Citation Nr: 18146635 Decision Date: 10/31/18 Archive Date: 10/31/18 DOCKET NO. 16-15 749A DATE: October 31, 2018 ORDER New and material evidence having been submitted, the claim of service connection for multiple sclerosis is reopened. To this extent only, the claim is granted. Entitlement to service connection for bilateral hearing loss is denied. Entitlement to service connection for tinnitus is granted. Entitlement to service connection for a skin disorder, to include as due to herbicide exposure, is denied. Entitlement to service connection for multiple sclerosis, to include as due to herbicide exposure, is denied. Entitlement to service connection for an emotional condition, to include as secondary to non-service connected multiple sclerosis, is denied. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. An unappealed January 2010 rating decision denied service connection for multiple sclerosis. 2. Evidence received since the January 2010 rating decision relate to unestablished facts necessary to substantiate the Veteran’s claims of entitlement to service connection for multiple sclerosis. 3. Bilateral hearing loss did not have its clinical onset in service and is not otherwise related to active duty. 4. Resolving all doubt in favor of the Veteran, tinnitus is etiologically related to the Veteran’s active service. 5. The Veteran does not have a diagnosed skin condition. 6. The Veteran’s multiple sclerosis did not have its clinical onset in service and is not otherwise related to active duty, to include as due to herbicide exposure. 7. The Veteran does not have a diagnosed emotional condition. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The January 2010 rating decision which denied service connection for multiple sclerosis is final. 38 U.S.C. § 7105 (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 20.1103 (2018). 2. Evidence received since the January 2010 rating decision is new and material, and the Veteran’s claim of entitlement to service connection for multiple sclerosis is reopened. 38 U.S.C. § 5108 (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (2018). 3. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for bilateral hearing loss have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307, 3.309, 3.385 (2018). 4. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for tinnitus are met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.304 (2018). 5. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for a skin condition have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131 (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 (2018). 6. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for multiple sclerosis have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307, 3.309, 3.385 (2018). 7. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for an emotional disorder have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131 (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 (2018). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Veteran had active service from July 1961 to July 1965. The record indicates that the Veteran asked to be afforded a videoconference Board hearing. However, the Veteran failed to appear at the scheduled hearing on September 12, 2018. Further review of the record does not indicate that the Veteran did not receive notice of this hearing, and further shows that he did not alert the Agency of Original Jurisdiction (AOJ) that he would not be present and that he did not provide good cause for his absence. Therefore, the Veteran’s request for a hearing was deemed to be withdrawn. 38 C.F.R. § 20.704 (2018). The Board acknowledges that the Veteran has not been afforded a VA examination with respect to his claims for service connection for a skin condition, an emotional condition, and multiple sclerosis. For the reasons explained in greater detail below, no such examination was required because the evidence does not indicate that the claimed disabilities, or symptoms thereof, may be associated with the Veteran’s active service. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A (d); McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79, 81 (2006). Under McLendon, in disability compensation claims, VA must provide a VA medical examination when there is (1) competent evidence of a current disability or persistent or recurrent symptoms of a disability, and (2) evidence establishing that an event, injury, or disease occurred in service or establishing certain diseases manifesting during an applicable presumptive period for which the claimant qualifies, and (3) an indication that the disability or persistent or recurrent symptoms of a disability may be associated with the Veteran’s service or with another service-connected disability, but (4) insufficient competent medical evidence on file for the Secretary to make a decision on the claim. Id. A VA examination under the standards of McLendon is not warranted regarding the Veteran’s claims for service connection for a skin condition, posttraumatic stress disorder, an emotional condition, and multiple sclerosis. As to those claims, there is simply no evidence establishing an “in-service event” during active service, competent evidence of current disability, and/or there is no evidence of an indication that the current disabilities or current symptoms may be related to any alleged in-service event. Accordingly, the Board finds that VA’s duty to assist with respect to obtaining a VA examination or opinion has been met. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (c)(4). The available medical evidence is sufficient for adequate determinations. There has been substantial compliance with all pertinent VA law and regulations and to adjudicate these claims would not cause any prejudice to the appellant. New and Material Evidence Generally, a claim denied in an unappealed RO decision or an unappealed Board decision may not thereafter be reopened and allowed. 38 U.S.C. §§ 7104 (b), 7105(c). The exception is that if new and material evidence is presented or secured with respect to a claim which has been disallowed, VA shall reopen the claim and review the former disposition of the claim. 38 U.S.C. § 5108. New evidence means evidence not previously submitted to agency decision-makers. Material evidence means existing evidence that, by itself or when considered with previous evidence of record, relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim. New and material evidence can be neither cumulative nor redundant of the evidence of record at the time of the last prior final denial of the claim sought to be reopened, and must raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (a) (2018). In determining whether evidence is new and material, the credibility of the new evidence is to be presumed. Justus v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 510, 513 (1992). The Board has jurisdictional responsibility to determine on its own whether there is new and material evidence to properly reopen a service connection claim. Jackson v. Principi, 265 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing 38 U.S.C. §§ 5108, 7105(c)); Barnett v. Brown, 83 F. 3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1996); VAOPGCPREC 05-92. The submission of “new and material” evidence is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the Board’s review on the merits of a previously denied claim. The January 2010 rating decision, as well as the previous August 2003 rating decision, denied service connection for multiple sclerosis. The RO found that the Veteran’s multiple sclerosis was not service connected because there was no diagnosis of multiple sclerosis in service and no evidence of a diagnosis within seven years of his discharge from active service. Since this decision became final, the Veteran has submitted a private medical opinion which notes a diagnosis of multiple sclerosis with symptoms of the disability first manifesting while the Veteran was “in the Air Force stationed in France”. The private physician essentially gave a positive nexus opinion for the claimed multiple sclerosis. Based on the foregoing evidence, the Board finds that the low threshold requirement for new and material evidence is satisfied with respect to the claim for multiple sclerosis. Shade v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 110 (2010). The evidence is material because it relates to unestablished facts necessary to establish the claim, and the evidence is neither cumulative nor redundant as that evidence was not of record at the time of the prior denial. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (a) (2018). Further, new evidence is to be presumed credible for purposes of deciding whether a previously denied claim may be reopened. Justus, 3 Vet. App. at 513. Moreover, when considering the new evidence in conjunction with the evidence already of record, combined with VA assistance including an examination, it raises a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claims. See Shade, 24 Vet. App. at 117. Thus, the claim for entitlement to service connection for multiple sclerosis is reopened. Service Connection Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated during service. 38 U.S.C. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. In order to establish entitlement to service connection, there must be (1) evidence of a current disability; (2) medical, or in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal connection between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the current disability. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2004). A disability which is proximately due to or the result of a service connected disease or injury shall be service connected. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 (a). When aggravation of a non-service connected disability is proximately due to or the result of a service connected disability, the Veteran shall be compensated for the degree of disability over and above the degree of disability existing prior to the aggravation. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 (b); Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439 (1995). The Board must assess the credibility and weight of all the evidence, including the medical evidence, to determine its probative value, accounting for evidence which it finds to be persuasive or unpersuasive, and providing reasons for rejecting any evidence favorable to the claimant. The Board must determine whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise, with the appellant prevailing in either case, or whether the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, in which case, service connection must be denied. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). The Board notes the Veteran’s assertions that his claimed skin disorder and diagnosed multiple sclerosis is alternatively caused by in-service exposure to Agent Orange while serving in France. While the Veteran has a current diagnosis for multiple sclerosis, multiple sclerosis is not a condition listed in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309 (e) for presumptive service connection due to Agent Orange exposure. Furthermore, the Veteran did not serve in Vietnam during the applicable time period or in any other area where Agent Orange was presumed to have been used. See 38 U.S.C. § 1116 (f); 38 C.F.R. § 3.307 (a)(6)(iii). Thus, service connection for a claimed skin condition or multiple sclerosis cannot be established on a presumptive basis due to Agent Orange exposure. See 38 U.S.C. § 1116 (a)(1); 38 C.F.R. § 3.309 (e). 1. Entitlement to service connection for bilateral hearing loss The Veteran contends that his current hearing loss disability is related to his active service. For the purposes of applying the laws administered by VA, impaired hearing will be considered to be a disability when the auditory threshold in any of the frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, and 4000 Hertz (Hz) is 40 decibels or greater, or when the auditory thresholds for at least three of the frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000 Hz are 26 decibels or greater, or when speech recognition scores using the Maryland CNC Test are less than 94 percent. 38 C.F.R. § 3.385 (2018). Once the requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 3.385 have been met and a present hearing disability under applicable VA laws and regulations is found, a determination must be made as to whether the current hearing disorder is related to service. Even if a veteran does not have a hearing loss disability for VA compensation purposes recorded during service, service connection may still be established if post-service evidence satisfies the criteria of 38 C.F.R. § 3.385 and the evidence links the present hearing loss disability to service. The threshold for normal hearing is 0 to 20 decibels. Hensley v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 155 (1993). Service treatment records are silent as to complaints about the Veteran’s hearing. Both service entrance and service discharge examinations reflect the Veteran had normal hearing sensitivity. An August 2014 VA audiological examination revealed pure tone thresholds for the right ear, in decibels, at 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, and 4000 hertz (Hz) were as follows: 50, 55, 65, 70, and 75, and for the left ear: 45, 55, 55, 60, and 70. A Maryland CNC test for the right ear was scored at 96 percent, and the left ear was scored at 92 percent. The examiner diagnosed bilateral sensorineural hearing loss. The examiner gave a negative etiological opinion, finding that as the Veteran’s service discharge examination and service entrance examination reflected no hearing loss of either ear, it was less likely as not that the claimed bilateral hearing loss was due to or aggravated by active service. Upon consideration of the above evidence, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim. As noted above, the Board concedes that VA examination confirms that the Veteran currently suffers from bilateral hearing loss. The Board concludes, however, that the greater weight of the evidence is against the claim. Here the Veteran’s Form DD-214 reflects his military occupation was as a store clerk with low exposure to acoustic trauma, the Veteran has submitted evidence of exposure to acoustic trauma, and the VA examiner found no link between any current hearing loss and military service based on the record. Additionally, there is no medical evidence suggesting that hearing loss became manifest to a compensable degree within a year of the Veteran’s separation from military service. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. Furthermore, the Board finds persuasive the absence of probative medical evidence showing a nexus between the Veteran’s service and current bilateral hearing loss. In that connection, the Board notes that the medical opinion submitted by the VA examiner concluded that it was less likely than not that the Veteran’s current bilateral hearing loss was in fact due to or otherwise related to service. In so finding, the examiner provided a report that considered the Veteran’s history, the medical records, and her own medical expertise and current medical knowledge. For these reasons, the Board concludes that the VA examiner’s opinion is probative. Full consideration has been given to the Veteran’s assertions that he has bilateral hearing loss which is related to his active service. Although lay persons are competent to provide opinions on some medical issues, the specific issue in this case-the etiology of the Veteran’s hearing loss-falls outside the realm of common knowledge of a lay person. See Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428, 435 (2011), Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Hearing loss as it relates to meeting the requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 3.385 is not the type of condition that is readily amenable to mere lay diagnosis, as the evidence shows that audiometric and word recognition testing is needed. See Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Although the Veteran is competent to report diminished auditory acuity, there is no indication that he is competent to provide a diagnosis and etiology of sensorineural hearing loss for VA disability purposes, and nothing in the record demonstrates that he received any special training or acquired any medical expertise in evaluating hearing disorders. See King v. Shinseki, 700 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The lay evidence does not constitute competent evidence and lacks probative value. Relevant law and regulations do not provide for the grant of service connection in the absence of competent evidence linking the current disability to service. The Board is satisfied that the VA examiner’s opinions is adequate for deciding this appeal. The VA examiner’s medical opinion, which is based on the entire record, including the Veteran’s own history, is that his hearing loss is not at least as likely as not related to service. Because the VA examiner’s opinions outweigh evidence in favor of the claim, and in light of the foregoing analysis and the underlying facts, the Veteran’s claim for bilateral hearing loss must be denied. Based on the foregoing, the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim for service connection for bilateral hearing loss. The benefit of the doubt doctrine is not applicable, and the claim must be denied. 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 55 (1990); Ortiz v. Principi, 274 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 2. Entitlement to service connection for tinnitus Here, the Veteran contends that he has tinnitus attributable to noise exposure he incurred on active duty. The Veteran has consistently maintained that he first noticed ringing in his ears in service and has continued to experience the same symptoms from that time to the present. Review of the Veteran’s service treatment records reflects that they are silent as to any complaints of, or treatment for, tinnitus. His service entrance examination noted normal bilateral hearing without mention of tinnitus, and his separation medical examination also noted normal bilateral hearing without mention of tinnitus. Post-service treatment records reflect that the Veteran has complained of symptoms of tinnitus. The Veteran was afforded a VA audiological examination in August 2014. The examiner opined that it was at least as likely that the Veteran’s claimed tinnitus was a symptom associated with his diagnosed bilateral hearing loss, and he opined it was less likely than not caused by or related to his active service. As rationale, he stated the Veteran had excellent hearing at enlistment and at separation with limited noise exposure while in service. The Board notes that the Veteran stated at his August 2014 VA audiological examination that his tinnitus symptoms had a gradual onset beginning in 1964, and he stated his tinnitus symptoms were intermittent and annoying. In adjudicating this claim, the Board must assess the competence and credibility of the Veteran. Washington v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 362 (2005). The Board must also assess the credibility, and therefore the probative value, of the evidence of record in its whole. Owens v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 429 (1995). In determining whether documents submitted by a veteran are credible, the Board may consider internal consistency, facial plausibility, and consistency with other evidence submitted on behalf of the claimant. Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498 (1995). As an initial matter, the Board notes that ringing in the ears is the type of symptom that is readily amenable to lay observation as it is subjective to the claimant. Thus, the Veteran is competent to report his symptoms and their frequency. See Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The August 2014 VA examination record notes the Veteran’s report detailing his tinnitus and his contention that tinnitus had its first onset while in service. Nothing in the record contradicts his statements. The Board finds the Veteran’s statements are credible and probative. Upon consideration of the above evidence, the Board finds that, resolving reasonable doubt in the Veteran’s favor, a grant of service connection for tinnitus is warranted. The evidence shows a current complaint of tinnitus symptoms, which the Veteran has reported began during service and has continued from that time to the present. The Board acknowledges that the August 2014 VA examiner stated that it was less likely than not that the Veteran’s tinnitus began in, or is otherwise etiologically linked to, his military service. However, the Board finds inadequate the rationale for this opinion that the Veteran’s hearing was normal at enlistment and separation. The absence of evidence of tinnitus in service is not a bar to service connection for tinnitus. Hensley v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 155 (1993). Further, this medical opinion did not give due consideration to the Veteran’s competent account of the onset of symptoms in service and their continuity thereafter. Thus, the Board finds that the August 2014 examination is less probative than the Veteran’s statements and complaints of tinnitus symptoms in finding that the Veteran’s tinnitus is likely linked to active duty. See Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295 (2008); Stefl v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 120, 124 (2007). Based upon the Veteran’s reports of continuous symptoms since service, the Board finds that tinnitus is a result of military service. With resolution of reasonable doubt in the Veteran’s favor, service connection for tinnitus is warranted. 3. Entitlement to service connection for a skin condition, to include as due to herbicide exposure The Veteran also asserts that he has a skin condition that is related to his active service. Alternatively, he asserts his claimed skin condition is as a result of exposure to herbicides. VA has promulgated regulations providing that certain diseases associated with exposure to herbicides such as Agent Orange may be entitled to service connection on a presumptive basis, including some skin conditions. 38 C.F.R. § 3.309 (e). If the Veteran was exposed to Agent Orange, then service connection must be considered based on a direct theory of entitlement. Combee v. Brown, 34 F.3d 1039, 1043-44 (Fed. Cir. 1994). VA has also promulgated regulations providing that exposure to Agent Orange may be presumed for veterans who, in specified circumstances and during specified times, served in the Republic of Vietnam or the Demilitarized Zone of Korea; or who operated, maintained, or served aboard certain U.S. Air Force aircraft. 38 C.F.R. § 3.307 (a)(6). Special VA rules were issued governing adjudication of claims based on veterans’ assertions that they were exposed to Agent Orange while serving at certain military bases in Thailand during the Vietnam War Era. The Veteran did not serve under any of the above circumstances; thus, exposure to Agent Orange is not presumed. Nonetheless, it must still be considered on a facts-found basis. See Combee, 34 F.3d at 1043-4. The Veteran did not serve in the Republic of Vietnam or Thailand; he asserts exposure to Agent Orange while stationed in France in 1962. The Veteran does not maintain any first-hand accounts of Agent Orange exposure. His December 2017 correspondence states only that there is “no way of knowing if my condition has anything to due [sic] with my handling of Agent Orange during my tour…” The RO issued a memo in August 2014 which detailed its attempts to corroborate the Veteran’s assertion of exposure to Agent Orange, and it made a formal finding that sufficient information required to verify herbicide exposure did not exist. The Board finds that there is no credible evidence to suggest the Veteran was exposed to Agent Orange during his active service. Although the Veteran is not entitled to the regulatory presumptions of service connection, the Board must still evaluate whether he is entitled to service connection on a direct basis. See Combee, 34 F.3d 1039. Service treatment records note one instance of treatment for “rash on body” dated April 1964. Service medical records are silent as to any other treatments or diagnoses for any skin condition. Medical treatment records reflect no current diagnosis of a skin condition. Indeed, medical treatment notes dated throughout the course of the appeal note the Veteran has normal skin without rash, lesions, or edema. After a review of the evidence, the Board finds there is no evidence of a current diagnosis of any skin condition. The Board notes that while the Veteran did suffer from symptoms of a skin rash while in service, such symptoms appear to have resolved as no current diagnosis has been made. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans’ Claims (Veterans Court) has held that the presence of a disability at any time during the claim process can justify a grant of service connection, even where the most recent diagnosis is negative McClain v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 319 (2007). However, Congress has specifically limited entitlement to service-connection to cases where such in-service disease or injury has resulted in disability. See 38 U.S.C. § 1110. Hence, where the evidence does not support a finding of current disability upon which to predicate a grant of service connection, there can be no valid claim for that benefit. Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992). As there is no diagnosis of a skin condition, the Board concludes that the basic service connection criteria have not been met with respect to this claim. The only evidence in favor of such a relationship consists of the Veteran’s lay assertions. Generally, lay evidence is competent with regard to identification of a disease with unique and readily identifiable features which are capable of lay observation. See Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 308-09 (2007). As discussed earlier, lay statements are not competent evidence regarding diagnosis or etiology. See Jandreau, at 1377; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (a)(2). In sum, the Board finds that the Veteran does not have a diagnosed skin disorder. Therefore, the Board concludes that service connection for the claimed disorder is not warranted. In reaching this conclusion, the Board has considered the applicability of the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine. However, as the preponderance of the evidence is against each claim, that doctrine is not applicable. See 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53-56 (1990). 4. Entitlement to service connection for multiple sclerosis, to include as due to herbicide exposure The Veteran also asserts that his diagnosed multiple sclerosis is related to his active service, to alternatively include as due to exposure to herbicides. As previously examined, the Board concludes the Veteran was not exposed to herbicides while in active service; however, the Board must still evaluate whether he is entitled to service connection on a direct basis. See Combee, 34 F.3d 1039. First, the Board notes that service treatment records are silent as to treatment or diagnosis of multiple sclerosis. Medical treatment records confirm a diagnosis of multiple sclerosis in 1995. While medical treatment records reflect continuing treatment for multiple sclerosis, none provide an etiological opinion for the disability. A statement from private physician K.S. dated November 2014 notes the Veteran was a patient of K.S. for a “number of years”. Dr. K.S. then states the Veteran’s symptoms of dizziness, ringing in the ears, and fatigue first manifested while in the Air Force and stationed in France. He further stated that these symptoms were exacerbated by stress and were consistent with early relapsing remitting multiple sclerosis. He gave no further rationale for this opinion. After consideration of the evidence, the Board finds service connection for multiple sclerosis, to include as due to herbicide exposure, is not warranted. In this case, the weight of the probative evidence reflects the Veteran’s multiple sclerosis diagnosis is not related to or caused by his active service. Specifically, post-service medical records confirm diagnosis thirty years after service discharge, and no treatment or diagnosis of multiple sclerosis was made while in service. The private physician statement given by Dr. K.S. is without any rationale, indication of service or medical record review, or objective medical evidence of the claimed symptoms while in service. While Dr. K.S. opined that the Veteran first experienced several symptoms consistent with multiple sclerosis while in service, no record of these symptoms appears anywhere in the Veteran’s service treatment records. Further, the statement by Dr. K.S. does not provide a clear, positive nexus opinion. As such, the Board gives little probative value to the private physician’s statement. The Board has also considered the Veteran’s lay statements. Although the Veteran is competent to describe observable symptoms of multiple sclerosis, he is not competent to opine as to a nexus between the disability and active service, as he has not been shown to possess the requisite training or credentials needed to render a competent opinion as to medical diagnosis. See Jandreau, at 1377; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (a)(2). Therefore, the Board concludes that service connection for the claimed disorder is not warranted. In reaching this conclusion, the Board has considered the applicability of the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine. However, as the preponderance of the evidence is against each claim, that doctrine is not applicable. See 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53-56 (1990). 5. Entitlement to service connection for an emotional condition, to include as secondary to non-service connected multiple sclerosis Finally, the Veteran essentially asserts that his claimed emotional condition is as a result of his active service. Alternatively, he also asserts that his claimed emotional condition is secondary to his multiple sclerosis. Service connection may also be established on a secondary basis for a disability which is proximately due to or the result of service-connected disease or injury. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 (a). Establishing service connection on a secondary basis requires evidence sufficient to show (1) that a current disability exists; and (2) that the current disability was either: (a) proximately caused by; or (b) proximately aggravated by a service-connected disability. Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439, 448 (1995) (en banc). As the Veteran’s claim for entitlement to service connection for multiple sclerosis has been denied herein, the Board will only examine entitlement to service connection for an emotional condition on a direct basis. Service treatment records note the Veteran was seen for an anxiety reaction to a new job in February 1965; however, service records do not reflect any continued or chronic complaints or treatment for any emotional problems during service. Medical treatment records are negative for any diagnosis or treatment of an emotional condition. Based on the evidence of record, the Board finds that service connection for an emotional condition cannot be granted. Objective medical evidence did not find any evidence of a mental disorder or an emotional disorder. Consequently, the record does not establish either a diagnosed mental or emotional disorder, or indication that the Veteran has any type of an unidentifiable mental or emotional disorder. Although the Veteran asserts that he has an emotional disorder that is related to his military service, the Board finds that his contentions in this regard are not competent. While he is competent to report psychiatric symptoms and their onset, he is not competent to report whether those particular psychiatric symptoms amount to an emotional disability. See Washington, 19 Vet. App. 362, 368. Accordingly, as the Veteran’s assertions are not competent to establish that a current emotional disorder had its onset in service, they are likewise of no probative value in supporting such a conclusion. (Continued on the next page)   In reaching the conclusions above the Board has considered the applicability of the benefit of the doubt doctrine. However, as the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran’s claim, that doctrine is not applicable in the instant appeal. 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (b); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). THOMAS H. O'SHAY Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD N. Peden, Associate Counsel