Citation Nr: 18106946 Decision Date: 06/01/18 Archive Date: 05/31/18 DOCKET NO. 15-04 368 DATE: June 1, 2018 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is denied. FINDING OF FACT The preponderance of the evidence indicates that the Veteran does not have PTSD. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for entitlement to service connection for PTSD have not been satisfied. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1154, 5107(b) (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304, 4.125 (2017). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran had active service in the United States Army from January 1968 to January 1970. During this time, he was deployed to Vietnam and was awarded, among other medals, the Purple Heart and the Vietnam Campaign Medal. This matter comes to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) on appeal from a July 2010 rating decision from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) regional office (RO) in Cleveland, Ohio. In November 2016, the Veteran presented testimony at a Board hearing in Washington, D.C. before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge. A transcript of the hearing is associated with the claims file. In April 2009, the Veteran first filed a claim for PTSD, a kidney condition, and residuals from a right-side shell fragment wound associated with combat in Vietnam. In September 2009, the Veteran underwent a VA PTSD examination. In its July 2010 rating decision, the Cleveland RO denied the Veteran’s claim for service-connected PTSD on basis of the September 2009 VA examination. The Veteran perfected an appeal for only the PTSD claim. At the Board hearing, the Veteran and his representative challenged the adequacy the September 2009 VA examination for PTSD. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) In support of his claim, the Veteran has credibly reported that his division was ambushed near Saigon, and that he witnessed the deaths of several men. His Purple Heart is conclusive evidence of combat. In September 2009, a VA examiner determined the Veteran had no mental disorders. Generally, to establish service connection, there must be lay or medical evidence of (1) a current disability, (2) incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury in service, and (3) a nexus between the in-service injury or disease and the current disability. 38 U.S.C. § 1110; Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313, 1315-16 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1166-67 (Fed. Cir. 2004); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. With regard to PTSD claims in particular, and in addition to the criteria above, service connection for PTSD requires: (1) medical evidence establishing a diagnosis of the condition pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a) (conforming to the appropriate edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders); (2) credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressors actually occurred; and (3) medical evidence of a link between the current symptomatology and the claimed in-service stressors. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f); Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128 (1997). If VA determines that a veteran engaged in combat with the enemy and his alleged stressor is combat-related, then his lay testimony or statement is accepted as conclusive evidence of the stressor’s occurrence and no further development or corroborative evidence is required, as long as such testimony is found to be credible and consistent with circumstances, conditions, or hardships of service. 38 U.S.C. § 1154(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(1); Zarycki v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 91, 98 (1993). In the absence of proof of a present disability there can be no valid claim. Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992). Service connection requires a finding of the existence of a current disability and a determination of a relationship between that disability and an injury or disease incurred in service. Watson v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 309, 314 (1993); Boyer v. West, 210 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000). A layperson is generally not capable of opining on matters requiring medical knowledge. Routen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 183, 186 (1997). Lay evidence can be competent and sufficient evidence of a diagnosis or to establish etiology if (1) the layperson is competent to identify the medical condition, (2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional. Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2007). A layperson is not considered competent to identify medical conditions that require scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (a)(1); Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994). While the Veteran’s exposure to combat is established, the weight of the evidence is against a finding that he currently has a diagnosis of PTSD. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1166-67 (Fed. Cir. 2004). For the Board to award service connection for PTSD, the Veteran must meet DSM diagnostic criteria. 38 C.F.R. § 4.125. The Veteran’s service treatment records are silent for any complaints, treatment, or diagnosis related to PTSD. Neither post-service clinical records nor the September 2009 VA examination showed that the Veteran has a current diagnosis of any mental disorders, to include PTSD. The Veteran’s representative challenged the adequacy of the September 2009 examination on the grounds that it did not address what the Veteran’s contentions. When VA undertakes to provide a medical examination or opinion, it must be adequate. Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 311 (2007). An examination or opinion is adequate if it is thorough and contemporaneous, considers the Veteran’s prior medical examinations and treatment, and describes the disability in sufficient detail so that the Board’s evaluation of the claimed disability will be a fully-informed one. Stefl v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 120, 123 (2007). On close review, the Board finds that the September 2009 VA examination did address the relevant facts and the effects of combat on the Veteran. The VA examiner provided an adequate medical opinion addressing whether any current mental disorder, to include PTSD, was related to the Veteran’s active duty service. In his medical opinion, the examiner partially attributed the Veteran’s dreams of Vietnam to the shrapnel wound he sustained in-service; however, Veteran was not diagnosed with any mental disorder. The examiner opined that the Veteran’s occupation and social functioning had not been significantly affected by his combat experiences in Vietnam. The examiner considered the Veteran’s assertions that he dreamed about Vietnam approximately once a month, as well as his personal belief that his combat experiences had not affected his ability to function at his post office job. During the examination, the Veteran indicated that he had a good relationship with one of his children and his co-workers, and that he has some friends. He also specified that while in the past he drank heavily and had engaged in drug usage that he attributed to his experiences in Vietnam, he currently drinks less and no longer uses drugs. The examiner considered the Veteran’s assertions during the examination; however, the Veteran was not diagnosed as currently having any mental disorder. The VA examiner’s 2009 determination of no current mental disorders is supported by the Veteran’s testimony at the November 2016 Board hearing, where he indicated that he retired from his job due to his kidney condition, and that when he was working he had taken time off from work due to PTSD approximately four times. He also testified that he has nightmares about Vietnam, but neither flashbacks nor hallucinations. He acknowledged that he infrequently became irritable and angry with other people, and that he did not feel anxious around groups of people. The Veteran also indicated that while he received some treatment for PTSD shortly after leaving the Army, he had not been recently treated. The existence of a current disability is the cornerstone of a claim for VA disability compensation. 38 U.S.C. § 1110; Degmetich v. Brown, 104 F. 3d 1328, 1332 (1997) (holding that interpretation of sections 1110 and 1131 of the statute as requiring the existence of a present disability for VA compensation purposes cannot be considered arbitrary). In the absence of proof of a current disability, there can be no valid claim. Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992). In determining whether service connection is warranted, the Board acknowledges that when there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding the merits of an outstanding issue, VA is statutorily required to apply the benefit-of the doubt doctrine to resolve the benefit of the doubt in favor of the Veteran. 38 U.S.C. 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Alemany v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 518 (1996); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1991). With respect to the Veteran’s assertions that he currently has PTSD, although lay persons are competent to provide opinions on some medical issues, determining a diagnosis of a “mental illness” falls outside the realm of common knowledge of a lay person. In this regard, while the Veteran can competently report psychiatric symptoms, any opinion regarding the diagnosis of a particular psychiatric disability requires medical expertise that the Veteran has not demonstrated. See Jandreau, 492 F. 3d at 1376. As such, the Board assigns no probative weight to the Veteran’s assertions that he developed PTSD as a result of his service. The most probative evidence of records are the findings of the VA examiner that the Veteran did not current have PTSD. As the weight of the evidence does not show that the Veteran has a current disability. Thus, the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran’s claim for entitlement to service connection for PTSD, and the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine is inapplicable. DAVID L. WIGHT Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD S. Raj, Associate Counsel