Citation Nr: 18142763 Decision Date: 10/17/18 Archive Date: 10/16/18 DOCKET NO. 16-31 274 DATE: October 17, 2018 ORDER Service connection for a psychiatric disorder, to include posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), is denied. FINDING OF FACT The preponderance of the evidence weighs against a finding that the Veteran has a diagnosed acquired psychiatric disorder, including PTSD, at this time. CONCLUSION OF LAW Criteria for service connection for a psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131, 1507 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304, 3.307, 3.309 (2018). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty from April 1987 to August 1991. This matter is on appeal from a May 2014 rating decision. Service connection for a psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (a). Service connection requires competent evidence showing: (1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498 (1995). In addition, certain diseases, such as psychoses, are presumed to have been incurred in service if manifested to a compensable degree within one year after service. The presumption is rebuttable by probative evidence to the contrary. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309(a) (2018). When chronicity in service is not adequately supported, then a showing of continuity after discharge is required to support a claim for such diseases. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (b); see Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013). However, as the Veteran has not been diagnosed with any psychoses at any time during the pendency of the appeal, continuity of symptomatology is simply not applicable in the present case regarding the Veteran’s claimed psychiatric disability. The Veteran contends that he has a psychiatric disorder, claimed as PTSD, that is related to his service. However, the STRs are void of findings, complaints, symptoms or any diagnoses of a psychiatric disorder. On May 2014 PTSD Disability Benefits Questionnaire examination, the examiner determined that the Veteran’s symptoms did not meet the diagnostic criteria for PTSD and diagnosed alcohol use disorder-moderate. The examining psychologist stated that the Veteran did not have PTSD as he did not present with or describe suffering PTSD symptoms. He experienced brief periods of down mood, but not enough to justify a mood disorder diagnosis. The examining psychologist opined that his predominant problem was alcohol which led to a number of life problems. In this regard, the weight of the evidence reflects that the Veteran has not had any diagnosed psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, at any point during the appeal period. Therefore, there can be no valid service connection claim for this disability. See Gilpin v. West, 155 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992); McClain v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 319 (2007); Romanowsky v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 289 (2013). With regard to the diagnosed alcohol use disorder, in his June 2016 substantive appeal, the Veteran stated he has been sober since he filed his service connection claim and disagreed with the examining psychologist’s diagnosis. At any rate, the Board notes that a substance abuse disorder cannot be service-connected as a direct result of service, and while it may be on a secondary basis, service connection for a psychiatric disorder that may have caused or aggravated the substance abuse is denied herein. Therefore, service connection for any substance abuse disorder is not warranted. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 105, 1131 (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.301 (a) (2018) (service connection may not be granted for alcohol abuse on the basis of service incurrence or aggravation); see also Allen v. Principi, 237 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (determining that alcohol abuse may be service connected if the alcohol abuse disability was acquired as secondary to, or as a symptom of, a service-connected disability). In the June 2016 substantive appeal, the Veteran requested to be re-examined by another VA medical examiner. However, the Board finds that the May 2014 VA examination report shows that the examining psychologist considered the evidence of record and the reported history of the Veteran and conducted a thorough VA examination and a review of the claims file, noting all findings necessary for proper adjudication of this claim. Hence, the Board finds that the VA examination in this case is adequate. See Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. Vet. App. 303 (2007) (VA must provide an examination that is adequate for rating purposes). Unfortunately, since there is no evidence of record which shows currently diagnosed psychiatric disorder, a remand to provide the Veteran with an additional VA examination pertaining to his claim is unnecessary. See Soyini v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 540, 546 (1991) (strict adherence to requirements of the law does not dictate an unquestioning, blind adherence in the face of overwhelming evidence in support of the result in a particular case; such adherence would result in unnecessarily imposing additional burdens on VA with no benefit flowing to the appellant); Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 426, 430 (1994) (remands which would only result in unnecessarily imposing additional burdens on VA with no benefit flowing to the veteran are to be avoided). The Board has closely reviewed the medical and lay evidence in the Veteran’s claims file and finds no evidence that may serve as a medical nexus between the Veteran’s service and his claimed psychiatric disorder. Although lay persons are competent to provide opinions on some medical issues, see Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428, 435 (2011), the specific issue in this case, the existence of a currently diagnosed psychiatric disorder, falls outside the realm of common knowledge of a lay person. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (lay persons not competent to diagnose cancer). Given the foregoing, the Board finds that the medical evidence outweighs the Veteran’s contentions. In light of the above discussion, the Board concludes that the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim for service connection for a psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD and there is no doubt to be otherwise resolved. As such, this claim is denied. (Continued on the next page)   (Continued on next page) KELLI A. KORDICH Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD T. Adams, Counsel