Citation Nr: 20022417 Decision Date: 03/31/20 Archive Date: 03/31/20 DOCKET NO. 17-06 217 DATE: March 31, 2020 ORDER New and material evidence has been submitted to reopen the claim of entitlement to service connection for major depressive disorder. Entitlement to service connection for suspect glaucoma is denied. REMANDED Entitlement to a rating higher than 20 percent for service-connected chronic right shoulder strain is remanded. Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder is remanded. Entitlement to service connection for bilateral hearing loss is remanded. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The August 2010 rating decision denied service connection for depression. The Veteran did not appeal or submit new and material evidence within one year. 2. Since the August 2010 rating decision, new and material evidence has been submitted to reopen the claim of entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder. 3. The preponderance of the evidence is against finding that suspect glaucoma began during active service, or is otherwise related to an in-service injury or disease. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The August 2010 rating decision denying service connection for depression is final. 38 U.S.C. § 7105(c) (2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104, 20.302, 20.1103 (2010). 2. The criteria to reopen the issue of entitlement to service connection for depression have been met. 38 U.S.C. § 5108; 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(b). 3. The criteria for service connection for glaucoma are not met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1112, 1131, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Veteran served on active duty in the United States Army from August 1978 to August 1981. He also served in the National Guard from 1985 to 1992. New and Material Evidence The Veteran seeks to reopen his claim for service connection for depression. Unappealed rating decisions are final with the exception that a claim may be reopened by the submission of new and material evidence. When an appellant seeks to reopen a claim based on new evidence, VA must first determine whether the additional evidence is “new and material.” Second, if VA determines that new and material evidence has been added to the record, the claim is reopened and VA must evaluate the merits of the appellant’s claim considering all the evidence, both new and old. Manio v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 140 (1991); Barnett v. Brown, 83 F.3d 1380, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Butler v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 167, 171 (1996). “New” evidence means evidence not previously submitted to VA decision makers. “Material” evidence means evidence that relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim. Cumulative or redundant evidence is not new and material. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a). To reopen, the new and material evidence must raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a). This is a low threshold that is meant to enable, rather than preclude, reopening. Shade v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 110 (2010). The focus is not on whether the evidence remedies the principle reason for the previous denial, but whether the evidence, taken together, would at least trigger the duty to assist by providing a medical opinion. Id. at 117. The Veteran was initially denied service connection for depression in August 2010 on the basis that he did not manifest depression during service. The Veteran did not appeal or submit new and material evidence within one year of that decision; thus, the August 2010 rating decision is final. Since that time, evidence added to the claims file include treatment records and lay testimony related to a nexus for depression. Since this evidence was not previously considered and it raises a possibility of substantiating the Veteran’s claim, it constitutes new and material evidence sufficient to reopen the claim. Service Connection Service connection may be granted for disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131, 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. The three-element test for service connection requires evidence of: (1) a current disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the current disability and the in-service disease or injury. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1166 -67 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Certain chronic diseases, which are listed in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a), may be presumed to have been incurred during service if manifested to a compensable degree within one year of separation from active service. 38 U.S.C. § 1112; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. Moreover, if a disease listed in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a) is shown to be chronic in service, subsequent manifestations of the same chronic disease at any later date, however remote, are service-connected, unless clearly attributable to intercurrent causes. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). For the showing of chronic disease in service, there is required a combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease entity and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time. Id. However, if evidence of a chronic condition is noted during service or during the presumptive period, but the chronic condition is not “shown to be chronic, or where the diagnosis of chronicity may be legitimately questioned,” i.e., “when the fact of chronicity in service is not adequately supported,” then a showing of continuity of symptomatology after discharge is required to support a claim for disability compensation for the chronic disease. Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b)). A claimant “can benefit from continuity of symptomatology to establish service connection in the ultimate sense, but only if [the] chronic disease is one listed in § 3.309(a).” Walker, 708 F.3d at 1337. Veteran status is the first element required for a claim for disability benefits. D’Amico v. West, 209 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The term “veteran” means a person who served in the active military, naval, or air service and who was discharged or released therefrom under conditions other than dishonorable. 38 U.S.C. § 101(2). The term “active duty” includes full-time duty in the Armed Forces, other than active duty for training (ACDUTRA). 38 U.S.C. § 101(21). The term Armed Forces means the United States Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard, including the reserve components thereof. 38 U.S.C. § 101(10). Active military, naval, or air service includes any period of ACDUTRA during which the individual concerned was disabled or died from a disease or injury incurred in or aggravated in line of duty or period of INACDUTRA during which the individual concerned was disabled or died from injury incurred in or aggravated in line of duty. 38 U.S.C. § 101(21) and (24); 38 C.F.R. § 3.6(a) and (d). When a claim for service connection is based only on a period of ACDUTRA, there must be some evidence that the appellant became disabled as a result of a disease or injury incurred or aggravated in the line of duty during the period of ACDUTRA. Smith v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 40, 47 (2010). In the absence of such evidence, the period of ACDUTRA would not qualify as “active military, naval, or air service,” and the appellant would not qualify as a “veteran” by virtue of ACDUTRA service alone. Id. Generally, no presumptions (including the presumptions of soundness, aggravation, or for presumptive diseases) attach to periods of ACDUTRA and INACDUTRA unless “veteran” status is attained during those periods. Paulson v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 466, 470 (1995). As to the presumption of soundness, it does not apply to a claimant who had only ACDUTRA service and who is not otherwise a veteran. Paulson, 7 Vet. App. at 471. Moreover, even for veterans who have achieved “veteran” status through a prior period of active service and claim a disability incurred only during a different period of ACDUTRA, the presumption of soundness applies only when the veteran has been “examined, accepted, and enrolled for service” and where that examination revealed no “defects, infirmities, or disorders.” Smith v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 40, 45-46 (2010). See also Donnellan v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 167, 171 (2010) (the presumption of aggravation is not applicable to ACDUTRA service unless claimant is service-connected for a disability for such period of ACDUTRA). With respect to a claim for aggravation of a preexisting condition during a period of ACDUTRA or INACDUTRA, in order for a claimant to establish “veteran” status, the claimant must demonstrate both elements of aggravation - (1) that the preexisting disability permanently worsened in service, and (2) that such worsening was beyond the natural progression of the disease (i.e., such worsening was caused by service). Donnellan, 24 Vet. App. at 174. In such instances, the claimant is not entitled to the easier presumption of aggravation standard. See 38 U.S.C. § 1153; 38 C.F.R. § 3.306(a). The standard of proof for the claimant is the “benefit of the doubt” standard; thus, the claimant must only show that there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence to prevail on this matter. Donnellan, 24 Vet. App. at 174. There is no shifting burden to VA as there is when the presumptions of soundness and aggravation apply. Id. at 175. For purposes of 38 U.S.C. § 101(24), the term “injury” refers to the results of an external trauma rather than a degenerative process. See generally VAOPGCPREC 4-2002 (May 14, 2002); VAOPGCPREC 86-90 (July 18, 1990); VAOPGCPREC 8-2001 (Feb. 26, 2001). A Veteran bears the evidentiary burden to establish all elements of a service connection claim, including the nexus requirement. Fagan v. Shinseki, 573 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2009). In making its ultimate determination, the Board must give a veteran the benefit of the doubt on any issue material to the claim when there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence. Id. at 1287 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b)). Entitlement to service connection for suspect glaucoma Upon consideration of the evidence, the Board concludes that, while the Veteran has a current diagnosis of glaucoma, the preponderance of the evidence weighs against finding that the Veteran’s diagnosis of glaucoma began during service or is otherwise related to an in-service injury, event, or disease. The Veteran’s service treatment records are silent for any complaints, treatments, or manifestations of glaucoma. Upon discharge from active duty, the Veteran’s eyes were noted as clinically normal. In his subjective medical report, the Veteran indicated that he had conjunctivitis, which was resolved. See Report of Medical Examination and Report of Medical History dated August 28, 1981. The Veteran’s post-service treatment records reflect that the Veteran was diagnosed with suspect glaucoma in 2014, several decades after his discharge from active service and more than a decade after his National Guard service. At the time of diagnosis, the treating physician did not provide an etiology for the Veteran’s glaucoma. Upon review of the record, the Board finds that service connection for suspect glaucoma is not warranted. As previously noted, service connection necessitates a link between the Veteran’s service and his claimed disability. As to the Veteran’s glaucoma, no such link is supported by the evidence of record. The Board notes that the Veteran has not been afforded a VA examination in relation to his claim. Pursuant to McClendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006), an examination is required when (1) there is evidence of a current disability, (2) evidence establishing an “in- service event, injury or disease,” or that a disease, manifested in accordance with presumptive service connection regulations, occurred which would support incurrence or aggravation, (3) an indication that the current disability may be related to the in-service event, and (4) insufficient evidence to decide the case. The Board finds that a VA examination in this instance is unnecessary. There is no indication that the Veteran’s current disability is related to service (including ACDUTRA and INACDUTRA) and no credible evidence of recurrent or persistent symptoms of disability since service. The Veteran’s service treatment records are void of treatment for or diagnosis of any condition regarding his glaucoma. It is well documented that the Veteran’s glaucoma was diagnosed in 2014 which is many years after his discharge from active service as well as his discharge from the National Guard. The passage of many years between discharge from active service and the documentation of a claimed disability is a factor that tends to weigh against a claim for service connection. Maxson v. Gober, 230 F. 3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Shaw v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 365 (1992). The Board also notes that throughout the course of his treatment for his glaucoma, neither the Veteran or any of his providers related his glaucoma to his active duty service. Significantly, the Veteran has not presented or identified any medical opinion that supports the claim for service connection. VA adjudicators are not free to ignore or disregard the medical conclusions of a VA physician, and are not permitted to substitute their own judgment on a medical matter. Colvin v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 171 (1991); Willis v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 66 (1991). The Board finds that the objective medical evidence of record does not establish or suggest that the Veteran’s glaucoma was caused by or otherwise etiologically related to his period of service. Although lay persons are competent to provide opinions on some medical issues, see Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428 (2011), as to the specific issue being decided herein, an opinion as to the etiology of the Veteran’s suspect glaucoma and whether it is etiologically related to the Veteran’s active service, falls outside the realm of common knowledge of a lay person. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). That is, although the Board readily acknowledges that the Veteran was competent to report his symptoms, there is no indication that either he was competent to etiologically link any such symptoms to his active service. In addition, the Veteran was not shown to possess the requisite medical training, expertise, or credentials needed to render a diagnosis or a competent opinion as to medical causation. Nothing in the record demonstrates that the Veteran received any special training or acquired any medical expertise in evaluating his specific symptomatology and diagnosis. See King v. Shinseki, 700 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Accordingly, the Veteran’s own personal opinion does not constitute competent medical evidence and lacks probative value. In sum, the claims file does not contain competent and credible evidence that the Veteran’s glaucoma was related to service. There is also no competent evidence that glaucoma began in service or to a compensable degree within one year of service. As such, service connection is not warranted under the provisions of 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303(b) and 3.309(a). Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, and consideration of the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine is not applicable in such instance. REASONS FOR REMAND 1. Entitlement to a rating higher than 20 percent for service-connected chronic right shoulder strain is remanded. The Veteran underwent VA examination in November 2014 to evaluate the severity of his right shoulder disability. The examiner indicated being unable to describe motion loss during a flare of disability as the Veteran was not being examined during a flare. The examination also did not contain passive range of motion measurements or any indication of the severity of the Veteran’s disability with weightbearing. The examination report must be returned as inadequate for rating purposes pursuant to Sharp v. Shulkin, 29 Vet. App. 26, 33 (2017) and Correia v. McDonald, 28 Vet. App. 158 (2016). 2. Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder. The Veteran contends that his depression was either caused or aggravated by his service-connected right shoulder disability. The Board cannot make a fully-informed decision on the issue of service connection for depression because no VA examiner has opined whether the Veteran’s depression was caused or aggravated by his right shoulder disability. Thus, remand is required to obtain a medical opinion. 3. Entitlement to service connection for bilateral hearing loss is remanded. The Veteran contends that his hearing loss was caused by his in-service exposure to loud noises. At the November 2014 VA examination, the Veteran did not manifest a hearing loss disability as defined in 38 C.F.R. § 3.385. The Veteran’s treatment records and testimony suggest ongoing problems and decreased hearing acuity since that time. As such, remand is required to afford the Veteran an appropriate audiological examination. The matters are REMANDED for the following action: 1. Associate with the claims folder updated VA treatment records. 2. Schedule the Veteran for an examination by an appropriate clinician to determine the current severity of his service-connected right shoulder disability. The examiner should provide a full description of the disability and report all signs and symptoms necessary for evaluating the Veteran’s disability under the rating criteria. In so doing, the examiner must test the Veteran’s active motion, passive motion, and pain with weight-bearing and without weight-bearing. If it is not possible to provide a specific measurement without speculation, the examiner must state whether the need to speculate is due to a deficiency in the state of general medical knowledge (no one could respond given medical science and the known facts), a deficiency in the record (additional facts are required), or the examiner (does not have the knowledge or training). The examiner must attempt to elicit information regarding the severity, frequency, and duration of any flare-ups, and the degree of functional loss during flare-ups. If it is not possible to provide a specific measurement based on direct observation, the examiner should provide an estimate, if at all possible, of the additional impairment due to flare-ups based on the other evidence of record and the Veteran’s statements. If it is not possible to provide a specific measurement without speculation, the examiner must state whether the need to speculate is due to a deficiency in the state of general medical knowledge (no one could respond given medical science and the known facts), a deficiency in the record (additional facts are required), or the examiner (does not have the knowledge or training).] 3. Schedule the Veteran for an examination by an appropriate clinician to determine the nature and etiology of any acquired psychiatric disorder, to include depression. The examiner should also determine whether any diagnosed acquired psychiatric disorder is at least as likely as not (1) proximately due to service-connected disability, or (2) aggravated (a discernible increase in disability) by service-connected disability.] 4. Schedule the Veteran for an examination by an appropriate clinician to determine the nature and etiology of any hearing loss disability. The examiner must opine whether it is at least as likely as not related to an in-service injury, event, or disease, including the cumulative exposure to loud noises during service as well as National Guard service. 5. Thereafter, readjudicate the claims. If any benefit sought on appeal remains denied, furnish the Veteran and his representative a supplemental statement of the case and an appropriate period of time to respond. T. MAINELLI Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals Attorney for the Board C. Orie, Counsel The Board’s decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.