Citation Nr: 18156669 Decision Date: 12/11/18 Archive Date: 12/10/18 DOCKET NO. 16-48 907 DATE: December 11, 2018 ORDER Service connection for a psychiatric disorder, including posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), is denied. FINDING OF FACT The Veteran does not have a diagnosis of PTSD linked to a verified military stressor, and a psychiatric disorder did not have onset during active service or within one year thereafter, and was not caused by active service. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for service connection for a psychiatric disorder, including PTSD, are not met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1131, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304(f) (2018). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty from July 1976 to December 1978. This case comes before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) on appeal from a February 2015 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO). Duties to Notify and Assist Neither the Veteran nor his representative has raised any issues with the duty to notify or duty to assist. See Scott v. McDonald, 789 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that “the Board’s obligation to read filings in a liberal manner does not require the Board... to search the record and address procedural arguments when the veteran fails to raise them before the Board”); Dickens v. McDonald, 814 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (applying Scott to a duty to assist argument). Laws and regulations Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131 (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) (2018). To establish a right to compensation for a present disability, a Veteran must show: (1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service- the so-called “nexus” requirement. Holton v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Service connection may be granted for any disease initially diagnosed after discharge when all of the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) (2018). In addition, service connection for certain chronic diseases may be established on a presumptive basis by showing that the condition manifested to a degree of 10 percent or more within one year from the date of separation from service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1131, 1137 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309(a) (2018); Fountain v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 258, 271-72 (2015). Although the disease need not be diagnosed within the presumption period, it must be shown, by acceptable lay or medical evidence, that there were characteristic manifestations of the disease to the required degree during that time. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309(a). For the showing of chronic disease in service, there is required a combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease entity, and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time. If chronicity in service is not established, a showing of continuity of symptoms after discharge may support the claim. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303(b), 3.309 (2018); Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Service connection for PTSD requires: (1) medical evidence establishing a diagnosis of the disorder; (2) credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred; and (3) a link established by medical evidence, between current symptoms and an in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (2018). There are several avenues to document an in-service stressor, other than obtaining verification from the Joint Services Records Research Center (JSRRC) or other government records repository: an in-service PTSD diagnosis with lay testimony; combat service with lay testimony; prisoner of war status with lay testimony; lay evidence of personal assault with appropriate corroboration; and a stressor related to Veteran’s fear of hostile military or terrorist activity, with appropriate medical evidence. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). Lay evidence may establish an alleged stressor may where: 1) the stressor is related to the Veteran’s fear of hostile military or terrorist activity; 2) a VA psychiatrist, VA psychologist, or VA-contracted psychiatrist or psychologist, confirms that the claimed stressor is adequate to support a diagnosis of PTSD and that the Veteran’s symptoms are related to the claimed stressor; 3) the stressor is consistent with the places, types, and circumstances of the Veteran’s service; and 4) there is no clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See Stressor Determinations for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 75 Fed. Reg. 39,843, 39,852. Fear of hostile military or terrorist activity occurs where a veteran experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or circumstance that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of the veteran or others, such as from an actual or potential improvised explosive device; vehicle-imbedded explosive device; incoming artillery, rocket, or mortar fire; grenade; small arms fire, including suspected sniper fire; or attack upon friendly military aircraft, and the veteran’s response to the event or circumstance involved a psychological or psycho-physiological state of fear, helplessness, or horror. See Stressor Determinations for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 75 Fed. Reg. 39,843, 39,852. The threshold question in any claim seeking service connection is whether the veteran, in fact, has the disability for which service connection is sought. McClain v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 319, 321 (2007). In the absence of proof of a current disability, service connection is not warranted. Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992). Analysis The Veteran asserts that he has PTSD as a result of witnessing the aftermath of an injury involving a fellow soldier and also as a result of suffering a fall from a telephone pole during military training. The Board finds that there is not a current disability. See Holton, 557 F.3d at 1366; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). A January 2015 VA examination was conducted upon a review of the claims file and interview of the Veteran. The examiner ultimately determined that the Veteran did not have a diagnosis of PTSD that conformed to DSM-5 criteria based on that day’s evaluation. In particular, the examiner indicated that the Veteran’s PTSD symptoms did not meet Criterion G (the disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning) or Criterion H (the disturbance is not attributable to the psychological effects of a substance or another medical condition). The Board accords this opinion significant probative value as it is based upon review of the relevant medical and contains a full supporting explanation. Although VA treatment and counselling records note a diagnosis of PTSD, these records do not discuss the Veteran's stressors, and contain little or no discussion concerning the Veteran's military service. Instead, the records discuss the Veteran's current difficulties in relationships and financial matters. In sum, the Veteran does not have a competent and credible medical diagnosis of PTSD linked to a verified military stressor. As such, service connection for PTSD is not warranted. The Veteran has not argued that he has psychiatric disorder other than PTSD related to his military service. The Veteran’s claim for PTSD, however, constitutes a claim for service connection for a psychiatric disorder, however diagnosed. Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1 (2009). The Veteran's service treatment records contain no complaints or findings related to service, and at the time of his separation form service the Veteran specifically denied that he had any psychiatric symptoms or problems. No examiner has linked a psychiatric diagnosis to the Veteran's service. Furthermore, the February 2015 VA examiner noted that the Veteran's mood disorder was related to substance abuse. In reaching this decision the Board considered the doctrine of reasonable doubt, however, as the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran’s claim, the doctrine is not for application. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). K. MILLIKAN Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD David Nelson