Citation Nr: 18144271 Decision Date: 10/25/18 Archive Date: 10/24/18 DOCKET NO. 16-34 906 DATE: October 25, 2018 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for prostate cancer, to include as due to herbicide agent exposure is denied. Entitlement to service connection for Non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, to include as due to herbicide agent exposure is denied. Entitlement to service connection for diabetes mellitus, to include as due to herbicide agent exposure is denied. Entitlement to service connection for right upper extremity neuropathy, to include as due to herbicide agent exposure is denied. Entitlement to service connection for left upper extremity neuropathy, to include as due to herbicide agent exposure is denied. Entitlement to service connection for left lower extremity neuropathy, to include as due to herbicide agent exposure is denied. Entitlement to service connection for right lower extremity neuropathy, to include to herbicide agent exposure is denied. Entitlement to service connection for sarcoidosis is denied. Entitlement to service connection for asthma is denied. Entitlement to an initial compensable rating for bilateral hearing loss is denied. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. Prostate cancer, is not shown to be present in service, nor did it manifest within one year after discharge from service, or for many years thereafter, nor has it been shown to be etiologically related to the Veteran’s active service, to include as due to in-service exposure to herbicide agents. 2. Diabetes mellitus, type II, is not shown to be present in service, nor did it manifest within one year after discharge from service, or for many years thereafter, nor has it been shown to be etiologically related to the Veteran’s active service, to include as due to in-service exposure to herbicide agents. 3. Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma, is not shown to be present in service, nor did it manifest within one year after discharge from service, or for many years thereafter, nor has it been shown to be etiologically related to the Veteran’s active service, to include as due to in-service exposure to herbicide agents. 4. Right upper extremity neuropathy, is not shown to be present in service, nor did it manifest within one year after discharge from service, or for many years thereafter, nor has it been shown to be etiologically related to the Veteran’s active service, to include as due to in-service exposure to herbicide agents. 5. Left upper extremity neuropathy, is not shown to be present in service, nor did it manifest within one year after discharge from service, or for many years thereafter, nor has it been shown to be etiologically related to the Veteran’s active service, to include as due to in-service exposure to herbicide agents. 6. Left lower extremity neuropathy, is not shown to be present in service, nor did it manifest within one year after discharge from service, or for many years thereafter, nor has it been shown to be etiologically related to the Veteran’s active service, to include as due to in-service exposure to herbicide agents. 7. Right lower extremity neuropathy, is not shown to be present in service, nor did it manifest within one year after discharge from service, or for many years thereafter, nor has it been shown to be etiologically related to the Veteran’s active service, to include as due to in-service exposure to herbicide agents. 8. Sarcoidosis, is not shown to be present in service, nor did it manifest within one year after discharge from service, or for many years thereafter, nor has it been shown to be etiologically related to the Veteran’s active service. 9. Asthma, is not shown to be present in service, nor did it manifest within one year after discharge from service, or for many years thereafter, nor has it been shown to be etiologically related to the Veteran’s active service or to a service-connected disability. 10. Throughout the entire period on appeal, the Veteran has had no more than Level II hearing loss in the right ear and Level I hearing loss in the left ear. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for prostate cancer, to include as due to herbicide agent exposure have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1110, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304, 3.307, 3.309 (2017). 2. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for diabetes mellitus type II, to include as due to herbicide agent exposure have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1110, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304, 3.307, 3.309 (2017). 3. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for Non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, to include as due to herbicide agent exposure have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1110, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304, 3.307, 3.309 (2017). 4. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for right upper extremity neuropathy, to include as due to herbicide agent exposure have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1110, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304, 3.307, 3.309 (2017). 5. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for left upper extremity neuropathy, to include as due to herbicide agent exposure have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1110, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304, 3.307, 3.309 (2017). 6. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for left lower extremity neuropathy, to include as due to herbicide agent exposure have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1110, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304, 3.307, 3.309 (2017). 7. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for right lower extremity neuropathy, to include to herbicide agent exposure have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1110, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304, 3.307, 3.309 (2017). 8. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for sarcoidosis have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1110, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304, 3.309 (2017). 9. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for asthma have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1110, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304, 3.309, 3.310 (2017). 10. The criteria for entitlement to an initial compensable rating for bilateral hearing loss have not been met. 38 U.S.C. § 1155, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 4.86, Diagnostic Code 6100 (2017). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Veteran served on active duty from July 1969 to March 1971. These matters come before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) on appeal from an October 2015 rating decision of a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Providence, Rhode Island. Duties to Notify and Assist VA has a duty to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159 and 3.326(a) (2017). A letter dated in July 2015 discussed the evidence necessary to support the Veteran’s claims. The Veteran was advised of the allocation of duties between himself and VA regarding the development of a claim for benefits. He was also advised of the manner in which VA determines disability ratings and effective dates. The Board finds that the content of the notices fully complied with the requirements of 38 U.S.C. § 5103 (a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (b) regarding VA’s duty to notify. The Veteran was provided with every opportunity to submit evidence and argument in support of his claims and to respond to VA notices. Further, the Board finds that the purpose behind the notice requirement has been satisfied because the Veteran has been afforded a meaningful opportunity to participate effectively in the processing of his claims. With respect to VA’s duty to assist, service and VA treatment records have been associated with the claims file. A VA examination was conducted in August 2015 for the Veteran’s initial compensable rating claim for bilateral hearing loss and the Board finds that it is adequate in that it was carried out by a skilled provider who reviewed the Veteran’s history and explained the rationale underlying her findings and conclusions. VA examinations were not provided with respect to the Veteran’s claims of service connection. A medical examination is necessary when there is (1) “competent evidence of a current disability or persistent or recurrent symptoms of a disability,” (2) evidence establishing an in-service “event, injury, or disease,” and (3) an “indication” that the disability or symptoms may be associated with service, but (4) insufficient medical evidence of record for the Secretary to make a decision on the claim. McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79, 81 (2006); see also 38 U.S.C. § 5103A (d)(2). For the reasons discussed below, the Board finds that examinations are not warranted. Here, the Board finds that although the Veteran has satisfied the first McLendon element, because he has current diagnoses of prostate cancer, diabetes mellitus, Non-Hodgkins lymphoma, neuropathy of the bilateral lower and upper extremities, sarcoidosis and asthma, however, the remainder of the elements for a VA examination are not satisfied. In reference to the second McLendon element, the Board finds the evidence in this case does not establish an in-service “event, injury, or disease.” Here, the Veteran contends he was exposed to herbicide agents during his service in Vietnam which caused his current disabilities of prostate cancer, diabetes mellitus, Non-Hodgkins lymphoma and neuropathy of the bilateral lower and upper extremities. However, as discussed in more detail below, the Board finds the Veteran does not have the requisite service in an area in which herbicide agent exposure is presumed; thus, he is not entitled to the presumption of exposure to herbicide agents. Also, the competent evidence in the record does not reflect actual exposure to herbicide agents. Additionally, the Veteran’s STRs are silent for any complaints, treatment, or diagnoses of prostate cancer, diabetes mellitus, Non-Hodgkins lymphoma, neuropathy of the bilateral lower and upper extremities, sarcoidosis or asthma, nor does the Veteran assert that these disabilities existed during or immediately after military service. Thus, the evidence of record does not establish an in-service “event, injury, or disease.” The Board further notes that in Bardwell v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 36, 40 (2010), the Court held that a layperson’s assertions indicating exposure to chemicals during service are not sufficient evidence alone to establish that such an event actually occurred during service. Nothing in the record otherwise demonstrates the Veteran is qualified to identify herbicide agents. Moreover, no other basis for possible herbicide agent or chemical exposure is demonstrated by the record. The Board also finds the Veteran did not satisfy the third McLendon element, aside from the Veteran’s lay assertions, the evidence does not in any way suggest the Veteran’s post-service disabilities are related to his service. Although the Veteran contends that his disability was caused by an in-service exposure to herbicide agents, there is no competent evidence that the Veteran was actually exposed to these chemicals. See Waters v. Shinseki, 601 F. 3d 1274, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2010)(noting that a veteran’s conclusory generalized statement that a service illness caused his present medical problems was not enough to entitle him to a VA medical examination since all veterans could make such a statement, and such a theory would eliminate the carefully drafted statutory standards governing the provision of medical examinations and require VA to provide such examinations as a matter of course in virtually every disability case.). Consequently, the Board finds that given the absence of in-service evidence of manifestations of his current disabilities on appeal or such showing within one year of discharge, the absence of reports of symptomatology for many years after separation, and no competent evidence of a possible nexus between service and his disability on appeal, the “low” threshold for purposes of triggering VA’s duty to provide an examination is not met. McLendon, 20 Vet. App. at 81. Based on the foregoing, the Board finds the record as it stands includes adequate competent evidence to allow it to adjudicate the appeal, and no further action is necessary. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (c). Therefore, the Board finds that all necessary assistance has been provided to the Veteran. Service Connection Service connection may be granted for any current disability that is the result of a disease contracted or an injury sustained in the line of duty during active military service. 38 U.S.C. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (a). Service connection may be granted for a disease diagnosed after discharge, when the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (d). Establishing service connection generally requires medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of (1) a current disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a link between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the present disability. Romanowsky v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 289, 293 (2013). Service connection may also be established under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (b), where a condition in service is noted but is not, in fact, chronic, or where a diagnosis of chronicity may be legitimately questioned. The continuity of symptomology provision of 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (b) has been interpreted as an alternative to service connection only for specific chronic diseases listed in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309 (a). See Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2013). “Continuity of symptomatology may be established if a claimant can demonstrate (1) that a condition was ‘noted’ during service; (2) evidence of post service continuity of the same symptomatology; and (3) medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of a nexus between the present disability and the post service symptomatology.” Id. citing Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488, 495-96 (1997). Service connection may also be established with certain chronic diseases based upon a legal presumption by showing that the disorder manifested itself to a degree of 10 percent disabling or more within one year from the date of separation from service. Such disease shall be presumed to have been incurred in service, even though there is no evidence of such disease during the period of service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1137; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309(a). While the disease need not be diagnosed within the presumptive period, it must be shown, by acceptable lay or medical evidence, that there were characteristic manifestations of the disease to the required degree during that time. Service connection may be granted, on a secondary basis, for a disability, which is proximately due to, or the result of an established service-connected disorder. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310. Any increase in severity of a nonservice-connected disease or injury that is proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disease or injury, and not due to the natural progress of the nonservice-connected disease, will be service connected. However, VA will not concede that a nonservice-connected disease or injury was aggravated by a service-connected disease or injury unless the baseline level of severity of the nonservice-connected disease or injury is established by medical evidence created before the onset of aggravation or by the earliest medical evidence created at any time between the onset of aggravation and the receipt of medical evidence establishing the current level of severity of the nonservice-connected disease or injury. The rating activity will determine the baseline and current levels of severity under the Schedule for Rating Disabilities (38 C.F.R. part 4) and determine the extent of aggravation by deducting the baseline level of severity, as well as any increase in severity due to the natural progress of the disease, from the current level. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 (b). If a veteran was exposed to an herbicide agent during active military, naval, or air service, then certain diseases will be service connected on a presumptive basis. Specific laws and VA regulations determine when a veteran may be presumed to have been exposed to herbicide agents, including Agent Orange, and when that presumed exposure may have caused specific diseases. 38 U.S.C. § 1116; 38 C.F.R. § 3.309 (e). A veteran who “served in the Republic of Vietnam” between January 9, 1962 and May 7, 1975 is presumed to have been exposed to designated herbicide agents during such service. 38 U.S.C. § 1116 (f); 38 C.F.R. § 3.307 (a)(6)(iii). “Service in the Republic of Vietnam,” includes service in the waters offshore and service in other locations if the conditions of service involved duty or visitation in the Republic of Vietnam. 38 C.F.R. § 3.307 (a) (6) (iii). The VA General Counsel has determined that the regulatory definition (which permits certain personnel not actually stationed within the borders of the Republic of Vietnam to be considered to have served in that Republic) requires that an individual actually have been present within the boundaries of the Republic. See VAOPGCPREC 27-97. Specifically, the General Counsel has concluded that in order to establish qualifying “service in Vietnam” a Veteran must demonstrate actual duty or visitation in the Republic of Vietnam. 1. Service connection for prostate cancer, diabetes mellitus type II (DM II), Non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, neuropathy of the bilateral lower and upper extremities, and sarcoidosis. In the present case, the Board finds that the Veteran has been diagnosed with all the disabilities listed above as reflected in his VA treatment records. Thus, the first element of service connection has been met. However, the Veteran is unable to establish the remaining requirements of service connection, which is evidence of an in-service disease or injury and a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the current disability. As previously discussed, 38 C.F.R. § 3.307 allows for the presumption of service connection for certain diseases associated with exposure to herbicide agents, including prostate cancer, DM II, Non-Hodgkins lymphoma and neuropathy. Additionally, 38 C.F.R. § 3.309 allows for the presumption of service connection for sarcoidosis. However, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran’s claim of service connection for these disabilities on a presumptive basis. First, there is no evidence the Veteran’s disabilities manifested within one year of service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.307 (a)(3). According to his VA treatment records, prostate cancer was not diagnosed until 2015, DM II was not diagnosed until 1990, Non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma was not diagnosed until 1995, sarcoidosis was not diagnosed until 1995 and neuropathy was not diagnosed until 2013, long after separation from active service in 1971. Second, although the Veteran asserts during his service from July 1969 to March 1971 he flew 3 or 4 medical evacuation missions to and from Tan Son Nhut Air Force Base in Vietnam, service records do not show that he actually served in Vietnam for the purposes of 38 C.F.R. § 3.307 (a)(6)(iii). The record does not show he ever set foot in Vietnam. After thorough review of the record, the Board notes there is no indication of the Veteran’s service in Vietnam. Specifically, military personnel records reflect the Veteran received several reprimands during the applicable time period while he was stationed at the McGuire Air Force Base in New Jersey. The Veteran’s DD 214 does not indicate that he received any Vietnam service medals or recognitions. The RO has requested that the Veteran provide additional evidence to corroborate his presence in Vietnam. However, the record reflects the Veteran has provided no evidence that would corroborate his presence in Vietnam. In August 2015 and February 2017, the RO notified the Veteran and informed him that he had not provided sufficient evidence to support his presence in Vietnam. The Board notes no new evidence has been received from the Veteran, as such the Board finds the Veteran did not have the requisite service in the Republic of Vietnam to allow for a presumption of exposure to herbicide agents. Although the Veteran’s prostate cancer, DM II, Non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma and neuropathy may not be presumptively associated with exposure to herbicide agents, he is not precluded from establishing service connection with proof of actual or direct causation, when all the evidence establishes that the diseases were incurred in service. Combee v. Brown, 34 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1994). However, the Veteran’s claims must also be denied on a direct basis. The Veteran’s service treatment records (STRs) are silent for any complaints or diagnoses of prostate cancer, diabetes, Non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, neuropathy or sarcoidosis or associated symptomatology. Additionally, as previously discussed, the Veteran was not diagnosed with these disabilities until decades after his separation from service. Consideration of these disabilities on a presumptive basis is therefore not warranted. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.309 (a). Finally, there is no competent evidence of record that would link the Veteran’s disabilities to any event in service. The Board has considered the Veteran’s lay testimony connecting his disabilities to his service in the Air Force during the Vietnam War. While it is true that as a lay person, the Veteran is competent to report the circumstances surrounding an injury or disease, as well as symptoms and history of treatment, he is not competent to make medical conclusions, especially as to such complex issues as the etiology of his disabilities. See Charles v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 370, 374-75 (2002). Based on the foregoing, the Board finds that a preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran’s claims for service connection. Because the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran’s claims, the benefit of the doubt provision does not apply. Accordingly, the Board concludes that service connection for prostate cancer, DM II, Non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, neuropathy of the bilateral lower and upper extremities and sarcoidosis, to include as due to herbicide agent exposure, is not warranted. 2. Entitlement to service connection for asthma. The Veteran contends that service connection is warranted for asthma as secondary to his sarcoidosis. A review of the medical evidence reflects that the Veteran has been diagnosed with this disability. However, the claim for service connection for sarcoidosis has been denied above. As such, there is no avenue for entitlement to service connection for the claim on a secondary basis. See Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 426 (1994). The Veteran has not asserted that this disability began in-service and the record itself does not support entitlement to service connection on a direct basis. Service treatment records are negative for any complaints or clinical findings indicative of this claim, including on separation evaluation in January 1971. Further, VA treatment records reflect the Veteran was diagnosed with this disability many years after service separation. In sum, the record simply lacks probative evidence which supports a grant of service connection for this claim. To that point, the Board acknowledges that the Veteran is competent to report his subjective symptoms. However, he has specifically reported that his symptoms began decades after service separation. Moreover, even if he were to suggest that his symptoms were related to service he is not competent to do so. These issues fall outside the realm of common knowledge of a lay person as it involves making definitive clinical diagnoses. See Kahana, 24 Vet. App. 428, 435 (2011). While the Veteran is certainly competent to report his symptoms, he is not competent to link those complaints to a particular etiology. His assertions are therefore not competent evidence of a medical nexus. Accordingly, the Board finds that the claim of entitlement to service connection for asthma must be denied under any theory of entitlement. In reaching this conclusion, the Board has considered the applicability of the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine. However, as the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran’s claim, that doctrine is not applicable. 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (b) (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2017); see also Ortiz, supra. 3. Entitlement to an initial compensable rating for bilateral hearing loss. The Veteran contends he is entitled to a compensable rating for his service-connected bilateral hearing loss. Disability evaluations are determined by the application of the Schedule for Rating Disabilities (Rating Schedule), 38 C.F.R. Part 4 (2017). The percentage ratings contained in the Rating Schedule represent, as far as can practicably be determined, the average impairment in earning capacity resulting from diseases and injuries incurred or aggravated during military service and their residual disorders in civil occupations. 38 U.S.C. § 1155 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.321 (a), 4.1 (2017). Impairment of auditory acuity (hearing loss) is evaluated pursuant to the provisions set forth at 38 C.F.R. § 4.85. Under that regulation, an examination for hearing impairment must be conducted by a state-licensed audiologist and must include a controlled speech discrimination test (Maryland CNC) and a pure tone audiometry test. Examinations are to be conducted without the use of hearing aids. 38 C.F.R. § 4.85 (a). To evaluate the degree of disability from defective hearing, the Rating Schedule establishes 11 auditory acuity levels from Level I for essentially normal acuity through Level XI for profound deafness. These are assigned based on a combination of the percent of speech discrimination and the pure tone threshold average, as contained in a series of tables within the regulations. 38 C.F.R. § 4.85 (b). The “pure tone threshold average” is the sum of the pure tone thresholds at 1000, 2000, 3000, and 4000 Hertz, divided by four. This average is used in all cases to determine the Roman numeral designation for hearing impairment from Table VI or VIa. 38 C.F.R. § 4.85 (d) (2017). Table VII, “Percentage Evaluations for Hearing Impairment,” is used to determine the percentage evaluation by combining the Roman numeral designations for hearing impairment of each ear. The horizontal rows represent the ear having the better hearing and the vertical columns the ear having the poorer hearing. The percentage evaluation is located at the point where the row and column intersect. 38 C.F.R. § 4.85 (e). The regulatory provisions also provide two additional circumstances under which alternative tables can be employed. One is where the pure tone thresholds in any four of the five frequencies of 500, 1,000, 2,000, 3,000, and 4,000 Hertz are 55 decibels or greater. The second is where pure tone thresholds are 30 decibels or less at frequencies of 1,000 Hertz, and are 70 decibels or more at 2,000 Hertz. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.86 (2017). In an October 2015 rating decision, the RO granted service connection for the Veteran’s bilateral hearing loss and assigned a noncompensable rating. The Veteran subsequently appealed the assigned rating to the Board. Applying the facts in this case to the applicable legal criteria, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the assignment of a compensable rating for bilateral hearing loss. In August 2015, the Veteran underwent a hearing examination. The objective evidence showed pure tone thresholds, in decibels, as follows: HERTZ 500 1000 2000 3000 4000 RIGHT 35 25 65 90 105+ LEFT 15 10 35 50 70 The average pure tone threshold was 71.25 decibels for the right ear and 41.25 decibels for the left ear. The examiner noted that the Veteran’s speech discrimination score (Maryland CNC Word List) was 96 percent in both ears. Such corresponds to Level II hearing loss in the right ear and Level I hearing loss in the left ear, which equates to a noncompensable rating. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.85, Tables VI and VII. If the Veteran has either of two exceptional pattern of hearings impairment, the Roman numeral value is determined using both Table VI and VIa. 38 C.F.R. § 4.86. This method is used if the Veteran’s puretone threshold at each of the four specified frequencies is 55 decibels or more, or if the Veteran’s puretone threshold is 30 decibels or less at 1000 Hertz and 70 decibels or more at 2000 Hertz. Whichever table results in a higher Roman numeral value is used to calculate a disability evaluation using Table VII. Id. The Veteran’s puretone thresholds do not meet the standard for an exceptional pattern of hearing, and therefore Table VIa will not be used to calculate his disability. The Board has carefully reviewed the remaining record in its entirety, but finds no other probative evidence of record showing the Veteran’s hearing loss disability is more severe for compensation purposes than demonstrated on the audiological evaluation discussed above. The Board has also considered his statements concerning how his hearing loss has affected his life since service. Although the Board finds his statements to be credible, it finds that these factors do not provide a sufficient basis on which to award a compensable rating for bilateral hearing loss. Disability ratings for hearing impairment are derived by a mechanical application of the rating schedule to the numeric designations assigned after audiometric evaluations are rendered. See Lendenmann v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 345, 349 (1992). In this case, as explained above, the numeric designations correlate to a noncompensable disability rating. Given the applicable rating criteria, the Board must base its determination on the results of the pertinent and valid audiology studies. In other words, the Board is bound by law to apply VA’s rating schedule based on the Veteran’s audiometry results. See 38 U.S.C. § 1155; 38 C.F.R. § 4.1. In this case, as explained above, the numeric designations do not correlate to a compensable rating. As such, the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran’s claim for a compensable schedular rating. KRISTI L. GUNN Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD K. McDuffie, Associate Counsel