Citation Nr: 20036697 Decision Date: 05/28/20 Archive Date: 05/28/20 DOCKET NO. 15-23 094A DATE: May 28, 2020 ORDER 1. Entitlement to service connection for iron deficiency (primary) anemia is denied. REMANDED 2. Entitlement to service connection for sleep apnea is remanded. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. Primary anemia was not manifested in, or within a year following the Veteran’s separation from service, and he is not shown to have had primary (or iron deficiency) anemia during the pendency of the instant claim seeking service connection for such disability. 2. A G6PD (congenital) defect was noted on induction and pre-existed the Veteran’s service. 3. A chronic worsening of the G6PD defect or chronic acquired pathology superimposed on the G6PD defect during service is not shown. CONCLUSION OF LAW Service connection for anemia is not warranted. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101(24)(B), 1110, 1131, 1153, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304, 3.306, 3.309, 3.310. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION The appellant is a Veteran who served on active duty from November 1984 to October 1994. These matters are before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) on appeal from an October 2012 rating decision. In July 2018, these matters were remanded (by another Veterans Law Judge) for additional development. [The Board notes that on his July 2015 Form 9, the Veteran limited the appeal to the matter of service connection for anemia. The next correspondence pertaining to service connection for sleep apnea was received in May 2016 (and would not constitute a timely substantive appeal). However, the Board’s issuance of the July 2018 remand on the matter is an implicit waiver of a timely substantive appeal in this matter. See Percy v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 37, 45 (2009).]. Service Connection 1. Service connection for iron deficiency anemia is denied. Service connection may be established for disability due to disease or injury that was incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. To establish service connection for a claimed disability, there must be evidence of: (i) a present claimed disability; (ii) incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury in service; (iii) and a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury in service. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The determination as to whether these requirements are met is based on an analysis of all the evidence of record and an evaluation of its credibility and probative value. Baldwin v. West, 13 Vet. App. 1 (1999); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (a). The existence of a current disability is the cornerstone of a claim for VA disability compensation. See Degmetich v. Brown, 104, F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In the absence of proof of a present disability there can be no valid claim [of service connection]. Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992). A congenital or developmental abnormality is not of itself a disease or injury within the meaning of applicable legislation [not a compensable disability]. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303 (c), 4.9. However, service connection may be granted for disability due to aggravation of a congenital abnormality by superimposed disease or injury in service. See Carpenter v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 240, 245 (1995). A congenital defect can be subject to superimposed disease or injury, and if superimposed disease or injury occurs during military service, service-connection may be warranted for the resultant disability. VAOPGCPREC 82-90, 55 Fed. Reg. 45,711 (1990). See also 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (c). Certain chronic diseases (to include primary anemia) may be presumed to be service connected if manifested to a compensable degree within a specified period of time following separation from service (one year for primary anemia). 38 U.S.C. §§ 1112, 1137; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309(a). For chronic diseases listed in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309 (a), nexus to service may be established by showing continuity of symptomatology. Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331, 1338-40 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that it was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (d); See Combee v. Brown, 34 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Lay evidence is competent if it is provided by a person who has knowledge of facts or circumstances and conveys matters that can be observed and described by a layperson. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (a)(2). Competent medical evidence is necessary where the determinative question requires medical knowledge. Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Competent medical evidence means evidence provided by a person who is qualified through education, training, or experience to offer medical diagnoses, statements, or opinions. Competent medical evidence may also mean statements conveying sound medical principles found in medical treatises. Competent medical evidence may also include statements contained in authoritative writings, such as medical and scientific articles and research reports or analyses. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (a)(1). When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding the merits of an issue material to the determination of the matter, the benefit of the doubt in resolving each such issue shall be given to the claimant. 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. A claim will be denied only if the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim. See 38 U.S.C. § 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 56 (1990). A November 1984 entrance physical report notes no significant abnormalities other than G6PD [Glucose 6 Phosphate Deficiency]. A November 1984 service treatment record (STR) notes G6PD deficiency. A May 1989 STR notes G6PD deficiency. An April 1991 STR notes hemoglobin (Hgb) of 16.1 g/dl (falling within the listed normal value of 14 – 18 g/dl), and noted G6PD deficiency. A May 2014 problem listing showing normocytic anemia (an anomaly in the number of blood cells, but with red blood cells normal in size), without further explanation or reference is merely that (an unsupported by factual data historical reference). It does not reflect that the veteran was then anemic. A July 2015 treatment record notes a history of G6PD deficiency. A July 2015 hematology test notes Hgb A1C of 5.1% (with reference range of 4.8 to 7.8). On July 2016 hematology test, the Veteran’s Hgb was 15 g/dl (with reference range of 12 to 17.5). On March 2017 hematology test, the Veteran’s Hgb was 15.2 g/dl (with reference range of 12 to 17.5). On May 2019 hematologic DBQ the diagnosis was G6PD deficiency (1984). The examiner noted the normal Hgb in 1991, and noted that the Veteran has not been treated with iron tablets or any other medication. The examiner also noted the Veteran’s current normal Hgb indices. It was noted that the Veteran’s G6PD deficiency was active. May 2019 diagnostic testing revealed Hgb of 14.1 gm/100ml. The examiner opined that it was less likely than not that the Veteran’s claimed iron deficiency anemia diagnosed as G6PD was incurred in or caused by a superimposed injury or disease in service that resulted in additional disability (anemia) during service. The examiner noted that there was no recorded anemia during or after service [emphasis added] or any record of conditions that might be secondary to anemia. The examiner observed that G6PD is a genetic defect. The Veteran’s STRs contain no mention of complaints, diagnosis or treatment pertaining to iron deficiency (primary) anemia. G6PD deficiency was noted on induction (in November 1984). When tested in April 1991, his Hgb was within normal range (i.e., he was not anemic). As noted above, the existence of a current disability is the cornerstone of a claim for VA disability compensation. See Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992). The threshold matter that must be addressed here (as in any claim seeking service connection) is whether there is competent evidence that the Veteran currently has (during the pendency of the claim has had) the disability for which service connection is sought. The record does not show that the Veteran has (or during the pendency of the instant claim has had) an iron deficiency (or primary) anemia. Multiple Hgb studies (both during and after service) were all normal. On May 2019 examination, it was noted that the Veteran had no record of iron deficiency anemia being found. The diagnosis of iron deficiency anemia is a medical question (confirmed by hematological testing). Here, multiple bloodwork tests show Hgb was within normal levels. The Veteran is a layperson. He does not cite to supporting medical data or medical opinion or treatise evidence for his assertion he has anemia. His own opinion that he has iron deficiency anemia disease related to G6PD deficiency noted in service has no probative value. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). AS the evidence does not show that the Veteran has iron deficiency anemia, he has not presented a valid claim for service connection for iron deficiency anemia. See McClain v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 319, 321 (2007); Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. At 225. Accordingly, the analysis does not need to proceed any further (such as to determine whether there was a related disease or injury in service or a relationship between current iron deficiency anemia disability and service). However, given the manner in which this matter has been presented and developed, the Board finds some further explanation is necessary. Regarding the diagnosis of G6PD, such defect was noted on induction. On May 2019 hematologic DBQ the provider explained that G6PD is a genetic defect. As noted above, service connection may be warranted for any additional disability that results where a congenital or developmental defect is subject to, or aggravated by, a superimposed disease or injury. Here the Veteran contends that anemia was superimposed on his G6PD. As noted above, his STRs do not show anemia, and his postservice treatment records do not shown show an iron-deficiency (or primary) anemia superimposed on his G6PD. The notation of normocytic anemia in a problem listing was noted by the examiner in May 2019, who, in essence, indicated that it did not represent a diagnosis of iron deficiency, or primary, anemia, as the blood studies for such were all normal. As primary anemia is not diagnosed, the continuity of symptomatology theory of entitlement that appears to be alleged here also has no applicability. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). The preponderance of the evidence is against this claim. Therefore, the appeal in this matter must be denied. REASONS FOR REMAND 2. Entitlement to service connection for sleep apnea is remanded. The Board finds that further development of the record is necessary. In support of this claim the Veteran submitted a buddy statement indicating he had a history of loud snoring since service. On May 2019 examination the examiner acknowledged the buddy statement, but does not appear to have considered it (discussed its significance in corroborating onset in service) in the opinion provided. Therefore, the opinion is inadequate for rating purposes, and development for another, fully adequate medical advisory opinion in the matter is necessary. See Miller v. Wilkie, No. 16-3046, 2019 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 923. The matter is REMANDED for the following: The AOJ should arrange for the Veteran’s record to be forwarded to a pulmonologist or sleep specialist for review and an advisory medical opinion regarding the etiology of his OSA. Upon review of the record (to specifically include the June 2012 received buddy statement), the consulting provider should respond to the following: (a.) Identify the likely etiology for the Veteran’s sleep apnea. Specifically, is it at least as likely as not (a 50 percent or better probability) that it is related directly to his service? Please address the submitted buddy statement describing the Veteran’s snoring/gagging/periods of not breathing during sleep (during and after service). (b.) If the Veteran’s sleep apnea is found to not be etiologically related to his service, identify the etiology for the disability that is considered to be more likely (and explain why that is so). The examiner must include rationale for all opinions. GEORGE R. SENYK Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals Attorney for the Board N. Staskowski, Associate Counsel The Board’s decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.