Citation Nr: 19149166 Decision Date: 06/24/19 Archive Date: 06/24/19 DOCKET NO. 15-07 888 DATE: June 24, 2019 ORDER The severance of service connection being improper, service connection for depressive disorder with poly-substance dependence (previously diagnosed as major depression with anxiety, poly-substance dependence in remission) is restored, and the appeal is granted. FINDING OF FACT There is conflicting evidence as to whether the Veteran’s depressive disorder with poly-substance dependence (previously diagnosed as major depression with anxiety, poly-substance dependence in remission) is related to service. CONCLUSION OF LAW The severance of service connection for depressive disorder with poly-substance dependence (previously diagnosed as major depression with anxiety, poly-substance dependence in remission), was improper. 38 U.S.C. § 5112; 38 C.F.R. § 3.105 REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty from December 1989 to October 1993. The case is on appeal from an July 2013 rating decision and August 2013 notification letter. In October 2018, the Veteran testified at a Board hearing. Severance Whether the severance of service connection for depressive disorder with poly-substance dependence (previously diagnosed as major depression with anxiety, poly-substance dependence in remission) was proper Background The Veteran was previously service-connected for depressive disorder with poly-substance dependence (previously diagnosed as major depression with anxiety, poly-substance dependence in remission). Service connection for that condition has now been severed. The Veteran maintains that the severance was improper. The Regional Office (RO) granted service connection in an October 2007 rating decision. The RO cited service treatment records (STRs) showing relevant treatment during service, plus an October 2007 VA examiner’s opinion relating his diagnosis to service. The RO proposed to sever service connection in an April 2013 rating decision. The RO explained that two VA examiners, including a second examiner in December 2012, had found that the Veteran did not have a psychological condition related to service. The RO noted that the second VA examiner found the Veteran to “meet the criteria for a Personality Disorder NOS and polysubstance abuse (in remission) and that any psychiatric distress and possible depression [was] secondary to [his] personality disorder, not [his] military service.” The RO also noted that the VA examiner offered an addendum opinion in which he found the original VA examination to have been “flawed as it contained no rationale for establishing a medical nexus between depression and adjustment disorder in service,” which led the second examiner to be only able to “speculate as to how the original examiner determined a nexus without providing a clear rationale for said conclusion.” The RO, therefore, reasoned that service connection was “granted without requested medical rationale for the nexus.” On this basis, the April 2013 rating decision found the grant of service connection to have been a clear and unmistakable error. In the July 2013 rating decision on appeal, the RO severed service connection for a depressive disorder with poly-substance dependence, effective October 1, 2013. The Veteran was notified of this decision in August 2013. Applicable Law When severance of service connection is considered warranted, a rating proposing severance will be prepared setting forth all material facts and reasons. The claimant will be notified at his or her latest address of record of the contemplated action and furnished detailed reasons therefor and will be given 60 days for the presentation of additional evidence to show that service connection should be maintained. Unless otherwise provided in paragraph (i) of this section, if additional evidence is not received within that period, final rating action will be taken and the award will be reduced or discontinued, if in order, effective the last day of the month in which a 60-day period from the date of notice to the beneficiary of the final rating action expires. 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(d). Service connection will be severed only where evidence establishes that it is clearly and unmistakably erroneous (CUE) (the burden of proof being on the Government). 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(d). When severance of service connection is considered warranted, a rating proposing severance will be prepared setting forth all material facts and reasons. The claimant will be notified at his or her latest address of record of the contemplated action and furnished detailed reasons therefor and will be given 60 days for the presentation of additional evidence to show that service connection should be maintained. Unless otherwise provided in paragraph (i) of this section, if additional evidence is not received within that period, final rating action will be taken and the award will be reduced or discontinued, if in order, effective the last day of the month in which a 60-day period from the date of notice to the beneficiary of the final rating action expires. 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(d). A change in diagnosis may be accepted as a basis for severance action if the examining physician or physicians or other proper medical authority certifies that, in the light of all accumulated evidence, the diagnosis on which service connection was predicated is clearly erroneous. This certification must be accompanied by a summary of the facts, findings, and reasons supporting the conclusion. 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(d). To establish that a grant of service connection was the product of CUE, VA must show that (1) either the correct facts as they were known at the time were not before the adjudicator, the adjudicator made an erroneous factual finding, or the statutory or regulatory provisions were incorrectly applied; (2) the alleged error was undebatable, not merely a disagreement as to how the facts were weighed or evaluated; and (3) the error manifestly changed the outcome of the prior decision. See Allen v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 54, 58-59 (2007); Stallworth v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 482, 487-88 (2006); cf. Bustos v. West, 179 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Damrel v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 242, 245 (1994); Russell v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 310, 313-14, 319 (1992) (en banc). A clear and unmistakable error is one about which reasonable minds could not differ. See, e.g., 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(a). In most respects, the CUE standard for severing service connection under § 3.105(d) is equivalent to the CUE standard for reversing or revising a prior final decision under 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(a). See Baughman v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 563, 566 (1991). Section 3.105(d) places at least as high a burden of proof on the VA when it seeks to sever service connection as § 3.105(a) places upon an appellant seeking to have an unfavorable previous determination overturned. See id. However, the determination is not limited to the law and the record that existed at the time of the original decision. VA may consider medical evidence and diagnoses that postdate the original award of service connection to demonstrate that the diagnosis on which service connection was predicated is clearly erroneous. Stallworth, 20 Vet. App. at 488. The Secretary’s burden is not to prove clear and unmistakable error in the original decision in the same manner a claimant would show CUE under sections 5109A or 7111. Id. A decision that is reversed or amended on the basis of CUE is revised to conform to the true state of the facts or the law that existed at the time of the original adjudication. Allen, 21 Vet. App. at 62 (internal quotations omitted). Discussion - Due Process The initial question before the Board is whether the RO followed the applicable due process procedures for severing service connection. The Board finds that RO followed the prescribed proper due process steps for severing service connection. First, the RO issued a proposed rating in April 2013. The Veteran was notified in May 2013 at his latest address of record of this contemplated action and furnished detailed reasons therefor and was given 60 days for the presentation of additional evidence to show that service connection should be maintained. The May 2013 notice letter also informed the Veteran that he had the opportunity for a predetermination hearing if such a request for a hearing was received by VA within 30 days from the date of the notice. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(i). The Veteran did not file a notice of disagreement (NOD), submit additional evidence, or request a predetermination hearing. Accordingly, the RO issued the July 2013 rating decision, which severed service connection prospectively effective October 1, 2013. Notice of this rating decision, plus his appeal rights, was sent to the Veteran under an August 2013 cover letter. The Board observes that the final date of severance was not greater than the last day of the month in which a 60-day period from the date of the August 2013 notice to the Veteran of the final rating action expired. That would have been October 31, 2013. Thus, the severance of service connection was initially improper on this basis. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.105. Discussion - Propriety of the Severance The next question before the Board in this case is whether the grant of service connection was clearly and unmistakably erroneous. The Board concludes that the severance of service connection was improper because there is conflicting, but not clear and unmistakable, evidence as to whether the Veteran’s condition is due to service. Tending to support a nexus to service, the Veteran’s STRs show complaints during service in May 1990. An initial diagnosis of adjustment disorder was made. One month later, in June 1990, he underwent a psychiatric evaluation. He reported that he was experiencing problems being separated from his fiancée, but had done well. That evaluation resulted in an assessment of “No Psychiatric Disorder.” The Board finds that this evidence indicates symptoms during service, so tends to support the grant of service connection. Also tending to support the grant of service connection, a VA examiner in October 2007 opined that it was more than likely that the Veteran’s depression was related to his adjustment disorder in service. The same examiner reiterated this opinion in a November 2009 addendum opinion. This examiner’s opinions support the grant of service connection because they unequivocally relate the Veteran’s diagnosis to service. The examiner did not provide a rationale, which weighs on the probative value of the opinion. See Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295, 304 (2008). But, there is nothing inherently inconsistent, irrational, or incoherent in the examiner’s opinion. Thus, its probative value cannot be discounted entirely. Tending to weigh against the grant of service connection, a VA examiner in January 2011 opined that the Veteran was no longer demonstrating significant symptoms of either depression or any other psychiatric diagnoses and failed to meet the diagnostic criteria for major depressive disorder and did not meet the diagnostic criteria for panic disorder. Rather, the examiner found the Veteran was suffering from an adjustment disorder with mixed emotional features, specifically an adjustment disorder with both anxiety and depression, the symptoms of which “appear[ed] to stem from his separation from his wife, his leaving his daughters, and other life changes.” The examiner stated that there did “not appear to be” evidence of a diagnosis of major depressive disorder, and in the examiner’s opinion, the Veteran’s episodic panic attacks were secondary to either his life situation or substance use. The examiner’s ultimate opinion was that the Veteran suffered from an adjustment disorder with anxiety and depressed mood, which at least as likely as not stemmed from separation from his family, and “there [did] not appear to be a military history behind his current symptoms.” The Board observes that this examiner’s opinion is not clear and unmistakable evidence against the claim because the examiner repeatedly couched the conclusions in equivocal language (“appear to be”) and gave the ultimate opinion in a degree of certainty less than clear and unmistakable. See Cotant v. Principi, 17 Vet. App. 116, 131 (2003) (the clear and unmistakable standard is “very demanding” and requires unconditional (uncontradicted) evidence, which is not satisfied by an equivocal medical opinion using such conditional qualifications as (“most likely” and “not significantly aggravated”)) (citing Harris, v. West, 11 Vet. App. 456, 462 (1998)). The same VA examiner completed a Disability Benefits Questionnaire (DBQ) in April 2012. The examiner at that time determined that the Veteran’s current diagnosis was unknown and was unable to be assessed at that time. The examiner explained that a diagnosis under Axis I could not be given because the Veteran had multiple problems that “appear[ed] to” derive from a personality disorder and substance abuse. The examiner spent much of the report attempting to undermine the earlier examiner’s diagnosis of depression. The examiner also noted that the Veteran was scheduled for psychological testing the following day. The examiner recommended that the Veteran be scheduled for a new VA examination with a different provider after that testing. Again here, this examiner’s April 2012 assessment is not clear and unmistakable as it was inconclusive, conditional, and rather equivocal. See Cotant, 17 Vet. App. at 131. A different VA examiner assessed the Veteran in December 2012. That examiner diagnosed a personality disorder not otherwise specified (NOS), and polysubstance abuse, in early remission. The examiner found that the Veteran’s current psychiatric problems were more likely to be a result of an Axis II disorder than polysubstance use, which was currently in remission. This examiner observed that the Veteran had completed psychological testing in May 2012, the results of which appeared to validate the prior examiner’s diagnostic impression. The instant examiner opined that, based on the Veteran’s clinical presentation that day and his subjective reporting of symptoms and patterns of behavior in treatment, plus the results of the psychological testing, he agreed with the prior VA examiner’s report, which indicated that the Veteran met the criteria for a personality disorder diagnosis and polysubstance abuse in remission, and that any psychiatric distress and possible depression was secondary to his personality disorder. The examiner concluded that the examination affirmed the prior diagnosis of personality disorder NOS with cluster B traits most likely having occurred before military service, plus polysubstance abuse and subsequent psychiatric distress, including depressive symptoms, secondary to the personality disorder. This same examiner gave a second opinion in a March 2013 DBQ. At that time, the examiner opined that the Veteran’s diagnosis was less likely than not incurred in or caused by service. The examiner explained that, it was unclear as to how the examiner in 2007 was able to establish a medical nexus between depression and adjustment disorder in service. The instant examiner found that “one can only speculate as to how [the 2007 examiner] determined a nexus without providing a clear rationale for said conclusion.” The examiner commented that, since that time, extensive assessments and treatment within VA pointed to the “likelihood” that the Veteran’s current psychiatric distress was rooted in an Axis II disorder, and this examiner concurred with the April 2012 VA examination, whose diagnosis was subsequently substantiated by personality testing in May 2012 and confirmed by this examiner in December 2012. The Board again finds that the December 2012/March 2013 VA examiner’s opinion does not meet the high evidentiary burden of establishing by clear and unmistakable evidence that the original grant of service connection was in error. This examiner’s opinion and rationale is compelling, but not clear and unmistakable. Most importantly, the examiner’s opinions were stated in degrees of certainty less than clear and unmistakable (“most likely,” “more likely,” and “less likely”). The examiner also cast doubt on the original 2007 VA examiner’s positive opinion, but was not able to identify any conclusive, undebatable error in that examiner’s diagnosis and opinion. Rather, the examiner was only able to state that the basis for the original examiner’s opinion was “unclear” and would require speculation to determine. Finally, the examiner was not able to certify that in the light of all accumulated evidence, the diagnosis on which service connection was predicated was clearly erroneous. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(d). Thus, the negative opinions do not establish by clear and unmistakable evidence that the original grant of service connection was erroneous. Aside from the opinions, the claims file contains VA medical records referring to ongoing treatment for the Veteran’s substance use and psychiatric symptoms. An August 2013 provider stated in a medical record that the Veteran has “longstanding depression which began in the Navy.” (It is not clear if this was intended to be an opinion or simply a recitation of the Veteran’s history.) Apart from this observation, the medical records do not undebatably establish that a current diagnosis is unrelated to service. Notably, the May 2012 medical testing to which the December 2012 VA examiner referred is not in the claims file. In conclusions, there is both positive supporting evidence and negative evidence against the grant of service connection in this case. The evidence presents a reasonable disagreement as to such, and reasonable minds could disagree as to the ultimate question of whether a current diagnosis is related to service. However, the determination, at this point, amounts to no more than a disagreement as to how to weigh the facts. In context of a severance case, a disagreement as to how to weigh the facts is legally insufficient to establish that the award of service connection was clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the severance of service connection was improper, service connection is restored, and the appeal is granted. A. ISHIZAWAR Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD C. Bosely, Counsel The Board’s decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential, and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.