Citation Nr: 18150276 Decision Date: 11/14/18 Archive Date: 11/14/18 DOCKET NO. 16-31 194 DATE: November 14, 2018 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for right ear hearing loss disability is denied. Entitlement to service connection for the residuals of a stroke is denied. Entitlement to service connection for migraine headaches is denied. Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is denied. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. Evidence of the claims file reveals that the Veteran does not meet the VA criteria for a right ear hearing loss disability. A September 2013 VA hearing loss examination reveals that the Veteran’s right ear tested as normal. 2. Evidence of the claims file reveals the Veteran reported a history of a stroke on January 2013 and February 2014; however, there is no evidence of a diagnosed stroke in-service during periods of active duty, active duty training, or inactive duty training. 3. Evidence of the claims file reveals that the Veteran has a history of migraines as early as September 2014; however, the there is no evidence of a diagnosis for a migraine disorder in-service during periods of active duty, active duty training, or inactive duty training. 4. Evidence of the claims file reveals that the Veteran does not meet the VA criteria for a PTSD diagnosis; however, a post-service diagnosis of major depressive disorder and general anxiety disorder unrelated to service was diagnosed. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for right ear hearing loss disability have not been met. 38 U.S.C.§§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 1113, 1131, 1137 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.6 (2017). 2. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for the residuals of a stroke have not been met. 38 U.S.C.§§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 1113, 1131, 1137 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307, 3.309, 3.6 (2017). 3. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for a migraine disorder have not been met. 38 U.S.C.§§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 1113, 1131, (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.6, 3.307, 3.309 (2017). 4. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD have not been met. 38 U.S.C.§§ 1110, 1131 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.6, (2017). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Veteran served in the reserves from December 1989 to February 2013. She had a periods of active duty training from July 5, 1990 to December 7, 1990 and active duty from January 3, 2002 to July 3, 2002. Service connection has been granted for left ear hearing loss and tinnitus. The Veteran submitted some private medical findings with her substantive appeal and did not request RO review, so the evidence is before the Board for consideration. The record reflects that there are very few service treatment records on file. There are for consideration service personnel records. It appears that all reasonable attempts to find service treatment records have been undertaken and that further attempts to obtain records would be futile. Service Connection Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from a disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131(2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (2018). “To establish a right to compensation for a present disability, a Veteran must show: “(1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service”—the so-called “nexus requirement.” Holton v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). For Veterans with 90 days or more of active service during a war period or after December 31, 1946, certain chronic diseases may be presumed to have been incurred in service if they manifest to a compensable degree within one year of separation from service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1112, 1113, 1137 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309 (2018). A cardiovascular renal disease, migraine headaches, and sensorineural hearing loss are on the list of diseases presumed to have been incurred in-service. Except as otherwise provided by law, a claimant has the responsibility to present and support a claim for benefits. VA shall consider all information lay and medical evidence of record in a case and when there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, VA shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant. 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2018); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1990). To deny a claim on its merits, a preponderance of the evidence must be against the claim. Alemany v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 518, 519 (1996). 1. Entitlement to service connection for right ear hearing loss disability The Veteran asserts that her ear trauma in-service resulted in her right ear hearing loss disability. As there is no medical evidence of record to support the Veteran’s assertion, the Board respectfully disagrees. For the purposes of applying the laws administered by VA, impaired hearing will be considered to be a disability when the auditory threshold in any of the frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000 Hertz is 40 decibels or greater; or when the auditory thresholds for at least three of the frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, or 4000 Hertz are 26 decibels or greater; or when speech recognition scores using the Maryland CNC Test are less than 94 percent. 38 C.F.R. § 3.385 (2017). In the Veteran most recent September 2013 VA audiological examination, pure tone thresholds, in decibels were as follows: HERTZ 500 1000 2000 3000 4000 RIGHT 25 25 25 20 20 LEFT 30 30 20 20 20 Speech audiometry revealed speech recognition ability of 94 percent in the right ear and of 92 in the left ear. The examiner diagnosed the Veteran’s hearing loss as normal. The foregoing summary of the treatment record reveals no past or current diagnosis for right ear hearing loss and offer no possibility for service connection. The Board also reviewed and carefully considered the Veteran’s lay statements that her right ear hearing loss was connected to ear trauma in-service. The evidence has assisted the Board in better understanding the nature and development of the Veteran’s claim. Lay people are competent to report on matters observed or within their personal knowledge. See Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 470 (1994). Therefore, the Veteran is competent to provide statements of symptoms which are observable to her senses and there is no reason to doubt her credibility. However, the Board must emphasize that the Veteran is not competent to interpret accurately clinical findings pertaining to hearing loss, as there requires highly specialized knowledge and training. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (a)(1) (2018). See also Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The Board has considered the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine; however, the Board does not perceive an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence. The preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, the doctrine is not applicable and the claim must be denied. 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (b) (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 4.3 (2018). 2. Entitlement to service connection for residuals of a stroke The Veteran seeks to establish service connection for a stroke and its residuals. She asserts that she suffered a stroke in-service. The Board respectfully disagrees. An April 2016 VA disability benefits questionnaire for residuals of a stroke reveals the Veteran reported a history of strokes in January 2013 and February 2014. There is no evidence that the Veteran’s reporting of strokes occurred during active duty, active duty training, or inactive duty training. Furthermore, there is no evidence in-service nor within one year of separation reporting any complaints, diagnosis, or treatments for a stroke. That she may have been a reserve member at the time of the strokes does not provide a basis for granting service connection. The foregoing summary of the treatment record for stroke offer no possibility for service connection. The Board also reviewed and carefully considered the Veteran’s lay statements that her reported strokes are connected to her time in-service. The evidence has assisted the Board in better understanding the nature and development of the Veteran’s reporting of suffering multiple strokes and its residuals Lay people are competent to report on matters observed or within their personal knowledge. See Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 470 (1994). Therefore, the Veteran is competent to provide statements of symptoms which are observable to her senses and there is no reason to doubt her credibility. However, the Board must emphasize that the Veteran is not competent to interpret accurately clinical findings pertaining to strokes, as there requires highly specialized knowledge and training. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (a)(1) (2018). See also Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The Board has considered the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine; however, the Board does not perceive an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence. The preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, the doctrine is not applicable and the claim must be denied. 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (b) (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 4.3 (2018). 3. Entitlement to service connection for migraine headaches The Veteran seeks to establish service connection for migraine headaches. She asserts that she suffered the headaches in-service. The Board respectfully disagrees. SSA treatment records for January 2013 to May 2014 reveal that the Veteran was diagnosed with a history of migraines as early as September 2013. There is no evidence that the Veteran’s reporting of headaches occurred during active duty, active duty training, or inactive duty training. Furthermore, there is no evidence in-service nor within one year of separation reporting any complaints, diagnosis, or treatments for migraines. The foregoing summary of the treatment record for migraines offer no possibility for service connection. The Board also reviewed and carefully considered the Veteran’s lay statements that her migraines are connected to her time in-service. The evidence has assisted the Board in better understanding the nature and development of the Veteran’s diagnosed migraines and its effect. Lay people are competent to report on matters observed or within their personal knowledge. See Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 470 (1994). Therefore, the Veteran is competent to provide statements of symptoms which are observable to her senses and there is no reason to doubt her credibility. However, the Board must emphasize that the Veteran is not competent to interpret accurately clinical findings pertaining to migraines, as there requires highly specialized knowledge and training. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (a)(1) (2018). See also Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The Board has considered the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine; however, the Board does not perceive an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence. The preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, the doctrine is not applicable and the claim must be denied. 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (b) (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 4.3 (2018). 4. Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD The Veteran seeks to establish service connection for PTSD as a result of sexual trauma suffered in-service. The Board respectfully disagrees as there is no evidence that the Veteran’s reporting of PTSD occurred during active duty, active duty training, or inactive duty training. Furthermore, there is no evidence in-service nor within one year of separation reporting any complaints, diagnosis, or treatments for a PTSD. Her treating provider has noted work place trauma post-service. Moreover, a diagnosis of PTSD has not been entered. No psychiatric treatment is shown during periods of active duty training or active duty. In a May 2016 VA Mental health disability benefits questionnaire, the examiner diagnosed the Veteran with affective disorder, major depressive disorder, and general anxiety disorder, but only symptoms and not a diagnosis of PTSD. There is no evidence that the Veteran’s reporting of PTSD occurred during active duty, active duty training, or inactive duty training. Furthermore, there is no evidence in-service of any other psychiatric disorder related to service. The foregoing summary of the treatment record for an acquired psychiatric disorder, including PTSD offers no possibility for service connection. The Board also reviewed and carefully considered the Veteran’s lay statements that her PTSD is connected to her time in-service. The evidence has assisted the Board in better understanding the nature and development of the Veteran’s diagnosed migraines and its effect. Lay people are competent to report on matters observed or within their personal knowledge. See Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 470 (1994). Therefore, the Veteran is competent to provide statements of symptoms which are observable to her senses and there is no reason to doubt her credibility. However, the Board must emphasize that the Veteran is not competent to interpret accurately clinical findings pertaining to PTSD, as there requires highly specialized knowledge and training. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (a)(1) (2018). See also Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The Board has considered the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine; however, the Board does not perceive an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence. The preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, the doctrine is not applicable and the claim must be denied. 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (b) (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 4.3 (2018). Here as noted there is no diagnosis of PTSD and there is no opinion that the other psychiatric disorders are related to service. Here personnel ratings were good in service and do not show changes suggestive of any psychiatric impairment. As such, there is no basis to allow the claim. MICHAEL D. LYON Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD M. Elliot Harris, Associate Counsel