Citation Nr: 18119596 Decision Date: 07/18/18 Archive Date: 07/18/18 DOCKET NO. 15-18 316 DATE: July 18, 2018 ORDER New and material evidence having been received, the claim for service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is reopened. Service connection for hypertension is denied. REMANDED Service connection for PTSD, to include insomnia, is remanded. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. A June 2002 rating decision denied service connection for PTSD, and the Veteran was notified of the rating action and of his appellate rights. The Veteran did not perfect an appeal on this issue, and new and material evidence was not submitted within one year of the decision. 2. The evidence received since the June 2002 denial relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim for service connection PTSD and raises a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. 3. The Veteran’s hypertension is not etiologically related to his active service. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The June 2002 rating decision that denied service connection for PTSD is final. 38 U.S.C. § 7105(c) (2000); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104, 20.302, 20.1103 (2001). 2. New and material evidence has been received to reopen the previously denied claim for service connection for PTSD. 38 U.S.C. § 5108; 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (a). 3. The criteria for service connection for hypertension have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307, 3.309. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Veteran had active military service from March 1967 to March 1971. New and Material Evidence Generally, a final decision issued by the agency of original jurisdiction may not thereafter be reopened and allowed, and a claim based on the same factual basis may not be considered. 38 U.S.C. § 7105 (c), (d)(3). However, if evidence is presented or secured with respect to a claim that has been disallowed, VA shall reopen the claim and review the former disposition of the claim. 38 U.S.C. § 5108. “New evidence” is evidence that has not previously been reviewed by VA adjudicators. “Material evidence” is existing evidence, that, by itself or when considered with previous evidence of record, relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim. New and material evidence can be neither cumulative nor redundant of the evidence of record at the time of the last final denial of the claim sought to be reopened and must raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (a). In determining whether evidence is new and material, the credibility of the newly presented evidence is to be presumed. Justus v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 510 (1992). The Board must review all evidence submitted since the last final disallowance of the claim on any basis in order to determine whether the claim may be reopened. Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247 (1999). The claim for service connection for PTSD is based on the same factual basis as the previously denied claim for service connection for PTSD. That claim was denied in a June 2002 rating decision on the basis that the Veteran had not submitted a stressor for the RO to verify. The Veteran did not perfect an appeal on this issue, nor did he submit new and material evidence within one year following the decision. Thus, the decision became final. Accordingly, new and material evidence must be received to reopen the claim of entitlement to service connection for PTSD. 38 U.S.C. § 7105(c); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104, 20.302, 20.1103. The pertinent evidence received since the above discussed denial includes multiple written statements of an alleged in-service stressor. The Veteran’s statements are presumed credible for the limited purpose of reopening the claim, and, thus, raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating his claim for service connection. Thus, as new and material evidence has been received, the claim for service connection for PTSD is reopened. Service Connection for Hypertension Service connection will be granted if the evidence demonstrates that a current disability resulted from an injury or disease incurred in or aggravated by active military service. 38 U.S.C. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. Service connection requires competent evidence showing: (1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Additionally, service connection can also be established through application of a statutory presumption for chronic diseases, like cardiovascular-renal disease, including hypertension, when manifested to a compensable degree within a year of separation from service. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. If a chronic disease is not manifested to a compensable degree within a year of separation of service, then, generally, a showing of “continuity of symptoms” after service is required for service connection. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (b). Regarding a presumptive service connection, the Veteran has not asserted that his hypertension manifested to a compensable degree within a year of his separation from service. The Veteran was not diagnosed with hypertension until 1999, more than 25 years after he separated from service. Further, the Veteran has not alleged to have experienced symptoms of elevated blood pressure since active service, and there is no medical indication to the contrary. As such, a presumptive service connection is not warranted for the Veteran’s hypertension. Thus, service connection can only be granted for the Veteran’s hypertension on a direct basis. Turning to a direct service connection, the Board finds the criteria are not met to establish a direct service connection for the Veteran’s hypertension. There is no medical evidence or even lay evidence suggesting that this condition is the result of his active service or any other element thereof. The Veteran does not allege that his hypertension existed or was onset during his active service, and, as expected, the Veteran’s service treatment records are silent for treatment or reports of elevated blood pressure. Moreover, at the Veteran’s October 1970 separation examination, his blood pressure was 128/80, well below the hypertensive range. The Veteran has not submitted any medical evidence linking his hypertension to his active service. His post-service VA treatment records show that he was diagnosed with hypertension in 1999, but these records do not contain any medical opinions linking the disease to the Veteran’s active service. The Veteran has also not submitted any lay assertions of such a relation, other than his filing a claim for service connection for hypertension. The Board finds that there is no medical evidence of record which supports a direct service connection for the Veteran’s hypertension. The Board acknowledged that lay persons may be competent to provide opinions on some medical issues. Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428 (2011). However, as to the etiology of hypertension, the issue of causation of such a medical condition is a complex medical determination outside the realm of common knowledge of a lay person. Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Thus, although the Board has carefully considered the fact that the Veteran filed a claim for service connection for hypertension, thereby suggesting his hypertension is related to his service, the Board has not uncovered any credible medical evidence which supports such a connection, and the Veteran lacks the medical expertise to competently determine the etiology of this disability. As such, the criteria for a direct service connection for hypertension is also not met, and the Veteran’s claim is denied. REASONS FOR REMAND Service Connection for PTSD As requested by the Veteran, the RO submitted his stressor statement alleging involvement in a classified mission with special forces in Vietnam to be verified. The VA DOD Liaison emailed the RO a reply that the US Special Operations Command local historian’s review of records was negative for anything showing the Veteran was Special Forces or verifying the Veteran’s alleged stressor. The email included follow up requests for the Veteran that could assist in conducting further research to verify the stressor, but the Veteran was unable to provide the requested information. The Veteran’s representative submitted a letter to the Board on February 25, 2016, requesting that further efforts be taken by VA to verify the Veteran’s stressor; adding that VA had not fulfilled its duty to assist. While the Board does not find VA owes further duties to assist the Veteran in verifying this stressor, the Board will remand for the RO to take the specific actions requested by the Veteran in his representative’s February 2016 letter. The matter is REMANDED for the following action: 1. Contact the appropriate parties, to include the VA DOD Liaison and VAVBASPT/RO/SOCOM email accounts that were previously involved in the April 2015 email stressor verification attempts, and attempt to ascertain the following information: (a.) Were any Special Forces soldiers with the 5th Special Forces KIA in North Cambodia in April 1970? If so, please provide as many details as possible. (b.) Were any Russian soldiers KIA in North Cambodia in April 1970? If so, please provide as many details as possible. MATTHEW W. BLACKWELDER Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD C. Davidoski, Associate Counsel