Citation Nr: 18151620 Decision Date: 11/19/18 Archive Date: 11/19/18 DOCKET NO. 16-49 531 DATE: November 19, 2018 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for hypertension is granted. FINDING OF FACT Resolving reasonable doubt in the Veteran’s favor, his hypertension is proximately due to or aggravated by his service-connected diabetes mellitus. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for secondary service connection for hypertension are met. U.S.C. §§ 1110, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.310 (2018). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active military service. To establish service connection for the claimed disorder, there must be (1) medical evidence of a current disability; (2) medical, or in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) medical, or in certain circumstances, lay evidence of a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the current disability. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (2018); see also Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1166-67 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Service connection may be established on a secondary basis for a disability which is proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disability or injury. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a) (2018). Secondary service connection may also be established for a nonservice-connected disability which is aggravated by a service-connected disability. In such an instance, the Veteran may be compensated for the degree of disability over and above the degree of disability existing prior to the aggravation. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a) (2018); Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439, 448 (1995). To establish entitlement to service connection on this secondary basis, there must be (1) evidence of a current disability; (2) evidence of a service-connected disability; and (3) medical evidence establishing a nexus between the service-connected disability and the current disability. See Wallin v. West, 11 Vet. App. 509, 512 (1998). The Board must determine the value of all evidence submitted, including lay and medical evidence. Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The evaluation of evidence generally involves a three-step inquiry. First, the Board must determine whether the evidence comes from a “competent” source. Second, the Board must then determine if the evidence is credible, or worthy of belief. Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 308 (2007). Third, the Board must weigh the probative value of the evidence in light of the entirety of the record. A claimant is entitled to the benefit of the doubt when there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2018). When a claimant seeks benefits and the evidence is in relative equipoise, the claimant prevails. See Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 4 (1990). The preponderance of the evidence must be against the claim for benefits to be denied. See Alemany v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 518 (1996). In July 2013 and March 2014, the Veteran received VA examinations for his diabetes mellitus. The VA examiners both noted that that his hypertension was at least as likely as not due to his diabetes mellitus. Furthermore, both examiners found that it was at least as likely as not that the Veteran’s diabetes mellitus permanently aggravated his hypertension. Conversely, in May 2014, a VA examiner found there was no causal link between the Veteran’s hypertension and diabetes mellitus. The examiner noted there was no evidence of diabetic renal disease, which according to VA guidelines is a necessary requirement to support a link. Additionally, the examiner noted the medical evidence did not show the Veteran’s diabetes mellitus permanently aggravated his hypertension. The positive and negative opinions are equally probative. Accordingly, as the evidence is in relative equipoise, the benefit-of-the-doubt goes to the Veteran. See Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 4 (1990). Therefore, the Board finds secondary service connection for hypertension is warranted. D. Martz Ames Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD R. Brunot, Associate Counsel