Citation Nr: 18151978 Decision Date: 11/20/18 Archive Date: 11/20/18 DOCKET NO. 14-25 420A DATE: November 20, 2018 ORDER Compensation for insomnia under 38 U.S.C. § 1151, as secondary to prostate cancer, is denied.   FINDING OF FACT The Veteran did not have insomnia during his lifetime. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for compensation for insomnia under 38 U.S.C. § 1151, as secondary to prostate cancer, have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.310, 3.361. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty from July 1962 to July 1965. He died in December 2017. The appellant is his surviving spouse. The case is on appeal from a January 2013 rating decision. In May 2016, the Veteran testified at a Board hearing. Prior to the Veteran’s death, in an October 2016 decision, the Board granted compensation pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 1151 for residuals of prostate cancer. In a February 2017 rating decision, the RO implemented the Board’s grant. The disability rating was 100 percent for prostate cancer and several other metastatic cancers. Special monthly compensation (SMC) at the housebound rate was also granted. See 38 U.S.C. § 1114(s); 38 C.F.R. § 3.350(i). The RO issued a supplemental statement of the case (SSOC) that same month listing the insomnia issue as still on appeal. After the Veteran passed away, in a February 2018 rating decision, the RO granted to the appellant Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (DIC) for the cause of the Veteran’s death under 38 U.S.C. § 1151. In March 2018, the appellant was substituted for the Veteran for the still pending insomnia issue appeal. The Board has limited the discussion below to the relevant evidence required to support its finding of fact and conclusion of law, as well as to the specific contentions regarding the case as raised directly by the Veteran and those reasonably raised by the record. See Scott v. McDonald, 789 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Robinson v. Peake, 21 Vet. App. 545, 552 (2008). Compensation for insomnia. The appellant contends that compensation is warranted for insomnia as a residual of, or secondary to, the Veteran’s prostate cancer. In a January 2012 statement, the Veteran had written that he had not had a full night’s sleep since his prostate cancer operation in April 2009. He explained that he must get up every 2 to 3 hours at night to urinate. A. Applicable Law Under 38 U.S.C. § 1151, compensation is awarded for a qualifying additional disability or death in the same manner as if such additional disability or death were service-connected. For purposes of this section, a disability or death is a qualifying additional disability if (1) the disability or death was not the result of the veteran’s willful misconduct, (2) the disability or death was caused by hospital care, medical or surgical treatment, or examination furnished the veteran under the law administered by the Secretary, and (3) the proximate cause of the disability or death was (A) carelessness, negligence, lack of proper skill, error in judgment, or similar instance of fault on the part of the Department in furnishing the hospital care, medical or surgical treatment, or examination, or (B) an event not reasonably foreseeable. 38 U.S.C. § 1151; 38 C.F.R. § 3.361; Viegas v. Shinseki, 705 F.3d 1374, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Disability compensation may be paid, pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 1151 and 38 C.F.R. § 3.310, for disability which is proximately due to or the result of a disability for which compensation is payable under section 1151. See VAOGCPREC 8-97; see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.310. B. Discussion In this case, the question for the Board is whether the Veteran had the disability of “insomnia” and whether it was secondary to his prostate cancer. The Board concludes that there is not sufficient evidence of the Veteran having insomnia, including a diagnosis. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a); Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439 (1995). While the Veteran—and now the appellant on his behalf—believed he had insomnia, he is not competent to provide a diagnosis in this case to the extent it is the commonly understood condition that is part of a mental condition. See Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary at 937 (30th ed. 2003). The issue is medically complex, as it requires specialized medical education/knowledge in the field of psychology. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377, 1377 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2007). See also 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a) (diagnoses of mental disorders must conform to the DSM). This is similarly complex if it is considered a physical sleep disorder. See, e.g., 38 C.F.R. § 4.97, Diagnostic Code (DC) 6847. Consequently, while the Veteran’s statements are competent and credible evidence that he had sleep problems related to prostate cancer, his statements are not competent to establish a diagnosis. Moreover, VA and private treatment records do not show such a diagnosis. To this extent his statements tend to indicate sleep problems from having to wake multiple times at night to urinate, such symptoms are contemplated by the rating schedule for prostate cancer, which provides for disabilities based on urinary frequency, including awakening at night to void. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.115a, 4.115b, DC 7528. To this extent, the Veteran’s symptoms are currently recognized as a component of his prostate cancer with compensation having been awarded under the rating schedule accordingly. The rating was 100 percent, which contemplates the residuals. Absent a current disability, the claim is denied. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303; Holton v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Romanowsky v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 289, 294 (2013); McClain v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 319, 321 (2007). As such, the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim and the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine is not applicable. See 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. The Veteran’s case was not reviewed by a VA examiner to address this claim. Such an opinion is not needed, however, as the evidence of record is currently adequate to decide the claim. See 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(a); DeLaRosa v. Peake, 515 F.3d 1319, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2008). RYAN T. KESSEL Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD C. Bosely, Counsel