Citation Nr: 20028065 Decision Date: 04/22/20 Archive Date: 04/22/20 DOCKET NO. 19-27 545 DATE: April 22, 2020 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is granted. FINDING OF FACT The most probative evidence of record demonstrates that PTSD was related to an incident during the Veteran’s active duty. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for entitlement to service connection for PTSD are met. 38 U.S.C. § 5110 (a) (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.400 (2018).   REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served in the United States Navy from June 1974 to June 1978. This case comes before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) on appeal from a June 2018 rating decision of the Department of Veteran Affairs (VA) Regional Office in Seattle, Washington. 1. Entitlement to service connection for PTSD is granted. Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131 (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) (2019). To establish a right to compensation for a present disability, a Veteran must show: (1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service - the so-called “nexus” requirement. Holton v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Service connection may be granted for any disease initially diagnosed after discharge when all of the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) (2019). In addition to the regulations discussed above, service connection for PTSD requires medical evidence diagnosing the condition in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125 (a); a link, established by medical evidence, between current symptoms and an in-service stressor; and credible supporting evidence that the in-service stressor occurred. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304 (f). The evidence needed to establish the occurrence of a claimed in-service stressor is typically dependent upon whether the veteran engaged in combat with the enemy, as well as whether the claimed in-service stressor is related to such combat; or, if not, whether there is objective evidence to verify the occurrence of the claimed stressor. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.304 (f); Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128, 147 (1997); Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389, 395 (1996). The regulation also contains specific provisions related to stressors not at issue here (combat, prisoner of war, and personal assault) and notes that lay evidence may enough to establish the in-service stressors in those situations. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304 (f) (2017). VA is responsible for determining whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise, with the Veteran prevailing in either event, or whether a preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, in which case the claim is denied. 38 U.S.C. § 5107; Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). The Veteran alleges that his PTSD began during service and has existed since that time. In his January 2018 statement, the Veteran alleged that he developed a psychiatric condition after being exposed to enemy artillery while in a helicopter and being tasked to clean up the blood of a fellow soldier after an accident on deck. First, the Board finds that there is a current disability. See Holton, 557 F.3d at 1366; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). In January 2018, the Veteran completed the PCL-5, a 20-item self-report measure that assesses the 20 DSM-5 symptoms of PTSD. A score of 33 is suggestive of PTSD on the PCL-5 and the Veteran scored a 65. The Veteran’s diagnosis of PTSD was formally confirmed under the DSM-5 in a June 2018 VA examination. Accordingly, the first element of service connection is met. Second, the Board finds that there was an in-service injury or disease. See Holton, 557 F.3d at 1366; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). The Veteran alleges two stressors for his PTSD, with the first being that he was deployed on a helicopter which came under enemy fire. While he was on this helicopter, he heard the sound of enemy ammunition hitting the helicopter. The Veteran stated that he was forced to make this trip in the helicopter two more times. The Naval History and Heritage Command did not maintain a 1976 command history for the Attack Squadron 196 and so this helicopter mission could not be confirmed. The Veteran also alleged that he was charged with cleaning out a bloody engine after being told that a fellow soldier had been sucked into it. The Veteran recalled seeing and smelling copious amounts of blood. The Veteran provided buddy statements from two fellow servicemembers who confirmed that this incident occurred. In a January 2018 letter, a fellow shipmate of the Veteran recalled that while on the USS Enterprise in the Power Plant shop, a flight operations inspector was sucked into the port intake while it was idling at 75 percent. The inspector lost the ability to walk and the Veteran was assigned to remove and clean the engine with two other shipmates. The Veteran also submitted an August 2018 letter from a Captain. The Captain described the incident in great detail, confirming that the inspector was sucked into the intake and paralyzed from the shoulders down, but did not die. The Captain confirmed that the Veteran was part of the engine shop at the time and tasked with fixing the intake. The Captain also described how he also had to look at the intake and how disturbed he was by the blood and damage inside the intake. DPRIS search results produced the deck logs from the USS Enterprise. These logs do not indicate a record of injury or death that involved the intake of a jet engine. There was, however, a record of a crewman who suffered trauma of the left leg from an accident on the flight deck, though no further details are listed. The evidence submitted by the Veteran and the DPRIS search supports the validity of at least one of the Veteran’s claimed stressors. Thus, the Board finds the Veteran’s lay statements regarding this incident are both competent and credible, as they have been consistent and are corroborated by other lay evidence and military records. See Washington v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 362, 368 (2005) (noting that a lay witness is competent to report to factual matters of which he or she has first-hand knowledge); Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 511 (1995) (noting that the credibility of a witness may be impeached by a showing of interest, bias, inconsistent statements, or consistency with other evidence), aff’d, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Accordingly, the second element of service connection is met. Third, the Board finds that the evidence of record does support a finding that the Veteran’s PTSD is related to his active service. See Holton, 557 F.3d at 1366; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). In the June 2018 VA examination, the examiner opined that the Veteran’s PTSD was at least as likely as not the result of his active duty service, to specifically include the cleaning incident on the USS Enterprise. The examiner noted his review of the claims file, to include the Veteran’s lay statements, the buddy statements, and relevant medical records. The Board finds this opinion probative as it is based upon a review of the relevant lay and medical evidence and the examiner provided a supporting explanation. See Prejean v. West, 13 Vet. App. 444, 448-9 (2000) (holding that factors for assessing the probative value of a medical opinion are the physician’s access to the claims file and the thoroughness and detail of the opinion); Stefl v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 120, 124 (2007) (holding that a medical opinion must be supported by an analysis that the Board can consider and weigh against contrary opinions). Accordingly, service connection is granted. K. MILLIKAN Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals Attorney for the Board Ashley Ki The Board’s decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.