Citation Nr: 18152317 Decision Date: 11/21/18 Archive Date: 11/21/18 DOCKET NO. 17-11 707 DATE: November 21, 2018 ORDER Whether additional monetary benefits have accrued but not been paid since the Veteran's death. FINDING OF FACT The Regional Office’s (RO) June 2016 rating action to include grants of service connection for psyche insomnia with dementia and for fibrosis does not result in payment of additional compensation benefits. CONCLUSION OF LAW Additional monetary benefits have not accrued but been unpaid since the Veteran's January 2016 death. 38 U.S.C. § 5121; 38 C.F.R. § 3.1000. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Veteran served on active duty from February 1962 to February 1964 and from September 1965 to February 1977. He died in January 2016. At the time of his death, he was entitled to VA compensation at the 100 percent rate, with additional monthly compensation based on the need for aid and attendance due to service connected disabilities. He was in the process of claiming for VA benefits when he died in January 2016. In February 2016, the appellant filed a claim for accrued benefits. In August 2016, VA informed her that accrued benefits decisions had been made and that the Veteran's monthly disability compensation remained unchanged after them. In September 2016, she expressed disagreement with the accrued benefits decision, stating that she did not understand – if the additional conditions the Veteran claimed during his lifetime are service connected, why is there no additional (monetary) compensation for them? Accrued benefits are periodic monthly benefits to which a Veteran was entitled but were unpaid at the time of his death. Review of the record shows that the Veteran had 2 service connection claims pending at the time of his January 2016 death and that these claims were subsequently granted in June 2016 as accrued benefits claims. The claims granted were for service connection for psyche insomnia with dementia, and for fibrosis. However, these newly-established service-connected conditions did not result in a change in the Veteran’s periodic monthly benefits. Prior to his death, the Veteran was already in receipt of service-connected compensation benefits at the 100 percent rate with additional monthly compensation based on aid and attendance. The accrued benefits rating decisions which were made in June 2016 did not change this periodic monthly benefit because the Veteran remained at the 100 percent rate with aid and attendance. This is what he was already being paid for before his death. He was already at the 100 percent rate, and the grants did not result in increased special monthly compensation above the regular aid and attendance rate. Consequently, there are no accrued but unpaid monetary benefits to be paid. In the appellant's notice of disagreement, she stated that she does not understand how the favorable accrued decisions which established service connection for new conditions do not result in additional compensation. The reason is that the Veteran, during his lifetime, already established entitlement to service-connected compensation benefits at the 100 percent rate with additional compensation benefits due to his need for aid and attendance (special monthly compensation). The accrued decisions which established service connection for new conditions do not result in a rate higher than the 100 percent rate plus the special monthly compensation rate the Veteran already received during his lifetime. While additional disabilities were granted service connection after the Veteran's death, they do not merit additional compensation. Consequently, there are no monetary benefits that were unpaid to the Veteran prior to his death that remain to be delivered. As such, payment of monetary benefits based on accrued benefits is not warranted. Unfortunately, this is the case although the appellant explained in February 2017 that she is appealing for additional benefits on the basis of financial need to sustain herself. The Board notes that the appellant had attempted to appoint Disabled American Veterans as her representative in July 2018. However, the necessary signature on behalf of Disabled American Veterans was not supplied on the July 2018 VA Form 21-22. The appellant was advised in October 2018 that the authorization dated in July 2018 was not valid, because a Veterans Service Organization employee must sign the authorization form. She was given a period of 30 days to appoint a representative if she so desired and was provided additional information about other representation options available to her. Since then, she submitted invalid VA Forms 21-22 dated in September and October 2018, signed only by her, and indicating that she had written Disabled American Veterans in the past without success and “I cannot do anything more.” She requested “[p]lease continue with my appeal.” Accordingly, she is considered to represent herself. M. C. GRAHAM Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD C. Lawson, Counsel