Citation Nr: 18148808 Decision Date: 11/08/18 Archive Date: 11/08/18 DOCKET NO. 16-07 210 DATE: November 8, 2018 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for residuals of a broken right leg is denied. FINDING OF FACT The record lacks sufficient evidence establishing that the Veteran has a current disability as a result of an injury sustained during active duty for training or inactive duty for training. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for service connection for residuals of a broken right leg have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 5103(a), 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran enlisted in the U.S. Air Force Reserve in March 1974, with an agreement to enlist in the regular Air Force in mid-July 1974. The Veteran relates that in early July 1974 he was involved in a motor vehicle accident while en route to the recruitment office in connection with a call to report to an Air Force Base for training. The Veteran sustained a broken right leg requiring at least six months in a cast, and as a result he was disqualified for enlistment in the regular Air Force and honorably discharged from the Air Force Reserve. The Veteran seeks service connection for the residuals of the broken right leg sustained in the motor vehicle accident. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans Appeals (Board) on appeal from a July 2013 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Waco, Texas. The Veteran declined a hearing before the Board. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.103, 20.700(a). Establishing service connection generally requires showing (1) a current disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and, (3) a nexus between the claimed in-service event, injury, or disease the present injury or disease. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. Congress entitles a veteran to compensation for a disability that results from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in the line of duty while the veteran is in the active military, naval, or air service during a period of war. 38 U.S.C. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. Active military, naval, or air service during a period of war includes active duty, a period of active duty for training during which an individual was disabled from an injury incurred in the line of duty, or a period of inactive duty for training during which an individual was disabled from an injury incurred in the line of duty. 38 U.S.C. § 101(24). An individual may be deemed to have been on active duty for training or inactive duty for training if, when required by competent authority, he assumes an obligation to perform such duty and is disabled from an injury incurred while proceeding directly to such training. 38 U.S.C. § 106(d); 38 C.F.R. § 3.6(e). For any claim alleging entitlement to benefits by reason of traveling to active duty for training or inactive duty for training, the burden of proof is on the claimant. 38 U.S.C. § 106(d)(3); 38 C.F.R. § 3.6(e)(2). In adjudicating that claim, the Board determines whether an individual was required to perform such duty and whether the individual was disabled from an injury so incurred. The Board must take into account the hour on which such individual began to proceed; the hour on which such individual was scheduled to arrive for such duty; the method of travel employed; the itinerary; the manner in which the travel was performed; and the immediate cause of disability. 38 U.S.C. § 106(d)(2); 38 C.F.R. § 3.6(e)(2). The Veteran’s status was at no time active duty, and therefore to be eligible for the disability compensation he seeks, the Veteran’s disorder must have been from an injury suffered during active duty for training or inactive duty for training. 38 U.S.C. § 101(24), 1110; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.6. Moreover, the Veteran’s status was at no time active duty for training or inactive duty for training. Rather, the Veteran’s service records and the Veteran’s own theory of entitlement show that his disorder stems from an injury sustained while traveling to the recruitment office in connection with a call to report for training. The Veteran therefore has the burden to prove that he was required by competent authority to assume an obligation to perform either active duty for training or inactive duty for training, and to prove that the injury he links to the present disorder was incurred while proceeding directly to such training. 38 U.S.C. § 106(d); 38 C.F.R. § 3.6(e). There is no evidence of record which establishes that the Veteran was required by competent authority to assume an obligation to perform training at the time he fractured his leg. Though the Veteran stated in his Report of Accidental Injury that he had just received orders to report to the Air Force Base for training, he previously stated at two places in his Notice of Disagreement that the accident occurred while he was driving to the recruitment office in order to plan to report to the Air Force Base for training. There is no official service record, or for that matter any other document, evidencing that competent authority had issued an obligation for the Veteran to report to training. There also is insufficient evidence of record to determine whether the Veteran was proceeding directly to training. In addition to the above inconsistency within the Veteran’s written statements, the record lacks such details as the itinerary, or even the hour on which the Veteran was scheduled to arrive for training. Further, even assuming for argument purposes that the Veteran had the requisite service at the time of his accident, there is no competent evidence beyond his own bare lay assertion that he has residual disability stemming from his broken leg. The Board concludes that the record fails to establish that the Veteran has current residuals of a broken right leg and that he was either on active duty for training or inactive duty for training at the time of the injury. 38 U.S.C. §§ 106(d), 1110, 5107(a); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.6(e)(2). Without evidence of a current disability, the Board must deny the claim for service connection. Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992). In reaching this decision, the Board has resolved any doubt in the Veteran’s favor, but still finds a preponderance of the evidence against the existence of a current disability. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53-54 (1990); see 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. K. PARAKKAL Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD M. Davis, Associate Counsel