Citation Nr: 18157814 Decision Date: 12/13/18 Archive Date: 12/13/18 DOCKET NO. 14-43 297 DATE: December 13, 2018 ORDER Recognition of the appellant as the surviving spouse of the Veteran for purposes of consideration for Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (DIC) is denied. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The Veteran had active service from January 1969 to December 1972. 2. The appellant and the Veteran entered into marriage in early February 2003 in the State of Florida, and there were no children born as a result of their union either prior to or during their marriage. 3. The Veteran died in early January 2004, less than one year after the marriage took place. 4. Prior to the February 2003 marriage, the appellant and Veteran cohabitated for four years in the state of Florida. 5. Common-law marriage is not recognized in the State of Florida and a marital relationship, for VA purposes, prior to marriage is not established. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for recognition of the appellant as the surviving spouse of the Veteran for purposes of consideration for DIC benefits have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103, 5103(a), 5103A, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.1, 3.50, 3.52, 3.54, 3.102 (2017). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION An August 2015 Report of Contact indicated that the appellant requested a hearing before a member of the Board. In November 2018 correspondence, she withdrew her request for a hearing. Accordingly, the request is deemed withdrawn and there is no bar to proceeding with the appeal. DIC benefits are payable to a surviving spouse who was married to a veteran: (1) within 15 years of the end of the period of service in which the injury or disease causing the veteran’s death was incurred or aggravated; or (2) one year or more; or (3) for any period of time if a child was born of the marriage, or was born to them before the marriage. 38 U.S.C. § 1304; 38 C.F.R. § 3.54(c). Consequently, “surviving spouse” status is a threshold requirement for DIC benefits. For a person to establish recognition as a surviving spouse of a veteran, there must be evidence of a valid marriage to the veteran under the laws of the appropriate jurisdiction. See Aguilar v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 21, 23 (1991). The validity of a marriage is determined based upon the law of the jurisdiction where the parties resided at the time of marriage or when the rights to benefits accrued. 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(j). In this case, the appellant’s marriage certificate indicates that she and the Veteran were married in early February 2003 in Florida. She contends that they cohabitated for four years prior to getting married and that she was the only one caring for him during times of sickness. She has not maintained that they were engaged in a common law marriage, were on a joint lease or mortgage, or further alluded to the intricacies of the financial aspects of their relationship except to reveal that the Veteran’s son removed her from their joint home following the Veteran’s death. The Veteran died in early January 2004, less than one year after the marriage. The Certificate of Death shows that he was married at the time of his death and lists the appellant as his surviving spouse. The appellant and the Veteran resided in the state of Florida. This jurisdiction has not recognized common law marriage since 1968, many years prior to the date during which the appellant has stated that she and the Veteran began living together. Both the marriage and death certificate of the Veteran are issued by the State of Florida. Further, it is not alleged or shown that the appellant and the Veteran ever lived as husband and wife, or otherwise, outside of Florida; therefore, a common law marriage cannot be established. In sum, the facts are undisputed. The Veteran and the appellant were married in February 2003 and he died in January 2004, less than one year later. While they lived together for several years prior to their marriage, Florida does not recognize common law marriage, which is binding on VA. Further, there were no children born of the relationship. The Board sympathizes with the appellant’s situation, however, under the statutes and regulations there is no choice but to find that the requirements for DIC benefits have not been met. As such, the appeal is denied. Finally, the appellant has not raised any other issues, nor have any other issues been reasonably raised by the record, for the Board’s consideration. See Doucette v. Shulkin, 28 Vet. App. 366, 369-370 (2017) (confirming that the Board is not   required to address issues unless they are specifically raised by the claimant or reasonably raised by the evidence of record). L. HOWELL Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD M. Yacoub, Associate Counsel