Citation Nr: 20004313 Decision Date: 01/17/20 Archive Date: 01/17/20 DOCKET NO. 17-48 212A DATE: January 17, 2020 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for pericarditis is denied. FINDING OF FACT Pericarditis is not currently manifest and did not manifest at any point during the appeal period. CONCLUSION OF LAW Pericarditis was not incurred in or aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C. § 1110 (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (2018). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty from January 2011 to January 2016. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) on appeal of an April 2016 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO). In May 2019, the Veteran was scheduled for a Travel Board hearing before a Veterans Law Judge. However, he failed to appear. Service connection for pericarditis Veterans are entitled to compensation from VA if they develop a disability “resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, or for aggravation of a preexisting injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty.” 38 U.S.C. § 1110 (wartime service), 1131 (peacetime service). To establish a right to compensation for a present disability, a veteran must show: “(1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service”-the so-called “nexus” requirement. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed.Cir. 2004). The Board notes that the Veteran has not claimed that his disability on appeal is the result of combat with the enemy. Therefore, the combat provisions of 38 U.S.C. § 1154 (2012) are not for consideration. After the evidence is assembled, it is the Board’s responsibility to evaluate the entire record. See 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a) (2012). When there is an approximate balance of evidence regarding the merits of an issue material to the determination of the matter, the benefit of the doubt in resolving each issue shall be given to the claimant. See 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 4.3 (2018). In Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1990), the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) stated that “a veteran need only demonstrate that there is an ‘approximate balance of positive and negative evidence’ in order to prevail.” To deny a claim on its merits, the preponderance of the evidence must be against the claim. See Alemany v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 518, 519 (1996), citing Gilbert, 1 Vet. App. at 54. The Veteran contends that he has pericarditis that is related to his service, specifically due to receiving a smallpox vaccine. See, e.g., the Veteran’s VA Form 9 dated September 2017. The Board acknowledges the Veteran’s service treatment records which document a finding of pericarditis. However, the Veteran’s service examination dated November 2015 prior to separation documents the pericarditis resolved as well as normal findings related to the heart. Moreover, the postservice evidence of record establishes that the Veteran does not currently have pericarditis. Notably, a February 2017 VA evaluation documents normal cardiovascular findings. There are no findings contrary to this evaluation during the appeal period. In this case, the Board finds that the most probative evidence weighs against finding that the criteria have been met for a current pericarditis disability. In this regard, the Board finds it highly probative that the VA medical records indicate normal cardiovascular findings and that the examinations were thorough. The Board has considered the Veteran’s statements that he has pericarditis. The Veteran is competent to provide evidence of that which he experiences, including his symptomatology and medical history. Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994). In addition, lay evidence can be competent and sufficient to establish a diagnosis of a condition when: (1) a layperson is competent to identify the medical condition; (2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis; or, (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional. Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007)); Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428, 433, n.4 (2011). However, competence must be distinguished from probative weight. Although the Veteran is competent to relate what he experiences through the senses, the lay evidence is lacking in detail to support the conclusion that there is a current pericarditis disability. The Veteran’s lay assertions are therefore afforded less probative weight, and less credibility than the VA medical records and service treatment records. In this instance, the Board concludes that the most probative evidence establishes that the Veteran does not have residual disability due to pericarditis. The existence of a current disability is the cornerstone of a claim for VA disability benefits. See Degmetich v. Brown, 104 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Therefore, in the absence of current disability, there can be no valid claim. See Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992). In this case, there is no disability that resulted from a disease or injury. We emphasize that under the provisions of 1110, there must be disability and such disability must be due to disease or injury. The Board acknowledges the Veteran’s in-service treatment for pericarditis. However, the November 2015 separation examination is absent any finding as to impairment due to pericarditis. Moreover, the normal cardiovascular examination postservice establishes that the Veteran does not currently have residuals of the disability (impairment). Under the circumstances, the Veteran has not met the regulatory requirements to establish service connection for pericarditis under any theory of entitlement and service connection must be denied. In reaching this conclusion, the Board has considered the applicability of the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine. Here, however, as the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, that doctrine is not applicable. See 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53-56 (1990). H. N. SCHWARTZ Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals Attorney for the Board Arif Syed, Counsel The Board’s decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential, and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.