Citation Nr: 18157265 Decision Date: 12/12/18 Archive Date: 12/12/18 DOCKET NO. 17-57 625 DATE: December 12, 2018 ORDER Service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include depression, is denied. FINDING OF FACT A psychiatric disorder was not caused by any in-service disease, injury, or event. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include depression have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1131 (2014); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304 (2015). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served in the United States Navy from October 1979 to July 1987. During his period of service, the Veteran received the Good Conduct Award, Battle “E” Award, Navy Expeditionary Medal, and the Sea Service Deployment Ribbon. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) on appeal from a March 2017 rating decision of a Regional Office (RO) for the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder. The Veteran seeks service connection for depression. Specifically, the Veteran claims an event on the submarine USS Sea Devil triggered his depression. Neither the Veteran nor his representative have raised any issues or concerns with the duty to notify or duty to assist. See Scott v. McDonald, 789 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that “the Board’s obligation to read filings in a liberal manner does not require the Board...to search the record and address procedural arguments when the Veteran fails to raise them before the Board.”); Dickens v. McDonald, 814 F.3d 1359, 1361 (applying Scott’s duty to assist argument). A Veteran seeking compensation under 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110 or 1131 must establish three elements: (1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service. See Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The Veteran spent time on the submarine, the USS Sea Devil (SSN 664), starting March 1980 and ending September 1980. In his November 2017 notice of disagreement, the Veteran claims that while aboard the USS Sea Devil, an incident happened that caused his depression, but due to the classified nature of the incident, he is not allowed to discuss it. The Veteran’s personnel records confirm he served aboard the USS Sea Devil. Service treatment records show that during his years of service, he only sought treatment once while on the USS Sea Devil in July 1980 for a lump on the outside of his left heel. There is no record of the Veteran seeking any psychiatric treatment while in service, as shown by the Veteran’s service treatment records. The Veteran’s June 1987 exit exam shows no evidence of psychiatric hardship. The Veteran also consistently denied any history of depression or excessive worry or nervous trouble of any sort on reports of medical history completed during service. After separating from service, the Veteran was seen as a private health care facility, where between February 2014 and November 2016 he would refill his anxiety medication. Records from the private facility provide no diagnosis of depression. Significantly, the February 2014 note indicated the Veteran presented with anxiety that was characterized as chronic and stable and noted there was more stress at work. The March 2017 VA examination was conducted, and the Veteran was diagnosed with unspecified depressive disorder and general anxiety disorder. The VA examiner indicates that is it not possible to differentiate as to which symptoms are attributable to which diagnosis because the conditions are comorbid and share symptoms, so differentiation is not possible. The VA examiner believes that the Veteran is generally functioning satisfactorily with normal routine behavior, self-care and conversation. The VA examiner notes that the Veteran is not currently being seen by a mental health professional, and notes symptoms of depressive moon, anxiety, panic attacks, and chronic sleep impairment in the Veteran, along with disturbances in motivation and mood, difficulty maintaining relationships, and difficulty adapting in stressful circumstances. In concluding the March 2017 examination, the VA examiner opined that the Veteran’s depressive disorder is at least as likely as not (50 percent or greater probability) incurred in or caused by the claimed in-service injury, event, or illness. The VA examiner’s rationale is his reliance on the Veteran’s report on being in the submarine service and involved in an incident with another vessel that he could not discuss further. The rationale states that the symptoms began after this event and have persisted since that time. While the March 2017 examination provides a diagnosis and an opinion with rationale, the Board cannot assign a high level of probative weight to the examination. Significantly, the examiner based the opinion solely on the Veteran’s self-report and provided little rationale to support the conclusion. Black v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 177, 180 (1993). Furthermore, the opinion is not consistent with other evidence of record. While the evidence of record reflects the Veteran was a Machinist Mate aboard the Sea Devil, there is no evidence of any accident during his service. Although the appellant posits that such information is still classified, the bare assertion of such experiences towards substantiation of the claim is entitled to no credence, in the absence of official U.S. Government records. Indeed, the Court has found that such conclusory lay statements are insufficient to even meet the low threshold to warrant a medical examination because it would “eliminate the carefully drafted statutory standards governing the provision of medical examinations and require the Secretary to provide such examinations in virtually every veteran’s disability case.” See Waters 601 F.3d 1278. It follows that such conclusory assertions, without more, are also not enough to warrant service connection. Since the Board cannot conclude that the Veteran’s in-service event occurred, the medical opinion provided by the VA examiner, which relies on the Veteran’s lay testimony, is not probative. Additionally, the opinion is based, in part, on symptoms ever since the incident in service. To the extent to which the Veteran has indicated continuity of symptoms, the service treatment records do not reflect any treatment for psychiatric symptoms and moreover the Veteran consistently denied the presence of symptoms on reports of medical history during his service. Furthermore, the first treatment of record, in 2014, nearly 27 years after separation, noted anxiety and did not indicate any form of history suggestion years of symptoms. The treatment records also did not suggest onset during service. The February 2014 record seemed to indicate the anxiety was related to stress at work. It is now well established that information from a Veteran which is merely transcribed by a medical professional still amounts only to a statement from the Veteran. Swann v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 229, 233 (1993) (generally observing that an opinion premised upon an unsubstantiated account is of no probative value, and does not serve to verify the occurrences described). Thus, the opinion is apparently based primarily on the Veteran’s self-report of an incident in service and continued symptoms, and, as that self-report is less than credible, it cannot serve as a basis for a nexus finding in this instance. The Board considered whether further development was warranted. However, the Veteran has provided virtually no details concerning the claimed incident from which any meaningful attempt at verification could be made. Rather, he has made a bare assertion of an incident and declined any further discussion as it is classified. “If a veteran wishes help, he cannot passively wait for it in those circumstances where he may or should have information that is essential in obtaining the putative evidence.” Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190, 193 (1991). Insofar as the Veteran has not provided sufficient evidence to conduct a search, no further development is warranted at this time. VA’s duty is just what it states, a duty to assist, not a duty to prove a claim with the claimant only in a passive role. Gobber v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 470, 472 (1992). To the extent to which the Veteran has claimed it is classified, if at any time after VA issues a decision on a claim, if VA receives or associates with the claims file relevant official service department records that existed and had not been associated with the claims file when VA first decided the claim, VA will reconsider the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c). Such records include service records that are related to a claimed in-service event, additional service records forwarded by the Department of Defense or the service department to VA any time after VA’s original request for service records, and declassified records that could not have been obtained because they had been classified when VA decided the claim. (Continued on the next page)   Although the claims file includes a diagnosis of depression, a diagnosis alone does not constitute sufficient evidence for the grant of service connection. No in-service event exists for the examiner to draw a connection to. Thus, service-connection for depression is not warranted. As the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine does not apply, and the claim of service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include major depressive disorder is denied. 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). H. SEESEL Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD E. Iannone, Law Clerk