Citation Nr: 18145744 Decision Date: 10/30/18 Archive Date: 10/30/18 DOCKET NO. 16-38 519 DATE: October 30, 2018 ORDER Service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, including post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), is denied. FINDING OF FACT During the appeal period, the probative evidence of record fails to establish that the Veteran has had a diagnosed psychiatric disorder. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, including PTSD have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran had active duty from January 2003 to May 2003 and from January 2006 to May 2007. Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, including PTSD. The Veteran believes that he has a psychiatric disorder related to his active duty. Unfortunately, the probative evidence of record precludes granting service connection for a psychiatric disorder. The Board concludes that the preponderance of the evidence of record is against finding that the Veteran has, or has had at any time during the appeal, a current diagnosis of an acquired psychiatric disability to include PTSD. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304. Service connection is established when the following elements are satisfied: (1) the existence of a current disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the current disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.30(a) (2017); Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331(Fed. Cir. 2012); Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Evidence of continuity of symptomatology from the time of service until the present is required where the chronicity of a condition manifested during service either has not been established or is legitimately questionable. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) (2018). This alternative means of linking the currently-claimed condition to service is only available if the condition being claimed is one of those specifically identified in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a) as chronic, per se. See Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013). In addition, service connection for PTSD requires: (1) medical evidence diagnosing the condition in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a) (i.e., the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.) (DSM-V), (2) credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressors actually occurred, and (3) a link, established by medical evidence, between the current symptomatology and the claimed in-service stressors. See 38 C.F.R. §3.304(f). A review of the Veteran’s service treatment records (STRs) shows that they are unremarkable for any complaints, symptoms, treatment or diagnosis of any psychiatric disorder. Additionally, post-service medical treatment records are silent concerning any diagnosed psychiatric disorder. In fact, the VA medical treatment records obtained reflect, for the most part, that the Veteran specifically denied being depressed or having symptoms relating to PTSD. The only exception is a June 2007 VA medical treatment record in which the clinician, at that time, noted that the Veteran’s PTSD screening was positive. However, this assessment was based on the Veteran’s positive response to three out of four questions without further details as to how the Veteran’s symptoms met the criteria for PTSD pursuant to DSM-V. Additionally, the screening was not conducted by a psychologist and the Veteran expressly denied being depressed. In response to the Veteran’s claim for PTSD, he was provided a VA examination in June 2015. He reported three incidents that he experienced while stationed in Afghanistan. First, he recalled that twice a week, they would get small arms fire or mortared near the base. Next, he described an incident when two people in his unit killed two civilians who blew through the checkpoint. He stated that he performed CPR on those civilians. Lastly, he reported that as a firefighter, every time he goes into a fire, his thoughts center on something bad happening. The examiner commented that these three stressors met criterion A for diagnosis of PTSD but only the first two stressors related to the Veteran’s fear of hostile military or terrorist activity. She, however, opined that the Veteran’s reported symptoms did not support a diagnosis of PTSD or any other mental health diagnosis, including anxiety or mood disorder. The examiner explained that the Veteran did not report enough categorical symptoms for PTSD; specifically, to meet criterion C or D. Her conclusion was based on observations that the Veteran never received mental health treatment and did not take any psychotropic medications. The examiner acknowledged that the Veteran had traumatic memories associated with his experiences in Afghanistan as well as a firefighter in civilian life. She, however, explained that these memories, by themselves, did not trigger a diagnosis of PTSD. At the same time, the examiner noted that the Veteran did not report any occupational, social, educational or familial functional impairment. Instead, the Veteran reported that he was more aware of his surroundings than the next person. He stated that, “It’s the firefighter in me; looking for exits. If something happens, I want to know how to get out.” The examiner commented that this description of hypervigilance did not appear to impact the Veteran’s life negatively. Additionally, the examiner noted the Veteran’s statements that he had daytime fatigue and restless sleep due to his irregular work schedule as a firefighter. She commented that the Veteran did not describe functional impairment due to his subjective report of fatigue. The examiner, therefore, concluded that the Veteran’s symptomatology did not support a clinical diagnosis of PTSD or any other mental health disorder. While the Veteran believes that he has a psychiatric disorder related to his service, the Board notes that the Veteran is not a medical professional, and therefore, his beliefs and statements about medical matters do not constitute competent evidence on matters of medical etiology or diagnosis. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Although the Board recognizes the sincerity of the arguments advanced by the Veteran in this case, his contentions regarding the nature and etiology of his claimed psychiatric disorder are not statements merely about symptomatology, an observable medical condition, or a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, but rather clearly fall within the realm of requiring medical expertise, which he simply does not have. Further, he has not submitted any medical evidence to support a diagnosis of a psychiatric disorder, much less that it is related to active service. Instead, the June 2015 medical opinion obtained fails to establish that the Veteran has a current diagnosis of a psychiatric disorder. In the absence of a disability, compensation may not be awarded. See Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992). (Continued on the next page)   Accordingly, the claim is denied. There is no doubt resolve. See 38 U.S.C. §5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). C.A. SKOW Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD N. Sangster, Counsel