Citation Nr: 18157323 Decision Date: 12/12/18 Archive Date: 12/12/18 DOCKET NO. 17-10 318 DATE: December 12, 2018 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for a left knee disability is denied. Entitlement to service connection for a right knee disability is denied. Entitlement to service connection for a left foot disability is denied. Entitlement to service connection for a right foot disability is denied. Entitlement to service connection for a groin muscle disability is denied. Entitlement to service connection for a right eye disability is denied. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The preponderance of the evidence is against finding that the Veteran has a current left knee disability that began during active service, or is otherwise related to an in-service injury, event, or disease. 2. The preponderance of the evidence is against finding that the Veteran has a right knee disability due to a disease or injury in service, to include an August 1978 right knee injury. 3. The preponderance of the evidence is against finding that the Veteran has a current left foot disability that began during active service, or is otherwise related to an in-service injury, event, or disease. 4. The preponderance of the evidence is against finding that the Veteran has a current right foot disability that began during active service, or is otherwise related to an in-service injury, event, or disease. 5. The preponderance of the evidence is against finding that the Veteran has a right groin muscle disability due to a disease or injury in service, to include an October 1984 pulled groin muscle. 6. The preponderance of the evidence is against finding that the Veteran has a current right eye disability that began during active service, or is otherwise related to an in-service injury, event, or disease. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for a left knee disability have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101, 1110, 1131, 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. 2. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for a right knee disability have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101, 1110, 1131, 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. 3. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for a left foot disability have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101, 1110, 1131, 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. 4. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for a right foot disability have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101, 1110, 1131, 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. 5. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for a groin muscle disability have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101, 1110, 1131, 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. 6. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for a right eye disability have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101, 1110, 1131, 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Veteran had service in the Army National Guard from March 1975 to November 1991 a period of active duty from July to November 1975. Service Connection Service connection may be granted if the evidence demonstrates that a current disability resulted from an injury or disease incurred or aggravated in active military service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). In general, service connection requires competent and credible evidence of (1) a current disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the current disability. See Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Active military service includes any period of active duty for training during which the individual concerned was disabled or died from a disease or injury incurred in or aggravated in line of duty, or any period of inactive duty training during which the individual concerned was disabled or died from injury incurred in or aggravated in line of duty. 38 U.S.C. § 101(21) and (24); 38 C.F.R. § 3.6(a) and (d). It follows that service connection may be granted for disability resulting from disease or injury incurred or aggravated while performing active duty for training, or from injury incurred or aggravated while performing inactive duty for training. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101(24),106, 1131. Active duty for training is defined, in part, as full-time duty in the Armed Forces performed by Reserves or National Guard members for training purposes. 38 U.S.C. § 101(22); 38 C.F.R. § 3.6(c). Inactive duty for training is generally duty (other than full-time duty) prescribed for Reserves or performed by a member of the National Guard of any state. 38 U.S.C. § 101(23); 38 C.F.R. § 3.6(d). Annual training is an example of active duty for training while weekend drills are inactive duty. 1. Entitlement to service for a left knee disability The Veteran is seeking entitlement to service connection for a left knee disability, which he contends is due to an injury after he tripped and fell during basic training. Statements from the Veteran reflect that he seeks compensation for in-service injury although he has not identified any current disability therefrom. The question for the Board is whether the Veteran has a current disability that began during service or is at least as likely as not related to an in-service injury, event, or disease. The Board concludes that the preponderance of the evidence is against finding that the Veteran has a current left knee disability that began during active service, or is otherwise related to an in-service injury, event, or disease. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131, 5107(b); Holton v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a), (d). As an initial matter, it does not appear that the Veteran has a current disability of the left knee. The Veteran has neither identified nor provided any medical records showing a current left knee disability. Service treatment records (STRs) reflect, in September 1975, left hamstring tendinitis with an accompanying complaint of left knee pain. However, examinations dated in July 1980, April 1986, and September 1990 reflect normal clinical evaluation of the lower extremities. Notably, in 2013, VA received a claim for right knee injury but there was no mention of left knee injury or disability until May 2016 on the Veteran’s notice of disagreement with VA’s denial of his right knee claim. Simply state, the evidence of record shows no indication that the Veteran has a current disability of the left knee or that he has had any abnormal left knee pathology in or since his active service. Therefore, his report of left knee injury during basic training in 1975 has no probative value. The Board assigns greater probative value to the STRs associated with the Veteran’s National Guard service after his active duty, which show normal lower extremities. The Veteran has not presented competent evidence that he has any current disability of the left knee. It is noted that the existence of a current disability is the cornerstone of a claim for VA disability compensation. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131; Degmetich v. Brown, 104 F. 3d 1328 (1997). In the absence of proof of a present disability due to disease or injury, there can be no valid claim. Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992). On balance, the weight of the evidence is against the claim. Accordingly, the claim is denied. There is no doubt to resolve. 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b). 2. Entitlement to service connection for a right knee disability The Veteran is seeking entitlement to service connection for a right knee disability, which he contends is related to an injury during basic training when he tripped and fell. The question for the Board is whether the Veteran has a current disability that began during service or is at least as likely as not related to an in-service injury, event, or disease. The Board concludes that, while the Veteran has a current diagnosis of right knee strain, and evidence shows that he suffered an unspecified right knee injury in August 1978, the preponderance of the evidence weighs against finding that the Veteran’s current diagnosis of right knee strain began during service or is otherwise related to an in-service injury, event, or disease. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131, 5107(b); Holton v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a), (d). STRs show treatment for a right knee injury, the nature of which is not specified, in August 1978. However, no additional right knee problems or abnormal right knee pathology is shown in the STRs. Examinations dated in July 1980, April 1986, and September 1990 reflect normal clinical evaluation of the lower extremities. Notably, decades after active service, in 2013, VA received a claim for right knee injury. However, the Veteran has neither identified nor provided any medical records showing a chronic right knee disorder during active service or otherwise related thereto. A November 2014 VA examination reflects that, although the Veteran’s has right knee strain, it is not at least as likely as not related to an in-service injury, event, or disease, including the August 1978 injury noted in the Veteran’s STRs. The examiner explained that the Veteran's in-service injury was most likely acute and transitory, as his STRs are negative for any further complaints that would suggest a chronic condition and there is no evidence of any medical treatment for a right knee problem immediately post-service or in the years since service. The examiner also noted that the Veteran had physically demanding jobs after service, including construction and maintenance work. While the Veteran believes his current right knee strain is related to an in-service injury, event, or disease, including his 1978 injury, he is not competent to provide a nexus opinion in this case because the etiology of his current disability, which is first documented decades after active service, is not susceptible to lay observation. An opinion in this matter requires medical training and knowledge of the mechanisms of the knee joint to formulate a medical opinion on whether injury decades earlier likely could cause the current disorder; this is a too complex question for a layman. Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Therefore, the Veteran’s medical opinion has no probative value. The Board assigns greater probative value to the November 2014 VA medical opinion because it is based on an accurate medical history and provides an explanation that contains clear conclusions and supporting data. Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295, 304 (2008). The Veteran has not presented a favorable medical opinion to weigh in this matter. On balance, the weight of the evidence is against the claim. Accordingly, the claim is denied. There is no doubt to resolve. 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b). 3. Entitlement to service connection for a right foot disability. 4. Entitlement to service connection for left foot disability. Issues 3-4. The Veteran seeks service connection for right and left foot disabilities. He has not identified any specific disability for which he seeks benefits, but he has described “pain and discomfort” in both feet that he theorizes is due to extensive marching and weight bearing in service. The question for the Board is whether the Veteran has a current disability that began during service or is at least as likely as not related to an in-service injury, event, or disease. The Board concludes that the preponderance of the evidence is against finding that the Veteran has a current right or left foot disability that began during active service, or is otherwise related to an in-service injury, event, or disease. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131, 5107(b); Holton v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a), (d). The medical evidence of record shows no indication that the Veteran has a current disability of either foot, to include a disability that is related to in-service injury. STRs include examinations dated in July 1980, April 1986, and September 1990, which reflect normal clinical evaluation of the feet. STRs show no complaints or findings for abnormal pathology of either foot except for a May 1980 note of athlete’s foot—a skin disorder. The Veteran has neither identified nor provided medical records showing a diagnosis of or treatment for a foot condition, much less one that is linked to his period of active service. Although a June 2016 letter from Dr. C.H. reflects that she treats the Veteran for a chronic endocrine disease which included examination of the feet several times a year as part of his routine assessment, this evidence shows no indication that the Veteran has functional impairment—or in other words, “disability” of either foot. Dr. C.H. does not identify any current foot condition or abnormal pathology—she merely states that the Veteran’s feet are periodically inspected, not that these inspections reveal any abnormality. Therefore, her statement have no probative value. The Veteran has neither provided nor identified any other medical records that may establish the existence of a current foot disability. The Board accepts the Veteran’s report of marching and weight bearing in service, and his report of pain and discomfort in the feet. However, neither the lay nor the medical evidence demonstrates the presence of “disability.” In the absence of proof of a present disability due to disease or injury, there can be no valid claim. Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992). See McClain v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 318, 321 (2007) (The current disability requirement for a service connection claim is satisfied if the claimant has a disability at the time the claim is filed or during the pendency of that claim). The Board has considered whether the Veteran’s report of pain constitutes a “disability” for VA compensation purposes. Saunders v. Wilkie, 886 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (pain alone can constitute a “disability” under 38 U.S.C. § 1110 because pain can cause functional impairment). However, the Board concludes that the Veteran does not have a present disability of the feet as he has not presented evidence of any functional loss or impairment due to his symptoms including pain. In fact, the available medical evidence shows no indication of functional impairment of the feet. The Veteran, although competent to report his symptoms, is not competent to diagnose himself with a chronic disability etiologically related to his in-service activities as he lacks the requisite medical expertise or training to formulate an opinion when one is not susceptible to lay observation as here. Jandreau, supra. Therefore, his opinion has no probative value. The Board assigns greater probative value to the STRs. See Curry v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 59, 68 (1994) (contemporaneous evidence has greater probative value than history as reported by the claimant). Also, the Board assigns greater probative value to the many years intervening active service and the first documented complaints. Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1337 (2006); see also Maxson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 453, 459 (1999), aff'd sub nom., Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that the Board may take into consideration the passage of a lengthy period of time in which the Veteran did not complain of the disorder at issue); Forshey v. West, 12 Vet. App. 71, 74 (1998), aff'd sub nom., Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding that the definition of evidence encompasses “negative evidence” which tends to disprove the existence of an alleged fact). On balance, the weight of the evidence is against the claims. Accordingly, the claims are denied. There is no doubt to resolve. 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b). 5. Entitlement to service connection for a pulled groin muscle The Veteran contends that VA compensation is warranted for a pulled groin muscle incurred during his service. The question for the Board is whether the Veteran has a current disability that began during service or is at least as likely as not related to an in-service injury, event, or disease. The Board concludes that the Veteran does not have a current groin muscle injury and has not had one at any time during the pendency of the claim or recent to the filing of the claim. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131, 5107(b); Holton v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Romanowsky v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 289, 294 (2013); McClain v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 319, 321 (2007); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a), (d). STRs show that he was treated in October 1984 for a strained groin muscle during a period of inactive duty training. However, there is no evidence that this injury resulted in any permanent disability. Examinations in April 1986 and September 1990 reflect normal clinical evaluation, with no finding for abnormal pathology of the groin muscles. The Veteran has neither identified nor provided medical evidence showing that he has been diagnosed with or treated for residuals of his 1984 groin muscle injury. A November 2014 VA examination report reflects that, while the Veteran occasionally experienced subjective symptoms described as a “heavy sensation” in his groin area, he did not have any current groin muscle condition. No abnormal pathology was identified. While the Veteran may believe he has a current diagnosis of groin muscle strain, he is not competent to provide a diagnosis in this case. The issue is medically complex, as it requires knowledge of the musculoskeletal system and injury that effect that system to formulate an opinion on whether there are residuals of injury. Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377, 1377 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Therefore, the Veteran’s medical opinion has no probative value. The Board assigns greater probative value to the STRs and November 2014 VA examination report as these were prepared by skilled, neutral medical professionals after examining the Veteran. The Veteran appears to seek compensation for injury sustained in service without regard to whether there is residual disability. However, the existence of a current disability is the cornerstone of a claim for VA disability compensation. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131; Degmetich v. Brown, 104 F. 3d 1328 (1997). In the absence of proof of a present disability due to disease or injury, there can be no valid claim. Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992). On balance, the weight of the evidence is against the claim. Accordingly, the claim is denied. There is no doubt to resolve. 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b). 6. Entitlement to service connection for a right eye disability The Veteran that he was hit in the eye by vegetation during training exercises in Panama, which caused a burned right eye pupil. The question for the Board is whether the Veteran has a current disability that began during service or is at least as likely as not related to an in-service injury, event, or disease. The Board concludes that the Veteran does not have a current right eye disability and has not had one at any time during the pendency of the claim or recent to the filing of the claim. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131, 5107(b); Holton v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Romanowsky v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 289, 294 (2013); McClain v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 319, 321 (2007); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a), (d). The Veteran has not presented any medical evidence showing that he has a current right eye disability of any kind, to include an injury to the right pupil. STRs reflect neither treatment nor abnormal right eye pathology. Examinations dated in April 1986 and September 1990 reflect normal eyes, with no record of any eye injury or condition. The Veteran has not provided nor identified any post-service treatment for right eye disorder. Simply stated, even accepting the Veteran’s history of vegetation hitting his right eye during active service, competent evidence of residuals of right injury is not shown any time during the pendency of the claim or recent to the filing of the claim. The Veteran is not competent to diagnose himself has having residuals of in-service right eye injury as he lacks the requisite medical training and expertise to formulate an opinion. Also, to the extent that he suggests ongoing eye problems since the alleged in-service injury, the Board finds that he is not credible in view of normal clinical evaluation in April 1986 and September 1990, and the many years intervening the alleged injury (with residual problems) and the first documented complaints related thereto. The Board assigns greater probative value to the STRs. See Curry, supra. Also, the Board assigns greater probative value to the many years intervening the alleged in-service injury and the first documented complaints of residual problems. Buchanan, supra; see also Maxson, supra. On balance, the weight of the evidence is against the claim. Accordingly, the claim is denied. There is no doubt to resolve. 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b). C.A. SKOW Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD E. D. Anderson, Counsel