Citation Nr: 19149282 Decision Date: 06/25/19 Archive Date: 06/24/19 DOCKET NO. 16-46 667 DATE: June 25, 2019 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include unspecified depressive disorder, claimed as dysthymia is denied. Entitlement to service connection for alcohol abuse disorder, to include as secondary to dysthymia is denied. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The evidence of record does not persuasively show that the Veteran has an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include unspecified depressive disorder that is etiologically related to service. 2. Service connection is not in effect for an acquired psychiatric disorder. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include unspecified depressive disorder, claimed as dysthymia have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1110, 1131, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303 (2018). 2. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for alcohol abuse disorder to include as secondary to an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include unspecified depressive disorder, claimed as dysthymia have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1110, 1131, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.310 (2018). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Veteran served during the Vietnam era on active duty from September 1968 to March 1973. These matters are before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) on appeal of a September 2015 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office in Denver, Colorado. The Veteran was afforded a hearing before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge in February 2019. Service Connection Service connection will be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. Establishing service connection requires evidence of (1) a current disability; (2) an in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the present disability. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2004). A disability that is proximately due to, or results from, a service-connected disease or injury shall be considered a part of the original condition. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a). Secondary service connection on the basis of aggravation is permitted. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(b). Compensation is payable for that degree of aggravation of a non-service-connected disability caused by a service-connected disability and not due to the natural progress of the nonservice-connected disease. Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439 (1995). Service connection may be established on a presumptive basis for certain chronic diseases, if such diseases are shown to have been manifested to a compensable degree within one year from the date of separation from service. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1131, 1137; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. If there is no evidence of a chronic disease during service or an applicable presumption period, then a showing of continuity of symptomatology after service may serve as an alternative method of establishing the second and/or third element of a service connection claim. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b); see also Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488 (1997). Continuity of symptomatology after service may be established if a claimant can demonstrate (1) that a condition was “noted” during service; (2) evidence of post-service continuity of the same symptomatology and (3) medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of a nexus between the present disability and the post-service symptomatology. Continuity of symptomatology applies only to the diseases explicitly recognized in 38 U.S.C. § 1101 as “chronic.” See Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F. 3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013). In making all determinations, the Board must fully consider the lay assertions of record. A Veteran is competent to report on that of which he or she has personal knowledge. Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994). When considering whether lay evidence is competent, the Board must determine on a case by case basis whether a veteran’s particular disability is the type of disability for which lay evidence may be competent. See Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428, 435 (2011); see also Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1376 -77 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 1. Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include unspecified depressive disorder, claimed as dysthymia The Veteran asserts that his currently diagnosed depressive disorder was caused by trauma he experienced during his service in Vietnam, including performing searches of Vietnamese men and women, doing perimeter checks, and witnessing injured service members. See September 2016 VA Form 9. The Veteran also asserts that he was involved in a physical altercation upon his return from Vietnam, that he was subsequently court-martialed and jailed, and that he was eventually separated from service with a “General Under Honorable Conditions” discharge. See September 2015 Notice of Disagreement. The Veteran asserts that he continues to be affected by the military’s unfair treatment and lack of adequate care for his mental health condition after returning from Vietnam. Id. The Veteran was afforded a VA examination for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in September 2014 by Dr. W.H. The examiner noted that the Veteran’s separation examination is silent for any complaints of mental disorders. The examiner also noted that the incident that led to the Veteran’s demotion was isolated, and that the Veteran was subsequently cooperative and engaging in the retraining process and returned to normal duties. The examiner determined that the Veteran did not meet the criteria for any mental disorder. In a December 2014 VA mental health assessment by psychologist T.M., the Veteran reported that his depression started after being transferred from the Philippines to Vietnam. The Veteran reported feelings of isolation and anxiety, and of feeling mildly depressed on a daily basis for several years. The Veteran was diagnosed with dysthymia and anxiety, not otherwise specified (NOS) but did not meet the criteria for PTSD. In an April 2015 VA mental health integration report, the Veteran was noted to have mild symptoms of depression. The Veteran reported that his symptoms did not impact his ability to work, take care of things at home, or to get along with others. VA treatment records show assessments of depression and “strong suspicion for PTSD” by a nurse practitioner and social workers in 2015 and 2016. The Veteran attended therapy sessions in 2017. In August 2015, the Veteran was afforded a mental disorders VA examination by Dr. W.H. The Veteran reported that he was no longer working full-time and was unhappy after marrying his partner of 27 years, as she had become more demanding since the marriage. The Veteran was diagnosed with an unspecified depressive disorder. The examiner opined that the Veteran’s depressive disorder is not related to his military service. The examiner explained that the Veteran’s service treatment records are silent as to in-service mental health treatment, and that the Veteran had no mental health contacts until 2014, many years after service. The examiner noted that the Veteran’s depression appears to be associated with periods of inactivity and attributed the Veteran’s depression to the fact that he no longer works full-time as an over-the-road truck driver and to his unhappiness with his marriage. In January 2017 the Veteran was administered a Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ-9) by a social worker, M.B., who noted symptoms indicating severe depression. The Veteran was afforded a Board hearing in February 2019. The Veteran testified that no medical care provider had asked him about mental problems or depression until 2014, and that he had not discussed his condition until he was asked about it. The Veteran’s representative asserted that there are several instances of possible mental health issues in the Veteran’s records, including an assault on the Veteran and behavioral issues leading to the Veteran’s discharge. Based on the foregoing evidence, the Board finds that service connection is not warranted for an acquired psychiatric disorder. The Veteran’s service treatment records do not show any complaints, treatment or diagnoses related to depression. The entrance and separation examinations are silent for psychiatric conditions. The Veteran’s service records show that he was involved in two physical altercations after returning from Vietnam, the second of which resulted in an October 1972 court-martial. The records show no other substantive behavioral problems. Prior to the court-martial, a performance report describes the Veteran as an “exceptional NCO”. After the Veteran served the confinement mandated by the court-martial, a post-confinement summary notes the Veteran’s maturity and ability to cope. Although the Veteran contends that his depression resulted from service in Vietnam and the post-return incidents, the earliest post-service evidence of depression is dated in 2014, approximately 41 years after separation from service. VA treatment records dated beginning in 2006 show numerous depression and PTSD screens were negative. In this regard, evidence of a prolonged period without medical complaint, and the amount of time that elapsed since military service, can be considered as evidence against the claim. Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The Board has carefully considered the evidence of record and finds the VA examiner’s opinion the most probative on the question of whether the Veteran has a psychiatric disability etiologically related to his military service. The VA examiner’s opinion is based on a review of the file, examination of the Veteran, consideration of the Veteran’s psychiatric history, consideration of the Veteran’s contentions, and supported by a rationale based on sound medical principles. For these reasons, the Board places greater evidentiary weight on the VA opinion than the general assessments of depression and “strong suspicion for PTSD” and recitation of the Veteran’s attribution of his symptoms to his service in the VA treatment records. Again, beginning in 2006, numerous depression and PTSD screens were negative until 2014. This is consistent with the VA opinion that the Veteran’s symptoms correlate more to current life stressors rather than his military experiences. While the Veteran is competent to report on symptoms, he is not competent to provide a diagnosis in this case or determine that these symptoms were manifestations of an acquired psychiatric disorder related to service. The issue of whether a lay person is competent to diagnose a psychiatric disorder and opine as to its cause is not unique to veterans law. See generally Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm, § 4 (2010) (reviewing evidentiary rulings on proving the existence of emotional harm and its likely causes from several jurisdictions). To the extent that other courts have addressed the weight to be given to lay evidence on this issue, the Board finds the logic and reasoning of these cases useful. Generally, courts have required objective indicia or "some guarantee of genuineness" sufficient to verify the existence of a mental injury or emotional harm. Johnson v. State, 334 N.E.2d 590, 592 (N.Y. 1975). The rationale given for this rule is that mental disturbance is easily simulated. The requirement of objective indicia may be met by clear medical proof of the existence of the claimed injury. The Board concludes that this rule is compatible with the veterans benefits system. VA regulations already require medical proof that psychoses and PTSD are diagnosed in conformity with the medical standards contained in the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Ed. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.304(f), 3.384, 4.125(a). Although the Board recognizes that a lay person may competently report subjective feelings, the Board looks to the medical evidence of record to determine whether a current psychiatric disability exists, and whether it is etiologically related to service. Here, the most probative medical opinion evidence is against the claim. As such, the preponderance of the evidence is against entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder. Reasonable doubt does not arise, and the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine does not apply; the Veteran’s claim must be denied. 38 U.S.C. § 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. 2. Entitlement to service connection for alcohol abuse disorder, claimed as secondary to an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include unspecified depressive disorder, claimed as dysthymia The Veteran asserts that he was provided with rations for alcohol when he joined the military and that he began drinking while in-service to self-medicate and to be accepted. See February 2019 Hearing Transcript. Direct service connection for disability resulting from a claimant's own drug or alcohol abuse is precluded for all VA benefit claims filed after October 31, 1990. See VAOPGCPREC 7-99; VAOPGCPREC 2-98. Compensation cannot be awarded pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 1110 and 38 U.S.C. § 105 (a) either for primary alcohol abuse disabilities or for secondary disabilities that result from primary alcohol abuse. Allen v. Principi, 237 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Primary alcohol abuse disability means an alcohol abuse disability arising from voluntary and willful drinking to excess. Id. (continued on next page) There is a lack of entitlement under the law to direct service connection for alcohol abuse, and the Board must deny the claim. Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 426 (1994). In addition, as service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder is not in effect, service connection on a secondary basis may not be established. TANYA SMITH Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD T. Bynum, Associate Counsel The Board’s decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential, and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.