Citation Nr: 18148294 Decision Date: 11/08/18 Archive Date: 11/07/18 DOCKET NO. 16-24 662 DATE: November 8, 2018 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, (claimed as acquired psychological condition to include posttraumatic stress disorder and attention deficit disorder) is denied. FINDING OF FACT A psychiatric disability was not shown in service or for many years thereafter, and the most probative evidence is against a finding that the current disability is related to service. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for establishing service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304(f) (2018). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty in the Army from January 1964 to January 1967. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) on appeal from a March 2015 rating decision of a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO). 1. Service connection for acquired psychiatric disorders Service connection may be established for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. Evidence of continuity of symptomatology from the time of service until the present is required where the chronicity of a chronic condition manifested during service either has not been established or might reasonably be questioned. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b); see also Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed.Cir. 2013) (holding that only conditions listed as chronic diseases in § 3.309(a) may be considered for service connection under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) (2018). Regulations also provide that service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disability was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Generally, in order to prove service connection, there must be competent, credible evidence of (1) a current disability, (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of an injury or disease, and (3) a nexus, or link, between the current disability and the in-service disease or injury. See, e.g., Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Pond v. West, 12 Vet. App. 341 (1999). Service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) requires a medical diagnosis of PTSD in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a); a link, established by medical evidence, between current symptoms and an in-service stressor; and credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). The Veteran seeks service connection for an acquired psychiatric condition, claimed as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and attention deficit disorder. The Veteran contends that “the circumstances of his military service, specifically, [being] placed in a position where he was responsible for nuclear weapons even before he could vote, caused him to develop mental disorders so severe that he was given a compassionate reassignment.” See September 2018 Appellate Brief. The Veteran “believes his life was altered at this point and had never returned to normal.” Id. As an initial matter, the February 2015 VA examiner indicated the Veteran did not meet the criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD. Similarly, the VA treatment records do not reflect a current diagnosis of PTSD at any point contemporaneous to the claim. Accordingly, as the evidence does not show a diagnosis of PTSD during the course of the claim, service connection for PTSD cannot be established. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f); see Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992). However, the February 2015 VA examiner diagnosed the Veteran with persistent depressive disorder with anxious stress. VA treatment records also note anxiety state and dysthymia on the problem list. As a current psychiatric disability is shown, the question becomes whether the condition is related to service. The Veteran’s service treatment records reveal no complaints or findings regarding a psychiatric disability. His entrance and separation examinations revealed normal psychiatric functioning, and the Veteran denied frequent trouble sleeping, frequent or terrifying nightmares, and depression or excessive worry on his separation report of medical history. Post service, the first evidence of a psychiatric disorder in 1994 when the Veteran was seen for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). As there is no competent evidence showing a diagnosed psychiatric disorder during service, competent evidence linking the current condition to service is needed to support the claim. However, the only medical opinion addressing this question is against the claim. In this regard, the February 2015 VA examiner opined that the Veteran’s currently diagnosed psychiatric disorder is less likely as not related to an in-service injury, event, or disease. The examiner considered the Veteran’s detailed history, to include his reports of handling atomic weapons in service as well as first being diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder while attending college in the 1990’s. The examiner explained that the Veteran’s symptoms emerged within the context of his higher educational pursuits and there was no mention of military related stressors at that time. The examiner further opined that ADHD and learning disabilities are “understood as neuropsychological/developmental conditions, requiring a childhood onset for formal diagnosis” and that there is “no evidence of in service treatment records for aggravation of these conditions.” See February 2015 VA examination. The examiner’s opinion is probative, because it is based on an accurate medical history and provides an explanation that contains clear conclusions and supporting data. Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295, 304 (2008). To the extent the Veteran contends he suffered from psychiatric symptoms during service, the Board finds his denial of psychiatric symptoms on his separation report of medical history to be more probative than his current assertions for the purposes of this claim. See Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1336-37 (2006) (the lack of contemporaneous medical records, the significant time delay between the affiants' observations and the date on which the statements were written, and conflicting statements of the veteran are factors that the Board can consider and weigh against a veteran's lay evidence). Additionally, while the Veteran believes his current condition is related to service, as a lay person, he is not competent to provide an opinion as to the diagnosis or etiology of psychiatric disorders as such matters require medical expertise to determine. Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The Board finds the opinion of the VA examiner to be significantly more probative than the Veteran’s assertions. In sum, a psychiatric disorder was not shown in service or for many years thereafter, and the most probative evidence is against a finding that the current psychiatric disorder is related to service. Thus, the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, and service connection must be denied. In reaching the above conclusions, the Board has considered the applicability of the benefit of the doubt doctrine. However, as the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, that doctrine is not applicable in the instant appeal. See 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) (2012); Ortiz v. Principi, 274 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 55-56 (1990). K. A. BANFIELD Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD G. N. Wilson, Law Clerk