Citation Nr: 19150656 Decision Date: 06/28/19 Archive Date: 06/28/19 DOCKET NO. 18-38 436 DATE: June 28, 2019 ORDER Entitlement to an effective date earlier than July 27, 2017, for the grant of dependency and indemnity compensation (DIC) and accrued benefits is denied. FINDING OF FACT 1. The Veteran died in April 2016. 2. On July 27, 2017, and no earlier, the Appellant’s claim for DIC was received. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for an effective date prior to July 27, 2017, for a grant of DIC have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 5107, 5110(b)(2), 7105; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.150, 3.159, 3.400(c)(2) (2018). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty from September 2013 to April 2016. The Veteran died in April 2016. The Appellant is the Veteran’s mother. This matter is on appeal from a September 2017 administrative decision. Earlier Effective Date Claim Dependency and Indemnity (DIC) is defined in the regulations as a monthly payment made by VA to a surviving spouse, child, or parent because of a service-connected death of a veteran occurring after December 31, 1956. 38 U.S.C. § 1310;38 C.F.R. § 3.5 (a)(1). Generally, a veteran’s death is service-connected if it resulted from a disability incurred or aggravated in the line of duty in the active military, naval, or air service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101 (16), 1110; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.1 (k), 3.303. Unless specifically provided otherwise, the effective date of an award based on an original claim, a claim reopened after final adjudication, or a claim for increase, of compensation, dependency and indemnity compensation, or pension, shall be fixed in accordance with the facts found, but shall not be earlier than the date of receipt of application therefor. 38 U.S.C. § 5110 (a). If an application for DIC is received within one year from the date of death, the effective date of the award shall be the first day of the month in which the death occurred. Otherwise, the effective date is the date of receipt of the claim. 38 U.S.C. § 5110 (d); 38 C.F.R. § 3.400 (c)(2). As a preliminary matter, the Board finds that there is no dispute at to the facts essential to resolution of this appeal: Specifically, the appellant does not contend that she filed a claim of entitlement to DIC benefits prior to July 27, 2017. Rather, she contends that VA erred by failing to notify her of the entitlement to DIC benefits within one year from the date of the Veteran’s death. Although the Veteran’s death was in April 2016 she contends that VA erred by not notifying he of her the VA benefit until June 2017. See July 2017 Claim. A review of the record shows that the Appellant’s original claim for DIC benefits was filed with VA on July 27, 2017. See, VA Form 21-535 received July 27, 2017. In a September 2017 administrative decision, VA granted DIC effective July 27, 2017, the date of receipt of the Appellant’s claim. In a March 2018 statement and notice of disagreement, the Veteran’s brother stated that VA did not contact his mother, the Appellant, until June 4, 2017, regarding her entitlement to DIC benefits and did not meet with VA until June 14, 2017. To the extent that the Appellant contends that VA should have provided her an application for DIC benefits at the time of the Veteran’s death, at the time of his death the Veteran was not service-connected for any disability. Therefore, there was no apparent entitlement to DIC benefits which would cause the RO to assist the Appellant in filing a DIC claim. See, 38 C.F.R. § 3.150 (b) (2018). The Board also notes that VA is under no legal obligation to individually notify every potential claimant of his or her possible entitlement to VA benefits. Lyman v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 194 (1993); Hill v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 451 (1991). Further, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that everyone dealing with the Government is charged with knowledge of Federal statutes and lawfully promulgated agency regulations. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947); Morris v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 260 (1991) (holding that a Veteran's abandonment of his claim for service connection based upon his failure to respond to a request for additional evidence could not be waived or set aside on grounds of alleged ignorance of regulatory requirements). Thus, although the Appellant may not have specifically known the statutes and regulations pertinent to her claim, she is charged with knowledge of those laws. While the Board is sympathetic to the Veteran’s contention, and understands the point clearly, the Board is without authority to grant eligibility to benefits simply because it might perceive the result to be “equitable.” See, 38 U.S.C. §§ 503, 7104 (2012); Harvey v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 416, 425 (1994). The Board also observes that "no equities, no matter how compelling, can create a right to payment out of the United States Treasury which has not been provided for by Congress." Smith v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 429, 432-33 (1992) (citing Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 426 (1990)). The authority to award equitable relief is committed solely to the discretion of the Secretary under 38 U.S.C. § 503 (a), and the Board is without jurisdiction to consider what is committed solely to the Secretary's discretion. See McCay v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 183, 189 (1996). Therefore, the Board is bound by the relevant laws and regulations governing the payment of monetary benefits. And those laws and regulations do not permit an award of an earlier effective date than July 27, 2017, for the award of DIC benefits. (Continued on the next page)   The Court has held that where the law not the evidence is dispositive, the Board should deny an appeal because of an absence of a legal merit or the lack of entitlement under the law. Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 426 (1994). The Veteran has failed to allege facts which meet the criteria in the law or regulations, and her claim must be denied. KELLI A. KORDICH Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD T. Adams, Counsel The Board’s decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential, and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.