Citation Nr: 18149199
Decision Date: 11/09/18	Archive Date: 11/08/18

DOCKET NO. 12-29 603
DATE:	November 9, 2018
ORDER
Entitlement to an evaluation in excess of 10 percent from May 4, 2011 to April 23, 2014, and an evaluation in excess of 20 percent from April 24, 2014, for right knee sprain is dismissed.
Entitlement to an evaluation in excess of 30 percent from May 4, 2011 to October 24, 2013, and an evaluation in excess of 70 percent from October 25, 2013, for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is dismissed.
Entitlement to a total disability evaluation based on individual unemployability due to service-connected disabilities (TDIU) is dismissed.
FINDING OF FACT
The Veteran died in August 2018, during the pendency of this appeal.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
Because of the Veteran’s death, the Board has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of his claims at this time.  38 U.S.C. § 7104(a); 38 C.F.R. § 20.1302.
REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION
The Veteran served on active duty in the U.S. Army from June 1991 to September 1991 and from October 1992 to July 1998.
These matters come before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) on appeal from rating decisions in July 2011 and December 2015 by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO).  
The Board remanded the issues on appeal for additional development in January 2014 and September 2016.  As the actions specified in the remands have been substantially completed, the matters have been properly returned to the Board for appellate consideration.  See Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268 (1998); D’Aries v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 97, 105 (2008).  
Dismissal
1. Entitlement to an evaluation in excess of 10 percent from May 4, 2011 to April 23, 2014, and an evaluation in excess of 20 percent from April 24, 2014, for right knee sprain
2. Entitlement to an evaluation in excess of 30 percent from May 4, 2011 to October 24, 2013, and an evaluation in excess of 70 percent from October 25, 2013, for PTSD
3. Entitlement to a TDIU
In September 2018, and during the pendency of his VA appeal, the RO was notified that the Veteran had died in August 2018.  As a matter of law, appellants’ claims do not survive their deaths.  Zevalkink v. Brown, 102 F.3d 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Smith v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 330 (1997); Landicho v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 42 (1994).  This appeal on the merits has become moot by virtue of the death of the Veteran and must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  38 U.S.C. § 7104(a); 38 C.F.R. § 20.1302.
In reaching this determination, the Board intimates no opinion as to the merits of this appeal or to any derivative claim brought by a survivor of the Veteran.  38 C.F.R. § 20.1106. 
The Board’s dismissal of this appeal does not affect the right of an eligible person to file a request to be substituted as the appellant for purposes of processing the claim to completion.  Such request must be filed no later than one year after the date of the appellant’s death.  38 U.S.C. § 5121A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.1010(b).  A person eligible for substitution includes “a living person who would be eligible to receive accrued benefits due to the claimant under section 5121(a) of this title....”  38 U.S.C. § 5121A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.1010(a).  An eligible party seeking substitution in an appeal that has been dismissed by the Board due to the death of the claimant should file a request for substitution with the VA office from which the claims originated.  38 C.F.R. § 3.1010(b).
 
LESLEY A. REIN
Veterans Law Judge
Board of Veterans’ Appeals
ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD	Journet Shaw