Citation Nr: 18156290 Decision Date: 12/07/18 Archive Date: 12/07/18 DOCKET NO. 17-01 955 DATE: December 7, 2018 ORDER Service connection for sleep loss secondary to tinnitus is denied. FINDING OF FACT The preponderance of the evidence of record is against finding that the Veteran has, or has had at any time during the appeal, a current diagnosis of a disability manifested by sleep loss. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for service connection for sleep loss secondary to tinnitus have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110 (wartime), 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.310(a). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION Service connection for sleep loss secondary to tinnitus Service connection may be granted for disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131 (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) (2018). Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) (2018). Service connection requires competent evidence of (1) a current disability; (2) the incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury during service; and (3) a causal relationship between the current disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Service connection may be granted for disability that is proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disability. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a) (2018). Any increase in severity of a nonservice-connected disease or injury that is proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disability, and not due to the natural progress of the nonservice-connected disease or injury, will be service connected. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(b) (2018). Thus, service connection is permitted not only for disability caused by a service-connected disability, but also for the degree of disability resulting from aggravation by a service-connected disability. The Veteran asserts that he is entitled to service connection for sleep loss secondary to his service-connected tinnitus. The Board acknowledges that the Veteran’s tinnitus interferes with his sleep. The Board also notes that VA medical records reflect complaints of sleep difficulty due to tinnitus. He also reported that it is hard to sleep with his tinnitus at a September 2015 VA audiological examination. However, there is no medical evidence that he has a disability as a result of his sleep loss. The audiological examination did not indicate such a disability and a September 2015 VA mental disorders examination revealed that he does not meet the criteria for a diagnosis of a mental disorder. Congress has specifically limited entitlement to service connection for disease or injury to cases where such incidents have resulted in a disability. In the absence of proof of a present disability, there can be no valid claim. Gilpin v. West, 155 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223 (1992). In this case, the preponderance of the evidence of record is against finding that the Veteran has, or has had at any time during the appeal, a current diagnosis of a disability manifested by sleep loss. As there is no disability that can be related to his tinnitus, the claim for service connection for sleep loss secondary to tinnitus must be denied. The Board notes that a lay person is competent to give evidence about observable symptoms such as difficulty sleeping. Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465 (1994). The Board also notes that a lay person is competent to address the etiology of a disability in some limited circumstances in which nexus is obvious merely through lay observation, such as a fall leading to a broken leg. Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). While the Board appreciates the Veteran’s statements indicating that he has a sleep disorder due to his tinnitus, as a lay person, he is not competent to self-diagnose such a disability. In conclusion, service connection for sleep loss secondary to tinnitus is not warranted. As the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, the claim must be denied. 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) (2012); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). KELLI A. KORDICH Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD J. W. Kim, Counsel