Citation Nr: 18158976 Decision Date: 12/18/18 Archive Date: 12/18/18 DOCKET NO. 11-17 937 DATE: December 18, 2018 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder is denied. FINDING OF FACT An acquired psychiatric disorder was not shown in service or many years thereafter; and, the evidence fails to establish that the Veteran’s diagnosed adjustment disorder is etiologically related to active service. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder are not met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1111, 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303(a), 3.304. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The matter was remanded in October 2017 for additional development. That included obtaining a VA medical opinion. Such was accomplished in November 2017. There has been substantial compliance with the Remand directives. See Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268 (1998); see also D’Aries v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 97, 104-05 (2008); Dyment v. West, 13 Vet. App. 141 (1999). Neither the Appellant nor his attorney has raised any issues with the duty to notify or duty to assist following the October 2017 Remand. See Scott v. McDonald, 789 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that “the Board’s obligation to read filings in a liberal manner does not require the Board . . . to search the record and address procedural arguments when the veteran fails to raise them before the Board.”); Dickens v. McDonald, 814 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (applying Scott to a duty to assist argument). Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder. Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active military, naval, or air service. 38 U.S.C. § 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). Service connection may be granted for any disease initially diagnosed after service when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Service connection for a disability requires evidence of: (1) a current disability; (2) a disease or injury in service, and; (3) a relationship or nexus between the current disability and any injury or disease during service. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2004). A veteran will be considered to have been in sound condition when examined, accepted and enrolled for service, except as to defects, infirmities, or disorders noted at entrance into service, or where clear and unmistakable (obvious or manifest) evidence demonstrates that an injury or disease existed prior thereto. Only such conditions as are recorded in examinations reports are to be considered as noted. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b). There has been some question as to the Appellant’s psychiatric diagnosis. By way of history, the Veteran was diagnosed with a personality disorder in service and was discharged after two months due to unsuitability. See April 2014 STR; June 2014 VA Examination. During that brief period of service, he had a seizure and blacked out when climbing a rope. The record shows that he applied for service connection for “bad nerves” in July 1970, approximately one year after separation. The Appellant underwent a VA examination in June 2014 and received a diagnosis of adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood, but not a personality disorder. At the examination, the Veteran reported that he blacked out three times prior to service when he was “extremely emotionally upset.” The results of the VA examination raised the questions of whether the in-service diagnosis of a personality disorder was mistaken (i.e., whether the Veteran should have been diagnosed with an acquired psychiatric disorder instead of or in addition to a personality disorder) and whether the newly diagnosed adjustment disorder preexisted service. A November 2017 opinion addresses these matters. First, the examiner found that there was essentially insufficient evidence to determine whether the in-service diagnosis of a personality disorder was proper. The examiner noted that it was unclear whether the Appellant was seen by a clinical psychologist in service and that the service treatment records do not show the extensive evaluation or psychological testing required to diagnose a personality disorder. In other words, the evidence does not support a finding that the Appellant had an in-service diagnosis of an acquired psychiatric disorder and/or personality disorder. Second, notwithstanding the lack of competent evidence of an in-service diagnosis, the examiner found insufficient evidence to support a finding that the Appellant’s adjustment disorder preexisted service. The examiner considered the Appellant’s reports of anxiety episodes prior to service as well as his in-service symptomology involving a seizure and a blackout. However, that anxiety episode was an acute episode. The examiner determined that the Appellant’s current adjustment disorder diagnosis is a reaction to his non-service-connected medical problems rather than a continuing condition that preexisted service. In particular, the examiner noted that the Appellant’s in-service blackout was an acute anxiety episode, that his symptoms had long resolved, and that there was no evidence of an ongoing seizure disorder. As previously stated, the Veteran has a current diagnosis of adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood. His diagnosis is sufficient to meet Shedden element (1). With respect to an in-service injury or disease, the Veteran asserts that he experienced psychological symptoms in service. His in-service evaluation for a potential psychological disorder and July 1970 application for service connection support his contention. This evidence is credible and sufficient to meet Shedden element (2) with respect to in-service psychological symptoms. What remains for consideration is whether there is evidence of a nexus between the Veteran’s current diagnosis and in-service symptomology. There is no competent evidence of such a nexus. The November 2017 examiner found that the Veteran’s in-service symptomology had resolved and was unrelated to his current diagnosis, which was linked to his non-service-connected medical problems. The Board affords the opinion great weight, as it was the product of reliable principles and methods reliably applied to sufficient facts or data. See Nieves-Rodriquez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295, 302 (2008). Full consideration has been given to the lay evidence, including the assertions that the Veteran’s psychiatric disorder preexisted service, that he had an acquired psychiatric disorder in service, and that his diagnosis is related to service. The Veteran and other lay individuals are not competent to diagnose a psychological disorder or opine on the etiology of such a disorder, and any statements to that effect are therefore afforded no weight. The Board also notes the Veteran’s assertions that he has experienced psychological symptoms continuously since service, but affords greater weight to the objective evidence indicating otherwise. MICHAEL A. HERMAN Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD M. Alhinnawi, Associate Counsel