Citation Nr: 20031177 Decision Date: 05/04/20 Archive Date: 05/04/20 DOCKET NO. 17-54 992 DATE: May 4, 2020 ORDER A resumption of VA disability compensation benefits for service-connected schizophrenia prior to February 1, 2013 is denied. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. In October 1983, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) discontinued the Veteran’s disability compensation benefits after he failed to report to a VA examination in September 1983. 2. After providing an adequate reason for failing to report to the examination, the Veteran requested reconsideration of the October 1983 decision to discontinue his disability compensation benefits. 3. In a July 1985 rating decision, the RO confirmed its prior decision to discontinue the Veteran’s disability compensation benefits after he failed to report to a VA examination in June 1985. 4. The Veteran is presumed to have received appropriate notice of the June 1985 examination, and he has not provided an adequate reason for failing to report to the examination. 5. The Veteran was not sent proper notice of the July 1985 rating decision to discontinue his disability compensation benefits, and the issue of the propriety of the discontinuation of his benefits has remained pending ever since. 6. The Veteran filed a claim for an increased rating for schizophrenia in January 2013 and his disability compensation benefits were resumed effective February 1, 2013. 7. The competent and credible evidence does not clearly establish that the Veteran’s service-connected schizophrenia existed in the former compensable degree at any time between October 1983 and February 2013. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for entitlement to a resumption of VA disability compensation benefits for service-connected schizophrenia prior to February 1, 2013 have not been met. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.103, 3.158, 3.329, 3.655, 4.132, Diagnostic Code 9203 (1983). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty in the United States Air Force from December 1971 to July 1975. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) on appeal from a February 2014 rating decision The Board recognizes that the Veteran has not appointed a representative and is proceeding pro se in this appeal. The Board remanded this case in April 2019 to schedule the Veteran for a personal hearing before a Decision Review Officer (DRO). The DRO hearing was held in July 2019. As the actions specified in the remand have been substantially completed, the matter has been properly returned to the Board for appellate consideration. See Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268 (1998); D’Aries v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 97, 105 (2008). Duties to Notify and Assist With respect to the Veteran’s claim herein, VA has met all statutory and regulatory notice and duty to assist provisions. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159. The Veteran has not advanced any procedural arguments in relation to VA’s duties to notify and assist; therefore, the Board will proceed with appellate review. See Scott v. McDonald, 789 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Entitlement to a resumption of VA disability compensation benefits for service-connected schizophrenia prior to February 1, 2013 The Veteran contends that his service-connected disability compensation benefits should be resumed prior to February 1, 2013. He specifically asserts that he should be granted retroactive benefits back to October 2, 1983, the day after his benefits were discontinued. I. Factual Background By way of background, in June 1976, the Veteran was granted service connection for schizophrenia, paranoid type, and assigned a 30 percent rating effective July 2, 1975. In August 1981, the RO reduced the Veteran’s disability rating for schizophrenia to 10 percent after a medical examination found the disability to be “fair, [in] remission.” In June 1983, the Veteran was scheduled for a routine examination to evaluate his psychiatric disorder. The Veteran notified VA that he was unable to attend the examination as he would be out of the state until mid-August. VA rescheduled the examination for September 1983; however, the Veteran did not report for the examination. Thereafter, in an October 1983 rating decision, the RO suspended the Veteran’s disability benefits for service-connected schizophrenia due to his failure to report for a routine examination. The discontinuation of benefits was effective October 1, 1983. However, the Board notes that the notice letter was sent to the Veteran’s old address (he had notified VA of a change of address in August 1983). In a January 1984 telephone call, the Veteran reported to the RO that he had been out of the country when the original VA examination was scheduled. He stated that when he returned home, he immediately called his local VA Medical Center (VAMC) and was told that the examination would be rescheduled. In the report of contact, the VA employee who spoke to the Veteran noted that the VAMC had returned the examination request to the RO instead, implying that the September 1983 examination had not actually been rescheduled. The VA employee then requested the RO to reschedule the examination and reinstate the Veteran’s compensation (which it did not do). Thereafter, the RO initiated an examination request for the Veteran. Review of the record indicates that the request remained pending until May 1985, when the Veteran was notified at his address of record that an examination had been scheduled to take place in June 1985. In July 1985, the RO was notified that the Veteran did not report for the examination; the request for physical examination form was marked with the comment “failed to cooperate.” In a July 1985 rating decision, the RO confirmed its prior decision to suspend the Veteran’s disability benefits for schizophrenia due to his failure to report for the rescheduled examination. The record does not contain any further communication from the Veteran until January 2013, when he filed a claim for an increased rating for schizophrenia. The Veteran underwent a VA examination in February 2014. The VA examiner changed the Veteran’s diagnosis to depressive disorder and found that there is no evidence of a current diagnosis of schizophrenia. Nonetheless, in a February 2014 rating decision, the Veteran’s compensation benefits for schizophrenia, rated 10 percent disabling, were resumed effective February 1, 2013. The Veteran appealed this rating action. In light of this background, the central issue now before the Board is whether the Veteran is entitled to a resumption of his service-connected disability compensation benefits before February 1, 2013. The Board notes that, despite being adjudicated as an earlier effective date claim by the RO, the appeal does not involve a question of assigning a proper effective date, as the Veteran was neither granted service connection nor an increased rating in this case. To the contrary, service connection for schizophrenia has remained continuously in effect since July 2, 1975. Likewise, the Veteran’s 10 percent rating for his disability has been in effect since November 1, 1981. Therefore, the only question before the Board is whether the Veteran’s compensation benefits, which were previously suspended, for service-connected schizophrenia should be resumed prior to February 1, 2013. On this question, the Veteran contends that he should be granted retroactive compensation back to October 2, 1983, which is the day following the date that his benefits for service-connected schizophrenia were discontinued. Essentially, the Veteran has put forth an argument based on 38 C.F.R. § 3.158(c) pertaining to abandoned claims and the disappearance of a veteran. The Veteran asserts that his benefits were discontinued because his whereabouts were unknown to VA, but that once VA became aware of his whereabouts, he was entitled to have his payments resumed effective the day following the date of last payment, which is October 2, 1983. Moreover, at his July 2019 DRO hearing, the Veteran indicated that he may have stopped receiving his VA disability check because VA did not have his correct address at time. Likewise, he also implied that VA may have sent his examination notices to the wrong address as he “was moving around a lot” during that time. The Board will thoroughly address all of the Veteran’s contentions in its discussion below. Finally, the Board notes that the Veteran has also argued that the decisionmaker committed clear and unmistakable error (CUE) in the February 2014 rating decision. The Board notes that a claim of CUE constitutes a collateral attack on a final RO decision. Smith v. Brown, 35 F.3d 1516, 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In this case, the February 2014 rating decision – the rating decision currently on appeal – has not become final. See 38 U.S.C. § 7105(b), (c); 38 C.F.R. § 3.160(d). A CUE motion is not valid in the absence of a final decision; therefore, the Board finds the Veteran’s allegation of CUE in the February 2014 rating decision to be moot and there is no error of fact or law for the Board to consider in this regard. II. Pertinent Law The Veteran’s contentions require careful consideration of the laws and regulations that were in effect as of 1983 when the Veteran’s benefits were discontinued. A claimant will be notified of any decision affecting the payment of benefits or granting relief. Notice will include the reason for the decision and the date it will be effectuated as well as the right to a hearing subject to [§ 3.103(c)]. The notification will also advise the claimant of his right to initiate an appeal by filing a Notice of Disagreement which will entitle him to a Statement of the Case for his assistance in perfecting an appeal. Further, the notice will advise him of the periods in which an appeal must be initiated and perfected. 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(e) (1983). Every person applying for or in receipt of compensation or pension shall submit to examinations, including periods of hospital observation, when required by VA under VA regulations or other proper authority. 38 C.F.R. § 3.329 (1983). When a veteran without adequate reason fails to report for a VA examination, including periods of hospital observation requested for pension or compensation purposes, the awards to the veteran and any dependents will be discontinued, except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, effective date of last payment. 38 C.F.R. § 3.655(a) (1983). If the veteran has one or more compensable static disabilities verified by a VA examination and without adequate reason fails to report for examination, including periods of hospital observation, the awards to the veteran and to any dependents will be amended to pay an amount based solely on the degree of disability of such static disabilities effective the day following the date of last payment. If the veteran has a disability or disabilities for which a prestabilization rating has been assigned, the minimum evaluation provided by the Schedule for Rating Disabilities will be assigned for each disability clearly established by the evidence of record and such disabilities will be considered static for the purpose of the award procedures of the foregoing sentence. 38 C.F.R. § 3.655(b) (1983). When payments have been discontinued because of failure to report for examination, payments will be resumed effective the day following the date of last payment if the evidence clearly establishes that during the period of his failure to report the disability existed in the former compensable degree and the claim was not abandoned and the rating agency confirms and continues the prior evaluation. 38 C.F.R. § 3.655(c) (1983). If the claim was abandoned, and the veteran subsequently states that he is willing to report for an examination, benefits may be paid from the date of receipt of the new claim if he reports for such examination within one year from date of notice to report. 38 C.F.R. § 3.655(f) (1983). Where evidence requested in connection with an original claim, a claim for increase or to reopen or for the purpose of determining continued entitlement is not furnished within one year after the date of request, the claim will be considered abandoned. After the expiration of one year, further action will not be taken unless a new claim is received. Should the right to benefits be finally established, pension, compensation, or dependency and indemnity compensation based on such evidence shall commence not earlier than the date of filing the new claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.158(a) (1983). Where the veteran fails without adequate reason to respond to an order to report for Veterans Administration examination within one year from the date of request and payments have been discontinued, the claim for such benefits will be considered abandoned. 38 C.F.R. § 3.158(b) (1983). Where payments of pension, compensation, or dependency and indemnity compensation have not been made or have been discontinued because a payee’s present whereabouts is unknown, payments will be resumed effective the day following the date of last payment if entitlement is otherwise established, upon receipt of a valid current address. 38 C.F.R. § 3.158(c). The Board notes, for sake of clarity, that the difference between “discontinuing” and “suspending” compensation benefits is immaterial in this appeal. Under the laws in effect in 1983, the correct term was “discontinue.” See, e.g., 38 C.F.R. § 3.655 (1983). However, the term “suspend” has been used interchangeably without legal consequence. III. Legal Analysis The initial issue before the Board concerns the question of whether the Veteran received proper notice of the RO’s July 1985 rating decision to discontinue his disability compensation benefits. This question concerns the finality of that July 1985 decision, which is preliminary to the question of whether the benefits should be resumed. If the RO’s July 1985 decision did not become final, the instant issue becomes whether the decision to discontinue benefits was proper, which, if so, is followed by the question of whether benefits should be resumed retroactively. See Ingram v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 232, 241 (2007) (a VA decision does not become final if a veteran is not notified of the decision and his appellate rights.). The Board will proceed accordingly. A. Due Process Notice As noted above, an October 1983 rating decision discontinued the Veteran’s disability benefits for service-connected schizophrenia due to his failure to report for a routine VA examination in September 1983. Although it appears from the record that the letter notifying the Veteran of the RO’s decision was sent to an incorrect mailing address, the Veteran is presumed to have received it because he contacted VA shortly thereafter, in January 1984, to request reconsideration of the decision to discontinue his benefits. At the time, he stated that he did not receive notice of the rescheduled examination for September 1983. Correspondingly, the VA employee who spoke to the Veteran indicated in the record of the conversation that it appeared that the examination had never actually been rescheduled. Because the Veteran showed good cause for his failure to report for a VA examination, he was scheduled for another examination in June 1985 in order for the RO to reconsider its decision. However, the Veteran failed to report for the examination. In a subsequent July 1985 rating decision, the RO confirmed its prior suspension of the Veteran’s disability benefits for schizophrenia. However, the Board notes that review of the record does not show that the Veteran was notified on this decision pursuant to the notice requirements that were in effect at the time, to include advising the Veteran of his right to initiate an appeal of the decision. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(e) (1983). The Board notes that in Lamb v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 227, 230 (2008), the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (the Court), explained that “if a claimant is not properly notified of an RO decision and how it may be appealed, then the time to appeal that decision is tolled” (citing Ingram, 21 Vet. App. at 232). Thus, the Court went on, “the next time the RO adjudicates entitlement to the same benefit, it is merely continuing the still-pending claim and, therefore, a Notice of Disagreement filed after proper notice of the next RO decision puts the matter into appellate status.” 22 Vet. App. at 230. In the present case, under 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(e) (1983), the Board notes that the Veteran was certainly entitled to notice of the RO’s July 1985 decision to discontinue his disability compensation benefits. However, as noted above, it does not appear likely that VA notified the Veteran of the decision to continue the suspension of his compensation benefits or of his right to initiate an appeal of that issue. Because the Veteran did not receive proper notice of the RO’s July 1985 decision to discontinue benefits, the result is that that decision did not become final. As such, it remained pending until addressed by the RO in February 2014. Because the July 1985 rating decision did not become final and the time to appeal the decision was tolled, the claim may not be properly considered abandoned under 38 C.F.R. § 3.158. As such, the Veteran’s contention that he is entitled to a resumption of benefits effective the day following the date of last payment, based on his “disappearance” pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 3.158(c), is without merit. In any event, the Board notes that the evidence does not support a finding that the Veteran’s whereabouts were unknown during the relevant period. The claims file shows that the Veteran provided VA with a change of address form in August 1983. It is the same address the Veteran used when he filed his claim for an increased rating in January 2013, thirty years later. Moreover, the Board notes that the Veteran continued to meet regularly with a VA vocational rehabilitation counselor, as well as received payment for an educational subsistence allowance at this address of record, during the relevant time period. As such, there is no indication that the Veteran’s whereabouts were unknown to VA at any time, and the Veteran has no entitlement to a resumption of benefits from October 1983 under 38 C.F.R. § 3.158. In light of the Board’s determination that the July 1985 decision is not final, the next question for consideration is whether the RO’s decision to discontinue the Veteran’s disability compensation benefits was proper. Because the RO discontinued his benefits due to a failure to report to a June 1985 VA examination, this question requires careful consideration of the Veteran’s contention that he never received notice of the VA examination. B. Notice & the Presumption of Regularity The Veteran has indicated that he did not receive the notice to report for a VA examination in June 1985. He has suggested that VA may have sent the notice to the wrong address as he “was moving around a lot” during that time. For the following reasons, the Board finds that the RO provided the Veteran with proper notice of the examination. First, the claims file shows that the Veteran’s last known mailing address is a P.O. Box in Atlanta, Georgia. He submitted a change of address form in August 1983 showing this address. The Veteran told his vocational rehabilitation counselor at the time that he had been evicted from his apartment while out of the country for the summer and that he was temporarily residing with friends. He got the P.O. Box so that he could continue to receive communications and his subsistence allowance from VA. The Board notes that this same P.O. Box address remains the Veteran’s current address on file with VA. Review of the record does not reveal a copy of an actual notice letter informing the Veteran that a VA examination had been scheduled for June 1985. However, because examination notification letters are sent to veterans by the VAMC where the examination is scheduled to take place, it is not standard practice for a copy of the notification letter to be filed in the claims file. Nonetheless, evidence in the claims file raises the inference that the Veteran had been properly notified of his VA examinations during this time. For example, a report of contact dated May 9, 1985 shows that the Veteran contacted the VAMC in Decatur, Georgia and requested that they reschedule his examination because he was “unable to locate [the] exam.” This communication indicates that the Veteran had been scheduled for an earlier examination in May 1985 and, having been properly notified of such examination, informed the VAMC that he was unable to attend. Thereafter, another examination was scheduled. Per a Request for Physical Examination form, the Veteran was notified at his correct address of record on May 23, 1985 that an examination had been scheduled for June 18, 1985. Thereafter, on July 12, 1985, the form was updated to reflect that the Veteran had failed to report for the examination. Even without regard to this evidence, the Court has long held that “[t]here is a presumption of regularity under which it is presumed that government officials properly discharge their official duties in good faith and in accordance with law and governing regulations.” Kyhn v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 228, 232 (2011) (citing Marsh v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 381, 385 (2005); Sthele v. Principi, 19 Vet. App. 11, 17 (2004); Ashley v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 307, 308 (1992). Even though the Court’s case law was not in effect at that time, the Board cites to United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., which was in effect in 1983. See 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926) (holding that courts should “presume that [government agents] have properly discharged their official duties” unless there is “clear evidence to the contrary”). Here, a copy of the actual VA examination notice from the VAMC is not of record. Nonetheless, the presumption of regularity applies as the RO’s May 1985 request for a VA examination indicates that the Veteran was notified of the June 1985 examination at his last known mailing address. Thus, the Board finds that it may be presumed that the Veteran was mailed proper notice of the June 1985 VA examination. Generally, the presumption of regularity may be rebutted “only by the submission of ‘clear evidence to the contrary.’” See Kyhn, 24 Vet App. at 232 (quoting Ashley, 2 Vet. App. at 309). The Court in Kyhn addressed a factual situation substantially similar to that in the instant case and found that, as a matter of law, a veteran’s “assertion of nonreceipt of the [VA examination] notice,” was not sufficient to rebut the presumption of regularity. Id. Here, the evidence of record does not include clear evidence rebutting the presumption of regularity. To the contrary, the Veteran himself stated at the July 2019 DRO hearing that it is possible he did not receive mail from VA during this time period because he was “moving around a lot” at the time and VA may not have had his correct address. As noted above, the record indicates that VA sent all examination notices after August 1983 to the P.O. Box confirmed to be the Veteran’s correct mailing address. Thus, if he did not receive notice of the VA examination, it is due to his own failure to keep VA apprised of his whereabouts. Such evidence does not rebut the presumption of regularity. The Court has since held that VA’s duty to assist is not a one-way street. Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190, 193 (1991). In the normal course of events, it is the burden of a veteran to keep VA apprised of his whereabouts. If he does not do so, there is no burden on the part of VA to turn up heaven and earth to find him. It is only when a file discloses other possible or plausible addresses that an attempt should be made to locate him at the alternate known address, which is not the case here. Hyson v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 262, 264 (1993). In summary, the Board finds that the record does not contain clear evidence rebutting the presumption of regularity under which the Board may presume that the RO appropriately attempted to notify the Veteran of the June 1985 VA examination. Therefore, the Veteran is presumed to have received appropriate notice of the June 1985 examination. C. Adequate Reasons/Good Cause Pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 3.655(a) (1983), a veteran may avoid discontinuance of his VA disability compensation benefits by demonstrating a valid excuse for his failure to appear for a VA examination. Here, however, neither the contemporaneous evidence nor the current evidence of record demonstrates adequate reason for the Veteran’s failure to report to the June 1985 VA examination. As discussed above, whether or not the Veteran actually received notice of the examination, the RO is presumed to have sent him proper notice of the examination. He was required to provide timely notice of his current mailing address (if it had changed) and his failure to do so is not an adequate reason for failing to report to the scheduled examination. See, e.g., Hyson, 5 Vet. App. at 264. Significantly, the Veteran has not put forth any other argument or evidence to demonstrate that he had adequate reason for failing to report to the June 1985 examination. In fact, at the DRO hearing, the Veteran stated that when his disability payments were discontinued, he told his wife: “don’t worry about it, I’m going to take care of it…. And [then] I never took care of it.” Based on this statement, the Veteran clearly knew that it was incumbent upon him to comply with VA requirements, such as attending routine future examinations, to avoid having his benefits suspended. He had already been notified that his benefits were being discontinued due to his failure to attend a VA examination in an October 1983 rating decision, an action that the Veteran requested the RO to reconsider in January 1984. As such, he should have been well-aware of the repercussions of not attending the rescheduled VA examination in June 1985. As such, the Board finds that the Veteran’s failure to comply with VA requirements was a voluntary election on his part and that his failure to appear at the examination was not based on good cause. Because the Veteran is presumed to have received notice of the rescheduled examination, but failed to report to the examination without adequate reason, his disability compensation benefits were confirmed to be discontinued effective from October 1, 1983. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.655(a) (1983). In summary, the record before the Board establishes that the Veteran was not sent proper notice of the RO’s July 1985 decision to discontinue his disability compensation benefits. Accordingly, the issue of the propriety of the discontinuance of his benefits has remained pending and is presently on appeal from that initial determination. However, the RO’s decision to discontinue benefits is found to have been proper as the decision was based on the Veteran’s failure to report to a VA examination in June 1985. He is presumed to have received appropriate notice of the examination, but is shown to have failed to report to the examination without adequate reason. Under such circumstances, his disability compensation benefits were appropriately discontinued. See id. Accordingly, the final question before the Board concerns whether the Veteran’s benefits may nonetheless be resumed retroactive to October 1983. D. Resumption of Disability Compensation The Veteran filed a claim for an increased evaluation for his service-connected schizophrenia in January 2013. The Veteran underwent a VA examination in February 2014. Upon examination, the Veteran reported to the examiner that he was not currently receiving any mental health treatment or prescribed any psychotropic medications. He denied any previous inpatient psychiatric treatment. The VA examiner determined that there is no evidence that the Veteran has, or ever had, a diagnosis of schizophrenia. The Veteran’s current mental health diagnosis was changed to depressive disorder, which the examiner noted was a new and separate diagnosis from schizophrenia. In a February 2014 rating decision, the RO denied the Veteran entitlement to an increased rating for schizophrenia. In the decision, the RO noted that there is no evidence to support a current diagnosis for schizophrenia. However, it continued the Veteran’s 10 percent rating for schizophrenia because VA regulation stipulates that a disability that has been continuously rated for 20 or more years cannot be reduced except upon a showing that such rating was based on fraud. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.951(b). As such, the Veteran’s 10 percent rating was resumed effective February 1, 2013, which is the first day of the month following his January 22, 2013 claim. Effectively, the RO’s determination was that there was no change in evaluation to the Veteran’s schizophrenia. This finding contemplates 38 C.F.R. § 3.655(c) (1983). Under this provision, when payments have been discontinued because of a failure to report for examination, payments will be resumed effective the day following the date of last payment if the evidence clearly establishes that during the period of his failure to report the disability existed in the former compensable degree and the claim was not abandoned and the rating agency confirms and continues the prior evaluation (emphasis added). However, after careful review of the evidence of record, the Board finds that a resumption of disability compensation benefits since October 1983 is not warranted because the evidence does not “clearly establish” that during the period of his failure to report the disability existed in the former compensable degree (10 percent). See 38 C.F.R. § 3.655(c) (1983). In this regard, the Board notes that in October 1983, the Veteran’s schizophrenia was assigned a 10 percent rating under 38 C.F.R. § 4.132, Diagnostic Code 9203 (1983). Under this rating criteria, a noncompensable rating was warranted for psychosis in remission. A 10 percent rating was assigned when symptoms resulted in slight impairment of social and industrial adaptability. (The Board notes that the provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 4.132 were subsequently amended and the rating criteria for schizophrenia is now located under 38 C.F.R. § 4.130, Diagnostic Code 9201). Prior to February 2014, the Veteran last underwent a VA examination in July 1981. At that examination, he endorsed no current symptoms of a psychiatric disorder and stated that he has never received psychiatric treatment. The Veteran described having a normal personal life with many hobbies and a good relationship with his wife. Since leaving service, he completed a bachelor’s degree and was in his first year of law school. Upon examination, the VA examiner determined that the Veteran’s schizophrenia was in remission. Thereafter, the Board notes that there is no medical or lay evidence of record attesting to the level of severity of the Veteran’s schizophrenia from July 1981 until February 2014, when the Veteran underwent a VA mental disorder examination in connection with his claim for an increased rating. At that examination, the Veteran reported that he was not currently receiving any mental health treatment or prescribed any psychotropic medications. The VA examiner noted that there was no medical evidence that the Veteran has a history of schizophrenia, and the Veteran was given a new diagnosis of depressive disorder. Based on the above, the Board does not find that the evidence clearly establishes that from October 1983 (when his benefits were discontinued) to February 2013 (when his benefits were resumed), the Veteran’s disability existed in the former compensable degree at any time. In fact, the medical evidence indicates that the Veteran’s schizophrenia has been in remission since at least 1981, which would warrant, at most, a noncompensable rating under 38 C.F.R. § 4.132, Diagnostic Code 9203 (1983). There is no evidence that the Veteran has continued to experience any symptoms of schizophrenia or has received medical treatment for schizophrenia in the 37 years since his benefits were first suspended. Significantly, he has not provided any other lay or medical evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, the Board does not find that the evidence “clearly establishes” that the Veteran’s disability existed in the former compensable degree, as required by 38 C.F.R. § 3.655(c) (1983). It would be pure speculation, at best, to find otherwise. See Wamhoff v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 517, 522 (1996). As such, the Veteran is not entitled to a resumption of benefits retroactive to October 1983. In light of the foregoing, the Board finds that the most appropriate date for the Veteran’s resumption of benefits is the presently-assigned date of February 1, 2013, which is the first day of the month following the Veteran’s January 22, 2013 claim for an increased rating. Accordingly, the Veteran’s appeal as to a resumption of his VA disability compensation benefits for service-connected schizophrenia prior to February 1, 2013 must be denied. In reaching this conclusion, the Board has considered the applicability of the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine. However, as the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran’s claim, that doctrine is not for application. See 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). LESLEY A. REIN Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals Attorney for the Board Melissa Barbee, Associate Counsel The Board’s decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.