Citation Nr: 18154642 Decision Date: 12/04/18 Archive Date: 11/30/18 DOCKET NO. 16-20 915 DATE: December 4, 2018 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for a heart condition is denied. Entitlement to service connection for an enlarged prostate is denied. Entitlement to service connection for prostate cancer is denied. Entitlement to service connection for diabetes mellitus is denied. Entitlement to neuropathy of the left upper extremity is denied. Entitlement to neuropathy of the right upper extremity is denied. Entitlement to neuropathy of the left lower extremity is denied. Entitlement to neuropathy of the right lower extremity is denied. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The Veteran did not serve in the Republic of Vietnam and was not exposed to herbicides during service. 2. The Veteran does not have a left upper extremity neuropathy disability that had its onset during active service, was caused by active service, or manifested within one year of separation from active service. 3. The Veteran does not have an enlarged prostate condition that had its onset in or is otherwise related to service. 4. The Veteran does not have prostate cancer that had its onset during active service, was caused by active service, or manifested within one year of separation from active service. 5. The Veteran does not have a diabetes mellitus disability that had its onset during active service, was caused by active service, or manifested within one year of separation from active service. 6. The Veteran does not have a left upper extremity neuropathy disability that had its onset during active service, was caused by active service, or manifested within one year of separation from active service. 7. The Veteran does not have a right upper extremity neuropathy disability that had its onset during active service, was caused by active service, or manifested within one year of separation from active service. 8. The Veteran does not have a left lower extremity neuropathy disability that had its onset during active service, was caused by active service, or manifested within one year of separation from active service. 9. The Veteran does not have a right lower extremity neuropathy disability that had its onset during active service, was caused by active service, or manifested within one year of separation from active service. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The criteria for service connection for a heart disorder have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1112, 1113, 1154(b), 5107(b) (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.304(d), 3.307, 3.309 (2018). 2. The criteria for service connection for an enlarged prostate have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304 (2018). 3. The criteria for service connection for prostate cancer have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 1116, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.6, 3.102, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309 (2018). 4. The criteria for service connection for diabetes mellitus have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1112, 1113, 1154(b), 5107(b) (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.304(d), 3.307, 3.309 (2018). 5. The criteria for service connection for neuropathy of the left upper extremity have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1131, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (2018). 6. The criteria for service connection for neuropathy of the right upper extremity have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1131, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (2018). 7. The criteria for service connection for neuropathy of the left lower extremity have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1131, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (2018). 8. The criteria for service connection for neuropathy of the right lower extremity have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1131, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (2018). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Veteran served on active duty from August 1973 to January 1974, at which time he was discharged while in trainee status. His allegations of earlier service are addressed in further detail below. Service Connection Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from a disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C. 1110 (2012); 38 C.F.R. 3.303 (a) (2018). To establish a right to compensation for a present disability, a veteran must show: (1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 1. Entitlement to service connection for a heart condition The Veteran contends that he has a heart condition that is related to in-service exposure to herbicides. At the outset, the Board notes that while the Veteran asserts that he served in Vietnam, there is no evidence to support that assertion. Review of the Veteran’s military personnel records and service treatment records (STRs) show that the Veteran entered active duty on August 15, 1973 and was discharged from active duty on January 30, 1974 with no overseas period of service. The Veteran contends that these dates of service are incorrect, and that his service department must have confused his records with another person. He alleges that his records should show he served beginning in 1971, with a period of service in Vietnam, and alleged that the records incorrectly show he was discharged with time lost for missing duty. The record contains the Veteran’s military personnel record, which includes his 1973 enlistment contract noting that the period beginning in August 1973 represented his first enlistment. None of his official personnel records suggest an earlier period of service, and are all remarkably consistent in showing service only in 1973 and 1974. Those records are also consistent in showing that he missed duty and was punished for that infraction. The personnel records identify the veteran by his social security number as well. The Veteran has submitted a photocopied scrap of paper from the Selective Service showing that he was registered with the Selective Service in 1971, at which time he had a scar on his right foot. The Board points out that registering with the Selective Service around the age of 18 is not the same as entering onto active duty. There is no law or regulations suggesting that registration with the Selective Service qualifies as active duty. The Board notes that the Veteran has requested that his service department correct his records to reflect the claimed earlier period of service. There is no response from the service department on file. As the Veteran has not provided VA with the service department’s response to his application for correction of the records, the Board assumes his application was denied. In any event, there simply is no official documentation suggesting the Veteran served on active duty prior to August 1973. Consequently, the Board finds that the Veteran never served overseas during service, and in fact was discharged while still a trainee. He clearly did not serve in Vietnam. A review of the Veteran’s STRs does not reveal any treatment for or diagnosis of a heart condition. Post-service treatment records reflect that the Veteran had a cardiac stent placed in 2002 and was diagnosed with coronary artery disease as early as July 2003, many years after discharge from service. To establish a right to compensation for a present disability, a veteran must show: (1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2004). There is no evidence of an in-service incurrence of a disease or injury and there is no competent medical evidence linking the Veteran’s current coronary artery disease disability to the Veteran’s military service. Furthermore, to the extent that the Veteran himself attributes a current heart condition to service, the medical evidence does not show that the Veteran has a current heart disability that warrants service connection. Although lay persons are competent to provide opinions on some medical issues, see Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428, 435 (2011), as to the specific issue in this case, the etiology of a heart condition falls outside the realm of common knowledge of a lay person. Moreover, the Veteran’s contention is not that his heart disorder was present in service, but rather that he was exposed to herbicides, which in turn led to the heart disorder. As already explained, he was not exposed to herbicides in service. In short, there is no competent or credible evidence of a heart disorder in service or until decades after service, and no competent evidence linking any heart disorder to service. Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim for service connection for a heart condition. The benefit of the doubt rule does not apply, and the Veteran’s claim for service connection for a heart condition is denied. 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (b); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. at 54-56. 2. Entitlement to service connection for an enlarged prostate The Veteran contends that his diagnosis of an enlarged prostate is related to his military service. A review of the Veteran’s STRs does not reveal any treatment for or diagnosis of a prostate condition. Post-service VA treatment records reflect that the Veteran was found to have a mildly enlarged prostate. Here, there is no evidence of an in-service incurrence of a disease or injury and there is no competent medical evidence linking the Veteran’s enlarged prostate to the Veteran’s military service. He was not exposed to herbicides in service. To the extent that the Veteran himself attributes a prostate condition to service, the medical evidence does not support a finding that warrants service connection for an enlarged prostate. Although lay persons are competent to provide opinions on some medical issues, see Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428, 435 (2011), as to the specific issue in this case, the etiology of a prostate condition falls outside the realm of common knowledge of a lay person. Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim for service connection for a prostate condition. The benefit of the doubt rule does not apply, and the Veteran’s claim for service connection for a prostate condition is denied. 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (b); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. at 54-56. 3. Entitlement to service connection for prostate cancer The Veteran contends that he has prostate cancer that is related to in-service exposure to herbicides. As noted above, the Veteran’s military personnel records show that the Veteran entered active duty on August 15, 1973 and was discharged from active duty on January 30, 1974 with no overseas period of service. As already discussed, he was not exposed to herbicides in service. A review of the Veteran’s STRs does not reveal any treatment for or diagnosis of prostate cancer. Post-service treatment records reflect the Veteran was diagnosed with prostate cancer in October 2013, nearly 40 years after discharge. There is no evidence of an in-service incurrence of a disease or injury and there is no competent medical evidence linking the Veteran’s prostate cancer to the Veteran’s military service. Furthermore, to the extent that the Veteran himself attributes a diagnosis of prostate cancer to service, the medical evidence does not show that the Veteran’s condition warrants service connection. Although lay persons are competent to provide opinions on some medical issues, see Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428, 435 (2011), as to the specific issue in this case, the etiology of prostate cancer falls outside the realm of common knowledge of a lay person. Additionally, as the Veteran did not serve in Vietnam and there is no evidence the condition manifested to a degree of 10 percent or more within one year after the date of separation, presumptive service connection for prostate cancer must be denied as a matter of law. Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim for service connection for prostate cancer. The benefit of the doubt rule does not apply, and the Veteran’s claim for service connection for prostate cancer is denied. 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (b); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. at 54-56. 4. Entitlement to service connection for diabetes mellitus The Veteran contends that he has diabetes mellitus type II that is related to in-service exposure to herbicides. The Board again notes that the Veteran was not exposed to herbicides in service. A review of the Veteran’s STRs does not reveal any treatment for or diagnosis of diabetes mellitus. Post-service treatment records reflect that the Veteran was diagnosed with diabetes mellitus in approximately 2006, many years after discharge from service. There is no evidence of an in-service incurrence of a disease or injury and there is no competent medical evidence linking the Veteran’s current diabetes mellitus to the Veteran’s military service. Furthermore, to the extent that the Veteran himself attributes a current diabetes mellitus condition to service, the medical evidence does not show that the Veteran has a current heart disability that warrants service connection. Although lay persons are competent to provide opinions on some medical issues, see Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428, 435 (2011), as to the specific issue in this case, the etiology of diabetes mellitus falls outside the realm of common knowledge of a lay person. Additionally, as the Veteran did not serve in Vietnam and there is no evidence the condition manifested to a degree of 10 percent or more within one year after the date of separation, presumptive service connection for diabetes mellitus must be denied as a matter of law. Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim for service connection for diabetes mellitus. The benefit of the doubt rule does not apply, and the Veteran’s claim for service connection for diabetes mellitus is denied. 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (b); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. at 54-56. 5. Entitlement to neuropathy of the left upper extremity The Veteran contends that he has a current left upper extremity neurological disability that is related to in-service exposure to herbicides. The Veteran was not exposed to herbicides. A review of the Veteran’s STRs does not reveal any treatment for or diagnosis of peripheral neuropathy. Post-service treatment records reflect that the Veteran has shown symptoms of peripheral neuropathy associated with his diabetes mellitus, type II. A January 2016 VA podiatry note reflects that the Veteran was seen for diabetic foot care and assessed with diabetes mellitus type II with peripheral neuropathy. There is no evidence of an in-service incurrence of a disease or injury and there is no competent medical evidence linking the Veteran’s current peripheral neuropathy to the Veteran’s military service. Furthermore, to the extent that the Veteran himself attributes a current peripheral neuropathy condition to service, the medical evidence does not show that the Veteran has a current neuropathy disability that warrants service connection. Although lay persons are competent to provide opinions on some medical issues, see Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428, 435 (2011), as to the specific issue in this case, the etiology of peripheral neuropathy falls outside the realm of common knowledge of a lay person. Additionally, as the Veteran did not serve in Vietnam and there is no evidence the condition manifested to a degree of 10 percent or more within one year after the last date on which the veteran was exposed to an herbicide agent during active military, naval, or air service, presumptive service connection for left upper extremity peripheral neuropathy must be denied as a matter of law. Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim for service connection for neuropathy of the left upper extremity. The benefit of the doubt rule does not apply, and the Veteran’s claim for service connection for left upper extremity peripheral neuropathy is denied. 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (b); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. at 54-56. 6. Entitlement to neuropathy of the right upper extremity The Veteran contends that he has a current right upper extremity neurological disability that is related to in-service exposure to herbicides. The Veteran was not exposed to herbicides. A review of the Veteran’s STRs does not reveal any treatment for or diagnosis of peripheral neuropathy. Post-service treatment records reflect that the Veteran has shown symptoms of peripheral neuropathy associated with his diabetes mellitus, type II which he is not service-connected for. A January 2016 VA podiatry note reflects that the Veteran was seen for diabetic foot care and assessed with diabetes mellitus type II with peripheral neuropathy. There is no evidence of an in-service incurrence of a disease or injury and there is no competent medical evidence linking the Veteran’s current right upper extremity peripheral neuropathy to the Veteran’s military service. Furthermore, to the extent that the Veteran himself attributes a current peripheral neuropathy condition to service, the medical evidence does not show that the Veteran has a current neuropathy disability that warrants service connection. Although lay persons are competent to provide opinions on some medical issues, see Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428, 435 (2011), as to the specific issue in this case, the etiology of peripheral neuropathy falls outside the realm of common knowledge of a lay person. Additionally, as the Veteran did not serve in Vietnam and there is no evidence the condition manifested to a degree of 10 percent or more within one year after the last date on which the veteran was exposed to an herbicide agent during active military, naval, or air service, presumptive service connection for right upper extremity peripheral neuropathy must be denied as a matter of law. Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim for service connection for neuropathy of the right upper extremity. The benefit of the doubt rule does not apply, and the Veteran’s claim for service connection for right upper extremity peripheral neuropathy is denied. 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (b); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. at 54-56. 7. Entitlement to neuropathy of the left lower extremity The Veteran contends that he has a current left lower extremity neurological disability that is related to in-service exposure to herbicides. The Veteran was not exposed to herbicides. A review of the Veteran’s STRs does not reveal any treatment for or diagnosis of peripheral neuropathy. Post-service treatment records reflect that the Veteran has shown symptoms of peripheral neuropathy associated with his diabetes mellitus, type II which he is not service-connected for. A January 2016 VA podiatry note reflects that the Veteran was seen for diabetic foot care and assessed with diabetes mellitus type II with peripheral neuropathy. There is no evidence of an in-service incurrence of a disease or injury and there is no competent medical evidence linking the Veteran’s current peripheral neuropathy to the Veteran’s military service. Furthermore, to the extent that the Veteran himself attributes a current peripheral neuropathy condition to service, the medical evidence does not show that the Veteran has a current neuropathy disability that warrants service connection. Although lay persons are competent to provide opinions on some medical issues, see Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428, 435 (2011), as to the specific issue in this case, the etiology of peripheral neuropathy falls outside the realm of common knowledge of a lay person. Additionally, as the Veteran did not serve in Vietnam and there is no evidence the condition manifested to a degree of 10 percent or more within one year after the last date on which the veteran was exposed to an herbicide agent during active military, naval, or air service, presumptive service connection for left lower extremity peripheral neuropathy must be denied as a matter of law. Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim for service connection for neuropathy of the left lower extremity. The benefit of the doubt rule does not apply, and the Veteran’s claim for service connection for left lower extremity peripheral neuropathy is denied. 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (b); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. at 54-56. 8. Entitlement to neuropathy of the right lower extremity The Veteran contends that he has a current right upper extremity neurological disability that is related to in-service exposure to herbicides. The Veteran was not exposed to herbicides. A review of the Veteran’s STRs does not reveal any treatment for or diagnosis of peripheral neuropathy. Post-service treatment records reflect that the Veteran has shown symptoms of peripheral neuropathy associated with his diabetes mellitus, type II which he is not service-connected for. A January 2016 VA podiatry note reflects that the Veteran was seen for diabetic foot care and assessed with diabetes mellitus type II with peripheral neuropathy. There is no evidence of an in-service incurrence of a disease or injury and there is no competent medical evidence linking the Veteran’s current right upper extremity peripheral neuropathy to the Veteran’s military service. Furthermore, to the extent that the Veteran himself attributes a current right upper extremity peripheral neuropathy condition to service, the medical evidence does not show that the Veteran has a current neuropathy disability that warrants service connection. Although lay persons are competent to provide opinions on some medical issues, see Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428, 435 (2011), as to the specific issue in this case, the etiology of peripheral neuropathy falls outside the realm of common knowledge of a lay person. Additionally, as the Veteran did not serve in Vietnam and there is no evidence the condition manifested to a degree of 10 percent or more within one year after the last date on which the veteran was exposed to an herbicide agent during active military, naval, or air service, presumptive service connection for right lower extremity peripheral neuropathy must be denied as a matter of law. Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim for service connection for neuropathy of the right lower extremity. The benefit of the doubt rule does not apply, and the Veteran’s claim for service connection for right lower extremity peripheral neuropathy is denied. 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (b); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. at 54-56. THOMAS H. O'SHAY Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD K. Mitchell, Associate Counsel