Citation Nr: 20029977 Decision Date: 04/29/20 Archive Date: 04/29/20 DOCKET NO. 17-63 569 DATE: April 29, 2020 ORDER 1. Entitlement to service connection for sleep apnea is denied. 2. Entitlement to service connection for an eye disability, to include subfoveal choroidal neovascularization OS, nonexudative age-related macular degeneration OD, and pseudophakia is denied. 3. Entitlement to service connection for a lumbar spine disability is denied. 4. Entitlement to service connection for a cervical spine disability is denied. 5. Entitlement to service connection for a left shoulder disability is denied. 6. The appeal for entitlement to service connection for chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder is dismissed. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The preponderance of the evidence is against finding that the Veteran’s sleep apnea was incurred in or is otherwise related to service. 2. The preponderance of the evidence is against finding that the Veteran’s eye disability, to include subfoveal choroidal neovascularization OS, nonexudative age-related macular degeneration OD, and pseudophakia was incurred in or is otherwise related to service. 3. A lumbar spine disability did not have its onset in service, was not manifested to a compensable degree within one year of service discharge, and is not otherwise related to service. 4. A cervical spine disability did not have its onset in service, was not manifested to a compensable degree within one year of service discharge, and is not otherwise related to service. 5. The preponderance of the evidence is against finding that the Veteran’s left shoulder disability was incurred in or otherwise related to service. 6. At the January 2020 Board hearing, prior to the promulgation of a decision in the appeal, the Veteran requested a withdrawal of the appeal for entitlement to service connection for chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The criteria for service connection for sleep apnea have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131, 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303(a). 2. The criteria for service connection for an eye disability, to include subfoveal choroidal neovascularization OS, nonexudative age-related macular degeneration OD, and pseudophakia have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131, 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303(a). 3. The criteria for service connection for a lumbar spine disability have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 1113, 1131, 1137, 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309(a). 4. The criteria for service connection for a cervical spine disability have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 1113, 1131, 1137, 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309(a). 5. The criteria for service connection for a left shoulder disability have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131, 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303(a). 6. The criteria for withdrawal of the appeal for entitlement to service connection for chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder by the Veteran have been met. 38 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(2), (d)(5); 38 C.F.R. § 20.204. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Veteran served on active duty in the United States Army from January 1966 to January 1968. The Veteran testified at a video conference hearing before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge in January 2020. A transcript of the hearing was prepared and associated with the claims file. At the January 2020 Board hearing, the undersigned Veterans Law Judge left the record open for one month, to allow the Veteran and his representative to submit any additional evidence within their possession. In February 2020 the Veteran submitted additional relevant evidence with respect to his appeal. Also at the January 2020 hearing, the Veteran’s representative raised the issue of the service treatment records not being complete. She stated that the Veteran had told her he had received medical treatment during service, which medical treatment was not in the service treatment records. The record shows that in March 2016, VA requested, “Furnish complete medical/dental records and entire personnel file at NPRC.” That same month, VA received service treatment records, dental records, and personnel records. In reviewing the service treatment records, the Board did not get the impression that there were missing service treatment records. For example, there’s an entrance examination from November 1965, there is a November 1965 Report of Medical History, there are multiple treatment records from February 1966 (two visits), May 1966 (two visits), August 1966, September 1966, February 1967, June 1967 (two visits), a December 1967 Report of Medical Examination, a December 1967 Report of Medical History, and a January 1968 Statement of Medical Condition. In other words, of record are medical records that cover the Veteran’s service from January 1966 to January 1968. Thus, the Board finds as fact that the service treatment records are complete. The Veteran was not afforded a VA examination in connection with the claims for service connection currently on appeal. The Board finds that the facts of this case do not establish entitlement to VA examination or medical opinion. For example, VA must provide a medical examination or opinion when there is (1) competent evidence of a current disability or persistent or recurrent symptoms of a disability, (2) evidence establishing that an event, injury, or disease occurred in service, and (3) an indication that the disability or persistent or recurrent symptoms of a disability may be associated with the veteran’s service, but (4) there is insufficient competent medical evidence on file for the Secretary to make a decision on the claim. McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006). In this case, the Board finds as fact that the record does not show evidence establishing than an event, injury, or disease related to the claims on appeal occurred in service, which is explained in detail below. The Board also finds that there is not an indication that the disabilities may be associated with the Veteran’s service. For a VA examination to be warranted, all the criteria have to be met, and at least one element is not met. Therefore, entitlement to a VA examination is not warranted for any of the issues decided herein. Service Connection Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from a disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by service. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). To establish a right to compensation for a present disability, a veteran must show: (1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service. Disorders diagnosed after discharge will still be service connected if all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Additionally, where a veteran served 90 days or more of active service, and certain chronic diseases, such as arthritis, become manifest to a degree of 10 percent or more within one year after the date of separation from such service, such disease shall be presumed to have been incurred in service, even though there is no evidence of such disease during the period of service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 1113; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309(a). 1. Entitlement to service connection for sleep apnea At the September 2017 DRO hearing, the Veteran testified that his sleep apnea was diagnosed in 2015. At the January 2020 Board hearing, the Veteran stated that his sleep apnea was incurred due to exposures to chemicals during service. The Veteran stated that his doctors told him that the causes for sleep apnea are unknown, but he believes that his sleep apnea was incurred during service because of cold weather conditions while sleeping and because of regular sleep deprivation. The Veteran also stated that after service, he felt immense drowsiness, resulting in persistent sleepiness, which he discussed with his wife at the time. The Board has carefully reviewed the evidence of record and finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the award of service connection for sleep apnea. The reasons follow. The Veteran has been diagnosed with sleep apnea, and thus there is evidence of a current disability, and the Veteran meets first element of a service-connection claim. As to an in-service disease or injury, the evidence does not support a finding of a disease or injury in service. The service treatment records (STRs) do not document complaints, symptoms, diagnosis, or treatment for sleep apnea. In a Report of Medical History from December 1967 at separation, the Veteran denied history of frequent trouble sleeping, which, although not directly related to sleep apnea, tends to show that he was not experiencing sleep apnea in service. In a January 1968 Statement of Medical Condition, the Veteran certified there had been no change in his medical condition since the December 1967 examination. Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence is against a finding of complaints or symptoms related to sleep apnea during service, and the in-service disease or injury element is not met. Additionally, the preponderance of the evidence is also against a nexus between the current disability and service. For example, when the Veteran went to VA to establish care in April 2015, he told the examiner that he had a concern with him falling asleep during the day at random times. He also reported fatigue. The Veteran then underwent a sleep study and was diagnosed with sleep apnea in May 2015, which is approximately 47 years following service discharge. Additionally, when seen by a chiropractor in January 2014, the Veteran denied “both a history of or presently having … general fatigue.” This would tend to show that the fatigue the Veteran complained about in April 2015 was of a more recent onset since he specifically denied a history of and currently having fatigue a little more than one year prior to April 2015. These facts tend to establish that sleep apnea did not have its onset in service. In a January 2018 lay statement, the Veteran’s wife wrote that the Veteran had a history of being sleepy since she met him, which she wrote was 35 years ago. She added that this was confirmed by the Veteran’s ex-wife as well. The Veteran’s wife generally contended that this was evidence of sleep apnea prior to the date of diagnosis. The Veteran’s wife would have met the Veteran in approximately 1983, which is still many years after service and does not establish that sleep apnea had its onset in service. The Veteran was married during service, and the Veteran’s current wife wrote that the ex-wife reported that the Veteran had always fallen asleep at the drop of a dime. While these facts show that the Veteran could fall sleep easily, such symptom is not exclusively related to sleep apnea, and the lay statement does not establish that the Veteran had sleep apnea in service. Although the Veteran claims that sleep apnea is related to service, the Veteran is not medically trained, and is therefore not qualified to competently opine about medical etiology. In certain instances, lay testimony may be competent to establish medical etiology or nexus. However, the diagnosis of sleep apnea requires specialized training for determinations as to diagnosis and causation, and is therefore, not susceptible to lay opinions on etiology. The origin or cause of the Veteran’s sleep apnea is not a simple question that can be determined based on mere personal observation by a lay person, the Veteran’s lay assertion is not competent to establish a nexus. At the present time, there is no competent evidence of a nexus between the sleep apnea and service. Therefore, as the evidence does not support a relationship between sleep apnea and service, the nexus element is not met. In sum, the Board concludes that the preponderance of the evidence of record is against the Veteran’s claim for service connection for sleep apnea. The benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine enunciated in 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) is not applicable, as there is no approximate balance of evidence. 2. Entitlement to service connection for an eye disability, to include subfoveal choroidal neovascularization OS, nonexudative age-related macular degeneration OD, and pseudophakia At the September 2017 DRO hearing, the Veteran testified that he was exposed to tear gas during service, which resulted in his eye disability. The Veteran contended that although his service records note that the Veteran was suffering from poison ivy exposure, the record was incorrect, and the related notation is in reference to the Veteran’s tear gas exposure. At the January 2020 Board hearing, the Veteran stated that his eye disability was due to chemical exposures during service. The Veteran also stated that there was an incident during service, where the Veteran was playing war games at Indiantown Gap, and was exposed to a type of training grenade that resulted in him seeing white for five minutes. The Veteran believed that his eyes were also exposed to debris from this incident. The Veteran also recounted an incident while he was stationed at Fort Drum in New York in which he felt his eyes were damaged after an explosion of C-4. The Veteran stated that a private medical facility in 1998 told him that his macular degeneration was due to these in-service events. The Veteran stated that his macular degeneration is only in the left eye. At the January 2020 Board hearing, the Veteran stated that he would attempt to obtain the relevant records. The Board has carefully reviewed the evidence of record and finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the award of service connection for an eye disability, to include subfoveal choroidal neovascularization OS, nonexudative age-related macular degeneration OD, and pseudophakia on a direct or presumptive basis. The reasons follow. The Veteran has been diagnosed with an eye disability, to include subfoveal choroidal neovascularization OS, nonexudative age-related macular degeneration OD, and pseudophakia, and thus there is evidence of a current disability, and the Veteran meets first element of a service-connection claim. The Board notes that the Veteran has been diagnosed with refractive errors. However, defects of form or structure of the eye that are of congenital or developmental origin may not be considered as disabilities or service connected on the basis of incurrence or aggravation beyond natural progress during service. Refractive errors are due to anomalies in the shape and conformation of the eye structures and generally of congenital or developmental origin for example - astigmatism, myopia, hyperopia, and presbyopia. Therefore, the effect of uncomplicated refractive errors must be excluded in considering impairment of vision from the standpoint of service connection and evaluation. Thus, to the extent that the Veteran has been diagnosed with a refractive error, service connection for this disability cannot be granted. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303(c), 4.9. Accordingly, the Veteran’s diagnosis of refractive error does not relate to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156. As to an in-service disease or injury, the evidence does not support a finding of a disease or injury in service. The STRs do not document complaints, symptoms, diagnosis, or treatment for an eye disability. The STRs show that the Veteran was found to have clinically normal evaluations of his eyes in a Report of Medical Examination from December 1967. The same record shows that the Veteran had a PULHES evaluation which showed a rating of 1 for “E.” The “E” in PULHES concerns the individual’s vision to a certain standard and able to ascertain color differences as well as diseases and defects of the eye. An individual having a numerical designation of “1” under any factor is considered to possess a high level of medical fitness for that category. In a Report of Medical History from December 1967 at separation, the Veteran denied a history of eye trouble, which tends to show that he was not experiencing an eye disease or injury in service. Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence is against a finding of complaints or symptoms related to an eye disability during service, and the in-service disease or injury element is not met. Having concluded that the preponderance of the evidence is against an in-service disease or injury to the eye, the Board notes that the Veteran’s representative had alleged, at the September 2017 DRO hearing, that a rash documented in the service treatment records was when he was exposed to tear gas and had a reaction to the exposure. There is an August 1966 service treatment record that shows the Veteran was seen with a rash over the entirety of his body with a sudden onset that afternoon. It was diagnosed as probable poison ivy. The Veteran had testified that he had poison ivy as a child and it did not look like the rash he had in service. Regardless, whatever the Veteran was exposed to at that time during service did not impact his eyes because it was not documented in that August 1966 record, and the Veteran denied a history of eye trouble at service discharge. Thus, this does not change the finding that the preponderance of the evidence is against an in-service disease or injury to the eye. Additionally, the preponderance of the evidence is also against a nexus between the current disability and service. For example, the Veteran was first diagnosed with an eye disability in 2010, according to a July 2013 private treatment record, which is approximately 42 years following service discharge, and tends to establish that an eye disability did not have its onset in service. At the present time, there is no competent evidence of a nexus between the current eye disability and service. With regard to the Veteran’s contentions that he incurred injuries to his eyes during service, and that these injuries resulted in his eye disability, the record does not support the Veteran’s contentions. The Board finds that if the Veteran had incurred such severe injuries to his eyes, that resulted in allergic reactions in the Veteran’s eye, or that resulted in impacting his vision, or involved the Veteran’s eyes being exposed to multiple explosives during service, the Veteran would have mentioned a history of eye trouble at separation, as he documented an injury to his left testicle from his childhood. In other words, the Board finds it likely that the Veteran would have documented a more recent injury if it had impacted his eyes. However, the Veteran had a normal clinical evaluation of his eyes at separation and specifically denied a history of eye trouble at separation, which tends to show that he did not experience an eye disability in service; otherwise, he would have documented it like he documented the injury to his left testicle. The Board assigns more probative value to what is documented in the Veteran’s service treatment records than the later allegation of multiple eye injuries in service, as the service treatment records were created contemporaneously with service, which records tend to be highly reliable, and the Board has no reason to doubt their accuracy. Although the Veteran claims that an eye disability is related to service, the Veteran is not medically trained, and is therefore not qualified to competently opine about medical etiology. In certain instances, lay testimony may be competent to establish medical etiology or nexus. However, the diagnosis of an eye disability requires specialized training for determinations as to diagnosis and causation, and is therefore, not susceptible to lay opinions on etiology. The origin or cause of the Veteran’s an eye disability is not a simple question that can be determined based on mere personal observation by a lay person, the Veteran’s lay assertion is not competent to establish a nexus. At the present time, there is no competent evidence of a nexus between the current eye disability and service. Therefore, as the evidence does not support a relationship between an eye disability and service, the nexus element is not met. In sum, the Board concludes that the preponderance of the evidence of record is against the Veteran’s claim for service connection for an eye disability. The benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine enunciated in 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) is not applicable, as there is no approximate balance of evidence. 3. Entitlement to service connection for a lumbar spine disability At the September 2017 DRO hearing, the Veteran testified that he injured his back in two different falls during service, however these incidents were not recorded in the Veteran’s service records. The Veteran stated that he sought treatment for his back from a chiropractor in 1969 but could not recall the identity of his treatment provider. At the January 2020 Board hearing, the Veteran testified that he incurred an injury to his back during an incident in service, where the Veteran was injured after he was forced out of a bed while sleeping and fell on the floor. He stated that he immediately felt back pain when the fall occurred. The Veteran explained that he did not want to seek medical attention for the injury at the time because he wanted to see if he could recover without treatment, and because of embarrassment in front of his fellow service members for seeking treatment. He also testified that heavy backpacks he was required to wear during service exacerbated his back injury. The Veteran stated that he additionally injured his back during service, during war games in England, when he slipped on a hill. The Veteran testified he required the assistance of a medic immediately after this incident. The Veteran stated he had continuous back problems since service, and a coworker could corroborate his symptoms in the 1970s after service. The Veteran stated that he received private chiropractic treatment for his lumbar spine disability as early as 1998. The Veteran stated that he submitted the available records from his private treatment providers, but that some records could not be obtained. The Board has carefully reviewed the evidence of record and finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the award of service connection for a lumbar spine disability on a direct or presumptive basis. The reasons follow. The Veteran has been diagnosed with a lumbar spine disability, and thus there is evidence of a current disability, and the Veteran meets first element of a service-connection claim. As to an in-service disease or injury, the evidence does not support a finding of a disease or injury in service. The STRs do not document complaints, symptoms, diagnosis, or treatment for a lumbar spine disability. The STRs show that the Veteran was found to have a clinically normal evaluations of his spine in a Report of Medical Examination from December 1967. The same record shows that the Veteran had a PULHES evaluation which showed a rating of 1 for “P” and “L.” The “P” stands for “physical capacity or stamina” and the “L” stands for “lower extremities.” The “L” factor concerns the feet, legs, pelvic girdle, lower back musculature and lower spine (lower lumbar and sacral) in regard to strength, range of motion, and general efficiency. An individual having a numerical designation of “1” under any factor is considered to possess a high level of medical fitness for that category. Additionally, in the Report of Medical History from December 1967, the Veteran specifically denied history of recurrent back pain, which tends to show that he was not experiencing a lumbar spine disability in service. He also denied having an illness or injury other than whose already noted. As stated above, the Veteran had the wherewithal to report an injury to his left testicle in his childhood. The Board finds it reasonable to conclude that had the Veteran sustained an injury to his back that caused him to seek treatment and continued to cause him pain, he would have documented that fact in the Report of Medical History, when he was asked about recurrent back pain and/or asked about an illness or injury. Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence is against a finding of complaints or symptoms related to a lumbar spine disease or injury during service, and the in-service disease or injury element is not met. The preponderance of the evidence is also against nexus between the current disability and service. For example, the Veteran was first diagnosed with a lumbar spine disability in an August 2012 private treatment record, which is approximately 44 years following service discharge, and tends to establish that a lumbar spine disability did not have its onset in service. In a January 2014 private treatment record, it shows the Veteran stated his lumbar spine disability symptoms “just came about insidiously,” and he told the chiropractor that he had not seen another qualified health professional in connection with these symptoms and that that he did not otherwise have a history of back pain. These records weigh against a finding that the Veteran’s lumbar spine disability had been longstanding since service. In a letter received in February 2020, Mr. [REDACTED] stated he was aware that the Veteran had experienced extreme discomfort associated with his back while they worked together in the early 1970s. Although Mr. [REDACTED] is competent to note that the Veteran may have complained of back problems in the early 1970s, this does not establish an onset of a lumbar spine disability in service from 1966 to 1968. The Veteran generally contends that this evidence supports the early onset of his lumbar spine disability, and that it was incurred in service. The Veteran also contends his memories of early chiropractic treatment support that his lumbar spine disability was incurred during service. With regard to the Veteran’s contentions that he incurred injuries to his back during service, and that these injuries resulted in his lumbar spine disability, the record does not support the Veteran’s contentions. The Board finds that if the Veteran had incurred such injuries to his back, as he has described, that were also exacerbated in service and required the assistance of a medic, the Veteran would have documented a history of recurrent back pain at separation or would have documented an illness or injury that had occurred but was not documented elsewhere, as he had the thought process to document an injury that occurred from his childhood. It would seem likely that he would have remembered a more recent injury that had caused him to seek treatment from a medic and caused him a lot of pain. However, the Veteran had a normal clinical evaluation of his spine at separation, specifically denied a history of recurrent back pain at separation, while recounting a medical history of an injury to his left testicle, and denied an illness or injury that was not otherwise documented in the Report of Medical History, which tends to show the Veteran was not experiencing lumbar spine symptoms during service; otherwise he would have documented it. The Board assigns more probative value to what is documented in the service treatment records than the later allegation of several in-service low back injuries in service, as the service treatment records were created contemporaneously with service, which records tend to be highly reliable, and the Board has no reason to doubt their accuracy. At the September 2017 DRO hearing, the Veteran testified that he visited a chiropractor in 1969, and then visited other chiropractors between 2010 and 2015. At the January 2020 Board hearing, the Veteran stated that he visited a chiropractor as early as 1998. Within the January 2014 private medical record from the chiropractor, he wrote that the Veteran had otherwise denied a history of low back pain. It is clear that the Veteran sought treatment in 2012 for low back pain, but prior to that, there is no documentation of treatment, and the Veteran’s denial of a history of low back pain when seen in January 2014 for low back pain would not lend to a finding of a history of decades of low back pain since 1968. Although the Veteran claims that a lumbar spine disability is related to service, the Veteran is not medically trained, and is therefore not qualified to competently opine about medical etiology. In certain instances, lay testimony may be competent to establish medical etiology or nexus. However, the diagnosis of a lumbar spine disability requires specialized training for determinations as to diagnosis and causation, and is therefore, not susceptible to lay opinions on etiology. The origin or cause of the Veteran’s lumbar spine disability is not a simple question that can be determined based on mere personal observation by a lay person, the Veteran’s lay assertion is not competent to establish a nexus. At the present time, there is no competent evidence of a nexus between the current lumbar spine disability and service. Therefore, as the evidence does not support a relationship between a lumbar spine disability and service, the nexus element is not met. As to presumptive service connection for a chronic disease, the Board finds that the Veteran did not incur an event, injury, or disease related to his current a lumbar spine disability in service and that his lumbar spine disability did not manifest during service or within one year of separation from service. Furthermore, the evidence of record does not demonstrate that the Veteran’s symptoms have been continuous since separation from service in January 1968. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303(b), 3.307, 3.309(a). There were no complaints, diagnosis, or treatment for this disorder for approximately 44 years following service discharge until the Veteran was diagnosed with a lumbar spine disability. The absence of post-service complaints, findings, diagnosis, or treatment for approximately 44 years after service is one factor that tends to weigh against a finding of continuous symptoms since separation from service. The Board may weigh the absence of contemporaneous medical evidence as one factor in determining credibility of lay evidence. A prolonged period without medical complaint can be considered, along with other factors, as evidence of whether an injury or a disease was incurred in service which resulted in any chronic or persistent disability. In sum, the Board concludes that the preponderance of the evidence of record is against the Veteran’s claim for service connection for a lumbar spine disability. The benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine enunciated in 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) is not applicable, as there is no approximate balance of evidence. 4. Entitlement to service connection for a cervical spine disability At the January 2020 Board hearing, the Veteran testified that the injuries he incurred to his back in service also resulted in injuries to his neck. The Veteran stated that the original incident where he fell out of his bed resulted in somewhat mild injuries to his neck, but that his symptoms became worse over time. The Veteran generally contended that these neck injuries resulted in his cervical spine disability. The Board has carefully reviewed the evidence of record and finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the award of service connection for a cervical spine disability on a direct or presumptive basis. The reasons follow. The Veteran has been diagnosed with a cervical spine disability, and thus there is evidence of a current disability, and the Veteran meets first element of a service-connection claim. As to an in-service disease or injury, the evidence does not support a finding of a disease or injury in service. The STRs do not document complaints, symptoms, diagnosis, or treatment for a cervical spine disability. The STRs show that the Veteran was found to have a clinically normal evaluations of his neck and spine in a Report of Medical Examination from December 1967. The same record shows that the Veteran had a PULHES evaluation which showed a rating of 1 for “U.” The “U” stands for “Upper Extremities.” This factor concerns the hands, arms, shoulder girdle, and upper spine (cervical, thoracic, and upper lumbar) in regard to strength, range of motion, and general efficiency. An individual having a numerical designation of “1” under any factor is considered to possess a high level of medical fitness for that category. In a Report of Medical History from December 1967, the Veteran did not document neck problems, and he denied an illness or injury not otherwise reported, which tends to show that he was not experiencing a cervical spine disease or injury in service. Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence is against a finding of complaints or symptoms related to a cervical spine disability during service, and the in-service disease or injury element is not met. The preponderance of the evidence is also against a nexus between the current disability and service. For example, the Veteran was first diagnosed with a cervical spine disability in an August 2012 private treatment record, which is approximately 44 years following service discharge, and tends to establish that a cervical spine disability did not have its onset in service. In a January 2014 private treatment record, it shows the Veteran stated his cervical spine disability symptoms “just came about insidiously,” and he told the chiropractor that he had not seen another qualified health professional in connection with these symptoms and that that he did not otherwise have a history of neck pain. These records weigh against a finding that the Veteran’s cervical spine disability had been longstanding since service. In a letter received in February 2020, Mr. [REDACTED] stated he was aware that the Veteran had experienced extreme discomfort associated with his neck while they worked together in the early 1970s. Although Mr. [REDACTED] is competent to note that the Veteran may have complained of neck problems in the early 1970s, this does not establish an onset of a cervical spine disability in service from 1966 to 1968. The Veteran generally contends that this evidence supports the early onset of his cervical spine disability, and that it was incurred in service. The Veteran also contends his memories of early chiropractic treatment support that his cervical spine disability was incurred during service. With regard to the Veteran’s contentions that he incurred injuries to his neck during service, and that these injuries resulted in his current cervical spine disability, the record does not support the Veteran’s contentions. The Board finds that if the Veteran had incurred such injuries to his neck during service, that were also exacerbated in service, the Veteran would have mentioned a history of neck problems at separation. However, the Veteran had a normal clinical evaluation of his neck and spine at separation and recounted a medical history of an injury to his left testicle as a child but not a more recent injury to his neck, which tends to show the Veteran was not experiencing a cervical spine disability during service. The Board assigns more probative value to what is documented in the service treatment records than the later allegation of more than one neck injury in service, as the service treatment records were created contemporaneously with service, which records tend to be highly reliable, and the Board has no reason to doubt their accuracy. Although the Veteran claims that a cervical spine disability is related to service, the Veteran is not medically trained, and is therefore not qualified to competently opine about medical etiology. In certain instances, lay testimony may be competent to establish medical etiology or nexus. However, the diagnosis of a cervical spine disability requires specialized training for determinations as to diagnosis and causation, and is therefore, not susceptible to lay opinions on etiology. The origin or cause of the Veteran’s cervical spine disability is not a simple question that can be determined based on mere personal observation by a lay person, the Veteran’s lay assertion is not competent to establish a nexus. At the present time, there is no competent evidence of a nexus between the current cervical spine disability and service. Therefore, as the evidence does not support a relationship between a cervical spine disability and service, the nexus element is not met. As to presumptive service connection for a chronic disease, the Board finds that the Veteran did not incur an event, injury, or disease related to his current a cervical spine disability in service and that his cervical spine disability did not manifest during service or within one year of separation from service. Furthermore, the evidence of record does not demonstrate that the Veteran’s symptoms have been continuous since separation from service in January 1968. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303(b), 3.307, 3.309(a). There were no complaints, diagnosis, or treatment for this disorder for approximately 44 years following service discharge until the Veteran was diagnosed with a cervical spine disability. The absence of post-service complaints, findings, diagnosis, or treatment for approximately 44 years after service is one factor that tends to weigh against a finding of continuous symptoms since separation from service. The Board may weigh the absence of contemporaneous medical evidence as one factor in determining credibility of lay evidence. A prolonged period without medical complaint can be considered, along with other factors, as evidence of whether an injury or a disease was incurred in service which resulted in any chronic or persistent disability. In sum, the Board concludes that the preponderance of the evidence of record is against the Veteran’s claim for service connection for a cervical spine disability. The benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine enunciated in 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) is not applicable, as there is no approximate balance of evidence. 5. Entitlement to service connection for a left shoulder disability At the January 2020 Board hearing, the Veteran stated that his left shoulder disability is secondary to his lumbar spine disability. The Veteran stated that his left shoulder disability began after cutting his lawn at home, where a pinched nerve in his back resulted in the Veteran collapsing. The Veteran stated that immediately after the collapse, he could not move his arm all the way up to his shoulder and was diagnosed with a rotator cuff injury at a VA treatment center. The Board has carefully reviewed the evidence of record and finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the award of service connection for a left shoulder disability. The reasons follow. The Veteran has been clinically evaluated for pain in his left shoulder, and thus there is evidence of a current disability for VA purposes, and the Veteran meets first element of a service-connection claim. Although the Veteran contends that he has been diagnosed with a rotator cuff injury, the record does not support such a diagnosis. As to an in-service disease or injury, the evidence does not support a finding of a disease or injury in service. The STRs do not document complaints, symptoms, diagnosis, or treatment for a left shoulder disability. The STRs show that the Veteran was found to have a clinically normal evaluation of his upper extremities in Reports of Medical Examination from December 1967 at separation. The same record shows that the Veteran had a PULHES evaluation which showed a rating of 1 for “U.” The “U” stands for “Upper Extremities.” This factor concerns the hands, arms, shoulder girdle, and upper spine (cervical, thoracic, and upper lumbar) in regard to strength, range of motion, and general efficiency. An individual having a numerical designation of “1” under any factor is considered to possess a high level of medical fitness for that category. In a Report of Medical History from December 1967, the Veteran denied history of painful or trick shoulder, which tends to show that he was not experiencing a left shoulder disability in service. Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence is against a finding of complaints or symptoms related to a left shoulder disability during service, and the in-service disease or injury element is not met. The preponderance of the evidence is also against a nexus between the current disability and service. For example, when the Veteran went to see a chiropractor in January 2014, he specifically denied “both having a history of and currently having … shoulder pain.” Thus, 46 years after service, the Veteran was denying a history of shoulder pain. The Veteran was first complained of left shoulder pain in a July 2016 VA treatment record, which is approximately 48 years following service discharge. These facts tend to establish that a left shoulder disability did not have its onset in service and is not otherwise related to service. At the January 2020 Board hearing, the Veteran stated that his left shoulder disability is proximately due to his lumbar spine disability. The Veteran stated that he injured himself while mowing his lawn, and a pinched nerve in his back resulted in his left shoulder disability. This evidence weighs against a finding that the Veteran’s left shoulder disability was incurred during service. Despite the fact that the Veteran contends that his left shoulder disability is proximately due to his lumbar spine disability, the Veteran is not service-connected for a lumbar spine disability. Accordingly, the Veteran may not receive service connection based upon this theory of entitlement. Although the Veteran claims that a left shoulder disability is related to service, the Veteran is not medically trained, and is therefore not qualified to competently opine about medical etiology. In certain instances, lay testimony may be competent to establish medical etiology or nexus. However, the diagnosis of a left shoulder disability requires specialized training for determinations as to diagnosis and causation, and is therefore, not susceptible to lay opinions on etiology. The origin or cause of the Veteran’s left shoulder disability is not a simple question that can be determined based on mere personal observation by a lay person, the Veteran’s lay assertion is not competent to establish a nexus. At the present time, there is no competent evidence of a nexus between the current left shoulder disability and service. Therefore, as the evidence does not support a relationship between a left shoulder disability and service, the nexus element is not met. In sum, the Board concludes that the preponderance of the evidence of record is against the Veteran’s claim for service connection for a left shoulder disability. The benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine enunciated in 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) is not applicable, as there is no approximate balance of evidence. Withdrawal The Board has jurisdiction where there is a question of law or fact on appeal to the Secretary. 38 U.S.C. § 7104; 38 C.F.R. § 20.101. Under 38 U.S.C. § 7105, the Board may dismiss any appeal which fails to allege a specific error of fact or law in the determination being appealed. An appeal may be withdrawn as to any or all issues involved in the appeal at any time before the Board promulgates a decision. 38 C.F.R. § 20.204(a). Unless an appeal is withdrawn on the record at a hearing, appeal withdrawals must be in writing and must include the name of the veteran, the name of the claimant or appellant if other than the veteran, the applicable VA file number, and a statement that the appeal is withdrawn. If the appeal involves multiple issues, the withdrawal must specify that the appeal is withdrawn in its entirety, or list the issue(s) withdrawn from the appeal. 38 C.F.R. § 20.204(b)(1). Until the appeal is transferred to the Board, an appeal withdrawal is effective when received by the agency of original jurisdiction. 38 C.F.R. § 20.204(b)(3). 6. Entitlement to service connection for chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder At the January 2020 Board hearing, the Veteran and his representative requested that the claim for entitlement to service connection for chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder be withdrawn from the appeal. The undersigned confirmed with the Veteran and his representative both prior to going on the record and on the record that the Veteran was withdrawing this issue (1) explicitly, (2) unambiguously, and (3) with a full understanding of the consequences of such action. The Veteran confirmed that his withdrawal of the issue was explicit, unambiguous, and done with a full understanding of the consequences of such action. The undersigned also let the Veteran know that she would not be issuing a decision as to this claim in the sense of a positive or a negative decision and would be dismissing the issue on appeal. She further told the Veteran that if he wanted to seek service connection for that benefit, then he would submit a claim for new and relevant evidence and that if the claim was granted, it would be granted as of the date of the new claim and not the current claim (pending at the time of the January 2020 hearing). See Transcript on pages 2-3. The Board finds that the Veteran effectively withdrew this issue from the appeal. The statement that the Veteran wishes to withdraw this issue is included within the hearing transcript. Accordingly, the Veteran’s withdrawal is in compliance with 38 C.F.R. § 20.204(b)(1). When pending appeals are withdrawn, there is no longer an allegation of error of fact or law with respect to the decision below. In such circumstances, dismissal of the appeal is appropriate. 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(5). The Board finds that the Veteran’s appeal has been withdrawn. The Board does not have jurisdiction over the issue; therefore, the Veteran’s appeal is dismissed. A. P. SIMPSON Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals Attorney for the Board R. Husain, Associate Counsel The Board’s decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.