Citation Nr: 18160284 Decision Date: 12/27/18 Archive Date: 12/26/18 DOCKET NO. 15-33 683 DATE: December 27, 2018 ORDER Service connection for a left ankle disorder is denied. Service connection for left foot disorder is denied. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The Veteran had active duty service from January 1991 to January 1993. 2. A left ankle disorder was not shown in service, not shown to a compensable degree within one year of service, was not continuous since service; left ankle osteoarthritis is not causally or etiologically related to service. 3. A chronic left foot disorder was not shown in service and the current diagnosis of left foot hammertoe is not causally or etiologically related to service. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. A left ankle disorder was not incurred in service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1116, 5103(a), 5103A, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304, 3.307, 3.309, 3.310 (2017). 2. A chronic left foot disorder was not incurred in service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1116, 5103(a), 5103A, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304. (2017). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS Service connection may be granted on a direct basis as a result of disease or injury incurred in service based on nexus using a three-element test: (1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by service. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303(a), (d); Holton v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Service connection may be granted on a presumptive basis for diseases listed in § 3.309 under the following circumstances: (1) where a chronic disease or injury is shown in service and subsequent manifestations of the same disease or injury are shown at a later date unless clearly attributable to an intercurrent cause; or (2) where there is continuity of symptomatology since service; or (3) by showing that the disorder manifested itself to a degree of 10 percent or more within one year from the date of separation from service. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.307. Left Ankle Disorder As to the first element of direct service connection, according to the VA examination, the Veteran was diagnosed with osteoarthritis of the left ankle in December 2012 and by X-ray evidence in January 2013. Therefore, a current disorder has been shown. Next, as to in-service incurrence, the service treatment records (STRs) reflect multiple treatment records regarding a right ankle injury, groin complaints, nausea and stomach pain, gastroenteritis, headache, confusion, right knee pain, back pain, decreased vision, left eye trauma, hepatitis B, head cold, groin rash, left foot injury, left foot pain, but no indication of an in-service injury to the left ankle. Therefore, the evidence does not support direct service connection. To the extent that the Veteran contends that his left ankle disorder is due to in-service parachute jumps, a December 2014 VA examiner opined that the left ankle disorder, diagnosed as osteoarthritis, was not incurred in or caused by being a paratrooper in service. After a review of the record and an examination of the Veteran, the examiner reasoned that the STRs did not note any left ankle disorder but acknowledged that the separation examination was not available for review. There is no medical evidence contrary to this opinion. As to presumptive service connection, no chronic disease or injury was shown in service. While the Veteran was treated for right ankle complaints and multiple other disorders, no symptoms were shown related to the left ankle. Therefore, the medical evidence does not support presumptive service connection on a “chronic disease or injury shown in service” basis. Next, the medical evidence does not support presumptive service connected based on continuity of symptomatology since service. Specifically, he was not diagnosed with arthritis of the left ankle until 2012. As he was discharged from service in 1993, the medical evidence does not support service connection on a “continuity of symptomatology” basis. Further, the disorder did not manifest itself to a degree of 10 percent or more within one year from the date of separation of service. The Veteran separated from service in 1993 but symptoms were not recorded until 2012. This evidence does not support presumptive service connection on a “manifest within one-year from separation” basis. Therefore, presumptive service connection on any basis is not supported by the medical evidence. Left Foot Disorder As to the first element of direct service connection – a current diagnosis – the Veteran was diagnosed with a hammertoe of his left foot in 2013. This is the only current foot disorder identified. As to in-service incurrence, the STRs reflect a contusion to the tendon and plantar fasciitis in July 1992. In October 1992, he was treated for a three-week history of pain in the same foot and diagnosed with calcaneous tendonitis. Therefore, an in-service incurrence has been shown. While the Veteran experienced left foot complaints in service, he has not been diagnosed with the disorders of plantar fasciitis or tendonitis during the appeal period. This suggests that his in-service complaints were not chronic. Further, his current left foot disorder – diagnosed as hammertoe – was not shown in service. Therefore, direct service connection is not warranted. To the extent that the Veteran asserts a medical nexus between service and his current diagnosis, the evidence does not support the claim. Specifically, in a December 2014 VA examination, the examiner acknowledged the Veteran’s left foot pain and detected some functional limitation during the examination attributed to minor deformities associated with hammertoes and mild degenerative joint disease; however, the examiner concluded that no evidence in his review of the record established the Veteran’s left foot disorder was caused by an in-service injury, including parachute jumps. Therefore, the medical evidence does not support the claim. With respect to both claims, the Board has considered the Veteran’s lay statements that his claims were caused by service, including hard parachute landings, carrying weight which compressed into his steel-toed boots, marching on uneven terrain, and an incident where he misjudged an 800-foot fall causing his legs to buckle underneath him while carrying 150 lbs. of gear. He is competent to report symptoms because this requires only personal knowledge as it comes to him through his senses. Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994). However, he is not competent to offer an opinion as to the etiology of his current disorders due to the medical complexity of the matters involved. Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Woehlaert v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 456, 462. Such competent evidence has been provided by the medical personnel who have examined the Veteran during the current appeal and by service records obtained and associated with the claims file. Here, the Board attaches greater probative weight to the examination report and clinical findings than to his statements. As such, the medical records are more probative than the Veteran’s lay assertions of a connection with service. In sum, after a careful review of the evidence, the benefit of the doubt rule is not applicable and the appeals are denied. Finally, the Veteran has not raised any other issues, nor have any other issues been reasonably raised by the record, for the Board’s consideration. See Doucette v. Shulkin, 28 Vet. App. 366, 369-370 (2017) (confirming that the Board is not required to address issues unless they are specifically raised by the claimant or reasonably raised by the evidence of record). L. HOWELL Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD D. Hamilton, Associate Counsel