlement to service connection for depression and entitlement to service connection for unspecified personality disorder, mental disorder, now to include depressive and avoidant traits. The Veteran subsequently perfected an appeal to the Board, and the Board finds that both issues are inextricably intertwined and should be addressed together. Therefore, the Board has characterized the issue on the title page. Although a Veteran may only claim service connection for a particular psychiatric disorder, the claim cannot be limited only to that diagnosis, but must rather be considered a claim for any mental disability that may be reasonably encompassed. Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1 (2009). Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, depression and unspecified personality disorder The Veteran maintains that he suffers from PTSD and depression that is related to his active service. Specifically, he testified that verbal abuse and hazing during his active service have cause various mental symptoms. Service connection may be established for a disability resulting from diseases or injuries which are clearly present in service or for a disease diagnosed after discharge from service, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110; 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. In order to prevail on the issue of service connection, generally, there must be medical evidence of a current disability; medical evidence, or in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service occurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and competent evidence of a nexus between an in-service injury or disease and the current disability. See Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999); see also Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007); Pond v. West, 12 Vet. App. 341, 346 (1999). In addition, certain chronic diseases may be presumed to have been incurred during service if they become manifested to a compensable degree within one year of separation from active duty. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1137; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. Service connection for PTSD requires: (1) medical evidence establishing a diagnosis of the disorder; (2) credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred; and (3) a link established by medical evidence, between current symptoms and an in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304 (f). The PTSD diagnosis must be made in accordance with the criteria of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-V (DSM V). 38 C.F.R. § 4.125 (a). In order to grant service connection for PTSD to a non-combat veteran, there must be credible evidence to support the veteran’s assertion that the stressful event occurred. A stressor need not be corroborated in every detail. Suozzi v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 307, 311 (1997). Moreover, a medical opinion diagnosing PTSD does not suffice to verify the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressors. Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128, 142 (1997); Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389, 395-396 (1996). According to 38 C.F.R. § 3.384 (2015), a “psychosis” includes the following specific disorders: brief psychotic disorder, delusional disorder, psychotic disorder due to general medical condition, psychotic disorder not otherwise specified (NOS), schizoaffective disorder, schizophrenia, schizophreniform disorder, shared psychotic disorder, and substance-induced psychotic disorder. It is very important for the Veteran to understand that “personality disorders”, the problem cited within the Veteran’s service records, are not compensable diseases or injuries within the meaning of veterans’ benefits law. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303 (c), 4.9 (2015); Winn v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 510, 516 (1996); Beno v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 439 (1992). Given the foregoing, the term “acquired psychiatric disorder” is not intended to include a personality disorder and the evidence that the Veteran has cited only provides evidence against this claim. The Board, while fully understanding the Veteran’s central contention, must unfortunately rule on this case based on the law and, under the law, this can not be the basis of a grant of this claim. The Veteran was honorably discharged from the United States Navy with the reason for separation listed as “personality disorder.” See May 1995 Certificate of Release from Active Duty. On entry, the Veteran denied history of nervous trouble of any sort, depression or excessive worry, having received counseling of any type, or having been evaluated or treated for a mental condition. Service treatment records show that the Veteran was referred for a psychiatric evaluation in March 1995 which diagnosed him with personality disorder NOS with dependent and avoidant and borderline traits. The Veteran reported nightmares, feelings of persecution, moodiness, suicidal thoughts, poor sleep, poor appetite, having few friends, being anxious, depressed, being impulsive and having low energy. Importantly, the Veteran informed the evaluator that these problems began prior to service, specifically noting having these symptoms during 8th and 12th grade, providing evidence against his own current claim. The evaluator found that the Veteran is not considered mentally ill, but manifests a disorder of character and behavior which affects his ability to serve adequately in the Navy. He does not presently require and will not benefit from hospitalization or psychiatric treatment. The Veteran is not currently considered a danger to himself or others, but tends to utilize manipulative methods to gain attention. He is deemed fit to return for duty for processing of a general administrative separation should his command deem it appropriate. An April 1995 separation examination report found no psychiatric issues. However, on a separation report of medical history, the Veteran did report frequent trouble sleeping, depression or excessive worry as well as nervous trouble. The earliest post service medical evidence is an April 2001 private psychological report diagnosing the Veteran with PSTD and adjustment disorder with depressed mood dated April 2001. This is nearly six years after his active duty service. Moreover, the Veteran did not reference his military service in the evaluation, instead focusing on childhood abuse that lead to difficulty trusting others and those in positions of authority, again providing some factual evidence against his own current claim. In an August 25, 2014 letter, a private counselor noted that she provided mental health treatment to the Veteran in 2005 for diagnoses of major depression and PTSD but did not provide any additional details due to the treatment records no longer being available. More recent private records include treatment for diagnoses of bipolar disorder, PTSD, depression, and anxiety in 2014 and 2015. However, none of the available private records contain any information or opinion as to the etiology of these conditions. The Veteran underwent a VA examination in April 2015. The examiner diagnosed him with unspecified personality disorder with avoidant and depressive traits which predated his service. The examiner also opined that the Veteran’s condition does not meet the diagnostic criteria for PTSD. Moreover, the examiner attributed the Veteran’s depressed mood to be due to a personality disorder and did not diagnose the Veteran with depression, noting that he has not had a positive response to anti-depressant medication despite multiple trials. Additionally, the Veteran reported various social and occupational difficulties prior to service, including not knowing how to make friends, fear of rejection and avoiding social gatherings and being terminated from multiple short-term employment stints. To insure that this case was fully addressed, the Veteran underwent a second VA examination in September 2015 where the examiner opined that the Veteran does not meet diagnostic criteria for PTSD and diagnosed the Veteran with unspecified personality disorder with avoidant and depressive features. The examiner noted some depressed mood that was attributed to his personality disorder. The examiner further opined that the Veteran’s longstanding personality disorder was present before service and was the reason for his discharge from service. The examiner also noted, persuasively, that the bipolar disorder found in various private treatment records was a misdiagnosis. The Veteran’s long-standing difficulties with interpersonal relationships and social interactions were attributed to the Veteran’s unspecified personality disorder. The Board finds the most probative evidence to be the two VA examinations in 2015. Accordingly, service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder is not warranted and unfortunately the claim must be denied. First, the available evidence does not show that the Veteran has been diagnosed with what could be characterized as a psychosis (a “chronic disease” listed under 38 C.F.R. § 3.309 (a)), such as schizophrenia and the Veteran does not allege such. As the Veteran has not been shown to have a chronic disease under 38 C.F.R. § 3.309 (a), service connection may not be awarded under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (b). See Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013). As noted above, the Veteran was diagnosed with a personality disorder during service and discharged on that basis. Personality disorders are considered “congenital or developmental defects” which are not diseases or injuries within the meaning of applicable legislation. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (c); see also Johnson v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 448, 450 (1992); Conley v. Peake, 543 F.3d 1301, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Therefore, as a matter of law, the Veteran is not entitled to service connection for a personality disorder. There is also no suggestion in the evidence that any personality disorder was somehow aggravated by his military service. The Board recognizes the Veteran’s assertion that he has a psychiatric disorder related to service. However, the Board finds that he is not competent to offer an opinion as to the etiology of these disabilities, as such a determination requires a level of medical expertise which the Veteran, as a layperson, does not possess. See Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469-71 (1994) (holding that in order for testimony to be probative of any fact, the witness must be competent to testify as to the facts under consideration, and that lay testimony is not competent to prove that which would require specialized knowledge, training, or medical expertise); Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F. 3d 1372, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (observing that a layperson can be competent to identify conditions that are simple, such as a broken leg, but is not competent to identify more complex conditions such as a form of cancer); Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 309 (2007) (holding that lay testimony is competent as to matters capable of lay observation, but not with respect to determinations that are “medical in nature”). See also 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (a)(1)-(2) (2017). As the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, the benefit of the doubt doctrine is not for application. See generally Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990); Ortiz v. Principi, 274 F. 3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001). JOHN J. CROWLEY Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD V. Woehlke, Associate Counsel