Citation Nr: 18156676 Decision Date: 12/10/18 Archive Date: 12/10/18 DOCKET NO. 17-17 832 DATE: December 10, 2018 ORDER The character of the Appellant's service constitutes a bar to receiving Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) compensation benefits. FINDING OF FACT The Appellant was discharged from service as the result of the sentence of a general court-martial, and he was not insane at any time during service. CONCLUSION OF LAW The character of the Appellant’s discharge from service is a bar to receiving VA compensation benefits. 38 U.S.C. § 5303; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.12, 3.13, 3.354. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Appellant served on active duty in the United States Army from October 1958 to March 1962. This matter comes before the Board from an May 2015 administrative decision. The May 2015 administrative decision established entitlement to health care under Chapter 17 of title 38, U.S.C. and 38 C.F.R. 3.360(a) for any disabilities determined to be service-connected for period of service from October 1958 to March 1962. 1. Whether the character of the Appellant's service constitutes a bar to receiving Department of Veterans Affairs compensation benefits For benefits purposes, a “veteran” is a person discharged or released from active service under conditions other than dishonorable. 38 U.S.C. § 101(2); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(d), 3.315. VA benefits are not payable unless the period of service upon which the claim is based was terminated by discharge or release under conditions other than dishonorable. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(a). A discharge from military service as a result of a general court martial conviction is dishonorable. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(d). A discharge under dishonorable conditions bars the payment of benefits unless the claimant was insane at the time of committing the offense. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(b). For the purpose of this regulation, an “insane” person is one who, while not mentally defective or constitutionally psychopathic, except when a psychosis has been engrafted upon such basic condition, exhibits, due to disease, a more or less prolonged deviation from his normal method of behavior; or who interferes with the peace of society; or who has departed (become antisocial) from the accepted standards of the community to which by birth and education he belongs so as to lack the adaptability to make further adjustment to the social customs of the community in which he resides. 38 C.F.R. § 3.354(a). In this case, the Appellant enlisted in the United States Army in October 1958 for a 3-year period of obligation. The Appellant was held for 9 months beyond his separation date for the convenience of the government. On November 2, 1961, the Appellant was found guilty at a trial by general court martial of the following charges: 1) on or about 22 July 1960, stealing 2 U.S. Postal Money orders, of a total value of $114; 2) on or about 22 July 1960, with intent to defraud, falsely make the signature of another to the indorsement on a U.S. Postal Money Order; and 3) on or about 22 July 1960, with intend to defraud, falsely make the signature of another to the indorsement on a U.S. Postal Money Order. The Appellant was sentenced to a reduction to the grade of Private E-1, to forfeit all pay and allowances, and to be dishonorably discharged from service. The court records are contained in the record. The Appellant was separated in March 1962. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the Appellant was insane at any point during his service and he does not raise insanity. The Appellant contends that he did not take the money orders, and, though he knew who did, he did not reveal their identities for fear of retribution. There is nothing in the record to support the allegation. The Board acknowledges that the Appellant’s service prior to the general court martial did not contain any disciplinary action and that since separation the record does not indicate disciplinary actions. The Board further acknowledges the many character letters submitted by friends and family of the Appellant. However, as the Appellant’s discharge was a result of a general court martial, it is a statutory bar to VA compensation benefits. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(d). As such, the Appellant’s claim for compensation benefits must be denied. MICHAEL A. HERMAN Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD E. Rekowski, Associate Counsel