Citation Nr: 20042852 Decision Date: 06/24/20 Archive Date: 06/24/20 DOCKET NO. 19-07 947 DATE: June 24, 2020 REMANDED The issue of whether the character of the appellant's discharge is a bar to eligibility for VA benefits is remanded. REASONS FOR REMAND The appellant had active duty service with the United States Marine Corps from December 1984 to March 1987 and was discharged under other than honorable conditions in lieu of trial by court-martial. The instant matter is on appeal from a November 2017 decision. The Board notes that the appellant was initially denied eligibility for VA benefits due to the character of his discharge in an unappealed January 2009 decision. New and material evidence, however, is not required to reopen a claim when, at any time after VA issues a decision on a claim, VA receives or associates with the claims file relevant official service department records that existed and had not been associated with the claims file when VA first decided the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(1). Service department records include, but are not limited to, records related to a claimed in-service event, injury or disease, additional records forwarded at any time after VA’s initial request, and declassified records that could not have been obtained at the time of the prior final denial. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(1)(i)–(iii). Relevant records are those records that relate to the injury for which the claimant is seeking benefits and have a reasonable possibility of helping to substantiate the Veteran’s claim. Golz v. Shinseki, 590 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2010). This exception does not apply to service department records that (1) did not exist at the time VA previously decided the claim, or (2) were not present because the claimant failed to provide sufficient information for VA to identify and obtain the records from the respective service department, the Joint Services Records Research Center, or any other official source. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(2). In the present case, pertinent service records, to include medical treatment records, have been obtained following the previous January 2009 denial. These records do not fall into an exception under 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(2). Thus, new and material evidence is not required to reopen this claim. 1. The issue of whether the character of the appellant's discharge is a bar to VA benefits is remanded. The Board regrets the additional delay, but remand is necessary in order to obtain a VA medical opinion with respect to the appellant’s insanity claim. For VA purposes, a veteran is a person discharged or released from active service under conditions other than dishonorable. 38 U.S.C. § 101 (2); 38 C.F.R. § 3.1 (d). The threshold question to be answered in every claim for VA benefits concerns the adequacy of the claimant’s service for purposes of establishing basic eligibility. Applicable laws and regulations provide that most VA benefits are not payable unless the period of service upon which the claim is based was terminated by discharge or release under conditions other than dishonorable. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101(2), 101(18), 5303; 38 C.F.R. § 3.12 (a). Health care and disability benefits may not be furnished for any disability incurred or aggravated during a period of service terminated by a bad conduct discharge or when one of the bars listed in 38 C.F.R. § 3.12 (c) applies. 38 C.F.R. § 3.360 (b). There are two types of character of discharge bars to establishing entitlement for VA benefits when someone receives an “under other than honorable” conditions discharge: statutory bars and regulatory bars. 38 U.S.C. § 5303(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.12. As to the statutory bars, benefits are not payable where the former service member was discharged or released under one of the following conditions: (1) As a conscientious objector who refused to perform military duty, wear the uniform, or comply with lawful order of competent military authorities; (2) By reason of the sentence of a general court-martial; (3) Resignation by an officer for the good of the service; (4) As a deserter; (5) As an alien during a period of hostilities, where it is affirmatively shown that the former service member requested his or her release; and (6) By reason of a discharge under other than honorable conditions issued as a result of an AWOL for a continuous period of at least 180 days. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12 (c). As to the regulatory bars, a discharge or release because of one of the following offenses is considered to have been issued under dishonorable conditions: (1) acceptance of undesirable discharge in lieu of trial by general court-marital; (2) mutiny or spying; (3) offenses involving moral turpitude (this includes, generally, conviction of a felony); (4) willful and persistent misconduct; and (5) homosexual acts involving aggravated circumstances and other facts affecting the performance of duty. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12 (d). None of the statutory bars apply in this case. Instead, the January 2009 Administrative Decision determined that there was a regulatory bar to VA compensation benefits by virtue of the appellant’s willful and persistent misconduct in service. An act is willful misconduct where it involves deliberate or intentional wrongdoing with knowledge of or wanton and reckless disregard of its probable consequences. A discharge because of a minor offense will not be considered willful and persistent misconduct if service was otherwise honest, faithful, and meritorious. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12 (d) (4). Mere technical violation of police regulations or ordinances will not, per se, constitute willful misconduct. 38 C.F.R. § 3.1 (n). However, “offenses that would interfere with the appellant’s military duty, indeed preclude their performance... are not minor.” Stringham v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 445, 448 (1995); see also Cropper v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 450, 452 453 (1991). If a statutory or regulatory bar exists, VA benefits may still be granted if it is established at the time of the offense leading to the discharge that the Veteran was insane. 38 U.S.C. § 5303 (b). An “insane” person is one who, while not mentally defective or constitutionally psychopathic, except when a psychosis has been engrafted upon such basic condition, exhibits, due to disease, a more or less prolonged deviation from his or her normal method of behavior; or who interferes with the peace of society; or who has departed (become antisocial) from the accepted standards of the community to which by birth and education he/she belongs so as to lack the adaptability to make further adjustment to the social customs of the community in which he/she resides. 38 C.F.R. § 3.354 (a). The burden is on the appellant to submit competent medical evidence that he was insane at the time of his offenses. Stringham v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 445, 449 (1995). The types of behavior identified as insanity in 38 C.F.R. § 3.354 (a) do not include a minor episode or episodes of disorderly conduct or eccentricity. A determination of the extent to which an individual’s behavior must deviate from his normal method of behavior could best be resolved by adjudicative personnel on a case-by-case basis in light of authorities defining the scope of the term insanity. The phrase “interferes with the peace of society” in the regulation refers to behavior which disrupted the legal order of society. The term “become antisocial” in the regulation refers to the development of behavior which was hostile or harmful to others in a manner which deviated sharply from the social norm and which was not attributable to a personality disorder. The reference in the regulation to “accepted standards of the community to which by birth and education” an individual belonged requires consideration of an individual’s ethnic and cultural background and level of education. The regulatory reference to “social customs of the community” in which an individual resided requires assessment of an individual’s conduct with regard to the contemporary values and customs of the community at large. VAOPGCPREC 20-97 (May 22, 1997). Behavior which is generally attributable to a substance abuse disorder does not exemplify the severe deviation from the social norm or the gross nature of conduct which is generally considered to fall within the scope of the term insanity, and, therefore, does not constitute insane behavior. Personality disorders, including antisocial personality disorder, do not satisfy the definition of insanity as contemplated at 38 C.F.R. § 3.354. VAOPGCPREC 20-97. In addition, mental illness is not identical to insanity. Beck v. West, 13 Vet. App. 535, 539 (2000). Rather, insane behavior is defined as a persistent morbid condition of the mind characterized by a derangement of one or more of the mental faculties to the extent that the person is unable to understand the nature, full import, and consequences of his acts such that he is a danger to himself or others. VAOPGCPREC 20-97. In effect, the person is rendered incapable of managing himself or his affairs, which is a concept akin to the level of incompetency generally supporting appointment of a guardian. VAOPGCPREC 20-97. Insanity must be shown to exist, due to disease, only at the time of the commission of the offense leading to discharge, not that insanity caused the misconduct. Beck v. West, 13 Vet. App. 535, 539 (2000). In other words, there need not be a causal connection between the insanity due to disease and the misconduct. See Struck v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 145, 154 (1996), citing Helige v. Principi, 4 Vet. App. 32, 34 (1993) and abrogated on other grounds by Gardner v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 415 (2009); see also VAOPGCPREC 20-97. Turning to the facts of the case, the appellant was discharged in lieu of court martial for offenses including desertion from January 12, 1987, to January 15, 1987, and wrongful consumption of alcohol. His discharge paperwork also reports two prior nonjudicial punishments for absence from his appointed place of duty. The limited personnel records associated with the claims file also indicate a vague report of a weapons charge associated with a possible second suicide attempt. The appellant previously attempted suicide in October 1987, and he was hospitalized following the intentional overdose. He was discharged with diagnoses of suicide attempt by intentional drug overdose, mixed personality disorder with narcissistic and antisocial features, and alcohol dependence. Due to the incomplete personnel records associated with the claims file, the nature of his previous two nonjudicial punishments and apparent civilian weapons charge remains unclear. Additionally, the record reflects significant mental health conditions around the time of the offenses underlying his discharge. Accordingly, once the complete service records are obtained for the appellant, a medical opinion is necessary to address his mental state prior to his discharge. The matters are REMANDED for the following action: 1. Ensure that all service treatment and personnel records have been associated with the claims file. If not, attempt to obtain, through all indicated and appropriate sources, any outstanding service records. All efforts to obtain these records should be documented. If any records cannot be obtained after reasonable efforts have been made, issue a formal determination that such records do not exist or that further efforts to obtain such records would be futile. This determination should be documented in the claims file and the appellant must be notified. 2. Contact the appellant and the representative of record in order to identify any outstanding non-VA treatment records regarding the issues on appeal. If non-VA providers are identified, obtain releases for those records. Make all reasonable attempts to obtain the non-VA treatment records and associate them with the claims file. If such records cannot be obtained, inform the appellant and the representative of record, and afford an opportunity to provide these outstanding records. 3. Obtain any relevant, outstanding VA treatment records that are not already associated with the claims file. If no records are available, the claims folder must indicate this fact and the Veteran should be notified in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (e). All attempts to contact the appellant should be documented in the record. 4. Following completion of the foregoing, obtain a VA medical opinion from a specialist to assess the appellant’s mental state leading up to his discharge from service. An examination may be scheduled if the specialist deems it necessary, and may utilize telehealth or other electronic means of interviewing if social distancing or pandemic restrictions remain in effect. The Board notes that if the requested specialist(s) is/are not available in the local or near-regional area, the RO is allowed to utilize a clinician whose scope of credentials is as close to the requested specialist as possible. If the specialist is housed locally, the examining clinician may provide the specialist with a clinically appropriate case summary, either verbally or in writing, and then request the specialist provide a written opinion. The specialist should review the entire claims file, including a copy of this remand. After a thorough review of the record, the specialist should discuss the following: (a.) Acknowledge understanding of the following definition of “insanity” per VA regulations: “An insane person is one who, while not mentally defective or constitutionally psychopathic, except when a psychosis has been engrafted upon such basic condition, exhibits, due to disease, a more or less prolonged deviation from his normal method of behavior; or who interferes with the peace of society; or who has so departed (become antisocial) from the accepted standards of the community to which by birth and education he belongs as to lack the adaptability to make further adjustment to the social customs of the community in which he resides.” (b.) Is it at least as likely as not (a 50 percent or greater probability) that the appellant was insane, per the aforementioned VA regulation, at the time he committed the below offenses leading to his discharge from service? • Desertion in January 1987; • Wrongful consumption of alcohol. (c.) Please specifically discuss the appellant’s suicide attempt in October 1986, as well as any pertinent post-service medical records. The examination report should specifically state that a review of the record was conducted. The specialist should provide a complete rationale for all opinions provided. If an opinion cannot be provided without to resorting to mere speculation, the examiner should identify all medical and lay evidence considered in this conclusion, fully explain why this is the case and identify what additional evidence (if any) would allow for a more definitive opinion. 5. Following completion of the foregoing, the AOJ should review the record and readjudicate the claim on appeal. If it remains denied, the AOJ should issue an appropriate supplemental SOC, afford the appellant and his representative an opportunity to respond, and return the case to the Board. B. MULLINS Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals Attorney for the Board H. Fisher, Associate Counsel The Board’s decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.