Citation Nr: 18116822 Decision Date: 07/09/18 Archive Date: 07/09/18 DOCKET NO. 14-30 963A DATE: July 9, 2018 ORDER New and material evidence having not been received, the claim for service connection for an unspecified respiratory condition (also claimed as a pulmonary disease and asthma) is not reopened. Entitlement to service connection for Hepatitis C is denied. Entitlement to service connection for Parkinson’s disease, to include as due to herbicide exposure, is denied. Entitlement to service connection for aural fullness (also claimed as sinal nerve damage/eustachitis), to include as secondary to rhinitis, is denied. Entitlement to service connection for chronic fatigue syndrome, to include as secondary to Parkinson’s disease, is denied. Entitlement to service connection for residuals of gall bladder removal, to include as secondary to Hepatitis C, is denied. Entitlement to service connection for an unspecified mental condition (now claimed as anxiety disorder), to include as secondary to Hepatitis C, is denied. Entitlement to an effective date prior to October 25, 2010 for the award of service connection service-connected tinnitus is denied. REMANDED Service connection for degenerative arthritis of the left shoulder is remanded. Service connection for degenerative arthritis of the right shoulder is remanded. Service connection for degenerative arthritis of the cervical spine is remanded. Service connection for degenerative arthritis of the lumbar spine is remanded. Entitlement to service connection for loss of smell is remanded. Entitlement to service connection for unspecified renal condition is remanded. Entitlement to service connection for an abdominal scar, status post gallbladder removal is remanded. Entitlement to service connection for unspecified skin condition is remanded. Entitlement to service connection for unspecified neurological disability is remanded. Entitlement to a compensable rating for service-connected bilateral hearing loss is remanded. Entitlement to a rating in excess of 10 percent disabling for service-connected sinusitis is remanded. Entitlement to a total disability rating based on individual unemployability (TDIU) is remanded. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. In a final decision issued in July 2010, the RO denied the Veteran’s claim of entitlement to service connection for an unspecified respiratory condition; evidence received since that decision is cumulative or redundant of evidence then of record and does not raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the Veteran’s claim of entitlement to service connection for an unspecified respiratory condition (also claimed as a pulmonary disease and asthma). 2. Hepatitis C is not shown to be causally or etiologically related to any disease, injury, or incident during service. 3. Parkinson’s disease was not manifested during service or the first post-service year; the Veteran is not shown to have served in Vietnam during the Vietnam era or to have otherwise been exposed to herbicide agents during service; and his diagnosed Parkinson’s disease is not shown to be related to his service. 4. Aural fullness is not shown to be causally or etiologically related to any disease, injury, or incident during service, did not manifest within one year of service discharge, and is not shown to be otherwise caused or aggravated by a service-connected disability. 5. Chronic fatigue syndrome is not shown to be causally or etiologically related to any disease, injury, or incident during service, did not manifest within one year of discharge, and is not shown to be otherwise caused or aggravated by a service-connected disability. 6. Residuals of gall bladder removal are not shown to be causally or etiologically related to any disease, injury, or incident during service, did not manifest within one year of service discharge, and is not shown to be otherwise caused or aggravated by a service-connected disability. 7. An unspecified mental condition (now claimed as anxiety disorder) is not shown to be causally or etiologically related to any disease, injury, or incident during service, did not manifest within one year of service discharge, and is not shown to be otherwise caused or aggravated by a service-connected disability. 8. The Veteran filed his original claim seeking service connection for tinnitus on November 30, 2010; an August 2014 rating decision granted service connection for tinnitus as secondary to service connected bilateral hearing loss with an effective date of October 25, 2010 (prior to his date of claim). CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. New and material evidence has not been received to reopen service connection for an unspecified respiratory condition (also claimed as a pulmonary disease and asthma). 38 U.S.C. § 5108 (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (a) (2017). 2. The criteria for service connection for Hepatitis C are not met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303 (2017). 3. The criteria for service connection for Parkinson’s disease are not met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1112, 1116, 1131, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304, 3.307, 3.309 (2017). 4. The criteria for service connection for aural fullness (also claimed as sinal nerve damage/eustachitis) have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1131, 1137, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309, 3.310 (2017). 5. The criteria for service connection for chronic fatigue syndrome have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1131, 1137, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309, 3.310 (2017). 6. The criteria for service connection for residuals of gall bladder removal have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1131, 1137, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309, 3.310 (2017). 7. The criteria for service connection for an unspecified mental condition (now claimed as anxiety disorder) have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1131, 1137, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309, 3.310 (2017). 8. An effective date prior to October 25, 2010 is not warranted for the grant of service connection for tinnitus. 38 U.S.C. §§ 5101, 5110 (West 2014); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.151, 3.155, 3.400 (2015). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Veteran served on active duty in the Navy from August 1964 to July 1968. In the Veteran’s September 2014 and October 2017 VA Form 9, he requested a Board videoconference hearing. He was scheduled for a hearing in May 2018, but failed to appear and has not requested a new hearing or provided good cause for such failure; thus, his hearing request is considered withdrawn. While the RO treated the Veteran’s claims for service connection for an unspecified mental disorder and residuals of gall bladder removal as petitions to reopen, the Board finds they are in fact original claims for service connection because the Veteran submitted a timely March 2011 notice of disagreement appealing their denial in an April 2010 rating decision. Furthermore, although a November 2017 rating decision continued to deny a “petition to reopen” service connection for Parkinson’s disease, such claim was already on appeal at that time. An April 2010 rating decision denied service connection for degenerative arthritis of the left and right shoulders and the lumbar and cervical spine; loss of smell; an unspecified renal condition; an abdominal scar, status post gallbladder removal; an unspecified skin condition; and an unspecified neurological disability. The Veteran subsequently filed a notice of disagreement as to the denials, but a statement of the case (SOC) as to these claims have not yet been issued; thus, the Board must take jurisdiction of these matters for the limited purpose of ordering corrective action. Manlincon v. West, 12 Vet. App. 238 (1999). Additional evidence was submitted by the Veteran in June 2018 with a waiver of initial RO consideration. Therefore, no prejudice will befall the Veteran by the Board reviewing the evidence and proceeding with adjudication of the Veteran’s claims. Service Connection and Petition to Reopen Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (a). Service connection may also be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all of the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (d). Direct service connection may not be granted without evidence of a current disability; in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the present disease or injury. Id; see also Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995) aff’d, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996) [(table)]. Additionally, for Veterans who have served 90 days or more of active service during a war period or after December 31, 1946, certain chronic disabilities, are presumed to have been incurred in service if manifest to a compensable degree within one year of discharge from service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1112; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. Alternatively, when a disease at 38 C.F.R. § 3.309 (a) is not shown to be chronic during service or the one-year presumptive period, service connection may also be established by showing continuity of symptomatology after service. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). However, the use of continuity of symptoms to establish service connection is limited only to those diseases listed at 38 C.F.R. § 3.309 (a) and does not apply to other disabilities which might be considered chronic from a medical standpoint. See Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Service connection may also be established on a secondary basis for a disability that is proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disease or injury. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 (a). Establishing service connection on a secondary basis requires evidence sufficient to show (1) that a current disability exists and (2) that the current disability was either (a) proximately caused by or (b) proximately aggravated by a service-connected disability. Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439, 448 (1995) (en banc). Service connection may not be established on the basis of aggravation without establishing a pre-aggravation baseline level of disability and comparing it to the current level of disability. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 (b). Rating actions are final and binding based on evidence on file at the time the claimant is notified of the decision and may not be revised on the same factual basis except by a duly constituted appellate authority. 38 C.F.R. § 3.104 (a). The claimant has one year from notification of an RO decision to initiate an appeal by filing a notice of disagreement with the decision, and the decision becomes final if an appeal is not perfected within the allowed time period. 38 U.S.C. § 7105 (b) and (c); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.160 (d), 20.200, 20.201, 20.202, and 20.302(a). Generally, a claim which has been denied in a Board decision or an unappealed RO decision may not thereafter be reopened and allowed. 38 U.S.C. §§ 7104 (b), 7105(c). The exception to this rule is 38 U.S.C. § 5108, which provides that if new and material evidence is presented or secured with respect to a claim which has been disallowed, the Secretary shall reopen the claim and review the former disposition of the claim. New evidence means existing evidence not previously submitted to agency decisionmakers. Material evidence means existing evidence that, by itself or when considered with previous evidence of record, relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim. New and material evidence can be neither cumulative nor redundant of the evidence of record at the time of the last prior final denial of the claim sought to be reopened, and must raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (a). The Court has held that the determination of whether newly submitted evidence raises a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim should be considered a component of the question of what is new and material evidence, rather than a separate determination to be made after the Board has found that evidence is new and material. See Shade v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 110 (2010). The Court further held that new evidence would raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim if, when considered with the old evidence, it would at least trigger the Secretary’s duty to assist by providing a medical opinion. Id. For the purpose of establishing whether new and material evidence has been submitted, the credibility of the evidence is to be presumed. Justus v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 510, 513 (1992). When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant. 38 U.S.C. § 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; see also Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1990). Whether new and material evidence has been submitted to reopen service connection for an unspecified respiratory condition (also claimed as a pulmonary disease and asthma) and, if so, whether service connection is warranted. A July 2010 rating decision denied service connection for an unspecified respiratory condition because there was no evidence of a current disability at that time. Of record at the time of the July 2010 rating decision were the Veteran’s service treatment records (including X-rays noting pleural effusions at the left costophrenic angle on separation examination without an accompanying diagnosis), post-service treatment records (which are silent for lung problems or treatment), lay statements, and a June 2010 VA examination report (documenting a normal pulmonary examination and finding the pleural effusion noted at separation had resolved because there was no associated residual lung or respiratory disability found on examination). The Veteran was advised of the denial and his appellate rights, but failed to file a timely appeal and no new and material evidence was received within a year of that denial. In fact, no further correspondence pertaining to this matter was received until the November 2011 claim to reopen currently on appeal. Therefore, the July 2010 rating decision is final based on the evidence then of record. 38 U.S.C. § 7105 (c) (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104, 20.302, 20.1103 (2017); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(b); Bond v. Shinseki, 659 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Roebuck v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 307, 316 (2006); Muehl v. West, 13 Vet. App. 159, 161-62 (1999). Evidence received since the prior final denial includes additional post-service treatment records and a July 2013 VA examination indicating the Veteran’s lung disease was less likely than not incurred in or caused by his pleural effusion in service. The examiner again noted that the effusion in service had resolved and that post-service treatment records did not show a clinical diagnosis of pulmonary disease. While the Veteran has submitted “new” statements regarding the onset and severity of his alleged respiratory disorder, they are duplicative of his generalized allegations of a relationship to service that were previously of record in July 2010. Therefore, the Board finds that the “new” evidence received since the prior final July 2010 rating decision is cumulative and redundant of evidence previously of record and does not raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the underlying service connection claim. Consequently, it is not “new and material evidence,” the preponderance of the evidence is against reopening the underlying claim, and appeal thereof must be denied. Entitlement to service connection for Hepatitis C. The Veteran seeks service connection for hepatitis C, which he relates to air gun inoculations in service. The Veteran has also alleged that he assisted with the evacuation of a soldier who bled on him. The Veteran’s service treatment records are silent for any complaints, treatment or diagnosis of hepatitis C or related symptoms. Furthermore, there is no evidence of any air gun transmissions and service treatment records are silent for any high-risk activities associated with the contraction of Hepatitis C, to include coming into contact with contaminated blood. Post-service treatment records show the Veteran received treatment for Hepatitis C, but do not include any etiological opinions. Lay statements indicate the Veteran was frequently sick because of his Hepatitis C. On December 2009 VA examination, the examiner confirmed a diagnosis of Hepatitis C and opined that such was less likely than not due to air gun inoculations in service, noting that, while air gun inoculations may be a source of hepatitis infection, it is not a recognized mode of transmission. Instead, the examiner said the most likely cause of the Veteran’s hepatitis was a blood transfusion received in 1987. The Board finds this December 2009 VA examiner’s opinion is entitled to significant probative weight because it reflects consideration of all pertinent evidence, including the Veteran’s own statements alleging onset of symptoms he attributes to hepatitis C during service, and includes a complete rationale with citation to supporting evidence. See Nieves-Rodriguez, supra; Stefl, supra. Absent any other competent or probative medical opinions to the contrary, the Board also finds this opinion is persuasive. In so finding, the Board acknowledges that the Veteran is competent to report observable symptoms since in-service inoculations and his belief that he was exposed to contaminated blood. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159; see Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469-70 (1994). However, whether any medical relationship exists between the Veteran’s hepatitis C and any alleged inoculations or alleged contact with contaminated blood are complex questions outside the scope of lay observation, particularly considering there is no evidence corroborating the Veteran’s speculation regarding blood contamination. See Woehlaert v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 456 (2007) (although the claimant is competent in certain situations to provide a diagnosis of a simple condition such as a broken leg or varicose veins, the claimant is not competent to provide evidence as to more complex medical questions); Jones v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 134, 137 (1994). Therefore, the Veteran’s own opinion is nonprobative evidence in this matter. Finally, while the Board notes that the Veteran submitted internet articles in support of his claims, and that they suggest the presence of a relationship between air-gun inoculations and Hepatitis C, the articles in question provide only general information as to the possibility of air-gun inoculations as a risk factor for Hepatitis C and are not accompanied by corresponding clinical evidence specific to the Veteran’s case. Moreover, they do not suggest a generic relationship between the Veteran’s in-service inoculations and hepatitis C with a degree of certainty that, under the facts of this specific case, reflects plausible causality based upon objective facts. As such, the Board finds this information to not be relevant as to the matter for consideration and, therefore, is afforded no probative weight. Wallin v. West, 11 Vet. App. 509, 514 (1998) (citing Sacks v. West, 11 Vet. App. 314, 317 (1998)); see also Libertine v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 521, 523 (1996) (medical treatise evidence must demonstrate connection between service incurrence and present injury or condition); Beausoleil v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 459, 463 (1996) (generic statement about the possibility of a link between chest trauma and restrictive lung disease is too general and inconclusive). Considering the above, the Board finds that the Veteran’s Hepatitis C is not shown to be causally or etiologically related to any disease, injury, or incident during service. Consequently, service connection for such disorder is not warranted, the preponderance of the evidence is against this claim, and the appeal thereof must be denied. Entitlement to service connection for Parkinson’s disease. The Veteran contends that he developed Parkinson’s disease as a result of exposure to herbicide agents during his active duty service. Specifically, he alleges herbicide exposure while aboard the USS Enterprise which he alleges transported equipment to and from Vietnam, to include tactical herbicides. Certain diseases, to include Parkinson’s disease, may also be service connected on a presumptive basis if manifested in a Veteran who served in Vietnam during the Vietnam Era (or was otherwise exposed to herbicide agents during active service), even if there is no record of such disease during service. 38 U.S.C. § 1116 (a)(1), (2); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307 (a)(6), 3.309(e). Notably, 38 C.F.R. § 3.307 (a)(6) specifically defines “herbicide agents” as chemicals in an herbicide “used in support of the United States and allied military operations in the Republic of Vietnam during the period beginning on January 9, 1962, and ending on May 7, 1975 (emphasis added).” The Veteran’s service treatment records are silent for any complaints, treatment, or diagnoses related to Parkinson’s disease, and nothing related to such disability was noted on service separation examination. Post-service treatment records reflect a diagnosis of Parkinson’s disease. The Joint Services Records Research Center (JSRRC) reviewed official military documents, ship histories, deck logs, and other sources of information related to Navy and Coast Guard ships and the use of tactical herbicide agents, such as Agent Orange, during the Vietnam Era. The JSRRC found no evidence that Navy or Coast Guard ships transported tactical herbicides from the United States to the Republic of Vietnam or that ships operating off the coast of Vietnam used, stored, tested or transported tactical herbicides. Therefore, the JSRRC provided a May 2009 memorandum noting there is no evidence to support the Veteran’s claim of exposure to tactical herbicide agents while serving aboard a Navy or Coast Guard ship during the Vietnam Era. There is also no conclusive evidence that the Veteran served in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam era. As the Veteran’s service treatment records are silent for complaints, treatment, or diagnoses related to Parkinson’s disease, service connection for such disability on the basis that such began in service and has persisted is not warranted. Absent related events or injuries in service, service connection for such disability is also not warranted on the basis that it is otherwise directly related to such events or injuries in service. Moreover, while Parkinson’s disease (as an organic disease of the nervous system) is a chronic disease under 38 C.F.R. § 3.309 (a), there is nothing suggesting that such was manifested in the first post-service year. Thus, service connection for such on a presumptive basis (as a chronic disease under 38 U.S.C. § 1112) is also not warranted. Similarly, although Parkinson’s disease may be service connected on a presumptive basis if manifested in a Veteran exposed to herbicides in service, for the reasons outlined above, there is nothing in the record corroborating the Veteran’s allegations of exposure, suggesting he is entitled to a presumption of exposure, or otherwise showing that he was so exposed during service. Therefore, the presumptive provisions of 38 U.S.C. § 1116 applicable to Veterans so exposed do not apply. Consequently, service connection for Parkinson’s disease is also not warranted on a presumptive basis as a disability related to herbicide exposure in service. Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence is against this claim, and the appeal in this matter must be denied.   Entitlement to service connection for aural fullness (also claimed as sinal nerve damage/eustachitis) as secondary to rhinitis; chronic fatigue syndrome to include as secondary to Parkinson’s disease; residuals of gall bladder removal to include as secondary to Hepatitis C; and an unspecified mental condition (now claimed as anxiety disorder) to include as due to Hepatitis C. The Board observes that there is no indication of aural fullness (also claimed as sinal nerve damage/eustachitis), chronic fatigue syndrome, residuals of gall bladder removal, or an unspecified mental condition (also claimed as an anxiety disorder) in the Veteran’s service treatment records or for many years after his separation from service. Furthermore, the Veteran does not contend and the record does not otherwise suggest that any of these disabilities began during service or in the first post-service year, or are otherwise related to any incident in service. See Robinson v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1355, 1361 (2008) (claims which have no support in the record need not be considered by the Board as the Board is not obligated to considered “all possible” substantive theories of recovery). Rather, the Veteran has exclusively claimed that these disorders were caused or aggravated by his rhinitis, Hepatitis C or Parkinson’s disease. For the reasons fully discussed in the section above, the Board has found that service connection for Parkinson’s disease and Hepatitis C are not warranted. Similarly, the Veteran is not service-connected for rhinitis and no claim seeking such benefit is currently on appeal or pending. As such, there is no legal basis upon which the Veteran’s secondary service connection claims for aural fullness (also claimed as sinal nerve damage/eustachitis), chronic fatigue syndrome, residuals of gall bladder removal, or an unspecified mental condition (also claimed as an anxiety disorder) could possibly be substantiated. As the record also does not support any other theory of entitlement, the Board finds that service connection for such disorders is not warranted. In so finding, the Board acknowledges a June 2018 private medical opinion diagnosing Unspecified Depressive Disorder and opining that such was the result of service-connected disabilities and prescribed medications. The private provider based this determination on “records showing an onset of mental health symptoms as the result of service-connected disabilities,” statements “indicating the severity and chronicity of the Veteran’s psychological symptoms until the present,” the lack of any indication that the Veteran had a mental health disorder prior to joining the military, and articles indicating medications for unrelated conditions could cause mood changes. Unfortunately, the medications that were felt to be the cause of his mental health problems were not prescribed for service-connected disabilities, and the examiner failed to provide an adequate rationale explaining her positive secondary service connection opinion. See Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295 (2008); Stefl v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 120, 124 (2007) (“[A] medical opinion... must support its conclusion with an analysis that the Board can consider and weigh against contrary opinions”). Therefore, the Board finds that opinion is inadequate for rating purposes and entitled to little to no probative weight. Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran’s claims in these matters, and the appeals thereof must be denied. See 38 U.S.C. § 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Gilbert, supra. Entitlement to an effective date prior to October 25, 2012, for service-connected tinnitus secondary to service-connected bilateral hearing loss. The Veteran generally contends that an effective date prior to October 25, 2012 is warranted for the award of service connection for tinnitus secondary to service-connected bilateral hearing loss. No specific argument was submitted in support of his contentions. The effective date for a grant of service connection is the day after separation from service or day entitlement arose, if a claim is received within one year of separation from service. Otherwise, it is the date the pertinent claim is received or the day entitlement arose, whichever is later. 38 U.S.C. § 5110 (b)(1); 38 C.F.R.§ 3.400 (b)(2)(i). A claim for VA benefits, whether formal or informal, must be in writing and must identify the benefit sought. 38 U.S.C. § 5101; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.1 (p), 3.151, 3.155; Rodriguez v. West, 189 F.3d 1351 (Fed.Cir. 1999); Lalonde v. West, 12 Vet. App. 377 (1999). Treatment records do not constitute informal claims when service connection has not yet been established for the condition. 38 C.F.R. § 3.157; Sears v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 244 (2002). While the VA should broadly interpret submissions from a Veteran, it is not required to conjure up claims not specifically raised. Brannon v. West, 12 Vet. App. 32 (1998); Talbert v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 352, 356-57 (1995). Secondary service connection is granted for a “disability which is proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disease or injury.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 (a). “When service connection is thus established for a secondary condition, the secondary condition shall be considered a part of the original condition.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 (a). The “plain meaning of th[is] regulation is and has always been to require VA to afford secondarily service-connected conditions the same treatment (no more or less favorable treatment) as the underlying service-connected conditions for all determinations.” Roper v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 173, 181 (2006). Building on Roper, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) held that “a requirement that a secondary condition ‘be considered a part of [an] original condition’ does not, in our view, establish that the original condition and the secondary condition must receive identical effective dates.” Ellington v. Peake, 541 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “Indeed, a per se rule requiring identical effective dates for primary and secondary conditions would be illogical, given that secondary conditions may not arise until years after the onset of the original condition.” Id. The Federal Circuit concluded that “the effective date for secondary conditions is governed by 38 C.F.R. § 3.400, which establishes the effective date as the ‘date of receipt of claim, or [the] date entitlement arose, whichever is later.’’ Id. It explained: We think this result is consistent with 38 U.S.C. § 5110, the statute which governs the effective date of awards. Section 5110(a) provides generally that “[u]nless specifically provided otherwise in this chapter, the effective date of an award based on an original claim... shall be fixed in accordance with the facts found, but shall not be earlier than the date of receipt of application therefore.” The statute contains no exception to this rule for a claim, such as the one filed in this case, seeking service connection for an alleged secondary condition. Id. at 1370 (emphasis added). A review of the record reveals the first claim, formal or informal, seeking service connection for bilateral hearing loss and tinnitus was dated November 30, 2010 and received by the RO on December 6, 2010. A July 2011 rating decision granted service connection for bilateral hearing loss with nerve damage, effective October 25, 2010, the date of the Veteran’s claim. The RO did not decide the Veteran’s claim for tinnitus. On March 2010 VA examination, the examiner opined that the Veteran’s tinnitus was not caused by or the result of military noise exposure. However, during a January 2011 VA examination, the examiner opined that the Veteran’s tinnitus was as likely as not a symptom associated with the Veteran’s service-connected bilateral hearing loss. In August 2014, the RO relied on that finding and granted service connection for tinnitus as secondary to bilateral hearing loss, also effective October 25, 2010. While the Veteran may have experienced tinnitus prior to October 25, 2010, the effective date of an award of service connection is assigned not based on the date the Veteran claims the disability appeared or the date of the earliest medical evidence demonstrating the existence of such disability and a causal connection to service; rather, the effective date is assigned based on consideration of the date that the application upon which service connection was eventually awarded was received by VA. See LaLonde v. West, 12 Vet. App. 377, 382-383 (1999). Here, it is clear from the evidence that the effective date assigned is already earlier than the earliest date allowable under a proper reading of the regulations governing effective dates, as the Veteran’s service connection claim was not received until December 2010. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the Board finds there is no legal basis upon which to assign an effective date prior to October 25, 2010 for the grant of service connection for tinnitus. Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence is against this claim, the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine does not apply, and the appeal thereof must be denied. See 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Gilbert, supra. REASONS FOR REMAND Although the Board regrets the delay, a remand is necessary to ensure that due process is followed and that there is a complete record upon which to decide the Veteran’s claim so that he is afforded every possible consideration. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159. Entitlement to service connection for degenerative arthritis of the left and right shoulders and the lumbar and cervical spine; loss of smell; an unspecified renal condition; an abdominal scar, status post gallbladder removal; an unspecified skin condition; and an unspecified neurological disability. An April 2010 rating decision denied service connection for the disabilities, and the Veteran submitted a timely March 2011 notice of disagreement appealing those denials. Thus, remand for issuance of a statement of the case on these issues is necessary. Manlincon v. West, 12 Vet. App. 238 (1999). Entitlement to a compensable rating for service-connected bilateral hearing loss and a rating in excess of 10 percent disabling for service-connected sinusitis are remanded. Relevant to the Veteran’s claims for an initial compensable rating and a higher rating, the Court has held that, where the record does not adequately reveal the current state of a claimant’s disabilities, fulfillment of the statutory duty to assist requires a contemporaneous medical examination, particularly if there is no additional medical evidence that adequately addresses the level of impairment of the disability since the last examination. Allday v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 517, 526 (1995). The Veteran was most recently afforded an ear examination in August 2013 and a respiratory examination in February 2012. As he has alleged significantly worsening symptoms since those examinations, contemporaneous examinations are needed in order to fully evaluate the current nature and degree of severity of these conditions. Entitlement to a TDIU is remanded. The Board finds that the claim for entitlement to a TDIU is inextricably intertwined with the claims remanded herein, the outcomes of which could possibly have bearing on whether the Veteran meets the schedular criteria for TDIU benefits. See Tyrues v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 166, 177 (2009) (en banc) (explaining that claims are inextricably intertwined where the adjudication of one claim could have a significant impact on the adjudication of another claim); Harris v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 180, 183 (1991). Finally, due to the amount of time which will pass on remand, updated treatment records should be obtained and associated with the claims file. The matters are REMANDED for the following action: 1. Provide the Veteran with a statement of the case regarding the issues of entitlement to service connection for degenerative arthritis of the left and right shoulders and the lumbar and cervical spine; loss of smell; an unspecified renal condition; an abdominal scar, status post gallbladder removal; an unspecified skin condition; and an unspecified neurological disability. Advise the Veteran of the time period in which to perfect his appeal. If the Veteran perfects his appeal of these issues in a timely fashion, then return the case to the Board for its review, as appropriate. 2. Obtain updated treatment records. 3. After all outstanding records have been associated with the record, the Veteran should be afforded appropriate VA examinations to determine the severity of his service-connected bilateral hearing loss and sinusitis. To the extent possible the examiners should describe all manifestations and symptoms of the Veteran’s service-connected bilateral hearing loss and sinusitis. The examiner should discuss any functional impact of the Veteran’s service-connected conditions. All opinions expressed should be accompanied by supporting rationale.   4. After the above-requested development has been completed, to the extent possible, readjudicate the appeal. L. M. BARNARD Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD J. Unger, Associate Counsel