Citation Nr: 18154540
Decision Date: 11/30/18	Archive Date: 11/30/18

DOCKET NO. 16-08 037
DATE:	November 30, 2018
ORDER
The application to reopen the claim of service connection for traumatic brain injury (TBI) is denied.
The application to reopen the claim of service connection for diabetes mellitus, type II (DM) is denied.
The application to reopen the claim of service connection for right knee disorder is granted.
Service connection for right knee disorder is denied
Service connection for left knee disorder is denied.
Service connection for bilateral hip disorder including as secondary to right knee disorder is denied.
Service connection for plantar fasciitis is denied.
Service connection for hypertension to include due to posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or as due to exposure to herbicide is denied.
Service connection for chloracne of chest, face, back, buttock, thighs, groin, and arm pits to include as due to exposure to herbicide is denied.
Service connection for migraine headaches is denied.
Service connection for peripheral neuropathy, bilateral lower extremities, to include as due to exposure to herbicide is denied.
Service connection for PTSD is denied.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. In a February 2009 decision, the Board denied service connection for TBI and right knee disorder.
2. Evidence received since the February 2009 Board decision denying service connection for TBI is cumulative or redundant of the evidence of record at the time of the prior final denial.
3. Evidence received since the February 2009 Board decision denying service connection for a right knee disorder is relevant and probative.
4. In an unappealed August 2005 rating decision, the RO denied service connection for DM.
5. Evidence submitted since the August 2005 rating decision is cumulative or redundant of the evidence of record at the time of the prior final denial of the DM claim.
6. Right knee disorder to include arthritis did not manifest in service or within one year of separation. The disability is not otherwise related to service.
7. Bilateral hip disorder did not manifest in service, is not otherwise related to service, nor is it related to a service-connected disease or injury.
 

8. Left knee disorder to include arthritis did not manifest in service or within one year of separation. The disability is not otherwise related to service.
9. There is no competent evidence of peripheral neuropathy of either lower extremity.
10.  Bilateral plantar fasciitis did not manifest in service and is not attributable to service.
11. Hypertension did not manifest in service or within one year of separation. The disability is not otherwise related to service or a service-connected disease or injury.
12. There is no competent evidence of chloracne of chest, face, back, buttock, thighs, groin, and arm pits.
13.  Migraine headaches did not manifest in service or within one year of separation. The disability is not otherwise related to service.
14. The Veteran does not have PTSD; there is no confirmed stressor.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The February 2009 Board decision denying service connection for TBI and right knee disorder is final. 38 U.S.C. § 7104; 38 C.F.R. § 20.1100.
2. New and material evidence having been received; the claim for entitlement to service connection for a right knee disability is reopened. 38 U.S.C. § 5108; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.156 (a).
3. New and material evidence not having been received; the claim for entitlement to service connection for TBI is not reopened. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 5108; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.156 (a).
4. The August 2005 rating decision denying service connection for DM is final. 38 U.S.C. § 7105; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104, 20.302, 20.1103.
5. New and material evidence not having been received; the claim for entitlement to service connection for DM is not reopened. 38 U.S.C. § 5108; 38 C.F.R. § 3.156.
6. The criteria for service connection for right knee disorder are not met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1110, 1131, 1137, 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303(a)-(b), (d), 3.307, 3.309(a).
7. The criteria for service connection for a bilateral hip disorder, to include as secondary to service-connected disease or injury, are not met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1112, 1113, 1131, 1137, 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303(a)-(b), (d), 3.310(a).
8. The criteria for service connection for left knee disorder are not met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1110, 1131, 1137, 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303(a)-(b), (d), 3.307, 3.309(a).
9. The criteria for service connection for peripheral neuropathy of bilateral lower extremities are not met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1110, 1131, 1137, 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303(a)-(b), (d), 3.307, 3.309(a).
10. The criteria for service connection for bilateral plantar fasciitis are not met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303.
 

11. The criteria for service connection for hypertension are not met, to include as secondary to service-connected disease or injury, are not met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1110, 1131, 1137, 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303(a)-(b), (d), 3.307, 3.309(a), 3.310(a).
12. The criteria for service connection for chloracne of chest, face, back, buttock, thighs, groin, and arm pits are not met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1110, 1131, 1137, 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303(a)-(b), (d), 3.307, 3.309(a).
13. The criteria for service connection for migraines are not met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1110, 1131, 1137, 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303(a)-(b), (d), 3.307, 3.309(a).
14.  The criteria for service connection for PTSD are not met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1110, 1131, 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304.
REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The Veteran served on active duty from June 1974 to June 1977. He appeals an October 2013 rating decision that denied these claims.
New and Material Evidence
In general, rating decisions that are not timely appealed are final. See 38 U.S.C. § 7105; 38 C.F.R. § 20.1103. Pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 5108, a finally disallowed claim may be reopened when new and material evidence is presented or secured with respect to that claim.
New evidence is defined as evidence not previously submitted to agency decision-makers. Material evidence means existing evidence that, by itself or when considered with previous evidence of record, relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim. New and material evidence can be neither cumulative nor redundant of the evidence of record at the time of the last prior final denial of the claim sought to be reopened, and must raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (a). In determining whether evidence is new and material, the "credibility of the evidence is to be presumed." Justus v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 510, 513 (1992). 
38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (a) creates a low threshold. Shade v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App 110 (2010). The regulation is designed to be consistent with 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (c)(4), which "does not require new and material evidence as to each previously unproven element of a claim." See id.


1. TBI
The Board issued a decision in February 2009 denying the Veteran’s claim for entitlement to service connection for TBI. That decision is final. See 38 U.S.C. § 7104; 38 C.F.R. § 20.1100 (a). At the time of the Board decision, there was no accepted competent evidence of current disability or of in-service disease or injury. The Board considered the service treatment records and post service medical records, which were negative as to head injury, as well as the Veteran’s statements that he fell head first off of a tank in service. The Board notes that the Veteran had checked yes to having a history of head injury in his March/April 1977 separation examination and the examiner noted that the Veteran had a contusion on his head, but there were no other details.
The Veteran submitted an application to reopen the claim in June 2012. Evidence received since the final February 2009 Board decision includes a March 2013 Memorandum of Formal Finding on a Lack of Information Required to Verify Stressors in Connection to a Post Traumatic Stress Disorder Claim, a June 2013 Formal finding on a lack of information required to concede herbicide exposure for service in or near the Korean DMZ, a September 2015 Defense Personnel Records Information Retrieval system (DPRIS) response regarding negative evidence of alleged in-service stressor in March 1975 in a tunnel in the DMZ, VA treatment records dated through October 2014, and statements from the Veteran. The evidence continues to show no current TBI or head injury diagnosis and no in-service injury. 
This evidence is not material because it provides no evidence that relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim. See Shade v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 110 (2010). The Veteran’s statements since February 2009 are not new and material because they are cumulative. The critical facts have not changed. There remains no current disability. Accordingly, the Board finds that new and material evidence has not been received to reopen the Veteran’s claim for entitlement to service connection for TBI, and the claim is not reopened. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (a).
While 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (a) creates a low threshold, and does not require new and material evidence as to each previously unproven element of a claim, the Veteran has not presented new and material evidence with respect to any previously unproven element of the claim.

2. Right knee
The Board issued a decision in February 2009 denying the Veteran’s claim for entitlement to service connection for right knee disorder. That decision is final. See 38 U.S.C. § 7104; 38 C.F.R. § 20.1100 (a). At the time of the Board decision, there was no accepted evidence of current disability or of in-service disease or injury. The Veteran alleged he injured his right knee when he fell off the tank as described in the TBI claim. It was noted that service treatment records contain no reported complaints, treatment, or findings related to a right knee, but that a March 1977 report of medical history shows the Veteran reported having swollen or painful joints. The examining physician did not provide any additional comment as to the report of swollen or painful joints and the associated April 1977 separation examination did not reveal any clinical abnormalities involving the Veteran’s right knee. Post service medical records show a reported history of right knee football injury in September 2004, and VA treatment records dated in April 2006 reflect right knee pain.
The Veteran submitted an application to reopen the claim in June 2012. Evidence received since the final February 2009 Board decision is noted above in the TBI claim discussion. The 2010-2014 VA treatment records show current arthritis of the right knee. 
This evidence is new in that it was not previously considered by VA. It is material because it provides evidence that relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim. See Shade v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 110 (2010). There is now current disability. Accordingly, the Board finds that new and material evidence has been received to reopen the Veteran’s claim for entitlement to service connection for right knee disorder, and the claim is reopened. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (a).
3. DM
In the August 2005 rating decision, the RO denied the claim of service connection for DM on the basis that there was no treatment or notation of DM in service or within a year of service separation, and there was no relationship between any current DM and service. Also, the Veteran did not service in Vietnam nor did he service in Korea during 1968 or 1969, thus he was not presumptively exposed to herbicide agents. Further, the record did not show that he was otherwise exposed to herbicides in service. Treatment records showed initial DM diagnosis decades after service. No notice of disagreement or new and material evidence was submitted within one year. The decision is final.
In 2012 the Veteran submitted the application to reopen the claim. Treatment records since the 2005 denial continue to show no relationship between any current DM and service. There have been no additional service treatment records added. The June 2013 Formal finding on a lack of information required to concede herbicide exposure for service in or near the Korean DMZ does not relate to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim; it is not material. The Veteran continues to assert he was in fact in the DMZ but he has not alleged it to have been during the presumptive time period, again he asserts it was in 1975, consistent with his documented service. Also, there is no new evidence that he was indeed exposed to herbicide in service. 
The Board finds that the evidence submitted since the August 2005 denial is redundant or cumulative of the evidence of record at the time of the last prior final decision. The record shows that the RO had previously considered the Veteran’s service records and all VA medical records and concluded that the Veteran’s DM noted years after service was not related to service because it had not manifested in service or during multiple decades thereafter, nor was it otherwise related to service. Also, no evidence suggests he was in fact exposed to herbicides, which could allow for presumptive service connection.
The Veteran’s statements since August 2005 are not new and material because they are cumulative. The critical facts have not changed: DM was first present years following service has not been shown to have been related to service, and there is no evidence that the Veteran was exposed to herbicides in service. 
Consequently, the claim may not be reopened because no new and material evidence has been received. 
While 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (a) creates a low threshold, and does not require new and material evidence as to each previously unproven element of a claim, the Veteran has not presented new and material evidence with respect to any previously unproven element of the claim.
Service Connection
Service connection may be established for disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in the line of duty in the active military, naval, or air service or for aggravation of a preexisting injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty. 38 U.S.C. § 1110, 1131.
In general, to establish a right to compensation for a present disability, a Veteran must show: (1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service - the so-called “nexus” requirement. Holton v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
The Board notes that the Veteran has not been afforded VA examination in connection with these claims. VA’s duty to assist includes providing a medical examination or obtaining a medical opinion when one is necessary to render a decision on the claim. See McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006). Development is considered necessary if the information and evidence of record does not contain sufficient competent medical evidence to decide the claim, but contains: (1) competent evidence of diagnosed disability or symptoms of disability, (2) establishes that the veteran had an event, injury or disease in service, or has a presumptive disease during the pertinent presumptive period, and (3) indicates that the claimed disability may be associated with the in-service event, injury, or disease, or with another service-connected disability. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (c) (4). The Board observes that there are no diagnoses pertaining to peripheral neuropathy, chloracne and plantar fasciitis, and no competent evidence that the claimed disability may be related to any event in service or a service-connected disease or injury. As to the conditions other than PTSD, although there are post-service diagnoses pertaining to the disorders, there is no evidence that the claimed disabilities may be related to service or a service-connected disease or injury. As to PTSD, there is no verified stressor and the Veteran did not serve in a capacity where a stressor can be presumed, a 2012 PTSD screening during VA treatment indicated PTSD but the diagnosis was not borne out on follow-up evaluation. Therefore, no examination is required for any of these claims. The factual foundation to support the claims is not demonstrated. The Board thus finds that the evidence on file is adequate to render a decision on the claims, and that examination is unnecessary.

4. Chloracne
5. Peripheral neuropathy of the lower extremities
6. Plantar fasciitis
The issue for the Board is whether the Veteran has current chloracne, peripheral neuropathy of the lower extremities or plantar fasciitis that began during service or is at least as likely as not related to service or service-connected disease or injury. 
The Board concludes that the Veteran does not have chloracne, peripheral neuropathy of the lower extremities or plantar fasciitis and has not had any such disability at any time during the pendency of the claim or recent to the filing of the claim. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131, 5107(b); Holton v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Romanowsky v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 289, 294 (2013); McClain v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 319, 321 (2007); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a), (d).
The Veteran does not contend nor does the record show that that he underwent treatment or made complaints, or that there were findings of peripheral neuropathy or plantar fasciitis in service. Service treatment records for the Veteran’s period of service are negative for treatment of these disorders and his April 1977 separation examination is negative as to the feet, lower extremities and neurologic system. 
The Veteran asserts generally in his June 2012 VA 21-526 Claim (Compensation), that he has these disabilities and they are due to service. However, a search of VA treatment records from all identified VA facilities from 2004 through 2006 and 2010 through 2014 does not reveal treatment for peripheral neuropathy or plantar fasciitis. No relevant complaints or supportive findings are noted. Rather, the Veteran repeatedly denied neurologic complaints during multiple treatment evaluations and periodic foot evaluations performed due to diabetes from 2010 to 2014. These instead revealed essentially normal feet with only some mild diabetic related reduced sensation. While metatarsalgia is listed as one of the conditions in the problem list in these VA treatment records, there are no findings or complaints relevant to that condition or plantar fasciitis in the actual treatment records. 
As to chloracne, there is no current diagnosis of chloracne and the long-standing skin disorder noted in the record is diagnosed as perforating folliculitis. Service connection and a 60 percent rating are in effect for that disability.
There is no competent evidence of current disease, residuals of injury or disability of plantar fasciitis or peripheral neuropathy of the lower extremities or chloracne. Due to the absence of proof of a present disability, there is no valid claim for service connection. Congress has specifically limited entitlement to service connection to cases where such incidents have resulted in a disability at any point during the claim or appeal period. Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223 (1992). Here, we lack competent evidence of disease, injury and disability.
While the Veteran is competent to report subjective symptoms, his minimal assertions that there is current disability are less probative than the negative current treatment record coupled with the overall lack of findings since service. 
The preponderance of the evidence is against the claims, the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine does not apply, and the claim must be denied. 38 U.S.C. § 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.102.
7. Right knee disorder
8. Left knee disorder 
9. Bilateral hip
The Veteran alleges that right and left knee disorders are due to service, and that a bilateral hip disorder is proximately due to the right knee disorder or due to cold injury. 
The first question for the Board is whether the Veteran has current right or left knee disorder that manifested in service or within the applicable presumptive period, or whether the conditions are otherwise related to service
The Veteran asserts that he injured his right knee when he fell from a tank in service, and has a current resulting right knee disorder. He reports that, during service, he fell off a tank head first and hit his right knee on the tailgate while his head hit the concrete. He has made no specific assertions with regard to the left knee except that he hurt it climbing poles in his linesman capacity. He has also alleged that the right knee disorder that caused the hip disorder is related to cold injury in Korea.
There is current right knee arthritis as demonstrated in 2010 through 2014 VA treatment records. There is also left knee arthralgia, as noted in these records. 
The Board concludes that, while the Veteran has right knee arthritis which constitutes a chronic disease under 38 U.S.C. § 1101(3); 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a) (arthritis), arthritis did not manifest in service or within a presumptive period, and continuity of symptomatology is not established. Rather, the lower extremities were normal at the separation examination in April 1977 and there were no related complaints for the knees for the years following service prior to approximately 2004. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101(3), 1112, 1113, 1137; Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303(b), 3.307, 3.309(a). While service treatment records contain no reported complaints, treatment, or findings related to a right knee, a March 1977 report of medical history shows the Veteran reported having swollen or painful joints in general. The examining physician did not provide any additional comment as to the report of swollen or painful joints and again the associated April 1977 separation examination did not reveal any clinical abnormalities involving the Veteran’s knees. Moreover, the March 1977 report of medical history also contains his denial of having or ever having had trick or locked knee and arthritis or lameness.
Left knee arthralgia is not a chronic disease and thus no presumption need be addressed. 
Post-service treatment records show left and right knee disorders were first noted decades following the Veteran’s separation from active service and outside the applicable presumptive period with respect to the right knee. The record reflects reports in 2004.
While the Veteran is competent to report having experienced certain symptoms, he has not asserted in connection with this claim that he has had symptoms of the knees during service or the presumptive period, with regard to the right knee. To the extent that he makes such contention, the record of his denial as to knee problems on his March 1977 report of medical history, as well as the lack of treatment for years following service, contradicts these assertions. To that extent, the assertions are not credible. 
The Board accords substantial probative weight to the competent medical evidence, the treatment record, which establishes that right knee arthritis and left knee disorder first manifested years after service, and not during service or during any presumptive period. The treatment record is more probative than the Veteran’s assertions as to the lack of these disorders in service or for years following service. See Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (the passage of many years between discharge from active service and the medical documentation of a claimed disability may be considered in evaluating a claim of service connection).
Finally, while the Veteran asserts that he has a bilateral hip disorder is due to a right knee disorder or cold injury, (1) there is no competent evidence of a bilateral hip disorder and (2) service connection is not being awarded for right knee disorder, and thus there can be no secondary service connection. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a). 
The preponderance of the evidence is against the claims, the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine does not apply, and the claim must be denied. 38 U.S.C. § 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.102
10. Hypertension
11. Migraine headaches
The Veteran alleges that hypertension and migraines are due to service. He has specifically asserted that hypertension is due to herbicide exposure in the DMZ in Korea. He has also specifically asserted that migraines are due to the aforementioned fall off a truck at Fort Hood.
The first question for the Board is whether the Veteran has current hypertension or migraines that manifested in service or within the applicable presumptive period, or whether the conditions are otherwise related to service.
There is current hypertension dating from 2003 private treatment records and migraine headaches as noted from March 2010 VA treatment records. 
The Board concludes that, while the Veteran has hypertension and migraines which are a chronic disease under 38 U.S.C. § 1101(3); 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a), they did not manifest in service or within a presumptive period, and continuity of symptomatology is not established. Rather, the heart and vascular system and the head and neurologic system were normal at the separation examination in April 1977. The Veteran denied frequent or severe headaches and high blood pressure in his March 1977 report of medical history. Also, there were no related complaints for these conditions for the years following service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101(3), 1112, 1113, 1137; Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303(b), 3.307, 3.309(a).
Post-service treatment records show migraines and hypertension were first noted many years following the Veteran’s separation from active service and outside the applicable presumptive period.
While the Veteran is competent to report having experienced certain symptoms, he has not actually asserted in connection with this claim that he has had symptoms of hypertension and migraines during service or the presumptive period. To the extent that he makes such contention, the record of his denial as to headaches and blood pressure problems on his March 1977 report of medical history, as well as the lack of treatment for years following service, contradicts these assertions. There is no treatment for migraine headaches or hypertension in service or for years thereafter. To that extent, the assertions are not credible. 
The Board accords substantial probative weight to the competent medical evidence, the treatment record, which establishes that migraines and hypertension first manifested years after service, and not during service or during any presumptive period. The treatment record is more probative than the Veteran’s assertions as to the lack of these disorders in service or for years following service. See Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (the passage of many years between discharge from active service and the medical documentation of a claimed disability may be considered in evaluating a claim of service connection).
Finally, while the Veteran asserts that his hypertension is related to herbicide exposure in the DMZ in Korea, the record reflects that he was not in Korea during the period in which there was a presumption of herbicide exposure, and the preponderance of the evidence is against a finding that he was otherwise exposed to herbicide while in Korea. The Department of Defense (DOD) has identified specific units it has cited that served in areas along the DMZ in Korea where herbicides were used between April 1968 and July 1969. 38 C.F.R. § 3.307 (a)(6)(iv). The service personnel record and the Veterans own statements indicate he served in Korea from December 1974 through December 1975, outside the dates to concede herbicide exposure. Moreover, hypertension is not a disease presumptively associated with herbicide exposure, but there is recognized “sufficient” evidence of an association, as noted in a recent Veterans and Agent Orange: Update 11 (2018), the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine (NAS). Service connection may be granted based on the establishment of direct exposure. In this regard, the Board notes the June 2013 VA formal finding of lack of information required to concede herbicide exposure for service in or near the Korean DMZ. This report was prepared following a thorough search of all available records in an effort to determine herbicide exposure. The Board finds it comprehensive and persuasive evidence that the Veteran was not exposed to herbicide, and thus there is no support for the theory that hypertension is due to herbicide exposure, even on a direct basis. 
The preponderance of the evidence is against the claims, the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine does not apply, and the claim must be denied. 38 U.S.C. § 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.102.
12. PTSD
The Veteran contends he has PTSD due to in service trauma, specifically that he was in the DMZ in Korea when a U.S. soldier was killed in a booby-trapped tunnel left by the North Korean forces. He reports the incident occurred in March 1975. He initially described it as a mortar attack 100 yards from his crew but this was later revised to the booby trap incident. His service personnel records do reflect that he was in Korea in the DMZ during March 1975. However, thorough and required efforts by VA have not been able to verify the incident.
Service connection for PTSD requires medical evidence diagnosing the condition in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125 (a); a link, established by medical evidence, between current symptoms and an in-service stressor; and credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304 (f). Additionally, VA regulations provide that if the veteran engaged in combat with the enemy, and the claimed stressor is related to that combat, then the veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of an in-service stressor, as long as it is consistent with the circumstances of his service and there is no clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Id.
At the outset, the Board determines that the record does not demonstrate that the Veteran engaged in combat; receipt of an award or medal related to combat or other documentation of combat has not been established. The Veteran was a linesman and TP installer with the 51st Signal Battalion, Korea from December 1974 to December 1975. and his medals include National Defense Service Medal and Sharpshooter (Rifle) Badge. Neither his military specialty nor the service personnel records disclose that the nature of his duties exposed him to combat.
Generally, where a determination is made that a veteran did not "engage in combat with the enemy," or the claimed stressor is not related to combat, a veteran's lay testimony alone will not be enough to establish the occurrence of the alleged stressor. See Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389, 395 (1996. In such cases, the record must contain service records or other corroborative evidence that substantiates or verifies the veteran's testimony or statements as to the occurrence of the claimed stressor. See West (Carlton) v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 70, 76(1994).
If a stressor claimed by a Veteran is related to the veteran's fear of hostile military or terrorist activity and a VA psychiatrist or psychologist, or a psychiatrist or psychologist with whom VA has contracted, confirms that the claimed stressor is adequate to support a diagnosis of PTSD and that the Veteran's symptoms are related to the claimed stressor, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided the claimed stressor is consistent with the places, types, and circumstances of the Veteran's service, the Veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. For purposes of this paragraph, "fear of hostile military or terrorist activity" means that a Veteran experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or circumstance that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of the Veteran or others, such as from an actual or potential improvised explosive device; vehicle-imbedded explosive device; incoming artillery, rocket, or mortar fire; grenade; small arms fire, including suspected sniper fire; or attack upon friendly military aircraft, and the Veteran's response to the event or circumstance involved a psychological or psycho-physiological state of fear, helplessness, or horror. 75 Fed. Reg. 39843 (July 13, 2010), as amended by 75 Fed. Reg. 41092 (July 15, 2010)). The rule has no geographic requirement and is not limited to service in a combat zone or on land. Id. 
Here, lay statements are not sufficient to verify the in-service stressor because the Veteran was not diagnosed with PTSD in service, is not a "combat veteran", does not have a stressor related to fear of hostile military or terrorist activity, and is not a prisoner of war. 38 C.F.R. 3.304 (f) (1-4). Thus, credible supporting evidence is required to establish the in-service stressor occurred.
The Veteran’s reported stressor has been considered. The RO initially found the evidence insufficient to send to the US Army and Joint Services Records Research Center (JSRRC). See November 2013 VA Memo. However, it ordered JSRRC review thereafter based on more detail and articles submitted by the Veteran about a death in a booby-trapped tunnel in March 1975 in the DMZ. A review by DPRIS in September 2015 reflects they reviewed all available records but were unable to locate any records pertaining to the Veteran’s unit, the 51st Signal Battalion, Korea, for the calendar year 1975. They did review other historical documents and were able to document that on November 20, 1974, a U.S. naval officer was killed and two others injured when an explosion erupted during their Joint Observer team investigation of the North Korean built tunnel extending under the United Nation Command portion of the DMZ. The Veteran was not yet in Korea at that time.
VA treatment records reflect the Veteran had positive PTSD screen in April 2012, which triggered a mental health evaluation for PTSD that month. The Veteran reported that he had a stressor of being in Korea during a period of bombing. The assessment upon mental status examination was:
CLM Score is 37 -PTSD dx is not suggested; DSM-IV PTSD Criteria C, D is met; DSM-IV PTSD Criteria B is NOT met.
The summary impression was: 
Veteran presents symptoms consistent with adjustment d/o with mixed anxious and depressed mood. He seems most concerned with increased VA SC disability for agent orange. He is not a danger to himself or others, at this time.
The diagnostic impression was adjustment disorder with mixed anxious and depressed mood.
Regarding the Veteran's claimed PTSD, the Board finds that the VA treatment records are entitled to more probative weight as to the issue of whether there is PTSD. The only in-service event identified by the Veteran is the booby-trapped tunnel. However, this could not be verified. The mental health evaluation in April 2012 indicated that the criteria for PTSD were not met. To the extent that the positive PTSD screen is taken to be a diagnosis of PTSD, it does not conform to the legal requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 3.304 (f), which requires "an in-service stressor and credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred." 
The Veteran claims he has PTSD, and is competent to report that which he has been told by a professional. However, such lay opinion is of less value than the documented record that establishes no verified stressor. Without a verified stressor, there can be no valid diagnosis of PTSD in this case based on the present record. The lay opinion and the notations of PTSD in the treatment record fail to establish a valid diagnosis based upon credible supporting evidence of a stressor. The Board gives more probative weight to the competent documented evidence that there is no verified stressor. 
The Board concludes that the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim for entitlement for service connection for PTSD. The benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine is therefore not applicable. 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (b).

 
H. N. SCHWARTZ
Veterans Law Judge
Board of Veterans’ Appeals
ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD	N. RIPPEL