Citation Nr: 20031871 Decision Date: 05/06/20 Archive Date: 05/06/20 DOCKET NO. 15-25 715 DATE: May 6, 2020 ORDER Service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder is denied. FINDING OF FACT The weight of the evidence is against finding that any acquired psychiatric disorder is due to or the result of the Veteran’s active service. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder have not been met. 38 U.S.C. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran had active service from February 1969 to February 1971. In July 2015, the Veteran requested a Board hearing. In November 2018, the Veteran requested to withdraw his request for a hearing. As such, the Veteran's hearing request is considered to have been withdrawn. See 38 C.F.R. § 20.704. Service Connection Service connection will be granted if the evidence demonstrates that a current disability resulted from an injury or disease incurred in or aggravated by active military service. 38 U.S.C. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. Service connection requires competent evidence showing: (1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Service connection may also be established under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b), where a condition in service is noted but is not, in fact, chronic, or where a diagnosis of chronicity may be legitimately questioned. The continuity of symptomatology provision of 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) has been interpreted as an alternative to service connection only for the specific chronic diseases listed in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a). See Walker v. Shinseki, 718 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Service connection may also be established with certain chronic diseases based upon a legal presumption by showing that the disorder manifested itself to a degree of 10 percent disabling or more within one year from the date of separation from service. Such disease shall be presumed to have been incurred in service, even though there is no evidence of such disease during the period of service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1137; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309(a). While the disease need not be diagnosed within the presumption period, it must be shown, by acceptable lay or medical evidence, that there were characteristic manifestations of the disease to the required degree during that time. The Veteran filed a service connection claim for an acquired psychiatric disorder, which was denied by a January 2015 rating decision. He asserts that he has an acquired psychiatric disorder due to his active service. The Veteran reported that he had posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a result of a number of stressors that occurred during his active service. VA attempted to corroborate the Veteran’s reported stressors. In December 2014, VA determined that the information required to corroborate the stressful events described by the Veteran was insufficient to send to the U.S. Army and Joint Services Records Research Center and/or insufficient to allow for meaningful research of Marine Corps or National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) records. VA determined that all procedures to obtain this information from the Veteran were properly followed, all efforts to obtain the needed information were exhausted, and any further attempts would be futile. The Veteran’s STRs do not show symptoms, treatment, or diagnoses for an acquired psychiatric disorder. He had normal psychiatric findings at his entrance physical in February 1969 and at his separation physical in February 1971. In addition, he specifically denied having any depression or excessive worry at his separation physical. After the Veteran’s separation from active service, his medical records show that in January 2008, he was diagnosed with sleep apnea. In March 2010, he was diagnosed with dementia. He also began treating for depressive symptoms in 2010. In May 2015, the Veteran was afforded a VA examination. After reviewing the Veteran’s claims file, interviewing the Veteran, and conducting an examination, the examiner diagnosed the Veteran with unspecified neurocognitive disorder and unspecified depression disorder with anxious distress. The examiner reported that the Veteran did not meet the criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD. The examiner opined that the Veteran’s acquired psychiatric disorder was less likely than not due to the Veteran’s active service. The examiner reported that there was no documented history of mental health treatment prior to 2008 when he was not diagnosed with a mental health disorder but had poor sleep due to sleep apnea. The examiner reported that the Veteran did not begin treatment for dementia and depression until 2010. In March 2020, a VA examiner reviewed the Veteran’s claim file. The examiner opined that the Veteran’s acquired psychiatric disorder was less likely than not due to his active service. The examiner reported that the Veteran’s mental health diagnoses were unspecified neurocognitive disorder and unspecified depressive disorder with anxious distress. The examiner opined that the Veteran’s symptoms of unspecified neurocognitive disorder and unspecified depressive disorder with anxious distress less likely than not had their onset during the Veteran’s active duty service or began within one year after discharge from active service. The examiner reported that the Veteran’s reported difficulty sleeping was likely attributable to his diagnosed sleep apnea and that his depressive symptomatology was likely in response and in conjunction with his dementia. The claims file contains no competent evidence that any current acquired psychiatric disorder had its onset in service or is otherwise etiologically related to service. The record contains no evidence of any mental health symptoms in service or at discharge, and there is no competent medical opinion which even suggests that any acquired psychiatric disorder even may be the result of his active service. The first evidence of any mental health symptoms is not until 2010, almost 40 years after his separation from service. Regarding PTSD, based upon the evidence of record, the Board finds that the weight of the evidence fails to support the conclusion that the Veteran met the DSM criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD at any time during the appeal period. See Gilpin v. West, 155 F. 3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The Veteran was clinically examined to specifically determine whether he had PTSD. However, after reviewing the claims file, the May 2015 VA examiner found that the diagnostic criteria to support a PTSD diagnosis had not been met. The examiner is shown to have conducted a thorough examination, to have reviewed and considered the pertinent evidence of record, and to have provided adequate rationale for her opinion. The Veteran’s reported history was adequately considered. See Dalton v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 23 (2007). Without a diagnosis of PTSD, the Veteran fails to meet the requirements of service connection set out under 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). Service connection for PTSD is denied. Regarding unspecified neurocognitive disorder and unspecified depressive disorder with anxious distress, after weighing all the evidence, the Board finds great probative value in the May 2015 and March 2020 VA examiners’ opinions. The VA examiners’ negative opinions are sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements of producing an adequate statement of reasons and bases where the expert has fairly considered material evidence which appears to support the Veteran’s position, including the Veteran’s assertion that his acquired psychiatric disorder was due to his active service. Wray v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 488, at 492-93 (1995). Consideration has been given to the personal assertion of the Veteran and his wife that the Veteran’s acquired psychiatric disorder was the result of his active service. Although lay persons are competent to provide opinions on some medical issues, see Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428, 435 (2011), as to the specific issues in this case, the etiology of an acquired psychiatric disorder, falls outside the realm of common knowledge of a lay person. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The etiology of an acquired psychiatric disorder is not the type of question that is readily amenable to mere lay diagnosis, as the evidence shows that examinations, which may include mental status examinations, are needed to properly assess and diagnose the disorder. See Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009). That is, although the Board readily acknowledges that Veteran and his wife are competent to report mental health symptoms, neither the Veteran nor his wife have been shown to possess the requisite medical training, expertise, or credentials needed to render a diagnosis or a competent opinion as to whether his acquired psychiatric disorder was due to the Veteran’s active service. Nothing in the record demonstrates that they have received any special training or acquired any medical expertise in evaluating acquired psychiatric disorders. See King v. Shinseki, 700 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Accordingly, the assertions of the Veteran and his wife do not constitute competent medical evidence. (Continued on the next page)   Accordingly, the Board finds that the evidence is against the claim, and service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder is denied. KELLI A. KORDICH Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals Attorney for the Board T. Berryman, Counsel The Board’s decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.