Citation Nr: 19147455 Decision Date: 06/18/19 Archive Date: 06/18/19 DOCKET NO. 16-01 536 DATE: June 18, 2019 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for a personality disorder is denied. FINDING OF FACT A personality disorder may not be service connected as a matter of law. CONCLUSION OF LAW A personality disorder is not a disease or injury within the meaning of the law providing compensation. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 4.9. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty from December 1991 to April 1993. Service Connection Service connection may be established for disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in the line of duty in the active military, naval, or air service. 38 U.S.C. § 1110. To establish a right to compensation for a present disability, a Veteran must show: (1) a current disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship, i.e., a nexus, between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the current disability. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a); see also Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Service connection may also be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease or injury was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). In evaluating a claim, the Board must determine the value of all evidence submitted, including lay and medical evidence. Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1335 (2006). The evaluation of evidence generally involves a three-step inquiry. First, the Board must determine whether the evidence comes from a “competent” source. Competent lay evidence means any evidence not requiring that the proponent have specialized education, training, or experience. Lay evidence is competent if it is provided by a person who has knowledge of facts or circumstances and conveys matters that can be observed and described by a lay person. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a); Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 470 (1994) (providing that a Veteran is competent to report on that of which he or she has personal knowledge). Lay evidence can also be competent and sufficient evidence of a diagnosis if (1) the medical issue is within the competence of a layperson, (2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007). If the evidence is competent, the Board must then determine if the evidence is credible, or worthy of belief. Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 308 (2007) (observing that once evidence is determined to be competent, the Board must determine whether such evidence is also credible). After determining the competency and credibility of evidence, the Board must then weigh its probative value. In this regard, the Board may properly consider internal inconsistency, facial plausibility, and consistency with other evidence submitted on behalf of the claimant. Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 511–12 (1995). When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant. 38 U.S.C. § 5107; see also Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1990). To deny a claim on its merits, the evidence must preponderate against the claim. Alemany v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 518, 519 (1996). Entitlement to Service Connection for a Personality Disorder The Veteran filed a claim for entitlement to service connection for Schizotypal Personality Disorder in July 2012. The Veteran’s service treatment records (STRs) are associated with the claims file. An October 1992 treatment record reflects that the Veteran reported that prior to military service he was treated for mental health issues and spent 5 weeks in a rehabilitation facility. A February 1993 treatment record reflects that the Veteran sought mental health treatment and was provisionally diagnosed with adjustment disorder and depressive mood, as well the potential for an antisocial personality disorder, by a general medical officer. There were references to dissatisfaction with his job, a “Dear John” letter from his girlfriend, and unhappiness stationed in a foreign country. A corresponding opinion from a staff psychiatrist diagnosed him with Schizotypal Personality Disorder. The psychiatrist found that the Veteran was not mentally ill and was responsible for his behavior. The psychiatrist found only that the Veteran had made a poor adjustment to the demands of military service. He had a character and behavior disorder that was sufficient to preclude further service. A March 1993 examination also reflects that the Veteran was diagnosed with Schizotypal Personality Disorder. The Veteran attended a VA examination in June 2013. Following an examination of the Veteran and review of the medical history, the examiner concluded that the Veteran had Schizotypal Personality Disorder, and no other mental health conditions were found. The examiner found that the personality disorder was incurred in service, suggesting but not explicitly stating that the developmental disorder was caused or at least aggravated by service. On the other hand, the Board finds that all the observations in service refer to the Veteran’s inability to adjust military life that would not be a factor after discharge from that military life situation. The weight of evidence is that the features of Naval service were just not compatible with the personality disorder, not that it was caused or aggravated by them. VA outpatient treatment records from 2015-16 are silent for any mental health symptoms; the Veteran denied any symptoms in several routine screenings. In a May 2016 statement, the Veteran reported an experience when he became nervous and concerned for his safety during a shipboard drill when there was no actual danger. The Veteran testified during a Board hearing in November 2018. The Veteran testified that he had never been diagnosed with anything other than schizotypal, and that he saw a mental health provider at VA annually. The Veteran and his representative contended that while the Veteran was diagnosed with a personality disorder, he could also potentially have an acquired psychiatric disability, to include posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). See November 2018 Board hearing transcript. The Board recognizes that there are outstanding VA treatment records, however, according to the Veteran’s testimony at the November 2018 Board hearing, the records would not indicate that the Veteran is being treated for any mental health disability other than schizotypal. A review of the evidence reflects that the Veteran has a personality disorder. There is no probative or competent evidence which suggests that the Veteran has an acquired psychiatric disability or a superimposed mental health disability. Relevant to the claim on appeal, the Veteran filed a separate claim for PTSD in May 2016. The RO denied his claim in a July 2016 Rating Decision. As to the claim for service connection for a personality disorder, a personality disorder is not a disability for which service connection may be granted; rather, it is considered a congenital or developmental abnormality. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(c). VA’s General Counsel issued an opinion interpreting 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(c) to mean that that service connection may be granted for diseases of congenital, developmental, or familial origin if the evidence as a whole shows that manifestations of the disease in service constituted “aggravation” of the disease within the meaning of applicable VA regulations. VAOPGCPREC 67-90. The VA General Counsel also has issued an opinion that a congenital defect can be subject to superimposed disease or injury, and if superimposed disease or injury occurs during military service, service connection may be warranted for the resultant disability. VAOPGCPREC 82-90. Notwithstanding some differences in diagnostic opinions, the weight of competent and credible evidence from reviews of the entire history is that the Veteran has a personality disorder and no other superimposed disease. Although the personality disorder seemed to emerge under the specific conditions of Naval service that placed stress on the Veteran, there was no competent evidence that they aggravated the developmental disorder as these service life conditions were no longer present after the Veteran was discharged. As VA regulations specifically prohibit service connection for congenital or developmental defects or disease, the Veteran’s claimed personality disorder is, therefore, not a disability for which VA compensation benefits may be awarded. As there is no legal basis upon which to award service connection for a personality disorder, the Veteran’s appeal must be denied. Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 426 (1994). J.W. FRANCIS Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD T. Fitzgerald, Associate Counsel The Board’s decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential, and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.