Citation Nr: 18118822 Decision Date: 07/18/18 Archive Date: 07/17/18 DOCKET NO. 18-22 935 DATE: July 18, 2018 ORDER Entitlement to an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety, and depression, is denied. FINDING OF FACT The preponderance of the evidence is against finding that the Veteran has an acquired psychiatric disorder due to a disease or injury in service, to include specific in-service event, injury, or disease. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder are not met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131, 5107(b) (2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303(a) (2018). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran had active service from March 1951 to February 1953. Entitlement to an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety, and depression Service connection may be established for a disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in the line of duty in the active military, naval, or air service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131 (2012). Certain diseases, to include psychoses, may be presumed to have been incurred in service when manifest to a compensable degree within one year of discharge from active duty. 38 U.S.C. § 1112 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309 (2018). As there is no evidence or claim that the Veteran was diagnosed with an acquired psychiatric disorder characterized as a psychosis within one year of service the above provision is not applicable. To establish a right to compensation for a present disability, a Veteran must show: “(1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service.” Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313, 1315-16 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Service connection for PTSD specifically requires medical evidence establishing a diagnosis of the disability, credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor actually occurred, and a link, established by medical evidence, between the current symptomatology and the claimed in-service stressor. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (2018). If the evidence establishes that the Veteran engaged in combat with the enemy and the claimed stressor is related to that combat, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided that the claimed stressor is consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of the Veteran’s service, the Veteran’s lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(1); see also 38 U.S.C. § 1154(b) (2012). Similarly, if a stressor claimed by a veteran is related to the Veteran’s fear of hostile military or terrorist activity and a VA psychiatrist or psychologist, or a psychiatrist or psychologist with whom VA has contracted, confirms that the claimed stressor is adequate to support a diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder and that the Veteran’s symptoms are related to the claimed stressor, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided the claimed stressor is consistent with the places, types, and circumstances of the Veteran’s service, the Veteran’s lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3); 75 Fed. Reg. 39,843 (July 13, 2010); 75 Fed. Reg. 41092 (July 15, 2010). Otherwise, the law requires verification of a claimed stressor. Where a determination is made that the Veteran did not “engage in combat with the enemy,” or the claimed stressor is unrelated to combat, the Veteran’s lay testimony alone will not be enough to establish the occurrence of the alleged stressor. See Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389, 395 (1996); Dizoglio v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 163, 166 (1996). In such cases, the record must include service records or other credible evidence that supports and does not contradict the Veteran’s testimony. Doran v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 283, 289 (1994). Moreover, a medical opinion diagnosing PTSD does not suffice to verify the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressors. See Moreau, 9 Vet. App. at 395-396; Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128, 142 (1997). The Veteran contends that he has a current acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, anxiety, and/or depression, due to seeing a fellow service member fall off a bridge to his death during a training operation at Fort Lewis, Washington. The Board notes that there are multiple private medical opinions of record linking the Veteran’s current psychiatric problems to the claimed death of a fellow service member due to a fall from a bridge while the Veteran was serving at Fort Lewis. In addition, a March 2015 letter indicated that during a training exercise “another soldier pulled the pin on a grenade, [the Veteran] fled to safety in a bunker.” The medical professional linked the Veteran’s PTSD to a combination of the bridge and grenade incidents. As there is no contention that the claimed incidents occurred during combat or were due to fear of hostile military or terrorist activity, the applicable provisions related to such scenarios are inapplicable here. Thus, the critical question is whether the claimed in-service incidents can be verified. In an attempt to verify the claimed in-service incidents VA has sent the Veteran multiple letters requesting that he provide specifics regarding the dates and circumstances of the claimed incidents. The Veteran has provided no statement or information regarding the alleged incident involving a fellow service member pulling the pin on a grenade during a training exercise. The Veteran has sent VA some information regarding the alleged fall of another service member from a bridge during the Veteran’s service at Fort Lewis, but he has not provided any date as to when such incident occurred. VA has attempted to obtain a date of the incident from the Veteran both by mail and telephone, but the Veteran has not provided the requested information. As such, the RO concluded that there was insufficient evidence available to undertake a search to verify the claimed incident. The Board concurs with the RO’s assessment. The evidence suggests that the Veteran served at Fort Lewis during his basic training and for a period thereafter, but in the absence of any more specific guidance regarding the timing of the incident a search at this time is not warranted. (Continued on the next page)   The Board notes that the Veteran’s service treatment records have been determined to be unavailable due to a fire at their storage facility; however, the Veteran has not claimed and there is no evidence to suggest that he sought or received any treatment for an acquired psychiatric disorder during service or that he otherwise raised any complaints or issues regarding symptoms related to an acquired psychiatric disorder. Accordingly, the claim is denied as the preponderance of the evidence is against a finding that the Veteran has an acquired psychiatric disorder as a consequence of another service member’s fall to his death from a bridge and/or a fellow service member pulling the pin on a grenade during a training exercise. See generally Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990); Ortiz v. Principi, 274 F.3d 1361 (Fed Cir. 2001). J.W. FRANCIS Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD C. J. Houbeck, Counsel