Citation Nr: 20003103 Decision Date: 01/14/20 Archive Date: 01/14/20 DOCKET NO. 19-12 933 DATE: January 14, 2020 ORDER Service connection for persistent depressive disorder with other specified stressor disorder and sleep disturbance, is granted. FINDING OF FACT The Veteran’s only acquired psychiatric disorder, persistent depressive disorder with other specified stressor disorder and sleep disturbance, is related to wartime service. CONCLUSION OF LAW Persistent depressive disorder with other specified stressor disorder with sleep disturbance was incurred in combat service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1154, 5107 (b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303(d). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran, who had active service from January 1952 to January 1954, to include service in Korea, appeals the denial of his claim of service connection for acquired psychiatric disorder (originally claimed as PTSD). His medals include a Combat Infantry Badge (CIB). In August 2019, he testified at a hearing before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge (VLJ). The VLJ clarified the issue on appeal; clarified the concept of service connection claims; identified potential evidentiary defects; clarified the type of evidence that would support the Veteran’s claim; inquired as to the existence of potential outstanding records; and held the record open for 60 days for the submission of additional evidence. Thus, the actions of the VLJ comply with 38 C.F.R. § 3.103. Additional evidence, a medical opinion from a non-VA psychologist licensed by the State of New York, was thereafter submitted directly to the Board. The Board has noted the initial characterization as one for PTSD and has recharacterized the claim in view of the discussion at the hearing as well as the specific diagnosis of record. But see Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1, 6 (2009) (“It is generally the province of medical professionals to diagnose or label a mental condition, not the claimant”). There is no prejudice to the Veteran, in light of the grant of the full benefit, in granting service connection for the only diagnosed psychiatric disorder of record, as it represents a grant as to all the Veteran’s psychiatric manifestations. Service Connection Service connection may be established for disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in the line of duty in the active military, naval, or air service or for aggravation of a preexisting injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131. In general, to establish a right to compensation for a present disability, a Veteran must show: (1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service - the so-called “nexus” requirement. Holton v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The Veteran urges that stressful combat-related events in Korea led to present-day psychiatric conditions. See, e.g., hearing transcript. These events involved the death of people in his unit are very difficult and upsetting to discuss. He is kept up at night by his memories. He has emotional difficulty and cries often when thinking of the events. He has been re-experiencing the events for at least 20 years. The undersigned finds the testimony credible and notes that the Veteran has a CIB based on his Korean War service. The principal question for the Board is whether the Veteran has a current disability that began during service or is at least as likely as not related to service. The Board concludes first that the Veteran does not have a current diagnosis of PTSD under the DSM-5 criteria. 38 C.F.R. § 4.125 (a); see generally Romanowsky v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 289, 294 (2013); McClain v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 319, 321 (2007). That is not in dispute. See June 2014 VA mental health exam. Indeed, this was discussed at the hearing. Following the Board hearing, the Veteran obtained a medical opinion reflecting the diagnostic impression of persistent depressive disorder with other specified stressor disorder related to his combat experiences in Korea. See October 2019 report from Q. A.-S., Ph.D. This psychologist reviewed the entire record and provided clear reasons and bases for the favorable opinion, including consideration of the negative VA opinion. It indicates that all his psychiatric manifestations are due to this disorder that is related to his wartime experiences. The Board concludes that the Veteran has this current disability that is related to military service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 5107(b); Holton v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (a). This non-VA medical opinion is well-supported and consistent with the record. The examiner made clear in the discussion that an exhaustive review of the record was completed. Consequently, the Board adopts the opinion of the October 2019 non- VA examiner. In reaching this decision, the Board is cognizant of the Court’s decision in Clemons v. Shinseki. In Clemons, the Court concluded that a Veteran’s claim for a specific psychiatric disability encompasses any psychiatric disability reasonably raised by the record. 23 Vet. App. 1, 5-6 (2009). However, under the circumstances of this particular case where there exists a compelling positive nexus opinion by a medical professional, the Board finds no prejudice to the Veteran in limiting the scope of this claim to the specific diagnosis. All the Veteran’s psychiatric manifestations are considered part of the only acquired psychiatric disorder, persistent depressive disorder with other specified stressor disorder. In sum, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence supports service connection for the only acquired psychiatric disorder, persistent depressive disorder with other specified stressor disorder with sleep disturbance and the claim is granted. 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102, 3.303. H. N. SCHWARTZ Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals Attorney for the Board N. Rippel The Board’s decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential, and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.