Citation Nr: 18151137 Decision Date: 11/16/18 Archive Date: 11/16/18 DOCKET NO. 09-38 369 DATE: November 16, 2018 ORDER Service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include a mood disorder, is denied. FINDING OF FACT The Veteran’s psychiatric disorder was not incurred in or due to his time in service. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for the establishment of service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder are not met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran had active service from June 1970 to February 1972. Generally, to prevail on a claim of service connection on the merits, there must be competent evidence of (1) a current disability, (2) medical, or in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury, and (3) medical evidence or other competent evidence of a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the present disease or injury. See Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247 (1999); Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). A claim for service connection for a mental disability may encompass claims for service connection of any mental disability that may reasonably be encompassed by several factors, including the veteran’s description of the claim, the symptoms the veteran describes and the information the veteran submits or that the Secretary obtains in support of the claim. Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1, 5 (2009). Accordingly, the Board has taken an expansive view of the claims for service connection for anxiety and depression pursuant to Clemons and re-characterized them as shown on the cover page of this decision. The Veteran contends he has a mental disability that was incurred in and due to his time in service. Specifically, the Veteran said while in service, he witnessed accidental death when a helicopter crashed in late 1971 in Germany in a non-combat situation. The Veteran said he was involved in putting bodies in bags and reported witnessing a suicide attempt. As a preliminary matter, the Board remanded this issue in January 2015 to afford the Veteran an examination to determine the nature and etiology of his mental disorder. The Veteran was scheduled for this examination, but could not attend due to the fact he had been admitted to a nursing home. The Board finds this is good cause for the Veteran not to appear for his examination. However, no further indication has been given by the Veteran that he is willing (or able) to attend an examination for his mental health. In response to a September 2018 memo to the Veteran’s representative noting the Veteran’s claim was being returned to the Board for adjudication, the Veteran’s representative did not state the Veteran still wished to have his examination. Therefore, the matter will be decided on the evidence of record. The Board, in light of the reason given, finds no basis that a second attempt to obtain an examination would succeed. The Veteran has been diagnosed with a mood disorder. (See June 2007 examination.) The Veteran’s service treatment records (STRs) are free of mention of treatment or symptoms of a mental disorder. The Veteran’s separation exam shows the Veteran appeared to have crossed out a positive response to having terrifying nightmares and nervous trouble. However, even if the Board were to grant the benefit of the doubt to the Veteran and say there was an in-service incurrence of the Veteran’s mental disorder, the evidence of record does not show the Veteran’s mental disorder was at least as likely as not due to his time in service. The Veteran had an examination in July 2007 for his mental health. The examiner noted the Veteran’s speech was articulate and his thought processes were logical and goal- oriented. The Veteran reported feeling depressed with sleep disturbances and nightmares. The Veteran also reported anxiety, impulsive spending, racing thoughts, and pacing. The examiner noted the Veteran showed some difficulty with attention and concentration. The examiner opined the Veteran’s mood disorder was at least as likely as not inextricably interwoven with his alcohol dependence. The examiner also opined the Veteran’s alcohol dependence was at least as likely as not associated with the Veteran’s military service. The Veteran had another examination for his mental disability in September 2010. The examiner noted the Veteran did not serve in combat. The Veteran was diagnosed with a mood disorder, NOS in July 2007. The Veteran had symptoms of anxiety and insomnia. The Veteran also reported having nightmares. The examiner said the Veteran’s mood disorder led to occupational and social impairment with deficiencies in most areas. However, the examiner did not offer an opinion as to whether the Veteran’s psychiatric disorder was at least as likely as not due to his time in service. While a veteran’s alcohol use disorder may be secondarily service connected due to a service connected disability, the Board notes alcohol dependence cannot be directly service connected and then used as the basis for secondary service connection of another disability. See VAOPGCPREC 7-99; VAOPGCPREC 2-98. Simply stated, alcohol abuse can not be the basis, or foundation, of a grant of service connection, under the law. The Board acknowledges the Veteran’s statements that he believes his mental disorder is due to his time in service. The Board also acknowledges the Veteran has continued to seek medical treatment for his mental health over the years. However, the Veteran is not competent to opine on matters requiring medical knowledge, such as the nature and etiology of his disability. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Thus, the Board provides more weight to the medical evidence of record, the preponderance of which does not show the Veteran’s mental disorder is due to his time in service. Therefore, the claims must be denied. It is important for the Veteran to understand that these medical findings provide highly probative evidence against this claim that the Board cannot, unfortunately, ignore, outweighing the Veteran’s belief that this problem is the result of service, providing a highly clear basis for the opinion (Continued on the next page)   Regarding all the above, the Board has considered the applicability of the benefit of the doubt doctrine. Because the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran’s claim, the benefit of the doubt doctrine does not apply. See 38 U.S.C. §5107(b); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 55-57(1990). John J. Crowley Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD A. Snoparsky, Associate Counsel