Citation Nr: 20043582 Decision Date: 06/29/20 Archive Date: 06/29/20 DOCKET NO. 15-41 627 DATE: June 29, 2020 ORDER Service connection for obstructive sleep apnea is granted. FINDING OF FACT The Veteran’s sleep apnea had its onset during active service. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for service connection for sleep apnea have been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty from February 1989 to February 1992. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) on appeal from a June 2014 rating decision by a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO). In November 2018, the Veteran testified at testified at a videoconference hearing before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge (VLJ). A transcript of the hearing is of record. In April 2019, the Board remanded the current issue for further evidentiary development. The Board finds that there has been substantial compliance with the prior remand instructions and no further action is necessary. See D’Aries v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 97 (2008) (holding that only substantial, and not strict, compliance with the terms of a Board remand is required pursuant to Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268 (1998)). Service Connection The Veteran essentially contends that service connection for sleep apnea is warranted because he developed symptoms associated with sleep apnea during active duty. He asserts that during service and since that time, he has experienced symptoms such as excessive snoring, daytime fatigue and waking up gasping for air, which he believes in hindsight could be considered symptoms of sleep apnea. He alternatively contends that service connection for sleep apnea is warranted as a result of his service-connected posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), including aggravation due to medication prescribed to treat PTSD. Service connection may be established for disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in the line of duty, or for aggravation of a preexisting injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, in the active military, naval, or air service. 38 U.S.C. § 1110, 1131. Service connection may also be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). To establish service connection for a disability resulting from a disease or injury incurred in service, or to establish service connection based on aggravation in service of a disease or injury which pre-existed service, there must be (1) competent evidence of the current existence of the disability for which service connection is being claimed; (2) competent evidence of incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury in active service; and (3) competent evidence of a nexus or connection between the current disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated in service. Horn v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 231, 236 (2010); Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 14, 2009); cf. Gutierrez v. Principi, 19 Vet. App. 1, 5 (2004) (citing Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999)). Service connection may also be warranted for disability proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disease or injury. 38 C.F.R.§ 3.310(a). This permits service connection not only for a disability caused by a service-connected disability, but for the degree of disability resulting from aggravation of a disability by a service-connected disability. See Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439, 448 (1995). In the case of aggravation by a service-connected disability, a Veteran may be compensated for the degree of disability over and above the degree of disability existing prior to the aggravation. Id.; see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(b). Service treatment records do not document complaints of sleep disturbances or treatment for sleep apnea. However, service treatment records do document weight gain and referrals for weight reduction. Post-service treatment records reflect diagnoses and treatment for obstructive sleep apnea. At an April 2013 comprehensive sleep evaluation, the Veteran endorsed excessive daytime sleepiness, and waking up two to three time per night. He also endorsed waking up with shortness of breath, feeling unrested, and with morning headaches. The Veteran indicated that he had very loud snoring daily and that people have noticed that he stops breathing during sleep, among other sleep apnea related symptoms. The Veteran’s April 2013 sleep study recording was consistent with severe obstructive sleep apnea and upper airway resistance. Subsequent VA treatment records reveal treatment for obstructive sleep apnea. In a September 2013 statement, the Veteran’s friend reported that, in 1991, when he and the Veteran were both stationed in Germany, he was the Veteran’s roommate. The friend reported that the Veteran’s excessive snoring would keep him awake at night. The friend encouraged the Veteran to seek treatment for the snoring. In a September 2015 substantive appeal, the Veteran stated that he did not attend sick call for his excessive snoring due to fear of being laughed at by the medics and doctors. At the November 2018 Board hearing, the Veteran reported that during service and since that time, he has experienced symptoms such as excessive snoring, daytime fatigue and waking up gasping for air. He also described incidents during service where he would fall asleep on duty during downtime. Pursuant to the April 2019 Board remand, the Veteran was afforded a VA sleep apnea examination in October 2019. The examiner noted that the Veteran requires the use of a continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP) machine. The examiner opined that the Veteran’s sleep apnea was less likely than not to have had its onset during service. The examiner also stated that there was no medical evidence that the Veteran’s sleep apnea is due to or the result of, permanently aggravated or was permanently aggravated beyond the natural progression by his service or is otherwise related to service, weight gain during service, PTSD or other service-connected disabilities but provided no further explanation in support of this statement. She elaborated that the Veteran’s pertinent in- and post-service evidence, including the Veteran’s lay assertions, were reviewed and were not diagnostic for any pathology or disability during service nor within the first few years of leaving service. She stated that obstructive sleep apnea is a diagnosis with a clear and specific etiology and characterized by recurrent collapse of the velopharyngeal and/or nasopharyngeal airway during sleep. She determined that the most likely etiology of the Veteran’s sleep apnea was his combined risk factors of obesity, craniofacial and upper airway abnormalities, gender, and age. She also concluded that the Veteran’s in-service weight gain was not the cause of his sleep apnea, instead finding that the Veteran’s sleep apnea was not due to a single risk factor, but more likely due to his multiple risk factors. The Board finds that the examiner’s negative nexus opinion is internally inconsistent and relies solely on the lack of service treatment records documenting complaints of symptoms and only superficially references the Veteran’s lay assertions. The absence of treatment records should not be the primary basis for a negative opinion. See Dalton v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 23, 40 (2007) (noting that an examiner cannot rely on the absence of medical records corroborating an injury to conclude that there is no relationship between the veteran's current disability and his military service (citing Smith v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 137, 140 (1992)). After review of the record, the Board finds that service connection for sleep apnea is warranted. Here, the Board finds the Veteran’s reports of sleep apnea symptoms, and statements by his fellow service members of observed apneas both competent and credible, especially given the Veteran’s described symptoms prior to his diagnosis of obstructive sleep apnea are the same as the ones described in service. Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 470 (1994); Owens v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 429 (1995); Elkins v. Gober, 229 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Madden v. Gober, 125 F.3d 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Guimond v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 69 (1993); Hensley v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 155 (1993); Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498 (1995); Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190 (1991). The above reflects that the evidence before the Board as to the issue of whether the diagnosed obstructive sleep apnea is related to service consists of an inadequate negative VA opinion, and competent, credible lay testimony indicating that since service the Veteran has had symptoms that were later diagnosed as obstructive sleep apnea. See Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[N]othing in the regulatory or statutory provisions [relating to evidence to be considered] require both medical and competent lay evidence; rather, they make clear that competent lay evidence can be sufficient in and of itself”). In these circumstances, a remand for another VA opinion on this issue could be construed as obtaining additional evidence for the sole purpose of denying a claim, which is impermissible. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(c) (“The development of evidence in connection with claims for service connection will be accomplished when deemed necessary but it should not be undertaken when evidence present is sufficient for this determination”); Mariano v. Principi, 17 Vet. App. 305, 312 (2003). Resolving doubt in favor of the Veteran, the claim of entitlement to service connection for sleep apnea is granted. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131, 5107; see generally Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990); Ortiz v. Principi, 274 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001). S.C. Krembs Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals Attorney for the Board M. Bilstein, Associate Counsel The Board’s decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.