Citation Nr: 18145858 Decision Date: 10/30/18 Archive Date: 10/30/18 DOCKET NO. 06-35 826 DATE: October 30, 2018 ORDER Service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is denied. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The Veteran had active service from February 1971 to January 1975. 2. The Veteran did not have service in combat while on active duty. 3. The Veteran does not have a current diagnosis of PTSD which is related to a verified in-service stressor. CONCLUSION OF LAW PTSD was not incurred in or aggravated by service, and is not due to any incident of such service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1112, 5103(a), 5103A, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304 (2017). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION Procedurally, the claim for service connection for PTSD was most recently before the Board in April 2014. The Board has provided a lengthy procedural recitation in its preceding decisions, and it is incorporated by reference at this time. The Board notes that a September 2017 rating decision granted a 50 percent rating for depressive disorder. In April 2018, the Veteran filed a notice of disagreement with this finding. It appears that the RO is still processing the claim. As such, the Board will not take action on the pending notice of disagreement at this time. Manlincon v. West, 12 Vet. App. 238 (1999). Service connection may be granted on a direct basis as a result of disease or injury incurred in service based on nexus using a three-element test: (1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by service. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303(a), (d); Holton v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Service connection may be granted on a presumptive basis for diseases listed in § 3.309 under the following circumstances: (1) where a chronic disease or injury is shown in service and subsequent manifestations of the same disease or injury are shown at a later date unless clearly attributable to an intercurrent cause; or (2) where there is continuity of symptomatology since service; or (3) by showing that the disorder manifested itself to a degree of 10 percent or more within one year from the date of separation from service. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.307. Service connection for PTSD requires: (1) medical evidence diagnosing the condition in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a); (2) medical evidence establishing a link between current symptoms and an in-service stressor; and (3) credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). In adjudicating a claim for service connection for PTSD, the evidence necessary to establish the incurrence of a stressor during service will vary depending on whether or not the veteran was “engaged in combat with the enemy.” Hayes v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 60, 66 (1993). If it is determined through military citation or other supportive evidence that a veteran engaged in combat with the enemy, and the claimed stressors are related to combat, the veteran’s lay testimony regarding the reported stressors must be accepted as conclusive evidence as to their actual occurrence and no further development or corroborative evidence will be necessary, provided that the testimony is found to be satisfactory, that is, not contradicted by service records and “consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of such service.” 38 U.S.C. § 1154(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304 (d),(f)(2007); Doran v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 283, 289 (1994). On the other hand, if the veteran did not engage in combat with the enemy, or the claimed stressor is not related to combat, then the veteran’s testimony alone does not suffice to establish the occurrence of the alleged stressor; instead, the veteran must corroborate his testimony by credible supporting evidence. Stone v. Nicholson, 480 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding no error in Board determination that a non-combat veteran’s “own statements cannot serve as ‘corroboration’ of the facts contained in those statements”). Zarycki v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 91, 98 (1993). The phrase “engaged in combat with the enemy” requires that the veteran have personally taken part in a fight or encounter with a military foe or hostile unit or instrumentality. VAOPGCPREC 12-99 (October 18, 1999); Moran v. Principi, 17 Vet. App. 149 (2003); Sizemore v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 264, 273-74 (2004). Initially, the Veteran was diagnosed with PTSD in approximately 2005 by a treating VA physician. Further, VA examiners who have evaluated him throughout the appeal period have identified depression which has been found to be related to active service, for which he is separately service connected. Accordingly, as a current diagnosis is shown, and medical evidence has established a link between service and a psychiatric disorder, the first and third elements of service connection are satisfied. However, as noted above, service connection for PTSD requires not only medical evidence establishing a diagnosis of the disorder, as well as a link, established by the medical evidence of record, between the current disorder and the claimed in-service stressor, but credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor actually occurred must also be shown. In that regard, the evidence fails as to the second element. In this case, the evidence does not show, and the Veteran does not allege, that he actually engaged the enemy in combat. Although he had foreign service during the Vietnam Era, his DD Form 214 and military personnel records (MPRs) show that his military occupational specialty (MOS) was an aircraft maintenance specialist. Further, he earned the National Defense Service Medal and Air Force Good Conduct Medal, but was not in receipt of any combat or valor decorations and there is no indication that he served in the Republic of Vietnam. Thus, the evidence does not reflect that he received any awards, citations, or decoration denoting having served in combat in Vietnam. Furthermore, he specifically denied being in combat at his January 2005 VA examination. Next, the service treatment records (STRs) reflect complaints and treatment for depression and anxiety identified while in service; however, they do not reflect complaints of or treatment for any traumatic incidents that could be associated with PTSD. Importantly, as previously stated, he has been granted service-connection for depressive disorder separately. The Veteran has reported that his stressors included (i) he was in charge of aircrafts in Hawaii required to be on 24-hour per day readiness and that any launch of the aircraft reflected a severe situation anywhere in the world, (ii) he was sent to Thailand to pick up dead bodies in June 1971, and (iii) he had several near-misses from missiles shot at the aircraft while operating over Vietnam and (iv) he was involved with covert missions with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Laos. With respect to the 24-hour readiness and near misses, these stressors are not the type that can be verified and are not sufficiently quantifiable to verify. His statements as to these stressors have been vague, at best, as to dates and details and he has offered little in the way of specificity of events. In addition, stressors such as the need to be in readiness are not the type of stressors contemplated by the regulations which would support a claim for PTSD. Moreover, although asked for additional information, he has offered no specific dates in which these incidents occurred. Therefore, there is no basis on which to verify these stressors. With respect to the handling of dead bodies, the MPRs have reflect that from February 1971 to September 1971 he was an apprentice aircraft mechanic. His duties included performing pre-flight, 7-day home station check, and flight inspections. He launched aircrafts on missions and serviced aircraft systems as directed. He assisted in towing and parking of aircraft. There is no indication that he was required to handle dead bodies or that he was part of a flight crew that was responsible for transportation of dead bodies. Therefore, his stressor regarding transporting dead bodies is unable to be verified by the record. Next, with regard to his covert missions with the CIA, both VA and the Veteran have attempted to obtain corroborating records from the Agency regarding this time period, providing the dates and locations that were given by the Veteran. In February 2016, the CIA provided a response stating that the Agency was unable to confirm or deny the existence or nonexistence of any responsive records. As such, his stressor regarding covert operations with the CIA were also unable to be verified by any evidence of record. The Board further acknowledges the assertions by the Veteran in his September 2018 statement wherein he contends that his MPRs indicated that he accompanied aircrafts to outlying bases, as well as the Naval records indicating that 20 members of his unit received temporary assignments in Southeast Asia. Importantly, the MPRs and his evaluations listed his duties in detail. Nowhere in any evaluation or duty list, including during the time specified by the Veteran, was it ever mentioned that he received a temporary assignment in Southeast Asia. Importantly, his duties as an aircraft mechanic were not consistent with ones which would have resulted in being stationed temporarily in Southeast Asia. Additionally, while his DD Form 214 did indicate foreign duty, duty in Laos or the Republic of Vietnam was not found. Accordingly, there is no corroborating evidence to verify this stressor. As noted above, service connection for PTSD requires credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor actually occurred. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304 (f); Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128 (1997). In this case, while the Veteran has provided stressors, they are unable to be corroborated by any credible supporting evidence. Although the medical evidence establishes the first and third elements of the claim (a diagnosis of PTSD related to claimed in-service stressors), the record fails to establish the second element of the claim (credible evidence that stressor actually occurred). Absent credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressors as described by the Veteran actually occurred, an essential element for a grant of service connection, the appeal must be denied. The Board again notes that no stressor has been verified within the record, and thus any diagnosis based upon such an unverified stressor is of little probative value. Wood, 1 Vet. App. 190. Next, while the Veteran alleges that his current PTSD is related to his service, there are no records which reflect treatment for psychiatric problems prior to 2005, thirty years following his separation from service. Accordingly, entitlement to service connection for a psychosis on a presumptive basis is not warranted because no disorder was shown within the applicable presumptive period following his separation from service. In making such determinations, the Board has considered the Veteran’s statements asserting a relationship between his PTSD and active duty service. Although the Veteran, as a lay person, is competent to report any psychiatric symptoms he has experienced at any given time, as well as a contemporaneous diagnosis by a medical provider, under the facts of this case that include no in-service stressful event or symptoms and no symptoms for many years following service, he is not competent to diagnose a psychiatric disability because a psychiatric diagnosis requires medical expertise and falls outside the realm of common knowledge of a lay person. Young v. McDonald, 766 F.3d 1348, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2014). As such, the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim for service connection for PTSD. Consequently, because a preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, the benefit of the doubt rule does not apply. Service connection for PTSD is denied. Finally, the Veteran has not raised any other issues, nor have any other issues been reasonably raised by the record, for the Board’s consideration. See Doucette v. Shulkin, 28 Vet. App. 366, 369-370 (2017) (confirming that the Board is not required to address issues unless they are specifically raised by the claimant or reasonably raised by the evidence of record). L. HOWELL Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD M. Yacoub, Associate Counsel