Citation Nr: 19150063 Decision Date: 06/26/19 Archive Date: 06/26/19 DOCKET NO. 17-08 484 DATE: June 26, 2019 ORDER New and material evidence not having been received, the claim for entitlement to service connection for residuals, back injury, is not reopened. Entitlement to service connection for sleep apnea is denied. Entitlement to service connection for stroke is denied. Entitlement to service connection for prostate cancer is denied. Entitlement to a higher disability rating for cluster headaches, currently evaluated as noncompensable prior to March 10, 2016 and 30 percent disabling from March 10, 2016 is denied. REMANDED The issue of entitlement to a higher initial rating for unspecified depressive disorder (claimed as PTSD), currently evaluated as 50 percent disabling, is remanded. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. A September 1985 rating decision denied entitlement to service connection for residuals, back injury; the Veteran did not timely appeal the denial; and new and material evidence was not submitted as to the issue within the one-year appeal period following the issuance of the September 1985 rating decision. 2. A March 1987 rating decision denied a petition to reopen the claim for service connection for residuals, back injury; the Veteran filed a timely Notice of Disagreement as to the March 1987 rating decision in April 1987; a Statement of the Case (SOC) was issued in July 1987; the Veteran did not file a substantive appeal as to the July 1987 SOC. 3. Evidence received since the March 1987 rating decision related to the issue of entitlement to service connection for residuals, back injury, is not new, or is new but is not material, and does not raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. 4. The Veteran has not had sleep apnea during the appeal period. 5. The Veteran’s stroke is not etiologically related to an in-service injury, event or disease. 6. The Veteran does not have prostate cancer etiologically related to an in-service injury, event or disease. 7. The Veteran did not have characteristic prostrating headache attacks at any time during the rating period prior to March 10, 2016. 8. From March 10, 2016, the Veteran’s cluster headaches were manifested by very frequent completely prostrating and prolonged attacks that produced severe economic inadaptability. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The September 1985 and March 1987 rating decision denials of entitlement to service connection for residuals, back injury, are final. 38 U.S.C. § 7105; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104, 3.156 (b), 20.200, 20.202, 20.302, 20.1103. 2. New and material evidence has not been received to reopen the claim for entitlement to service connection for residuals, back injury; therefore, the claim is not reopened. 38 U.S.C. §§ 5108, 7105; 38 C.F.R. § 3.156. 3. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for sleep apnea, have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1110, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303. 4. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for stroke, have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1110, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303. 5. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for prostate cancer, have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1110, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303. 6. The criteria for an increased rating for cluster headaches, rated as noncompensable prior to March 10, 2016, and 30 percent disabling from March 10, 2016, have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1155, 5103A, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.7, 4.124a, Diagnostic Code 8100. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Veteran served on active duty from November 1975 to November 1978 and from January 1980 to April 1985. These matters come before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) on appeal of May 2013, September 2014, and March 2016 rating decisions by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Waco, Texas. The May 2013 rating decision denied the claim of entitlement to service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). An October 2017 rating decision granted entitlement to service connection for unspecified depressive disorder (claimed as PTSD). As this represents a total grant of the benefit sought on appeal with respect to this issue, it is no longer before the Board. See Grantham v. Brown, 114 F. 3d 1156, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In a September 2016 rating decision, the Agency of Original Jurisdiction (AOJ) increased the rating for the Veteran’s cluster headaches to 30 percent, effective March 10, 2016. As the increase did not satisfy the appeal in full, the issue remains on appeal and has been characterized as shown above. See AB v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 35 (1993). In October 2017, the RO issued a rating decision that granted entitlement to service connection for unspecified depressive disorder. Thereafter, the Veteran filed a notice of disagreement in December 2017 relating to the effective date of award and evaluation of the disability; however, as will be discussed further below, a statement of the case has not been provided as to those issues. See Manlincon v. West, 12 Vet. App. 238 (1999). The Board is cognizant of the ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) in Rice v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 447 (2009). In Rice, the Court held that a claim for a total rating based on individual unemployability (TDIU) due to service-connected disability, either expressly raised by the Veteran or reasonably raised by the record, involves an attempt to obtain an appropriate rating for a disability and is part of the claim for an increased rating. In this case, the Veteran has not argued, and the record does not otherwise reflect, that the disability at issue renders him unemployable. Accordingly, the Board concludes that a claim for TDIU has not been raised. The Veteran had previously executed a VA Form 21-22a, appointing an attorney as his representative. In a September 2018 letter, the attorney advised VA that he was withdrawing representation of the Veteran. This occurred after the case was certified to the Board. In March 2019, the Board sent a letter to the attorney construing the September 2018 letter as a motion to withdraw and informing the attorney of regulations governing withdrawals once a case is certified to the Board. The letter informed the attorney that such motion must include good cause to withdraw and provided examples of what constituted good cause. In April 2019, the attorney filed an additional letter with VA but did not provide good cause for withdrawing representation. As good cause has not been shown, the motion is denied and attorney is still the Veteran’s representative, as reflected on the title page of this document. New and Material Evidence 1. Whether New and Material Evidence Has Been Received to Reopen a Claim for Entitlement to Service Connection for Residuals, Back Injury Legal Criteria In general, rating decisions that are not timely appealed are final. See 38 U.S.C. § 7105; 38 C.F.R. § 20.1103. An exception to this rule is provided in 38 U.S.C. § 5108, which states that if new and material evidence is presented or secured with respect to a claim that has been disallowed, the Secretary shall reopen the claim and review the former disposition of the claim. The question of whether new and material evidence has been received to reopen a previously denied claim must be addressed by the Board in the first instance because the issue goes to the Board’s jurisdiction to reach and adjudicate the underlying claim on a de novo basis. See Jackson v. Principi, 265 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Barnett v. Brown, 83 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1996). If the Board finds that no such evidence has been offered, that is where the analysis must end, and further analysis beyond consideration of whether the evidence received is new and material is neither required nor permitted. Barnett, 83 F.3d at 1384. New evidence is existing evidence not previously considered by VA. Material evidence is existing evidence that, by itself or when considered with previous evidence of record, relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim. New and material evidence can be neither cumulative nor redundant of the evidence of record at the time of the last prior final denial of the claim sought to be reopened, and must raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (a). In determining whether evidence is new and material, the credibility of the evidence is generally presumed. Justus v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 510, 512-13 (1992). Analysis In this case, the RO denied service connection for residuals, back injury, in a September 1985 rating decision because it was no shown that the Veteran’s preexisting back injury was aggravated by his active service. Thus, service connection for residuals, back injury could not be established. The Veteran did not file a notice of disagreement with the September 1985 rating decision and no additional evidence pertinent to the issue was physically or constructively associated with the claims folder within one year of issuance of notice of the rating decision. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (b); Bond v. Shinseki, 659 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also Buie v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 242, 251-52 (2010). Thus, the September 1985 rating decision became final based on the evidence then of record. 38 U.S.C. §§ 7104, 7105; 38 C.F.R. § 20.1105. The Veteran submitted a petition to reopen the claim for entitlement to service connection for residuals, back injury, in September 1986. The RO denied the Veteran’s petition to reopen the claim in a March 1987 rating decision because the evidence submitted was not new and material. The Veteran filed a timely notice of disagreement as to the issue in April 1987. See, VA Form 21-4138, Statement in Support of Claim received April 1987. In July 1987, the RO issued a Statement of the Case (SOC) as to the matter. The Veteran did not timely submit a substantive appeal as to the issue. Thus, the September 1986 rating decision is therefore final. 38 U.S.C. § 7105; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104, 20.302, 20.1103. Evidence received since the final March 1987 rating decision that is relevant to the claim for entitlement to service connection for residuals, back injury, includes VA treatment records and additional copies of the Veteran’s service treatment records. The VA treatment records continue to show that the Veteran has a current low back disability. They do not contain any medical statements or evidence indicating that the Veteran’s low back disability was aggravated by his active service. Accordingly, the medical treatment records are new in the sense that they have not yet been reviewed by VA, but they are merely cumulative of previously considered records. Namely, they merely confirm facts previously established and do not raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. Therefore, the medical treatment records are not considered new and material evidence as to the claim for entitlement to service connection for residuals, back injury. The service treatment records reflect that the Veteran was treated for a low back injury during his active service. The Veteran’s service treatment records, including evidence that he was treated for a low back disability during service, were of record and were considered at the time of the previous final decision on this issue. Therefore, the service treatment records themselves are not new evidence. Accordingly, the evidence is redundant of previous evidence that was considered as part of the prior final denial. They do not tend to establish a previously unestablished fact that the Veteran’s low back disability was aggravated by his active military service. In summary, the Veteran was denied entitlement to service connection for residuals, back injury, in the final March 1987 rating decision. Evidence received since the March 1987 rating decision is cumulative of evidence already considered by VA, does not relate to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the previously denied claim, and/or does not raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the previously denied claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156. Accordingly, new and material evidence to reopen the finally denied claim for entitlement to service connection for residuals, back injury, has not been received, the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine is not for application, and the claim for entitlement to service connection for residuals, back injury, is not reopened. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990); 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. Service Connection 2. Entitlement to Service Connection for Sleep Apnea The Veteran contends that he currently has sleep apnea that is etiologically related to his active military service. The existence of a current disability is the cornerstone of a claim for VA disability compensation. 38 U.S.C. § 1110; see Degmetich v. Brown, 104 F.3d 1328, 1332 (1997) (holding that interpretation of 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110 and 1131 as requiring the existence of a present disability for VA compensation purposes cannot be considered arbitrary). In the absence of proof of a present disability, there can be no valid claim. Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992). In this case, the evidence of record does not contain probative evidence of sleep apnea at any time proximate to, or during, the claim. During the pendency of the claim the Veteran was provided treatment at VA treatment centers. The VA medical evidence does not contain a diagnosis of sleep apnea. Thus, the most probative evidence fails to demonstrate that it is at least as likely as not that the Veteran has a current sleep apnea disability that had its onset during active service or that there is a current sleep apnea disability that is otherwise causally or etiologically related to his active service. As such, service connection for sleep apnea is not warranted. Degmetich, 104 F. 3d at 1333. The Board acknowledges that the Veteran was not afforded a VA examination relating directly to his claim for entitlement to service connection for sleep apnea. On these facts, however, an examination is not required. VA will provide a medical examination or obtain a medical opinion if the evidence indicates the existence of a current disability or persistent or recurrent symptoms of a disability that may be associated with an event, injury, or disease in service, but the record does not contain sufficient medical evidence to decide the claim. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A (d) (2); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (c) (4) (i); McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006). In this case, the claim does not meet these requirements for obtaining a VA medical opinion. Because the weight of the evidence demonstrates no indication of a current disability, no examination is required. Absent evidence that indicates that the Veteran has a current claimed disability that is related to an injury or symptoms in service, the Board finds that a VA examination or opinion is not necessary for disposition of the claim. Accordingly, the Board finds that VA’s duty to assist with respect to obtaining a VA examination or opinion with respect to the Veteran’s claim for entitlement to service connection for sleep apnea have been met. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (c) (4). The Board acknowledges the Veteran’s assertions that he has a sleep apnea. However, he has not been shown to have the medical training and knowledge required to diagnose such a complex condition. See Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428, 435 (2011); Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F. 3d 1331, 1336-37. Therefore, his assertions are not considered competent and do not weigh against the probative value of the medical treatment records, including the VA treatment records, which do not show a diagnosis of a sleep apnea disability. As noted above, the threshold requirement for service connection is competent medical evidence of the existence of the claimed disability at some point during the course of the appeal or in proximity to the claim. See Degmetich, 104 F. 3d at 1332; Brammer, 3 Vet. App. at 225; see also McClain v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 319 (2007); Romanowsky v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 289 (2013). While the Veteran has this complaint, a complaint, or symptoms, is not a “disability” for VA purposes. The Board cannot grant service connection for a symptom. Although the Board recognizes the Veteran’s sincere belief in his claim, the most probative evidence of record does not show that he had sleep apnea at any point during or in proximity to the appeal period. In the absence of proof of a current disability, there can be no valid claim. Brammer, 3 Vet. App. at 225. In this case there is an absence of proof of sleep apnea disability during or in proximity to the appeal period. Without evidence of a current diagnosis of sleep apnea the Board need not address the other elements of service connection. The preponderance of the evidence is therefore against the claim, the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine is not for application, and the claim must be denied. 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (b); see also Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). 3. Entitlement to Service Connection for Prostate Cancer and Entitlement to Service Connection for Stroke The Veteran contends that he had a stroke and prostate cancer directly related to his active military service. The Veteran has not stated how his stroke and/or prostate cancer are related to his active service. To establish service connection for a disability on a direct-incurrence basis, the Veteran must show: (1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F. 3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See also 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. The evidence of record shows that the Veteran was diagnosed with prostate cancer in April 2013. See VA treatment record, dated April 2013. Therefore, there is evidence of a current disability of prostate cancer. The evidence of record further shows that the Veteran reported that he had a stroke in 1996. Id. There is also evidence of stroke. As to an in-service event, injury or disease, a review of the Veteran’s service treatment records does not reflect any symptoms, complaints or treatment for a stroke or any cardiovascular disabilities. Additionally, the Veteran’s service treatment records do not reflect any symptoms, complaints or treatment for prostate cancer or any genitourinary system disability. The Veteran’s November 1979 separation examination, relating to his first period of active service reflects that his heart and vascular system were normal. Additionally, the November 1979 separation examination, reflects that the Veteran’s genitourinary system was normal. Furthermore, a January 1985 report of medical examination related to a medical board review reflects that the Veteran had normal heart, vascular system, and genitourinary system. The earliest indication in the record in the record that the Veteran suffered from a stroke in 1996 are the VA treatment records. Additionally, the earliest indication that the Veteran had prostate cancer is the April 2013 VA treatment record. In summary, the service treatment records do not reflect in-service complaints of a cardiovascular condition or a genitourinary system condition. The earliest evidence of record of a cardiovascular condition or a genitourinary system condition are the VA treatment records. Therefore, there is evidence that the Veteran had a stroke and that he has a diagnosis of prostate cancer, but there is no evidence of an in-service injury, illness or disease to which the current disabilities may be medically attributed. Rather, the evidence tends to show that the Veteran did not have a stroke or prostate cancer until more than a decade after his active military service. The only evidence indicating an association between the current disabilities and his active service are the Veteran’s own assertions. It is well established that a layperson without medical training is not qualified to render a medical opinion regarding the diagnosis or etiology of certain disorders and disabilities. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (a) (1). In certain instances, lay testimony may be competent to establish medical etiology or nexus. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F. 3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007). However, the origin or cause of a stroke and prostate cancer are not simple questions that can be determined based on personal observation by a lay person. It is not shown that the Veteran is qualified through specialized education, training, or experience to offer a medical opinion as to the etiology of a stroke and/or prostate cancer. Grottveit v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 91, 93 (1993). Hence, the Veteran’s lay statements are not competent to establish medical etiology or nexus. Id. As such, the Board finds the question of whether the Veteran’s stroke and/or prostate cancer are etiologically related to an in-service event, injury or disease does not lie within the range of common experience or common knowledge but requires special experience or special knowledge. The Board acknowledges that the Veteran was not afforded a VA examination relating directly to his stroke or prostate cancer. On these facts, however, an examination is not required. In this case, the claims do not meet the requirements for obtaining a VA medical opinion. Because the weight of the evidence demonstrates no cardiovascular or genitourinary system condition in service, and that the symptoms of a stroke and prostate cancer were not present for many years thereafter, no examination is required. Absent evidence that indicates that the Veteran has a current claimed disability that is related to an injury or symptoms in service, the Board finds that an additional VA examination or opinion is not necessary for disposition of the claim. Accordingly, the Board finds that VA’s duty to assist with respect to obtaining a VA examination or opinion with respect to the Veteran’s claim for entitlement to service connection for a stroke and entitlement to service connection for prostate cancer have been met. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (c) (4). In view of the foregoing, the Board concludes that the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim for entitlement to service connection for a stroke and entitlement to service connection for prostate cancer. Because the preponderance of the evidence is against the claims, the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine is not for application, and the claims must be denied. 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (b); see also Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). Increased Rating Disability ratings are determined by the application of VA’s Schedule for Rating Disabilities (Schedule), which is based on the average impairment of earning capacity. Separate diagnostic codes identify the various disabilities. 38 U.S.C. § 1155; 38 C.F.R. Part 4. Pertinent regulations do not require that all cases show all findings specified by the Schedule, but that findings sufficient to identify the disease and the resulting disability and, above all, coordination of the rating with impairment of function will be expected in all cases. 38 C.F.R. § 4.21; see also Mauerhan v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 436 (2002). When after careful consideration of all procurable and assembled data, a reasonable doubt arises regarding the degree of disability such doubt will be resolved in favor of the claimant. 38 C.F.R. § 4.3. Where there is a question as to which of two ratings shall be applied, the higher rating will be assigned if the disability picture more nearly approximates the criteria required for that rating. Otherwise, the lower rating will be assigned. 38 C.F.R. § 4.7. The Board will consider whether separate ratings may be assigned for separate periods of time based on facts found, a practice known as “staged ratings,” in all claims for increased ratings. Fenderson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 119, 126-27 (1999). 4. Entitlement to Higher Ratings for Service-Connected Cluster Headaches The Veteran seeks a higher rating for his service-connected cluster headaches. The Veteran’s service-connected cluster headaches are rated as noncompensable prior to March 10, 2016 and 30 percent disabling from March 10, 2016 under 38 C.F.R. § 4.124a, Diagnostic Code 8100. The Veteran’s increased rating claim was received on March 2, 2011. Therefore, the relevant rating period is from March 3, 2010, one year prior to receipt of the claim, through the present. See, 38 C.F.R. § 3.400 (o) (2). Under Diagnostic Code 8100, a noncompensable rating is assigned for headaches with characteristic prostrating attacks averaging less than one in two months over the last several months. A 10 percent rating is assigned for headaches with characteristic prostrating attacks averaging one in two months over the last several months. A 30 percent rating is assigned for headaches with characteristic prostrating attacks occurring on an average once a month over the last several months. A maximum schedular 50 percent rating is assigned for headaches with very frequent completely prostrating and prolonged attacks productive of severe economic inadaptability. The rating criteria do not define “prostrating.” By way of reference, the Board notes that DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1531 (32nd Ed. 2012), defines “prostration” as “extreme exhaustion or powerlessness.” Turning to the relevant evidence of record, the Veteran was provided a VA examination in January 2013. The Veteran stated that he has headaches once a day, lasting three hours for a time frame of a few months, then remission for a few months. The Veteran further stated that his headaches are manifested in tearing in the left eye with an occasional feeling of near syncope, without actual syncope. He stated his headaches are not prostrating. The Veteran was provided a VA examination in March 2016. The VA examiner reviewed the record, interviewed the Veteran and conducted an in-person examination. The Veteran stated that he has chronic cluster headaches with increased frequency and duration. The VA examiner noted that the Veteran experiences constant head pain that is pulsating or throbbing. Additionally, the Veteran’s headaches cause sensitivity to light, tearing of the eyes, nasal congestion and rhinorrhea. The VA examiner noted that the Veteran has prostrating attacks of migraine pain once every month. In view of the relevant evidence of record, the Board concludes that the Veteran was not entitled to a compensable rating for his service-connected cluster headaches prior to March 10, 2016. The January 2013 VA examination report indicates that the Veteran experienced headache pain that lasted for three hours a day. However, the report does not indicate that the headaches were “characteristic prostrating attacks.” Rather, the Veteran described symptoms of constant head pain, pulsating or throbbing head pain, pain on the left side of the head, and a feeling of near syncope. Although these symptoms are significant, they do not fit the criteria for a compensable rating under 38 C.F.R. § 4.124a, Diagnostic Code 8100, because they do not manifest with the severity or occur with the frequency required for a compensable rating (a minimum of characteristic prostrating attacks averaging one in two months over the last several months). There is no probative evidence that the Veteran experienced prostrating headache attacks at any time during the rating period prior to the January 2013 VA examination. Accordingly, the record does not show that at any time prior to March 10, 2016, was the Veteran entitled to a compensable initial rating for headaches. For the period from March 10, 2016, the Board concludes that the Veteran was not entitled to a rating in excess of 30 percent. The March 2016 VA examination report indicates that the Veteran experiences constant head pain that is pulsating or throbbing. Additionally, the VA examiner noted that the Veteran experienced characteristic prostrating attacks that occurred on an average once per month. However, the report does not indicate that the headaches were characteristic prostrating attacks of more than one per month. These symptoms do not meet the requirements for a 50 percent rating (very frequent completely prostrating and prolonged attacks that produce severe economic adaptability). Accordingly, the record does not show that at any time from March 10, 2016, was the Veteran entitled to a disability rating in excess of 30 percent for his service-connected cluster headaches. In light of the above, the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim. The benefit-of-the-doubt rule does not apply and the claim must be denied. 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. In addition, there is no probative evidence of record or allegation in support of application of any other diagnostic code for the Veteran’s service-connected cluster headaches. Therefore, no diagnostic code will be applied other than Diagnostic Code 8100. See Butts v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 532, 538 (1993) (choice of diagnostic code should be upheld if it is supported by explanation and evidence). The Board has carefully considered the Veteran’s reports with respect to the nature and severity of his service-connected cluster headaches and notes that his lay testimony is qualified to describe his headache symptoms. The Veteran’s history and symptom reports have been considered, including as presented in the medical evidence discussed above, and are noted to be contemplated by the criteria for the disability rating for which the Veteran has been found entitled by the Board. The Board therefore finds that the criteria for a compensable rating, prior to March 10, 2016, and a rating in excess of 30 percent from March 10, 2016, for the Veteran’s service-connected cluster headaches have not been met at any time during the rating period. Neither the Veteran nor his representative has raised any other issues, nor have any other issues been reasonably raised by the record. See Yancy v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 484, 495 (2016); Doucette v. Shulkin, 38 Vet. App. 366, 369-70 (2017) (confirming that the Board is not required to address issues unless they are specifically raised by the claimant or reasonably raised by the evidence of record). VA’s Duty to Notify and Assist With respect to the Veteran’s claims herein, VA has met all statutory and regulatory notice and duty to assist provisions. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5106, 5107, 5126; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156 (a), 3.159, 3.326; see also Scott v. McDonald, 789 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2015). REASONS FOR REMAND 1. Entitlement to a Higher Initial Rating for Unspecified Depressive Disorder An October 2017 rating decision granted entitlement to service connection for unspecified depressive disorder as 50 percent disabling effective March 2, 2011. A timely notice of disagreement was received by VA in December 2017 concerning the effective date of award and evaluation of the disability. A statement of the case (SOC) has not been issued. See Manlincon v. West, 12 Vet. App. 238 (1999). The Board is required to remand the issue for issuance of a SOC. Id. (Continued on the next page)   The matter is REMANDED for the following action: Provide the Veteran with a statement of the case with respect to the October 2017 rating decision, with consideration of any additional evidence, concerning the issues of entitlement to an earlier effective date and entitlement to a higher initial rating for unspecified depressive disorder, pursuant to the December 2017 notice of disagreement. The appropriate period should be allowed for response before the appeal is returned to the Board. The Veteran should be informed that he must file a timely substantive appeal to perfect an appeal to the Board of the October 2017 rating decision as to these issues. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.200, 20.202, 20.302 (b). JAMES G. REINHART Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD B. G. LeMoine, Associate Counsel