Citation Nr: 19106961 Decision Date: 01/29/19 Archive Date: 01/29/19 DOCKET NO. 17-10 083 DATE: January 29, 2019 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include paranoid schizophrenia, is denied. FINDING OF FACT The preponderance of the evidence is against finding that the Veteran’s acquired psychiatric disorder, to include paranoid schizophrenia, is related to an in-service injury, event, or disease, or that it manifested within one year of service. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include paranoid schizophrenia, have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1131, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served in the United States Navy from February 1969 to April 1970. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) on appeal from a February 2016 rating decision (RD) of the Jackson, Mississippi, Regional Office (RO) of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Under the relevant laws and regulations, service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131. Generally, the evidence must show: (1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1166-67 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b), an alternative method to establishing the second and third Shedden elements is through a demonstration of continuity of symptomatology if the disability claimed qualifies as a chronic disease listed in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a). See Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Psychosis, including schizophrenia, is explicitly recognized as a chronic disorder under 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a) (see 38 C.F.R. § 3.384) and may be presumed to have been incurred in service if manifest to a degree of 10 percent or more within one year of service. Consideration must be given to a veteran’s personal assertion that he has a disability related to active service. While the Veteran is competent to convey that which comes to him through his senses, he is not competent to make a medical determination or conclusion. Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994). It is also worth noting that lay persons are competent to provide opinions on some medical issues, see Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428, 435 (2011), the specific issue in this case falls outside the realm of common knowledge of a lay person. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The disability at issue here is not a condition that is readily amenable to lay diagnosis or probative comment regarding etiology. See Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009). It is the policy of VA to administer the law under a broad interpretation, consistent with the facts in each case, with all reasonable doubt to be resolved in favor of the claimant. Once all the evidence is assembled, the Board is then responsible for determining whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise, with the Veteran prevailing in either event; or whether the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, in which case the claim will be denied. 38 U.S.C. § 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 54 (1990). The question for the Board is whether the Veteran’s current disability is related to an in-service injury, event, or disease; or whether his current disability was aggravated beyond its natural progression due to his service. With respect to Shedden element one, current disability, the objective medical evidence of record establishes that the Veteran has a history of an acquired psychiatric disorder, dating back to 1996. Hence, the Board concedes that the Veteran currently suffers from an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include schizophrenia. Accordingly, element one under Shedden has been satisfied. With respect to Shedden element two, in-service disease or injury, the Veteran’s service treatment records (STR’s), as well as the military service personnel records reveal no complaints of or treatment for psychiatric/mental disorders. Indeed, a review of these records reveals that the sections dealing with the Veteran’s psychological state-of-mind during his active service returned negative results. The Veteran contends that his acquired psychiatric disorder, to include paranoid schizophrenia, is related to his active military service. However, the Veteran has not articulated a specific time, place, or event during his service or within one year of separation as the primary cause of his disability, nor has he asserted he experienced any symptoms during service. He feels his condition is related to service because he has “visions” of his service and he sometimes continues to behave as if he is still in service, but he has never actually alleged he experienced any mental health symptoms during service. With respect to Shedden element three, causal relationship, none of the objective medical evidence suggests that there is an actual connection between the Veteran’s acquired psychiatric disorder and his military service. Thus, without an in-service event or occurrence, there can be nothing to connect the Veteran’s acquired psychiatric disorder to his service in the United States Navy. The only evidence in the record that a nexus exists is the Veteran’s own subjective lay statement. The Veteran’s lay statement insists that his United States Navy service has caused him to suffer from schizophrenia, but this is not supported by any objective medical evidence. The Veteran is not medically qualified to render a medical opinion/diagnosis that etiologically links his disability to his military service. Of course, the Veteran is qualified/competent to report symptoms related to his disability, but this competency does not extend to rendering medical diagnoses. See Layno, 6 Vet. App. at 469; Jandreau, 492 F.3d at 1377. The objective medical evidence does not suggest that the Veteran’s acquired psychiatric disorder was incurred during, aggravated by, or otherwise related to his military service. In fact, the record is entirely absent of any mention of an in-service event causing or worsening the Veteran’s acquired psychiatric disorder. There is no documentary medical evidence in the record of treatment for his disability until 1996, some 25 years post-service. There is nothing in the private treatment records suggesting any continuity of symptomatology back to service or any manifestations of the mental health condition within the first year of service. Accordingly, element three under Shedden has not been satisfied. The Veteran’s subjective assertions that he feels as though his acquired psychiatric condition was the result of his military service are found to be wholly unpersuasive by the Board. In summary, the Board concludes that the preponderance of the evidence is against a finding that the Veteran’s acquired psychiatric condition, to include schizophrenia, was caused by his military service, which lasted from 1969 to 1970. Because the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, the benefit of the doubt doctrine is not for application.   In light of the foregoing, the claim for entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include schizophrenia, is denied. 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b); see also Gilbert,1 Vet. App. at 49. MICHELLE KANE Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD K. Meiners