Citation Nr: 18147629 Decision Date: 11/05/18 Archive Date: 11/05/18 DOCKET NO. 10-40 654A DATE: November 5, 2018 ORDER Entitlement to an earlier effective date than May 13, 2015, for a 50 percent rating for headaches is denied. Entitlement to an earlier effective date than July 22, 2005, for a grant of special monthly compensation (SMC) at the housebound rate is denied. Entitlement to an earlier effective date than April 17, 2000, for a grant of a total disability rating based on individual unemployability (TDIU) is denied. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The record evidence shows that the Veteran’s original informal claim of service connection for headaches was included in a letter received by VA on May 7, 2007. 2. The record evidence shows that VA examination on May 7, 2007, documented the Veteran’s complaints of headaches and related them to his service-connected cervical spine disability. 3. In the currently appealed rating decision dated on October 9, 2007, the Agency of Original Jurisdiction (AOJ) granted, in pertinent part, claims of service connection for headaches as due to a service-connected cervical spine disability, assigning a zero percent rating effective May 7, 2007, and entitlement to SMC at the housebound rate effective July 22, 2005. 4. In a letter dated on October 27, 2007, and received by the AOJ on October 30, 2007, the Veteran disagreed with the initial zero percent rating assigned for his service-connected headaches and with the effective date assigned for the grant of SMC at the housebound rate. 5. In a decision dated on May 13, 2015, the Board remanded the Veteran’s initial rating claim for headaches to the AOJ for an updated examination to determine the current nature and severity of this disability. 6. The record evidence shows that, on VA examination on August 30, 2016, the Veteran’s service-connected headaches are manifested by, at worst, prostrating and prolonged attacks of migraines/non-migraine headache pain productive of severe economic inadaptability. 7. In the currently appealed rating decision dated in September 2016, the AOJ assigned an initial 50 percent rating effective May 13, 2015, for the Veteran’s service-connected headaches. 8. In statements on a VA Form 21-0958, “Notice Of Disagreement,” dated on October 21, 2016, and date-stamped as electronically received by the AOJ on November 16, 2016, the Veteran disagreed with the effective date assigned for the initial 50 percent rating assigned for his service-connected headaches. 9. The record evidence shows that the earliest factually ascertainable date for the assignment of a 50 percent rating for headaches is May 13, 2015 (the date of a Board decision remanding the Veteran’s claim for an updated examination to determine the current nature and severity of his service-connected headaches). 10. Service connection is in effect for cognitive disorder, evaluated as 70 percent disabling effective April 17, 2000, and as 100 percent disabling effective July 22, 2005, headaches, evaluated as zero percent disabling effective May 7, 2007, and as 50 percent disabling effective May 13, 2015, degenerative joint disease of the cervical spine, evaluated as 20 percent disabling effective October 1, 1993, and as 40 percent disabling effective December 30, 1999, seborrheic dermatitis, evaluated as 10 percent disabling effective October 1, 1993, and as 30 percent disabling effective August 30, 2002, chronic gastritis, evaluated as 20 percent disabling effective September 21, 2006, bilateral Morton’s neuroma, evaluated as 10 percent disabling effective October 1, 1993, for chronic sinusitis, burns to the chest, hands, and back, and temporomandibular joint (TMJ) syndrome, each evaluated as 10 percent disabling effective October 1, 1993, and for hemorrhoids and a dystrophic left thumbnail, each evaluated as zero percent disabling effective October 1, 1993; the Veteran’s combined disability evaluation for compensation is 50 percent effective October 1, 1993, 60 percent effective December 31, 1999, 90 percent effective April 17, 2000, and 100 percent effective July 22, 2005. 11. The record evidence shows that the Veteran did not meet the schedular criteria for a grant of SMC at the housebound rate prior to July 22, 2005. 12. The record evidence shows that the Veteran’s service-connected disabilities, alone or in combination, did not preclude him from securing or maintaining substantially gainful employment prior to April 17, 2000. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The criteria for entitlement to an earlier effective date than May 13, 2015, for a 50 percent rating for headaches have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1155, 5107(b), 5110 (West 2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.151(a), 3.156, 3.400, 4.7, 4.124a, Diagnostic Code (DC) 8100 (2017). 2. The criteria for entitlement to an earlier effective date than July 22, 2005, for a grant of SMC at the housebound rate have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1114(s), 5107(b), 5110 (West 2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.350(i), 3.400 (2017). 3. The criteria for entitlement to an earlier effective date than April 17, 2000, for a grant of a TDIU have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1155, 5107(b), 5110 (West 2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.400, 4.16 (2017). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Veteran had active service from June 1971 to December 1974, from December 1978 to February 1992, and from March 1992 to September 1993. The case has a long and complicated procedural history. Most recently, in March 2017, the Board remanded the Veteran’s claims of entitlement to an earlier effective date than July 22, 2005, for a grant of SMC at the housebound rate and to an earlier effective date than May 13, 2015, for a 50 percent rating for headaches for additional development to the AOJ. As noted elsewhere, the Veteran subsequently perfected a timely appeal on his earlier effective date claim for a 50 percent rating for headaches in June 2018 and the AOJ certified this issue for appellate review in July 2018. Thus, the Board has jurisdiction over the earlier effective date claim for a 50 percent rating for headaches. The Board notes that both the Veteran and his attorney continue to submit voluminous duplicative evidence in support of his appeal. This includes resubmitting duplicates copies of medical records from the claims file apparently copied by the Veteran at VA facilities and records which have been retired by VA pursuant to a records retention schedule. Submitting this evidence accomplishes nothing other than delaying adjudication of the currently appealed claims. Accordingly, both the Veteran and his attorney are advised to discontinue this practice of submitting voluminous duplicative medical evidence. The AOJ also is instructed that, going forward, any duplicative evidence received by the Veteran or his attorney should be returned to them and not associated with the claims file. The Board notes that it consolidated several of the Veteran’s pending appeals, all of which were certified for appellate review by the AOJ, and assigned the oldest docket number (10-40 654A) to this decision. Effective Date Although his argument is not a model of clarity, it appears that the Veteran essentially contends that the appropriate effective date for a 50 percent rating for his service-connected headaches and for a grant of a TDIU is October 1, 1993, the day after the date of his discharge from active service. The Veteran also essentially contends that the appropriate effective date for an award of SMC at the housebound rate is 1995. He alleges that certain of his medical records were altered by unnamed VA personnel in order to avoid rating his service-connected disabilities, in particular his cognitive disorder, appropriately on or about 1995 and resulted in his not qualifying for SMC at the housebound rate at that time. Neither the Veteran nor his attorney has raised any other issues nor have any other issues been reasonably raised by the record. See Doucette v. Shulkin, 28 Vet. App. 366, 369-370 (2017) (confirming that Board not required to address issues unless specifically raised by claimant or reasonably raised by record evidence). 1. Entitlement to an earlier effective date than May 13, 2015, for a 50 percent rating for headaches The Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against granting the Veteran’s claim of entitlement to an earlier effective date than May 13, 2015, for a 50 percent rating for headaches. As noted, the Veteran essentially contends that the appropriate effective date for a 50 percent rating for his service-connected headaches is the day after the date of his discharge from active service. The record evidence does not support his assertions. It shows instead that, prior to May 13, 2015, the Veteran’s service-connected headaches are manifested by, at worst, complaints of headache pain associated with his service-connected cervical spine disability. For example, the Board notes that a review of the Veteran’s service treatment records shows that he was involved in a motorcycle accident on September 29, 1979. The Veteran reported that he fell off his motorcycle “while trail riding.” The in-service medical officer stated that the Veteran “strained” his neck as a result of this in-service accident. This clinician also stated that the Veteran was conscious at the time he received treatment for this neck injury. The Veteran was found fit to return to regular duty. The post-service evidence also does not support assigning an earlier effective date than May 13, 2015, for a 50 percent rating for the Veteran’s service-connected headaches. Contrary to his lay assertions, the record evidence shows that, prior to May 13, 2015, his service-connected headaches are manifested by, at worst, less frequent attacks (i.e., a zero percent rating under DC 8100). See 38 C.F.R. § 4.124a, DC 8100 (2017). For example, following VA outpatient treatment in September 2000, the Veteran was diagnosed as having sinus pain associated with “some headaches, sometimes severe.” His sinus problems improved with medication (Atarax combined with high doses of beclomethasone). “Never 100% relief but this is the best condition yet.” In July 2005, the Veteran had a brain magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan due to complaints of chronic headaches, neck pain, some left arm numbness, and weakness in the upper body. The MRI showed very mild brain atrophy and very mild chronic ischemic change of the white matter which was “not unusual for” someone the Veteran’s age, no acute intracranial abnormality, no evidence of intracranial mass, no recent brain infarct, mild chronic sinusitis, and a mild degree of rightward deviation of the nasal septum. On VA brain and spinal cord examination on May 7, 2007, the Veteran’s complaints included headaches. The VA examiner stated: Veteran’s behavior was very disruptive and loud [borderline] threatening during this examination. I was unable to keep him focused on what was needed for this examination. He wished to talk about other issues that were not requested. The Veteran refused to answer the VA examiner’s questions. He asserted that he incurred an in-service head injury following his motorcycle accident and currently experienced headaches as a residual of this alleged in-service head injury. “I could not obtain any other information regarding headaches.” The Veteran complained of having “headaches often.” He also was “verbally aggressive and demonstrated threatening body movement/behaviors.” The diagnoses included headaches per Veteran’s documentation which “appear to be related to neck pain, not brain injury.” The Board notes that the Veteran’s post-service VA outpatient treatment records show that he was banned from receiving medical treatment at certain VA outpatient treatment facilities and medical centers for several years due to abusive, threatening, and other unacceptable behavior towards his treating VA clinicians (such as the behavior noted on VA examination in May 2007). On VA sinusitis Disability Benefits Questionnaire (DBQ) in May 2013, the Veteran denied experiencing headaches. Similarly, on VA outpatient treatment visits in September 2013 and in February 2014, the Veteran again denied experiencing headaches. As noted elsewhere, in a remand dated on May 13, 2015, the Board directed that the AOJ schedule the Veteran for an updated examination to determine the current nature and severity of his service-connected headaches. The Board specifically noted that the Veteran recently asserted in lay statements that this disability had worsened since his most recent VA examination in May 2007. See Board remand dated May 13, 2015, at pp. 28. On VA headaches DBQ in August 2016, the Veteran’s complaints included migraines. He reported that he had fallen off of a motorcycle while on active service. He also stated: He believes that he was unconscious for three days, lying in the field covered in mud. His memory is riding the motorcycle on Friday and getting up in the field Sunday. He mounted his motorcycle after he cleared corn stalks from the tires and motor and went to base. There he was assessed by a medic and released for full duties on Monday. He stated that his headaches varied from 1-4 per week but averaged 2-3 times per week. “He is in bed all the time due to either a headache or anticipation of a headache developing.” His headaches were triggered by bright lights and snow with rare nausea and infrequent vomiting. “The headaches are a piercing pain that ‘runs through both temples.’” His reported symptoms also included pain which worsened with physical activity, characteristic prostrating attacks of migraines/non-migraine pain occurring once a month, and very prostrating and prolonged attacks of migraines/non-migraine pain productive of severe economic inadaptability. The VA clinician stated that the cause of the Veteran’s headaches are “contributed to” by his ongoing use of narcotics to treat his complaints of chronic pain. “There likely is a rebound effect from using the narcotics that contribute[s] to chronic headache pain.” The diagnosis was migraine including migraine variants. The Court has held that the Board is free to assess medical evidence and is not compelled to accept a physician's opinion. Wilson v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 614 (1992). A medical opinion based upon an inaccurate factual premise is not probative. Reonal v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 458, 461 (1993). A bare conclusion, even one reached by a medical professional, is not probative without a factual predicate in the record. Miller v. West, 11 Vet. App. 345, 348 (1998). A bare transcription of lay history, unenhanced by additional comment by the transcriber, does not become competent medical evidence merely because the transcriber is a medical professional. LeShore v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 406, 409 (1995). The Court also has held that the value of a physician's statement is dependent, in part, upon the extent to which it reflects "clinical data or other rationale to support his opinion." Bloom v. West, 12 Vet. App. 185, 187 (1999). Thus, a medical opinion is inadequate when it is unsupported by clinical evidence. Black v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 177, 180 (1995). The Board notes that, at his VA brain and spinal cord examination in May 2007, the Veteran asserted – for the first time – that he had incurred an in-service head injury at the time of a motorcycle accident which caused or contributed to his current headaches. The Board also notes that, at his most recent VA headaches DBQ in August 2016, the Veteran reported – for the first time – that he had been unconscious for 3 days following an in-service motorcycle accident. The Board does not dispute that the Veteran was involved in a motorcycle accident during service. Nevertheless, having reviewed the record evidence, the Board finds that none of the assertions made by the Veteran to the VA examiners in May 2007 and in August 2016 concerning what happened at the time of his in-service motorcycle accident are credible because they are not supported by the contemporaneous service treatment records regarding this in-service accident. When that this accident occurred in September 1979, only neck strain was noted by an in-service clinician. The Veteran also did not report – and the in-service clinician who treated him for neck strain did not indicate – that he had incurred a head injury (or any other injuries) or had been unconscious for any period of time following his motorcycle accident in September 1979. The Board finds the contemporaneous service treatment records to be more probative of the facts and circumstances surrounding the Veteran’s in-service motorcycle accident than the assertions he made to his VA clinicians on VA examinations conducted decades later. The Board also finds that the Veteran’s apparent embroidering of the details regarding his in-service motorcycle accident when discussing this incident with VA examiners in May 2007 and in August 2016 undercuts the probative value of the medical evidence obtained at these examinations. The Board next observes that the effective date for increased ratings generally will be the earliest date as of which it is factually ascertainable that an increase in disability had occurred if the claim is received within 1 year from such date; otherwise, the effective date is the date of receipt of claim. 38 U.S.C. § 5110 (West 2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(o)(2) (2017). The Board already found in its May 13, 2015, remand that the Veteran had asserted recently in lay statements that the symptomatology attributable to his-service headaches had worsened, justifying an updated examination to determine the current nature and severity of this disability. This finding is supported by a review of the record evidence which shows that the Veteran specifically denied experiencing headaches when examined by VA clinicians on multiple occasions prior to the Board’s May 13, 2015, remand (as discussed above). The Board has reviewed the record evidence and finds that there was no factually ascertainable increase in the disability attributable to the Veteran’s service-connected headaches prior to his most recent VA headaches DBQ in August 2016. The AOJ essentially concluded in the currently appealed rating decision issued in September 2016 that May 13, 2015, was the appropriate effective date for the assignment of a higher initial 50 percent rating for the Veteran’s service-connected headaches because that date was close enough in time to receipt of evidence (VA headaches DBQ dated in August 2016) showing worsening symptomatology attributable to this disability. The Board agrees, noting that the August 2016 VA examination occurred more than 1 year after its May 2015 remand. The regulation governing effective dates for increased ratings is clear – the effective date is the earliest date as of which it is factually ascertainable that an increase in disability had occurred if the claim is received within 1 year from such date or the date of receipt of the claim. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(o)(2). In this case, it is not factually ascertainable that an increase in disability occurred prior to May 13, 2015, the date when the Board directed the AOJ to schedule the Veteran for an updated examination to determine the current nature and severity of his service-connected headaches. The Veteran also has not identified or submitted any evidence demonstrating his entitlement to an earlier effective date than May 13, 2015, for the 50 percent rating for service-connected headaches. In summary, the Board finds that the criteria for an earlier effective date than May 13, 2015, for a 50 percent rating for headaches have not been met. 2. Entitlement to an earlier effective date than July 22, 2005, for a grant of SMC at the housebound rate The Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against granting the Veteran’s claim of entitlement to an earlier effective date than July 22, 2005, for a grant of SMC at the housebound rate. The Board notes initially that SMC is payable at the housebound rate when a Veteran has a single service-connected disability rated as 100 percent disabling and additional service-connected disability/ies ratable at 60 percent separate and distinct from the service-connected disability rated as 100 percent disabling or is permanently housebound. See 38 U.S.C. § 1114(s) (West 2012) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.350(i) (2017). The Board acknowledges that service connection currently is in effect for multiple disabilities. The record evidence shows that the Veteran did not meet the schedular criteria for a grant of SMC at the housebound rate prior to July 22, 2005, when a 100 percent schedular rating was assigned for his service-connected cognitive disorder and there were additional service-connected disabilities ratable at 60 percent separate and distinct from his service-connected cognitive disorder (which was rated as 100 percent disabling). Id. The record evidence also does not support assigning an earlier effective date than July 22, 2005, for a grant of SMC at the housebound rate. As noted above, in the currently appealed rating decision issued in October 2007, the AOJ granted, in pertinent part, entitlement to SMC at the housebound rate effective July 22, 2005. The AOJ concluded that this was the appropriate effective date for a grant of SMC at the housebound rate because that was the first date that the Veteran met the schedular criteria for this benefit. Although his argument is not a model of clarity, it appears that, in statements on his October 2007 notice of disagreement, the Veteran essentially alleges that certain of his medical records were altered by unnamed VA personnel in order to avoid rating his service-connected disabilities, in particular his cognitive disorder, appropriately on or about 1995 resulting in his not qualifying for SMC at the housebound rate at that time (as noted above). The Board notes here that the Veteran has had a difficult relationship with his VA treating clinicians over the years and has been barred from receiving medical treatment at certain VA medical facilities on multiple occasions due to his unacceptable behavior towards his treating clinicians (as discussed above). In light of this fraught relationship, it is unclear to the Board what exactly the Veteran is alleging regarding his entitlement to an earlier effective date for the grant of SMC at the housebound rate and any alleged alterations of his medical records by unnamed VA personnel. The Board observes here that its own review of the medical evidence did not disclose any indications of alterations or other unauthorized actions by VA personnel at any time relevant to this appeal. On VA aid & attendance or housebound examination in October 2009, the VA examiner stated that the Veteran could travel beyond his current domicile. The Veteran himself reported that he drove himself away from his home on a daily basis. The examiner stated that the Veteran could perform all of his daily self-care functions. This examiner also stated that the Veteran was unrestricted in his ability to leave his home. The Board next notes that it previously denied the Veteran’s claim for an earlier effective date than July 22, 2005, for a 100 percent rating for his service-connected cognitive disorder in a March 2017 decision. This decision was not appealed to the Court and is now final. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7104, 7266 (West 2012). Although his argument again is not a model of clarity, the Veteran appears to suggest in his October 2007 notice of disagreement with the effective date assigned for a grant of SMC at the housebound rate that his service-connected cognitive disorder was not rated appropriately in approximately 1995. To the extent that the Veteran may be attempting to disturb the finality of any prior rating action concerning the 100 percent rating currently assigned for his service-connected cognitive disorder by means of a freestanding earlier effective date claim involving a grant of SMC at the housebound rate, the Board finds that this claim must be dismissed as a matter of law. See also Rudd v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 296 (2006) (prohibiting a collateral attack on a final rating action by filing a freestanding earlier effective date claim). The Veteran contends that he is entitled to an earlier effective date than July 22, 2005, for a grant of SMC at the housebound rate. The regulation governing effective dates for SMC at the housebound rate is clear – the effective date is the date that the Veteran has a single service-connected disability rated as 100 percent disabling and additional service-connected disability/ies ratable at 60 percent separate and distinct from the service-connected disability rated as 100 percent disabling or is permanently housebound. See 38 U.S.C. § 1114(s) (West 2012) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.350(i) (2017). The Veteran does not contend – and the evidence does not show – that he is permanently housebound solely as a result of his service-connected disabilities prior to July 22, 2005. The Board finds it highly persuasive that, on VA examination in October 2009, more than 4 years after the Veteran began receiving SMC at the housebound rate because he met the schedular criteria for this benefit, he was able to drive himself away from his home on a daily basis, could perform all of his daily self-care functions, and was not restricted in his ability to leave his home. This persuasively suggests that the Veteran was not housebound prior to July 22, 2005, when he met the schedular criteria for SMC at the housebound rate and began receiving this benefit. The evidence also does not show that the Veteran met the schedular criteria for a grant of SMC at the housebound rate prior to July 22, 2005, when a 100 percent schedular rating was assigned for his service-connected cognitive disorder and there were additional service-connected disabilities ratable at 60 percent separate and distinct from his service-connected cognitive disorder (which was rated as 100 percent disabling). Id. The Veteran finally has not identified or submitted any evidence demonstrating his entitlement to an earlier effective date than July 22, 2005, for a grant of SMC at the housebound rate. In summary, the Board finds that the criteria for an earlier effective date than July 22, 2005, for a grant of SMC at the housebound rate have not been met. 3. Entitlement to an earlier effective date than April 17, 2000, for a grant of a TDIU The Board finally finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against granting the Veteran’s claim of entitlement to an earlier effective date than April 17, 2000, for a grant of a TDIU. As noted, the Veteran essentially contends that the appropriate effective date for a grant of a TDIU is October 1, 1993, the day after the date of his discharge from active service. The record evidence does not support his assertions. It shows instead that, prior to April 17, 2000, he was not precluded from securing or following a substantially gainful occupation solely as a result of his service-connected disabilities. The Board notes initially that effective dates for TDIU ratings are governed by the regulations governing effective dates for increased ratings (discussed above). See generally 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(o). The Board also notes initially that service connection is in effect for cognitive disorder, evaluated as 70 percent disabling effective April 17, 2000, and as 100 percent disabling effective July 22, 2005, headaches, evaluated as zero percent disabling effective May 7, 2007, and as 50 percent disabling effective May 13, 2015, degenerative joint disease of the cervical spine, evaluated as 20 percent disabling effective October 1, 1993, and as 40 percent disabling effective December 30, 1999, seborrheic dermatitis, evaluated as 10 percent disabling effective October 1, 1993, and as 30 percent disabling effective August 30, 2002, chronic gastritis, evaluated as 20 percent disabling effective September 21, 2006, bilateral Morton’s neuroma, evaluated as 10 percent disabling effective October 1, 1993, for chronic sinusitis, burns to the chest, hands, and back, and TMJ syndrome, each evaluated as 10 percent disabling effective October 1, 1993, and for hemorrhoids and a dystrophic left thumbnail, each evaluated as zero percent disabling effective October 1, 1993. The Veteran’s combined disability evaluation for compensation is 50 percent effective October 1, 1993, 60 percent effective December 31, 1999, 90 percent effective April 17, 2000, and 100 percent effective July 22, 2005. Thus, the Veteran met the schedular criteria for a TDIU effective April 17, 2000. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a) (2017). The Board observes that the record evidence is replete with the Veteran’s inconsistent statements regarding his post-service employment history and whether or not he considered himself unemployable solely as a result of his service-connected disabilities. For example, on private outpatient treatment in April 1994, the Veteran reported that he had retired in 1993. On VA outpatient treatment in November 1996, however, he reported that he had worked consistently since his service separation in September 1993. He currently worked 7 days a week “as a machinist.” He also reported prior post-service employment as a vocational rehabilitation counselor for VA and at the postal service. On subsequent VA outpatient treatment in September 2000, the Veteran reported that he recently had been fired from a job as a government contractor “for behavioral issues.” The Veteran asserted on his VA Form 21-8940 (formal TDIU claim), date-stamped as received by the AOJ on October 19, 2000, that his service-connected cognitive disorder and service-connected cervical spine disability prevented him from securing or following any substantially gainful occupation. His service-connected disabilities had affected his full-time employment in 1991. He last had worked full-time in July 2000. He had become too disabled to work in October 1993. His most recent job had been terminated by his employer while he was still in a probationary period. The Board notes here that, although the Veteran asserted in October 2000 that his service-connected disabilities had affected his full-time employment in 1991, he had honorable active service until February 1992 and from March 1992 to September 1993. Approximately 1 month later, in statements on a November 2000 VA Form 21 8940, the Veteran asserted that a head injury prevented him from securing or following any substantially gainful occupation. His disability had affected his full-time employment on October 1, 1993. He last had worked full-time on May 31, 2000. He became too disabled to work on October 1, 1993. The Board notes here that service connection is not in effect for a head injury. Given the inconsistencies in the Veteran’s statements regarding his post-service employment history and which disabilities affected his employability, the Board finds that this evidence is not probative on the issue of entitlement to an earlier effective date than April 17, 2000, for a grant of a TDIU. See Bastien v. Shinseki, 599 F.3d 1301, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("The evaluation and weighing of evidence and the drawing of appropriate inferences from it are factual determinations committed to the discretion of the fact finder."). The medical evidence also does not support assigning an earlier effective date than April 17, 2000, for a grant of a TDIU. For example, following VA neuropsychological testing in September 2000, the VA clinician who administered this testing to the Veteran concluded: On the question of employability, we note that the profile of test results would not exclude him from most jobs, though his verbal learning difficulties would need to be taken into account. More importantly, his behavioral presentation (agitation, low frustration tolerance, volubility, hypomania) would detract in a very significant way from his being able to stay in a job for any amount of time. The fact that he has been employed in so many settings in the past seven years supports this conclusion. Thus it would be fair to state that this [Veteran] is unemployable. In a November 2000 addendum to the Veteran’s September 2000 VA neuropsychological testing, the VA clinician who administered this testing to the Veteran concluded that his schizotypal personality disorder had caused his unemployability. The Board acknowledges that the Veteran became entitled to a TDIU on April 17, 2000, when he met the schedular criteria for this benefit. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a) (2017). The evidence does not support assigning an earlier effective date than April 17, 2000, for a grant of a TDIU, however. It shows instead that, prior to this date, the Veteran was not precluding from securing or following a substantially gainful occupation solely as a result of his service-connected disabilities. The Board already has found the Veteran’s lay assertions of unemployability and the disabilities which affected his employability to be less than probative due to their internal inconsistencies. The Board also acknowledges that the Veteran was found to be unemployable following VA neuropsychological testing in September 2000. Critically, however, the VA staff psychologist who administered this testing to the Veteran concluded that the Veteran’s “profile of test results would not exclude him from most jobs, though his verbal learning difficulties would need to be taken into account.” And, despite the Veteran’s inconsistent statements to VA concerning his post-service employment history, the VA clinician stated in September 2000 that he had been employed “in…many settings in the past seven years” or since his service separation in September 1993. This clinician also suggested that the Veteran’s apparently frequent job changes since his service separation supported a conclusion that his behaviors – listed as agitation, low frustration tolerance, volubility, and hypomania – would preclude him from staying in any job for a long time. (The Board notes parenthetically that these behaviors are noted in the Veteran’s VA outpatient treatment records, including those behaviors which prompted the decisions to bar him from receiving medical treatment at certain VA medical facilities on several occasions during the appeal period). More importantly, this clinician also concluded in November 2000 that the Veteran’s schizotypal personality disorder caused his unemployability. The Board observes here that service connection is prohibited for a personality disorder because it is not considered a disability for VA purposes. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.9 (2017). As such, a personality disorder cannot be the basis for an award of a TDIU. The regulation governing effective dates for TDIU is clear – the effective date is the date of receipt of the claim or the date entitlement arose, whichever is later. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(o). In this case, it is undisputed that the Veteran’s formal TDIU claim (VA Form 21-8940) was date-stamped as received by the AOJ on October 19, 2000. The Board has reviewed the record evidence and finds that the earliest date that entitlement to a TDIU arose is April 17, 2000, the date when the Veteran met the schedular criteria for this benefit and within 1 year of the date that VA received his formal TDIU claim. See also 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a). The evidence otherwise does not suggest entitlement to an earlier effective date than April 17, 2000, for a grant of a TDIU. The Veteran finally has not identified or submitted any evidence demonstrating his entitlement to an earlier effective date than April 17, 2000, for a grant of a TDIU. In summary, the Board finds that the criteria for an earlier effective date than April 17, 2000, for a grant of a TDIU have not been met. R. FEINBERG Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Michael T. Osborne, Counsel