Citation Nr: 20043763 Decision Date: 06/29/20 Archive Date: 06/29/20 DOCKET NO. 16-12 909 DATE: June 29, 2020 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for obstructive sleep apnea (OSA) is denied. FINDING OF FACT The Veteran’s OSA was not incurred in, and is not etiologically related to, his active military service. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for service connection for obstructive sleep apnea have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131, 1154(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty from January 2005 to July 2006, with an additional period of active duty for training (ACDUTRA) from August 2000 to December 2000. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) on appeal from a July 2015 rating decision of a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO). In March 2019, the Veteran testified at a hearing before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge (VLJ); a transcript is of record. The Board remanded the claim on appeal in October 2019 for additional development. The Board’s remand directives have been substantially completed. See Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268 (1998). Entitlement to service connection for OSA. The Veteran contends that his current OSA is related to his active military service. Specifically, he contends that his OSA manifested while he was deployed to Iraq. See August 2015 Notice of Disagreement; March 2019 hearing transcript. For the reasons that follow, the Board finds that service connection is not warranted. Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated during active service. 38 U.S.C. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). Generally, to establish service connection, there must be competent, credible evidence of 1) a current disability, 2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of an injury or disease, and 3) a nexus, or link, between the current disability and the in-service disease or injury. See Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009). If the veteran was engaged in combat with the enemy, VA shall accept as sufficient proof of service connection satisfactory lay or other evidence of service incurrence, if the lay or other evidence is consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of such service. 38 U.S.C. § 1154(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(d). In the case of a combat veteran not only is the combat injury presumed, but so is the disability due to the in-service combat injury. Reeves v. Shinseki, 682 F.3d 988, 998-99 (Fed. Cir. 2012). To establish service connection, however, there must be evidence of a current disability and a causal relationship between the current disability and the combat injury. Id. (citing Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Service connection may also be warranted for a Persian Gulf veteran who exhibits objective indications of a qualifying chronic disability that became manifest during active military, naval or air service in the Southwest Asia Theater of Operations during the Persian Gulf War, or that became manifest to a degree of 10 percent or more not later than December 31, 2021. 38 C.F.R. § 3.317(a)(1). The Veteran’s DD Form 214 shows that he served in Kuwait/Iraq from June 2005 to June 2006. As such, the Veteran is considered a Persian Gulf War veteran. The Veteran’s current condition has been attributed to a known clinical diagnosis of conclusive pathophysiology and etiology. Thus, the law and regulations providing for presumptive service connection for Persian Gulf veterans with qualifying chronic diseases are not applicable. 38 C.F.R. § 3.317. Turning to the evidence of record, the Veteran has a current diagnosis of obstructive sleep apnea. See February 2020 VA examination. Accordingly, the first element of service connection has been established. Turning to the second element, an in-service event, the Board notes that the Veteran is considered a combat veteran. See May 2006 military personnel record (awarding a combat action badge for engaging or being engaged by the enemy). However, the provisions of 38 U.S.C. § 1154(b) do not apply as it has not been claimed, and the record does not otherwise indicate, that the Veteran’s sleep apnea was incurred while engaging in combat. Nonetheless, the Board still finds that the second element of service connection has been established. The Veteran generally contends that he snored and had difficulty breathing in his sleep during service. The Veteran’s STRs are silent for any complaints, treatment, or diagnoses related to sleep apnea. While June and July 2006 service treatment records (STRs) show that the Veteran complained of difficulty sleeping, the issue appears to have been associated with the Veteran’s psychiatric condition. The Veteran has reported that he did not seek treatment for his sleep apnea in service because he did not want to leave his unit or risk re-deployment home. See February 2020 Statement in Support of Claim; May 2020 Statement of Accredited Representative in an Appealed Case (VA 646). The Veteran has submitted a number of buddy statements in support of his appeal. In a November 2016 statement, the Veteran’s wife indicates that the Veteran had issues with snoring and breathing in his sleep for the last twelve years. In another November 2016 statement, M.T. reported that he slept next to the Veteran from January 2005 to July 2006 and he would hear the Veteran snore loudly. In a March 2019 statement, C.D. reported that he was the Veteran’s roommate during their deployment and that he would hear the Veteran stop breathing and snore very loud. He further noted that at times he would have to make sure the Veteran was ok by kicking his bed and waking him up during the night. He also reported that he suggested the Veteran sleep on his side and be checked for sleep apnea. In a February 2020 statement, M.K. reported that he would hear the Veteran making choking sounds and snoring loudly in his sleep. In a statement received by VA in February 2020, J.D. reported that he would check on the Veteran when he was sleeping because he would snore excessively and stop breathing. The Veteran’s wife and fellow soldiers are competent to report that the Veteran snored and had breathing issues while sleeping as such are readily observable. See Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 470 (1994). Accordingly, as there is competent and credible evidence that the Veteran snored and stopped breathing in his sleep during service, the Board finds that the second element of service connection also has been established. Turning to the third element, a nexus between the Veteran’s current sleep apnea and in-service symptomatology, the Board finds that this element has not been established. Pursuant to the October 2019 remand, the Veteran underwent a VA examination in February 2020. The examiner opined that it was less likely than not that the Veteran’s current sleep apnea was incurred in or caused by service. The examiner explained that the only way to diagnose OSA is through a sleep study which, here, occurred eight years after active duty service. The examiner further noted that he had reviewed the buddy statements provided but that they were not conclusive of OSA especially since no diagnosis was rendered until much later after service. The examiner also emphasized that reports of snoring and gasping are not conclusive for a diagnosis of OSA. The examiner noted that the Veteran’s enlistment and entrance exams just before active duty were all negative. The Board finds this opinion, supported by a rationale based on an accurate medical history with clear conclusions and supporting data, is highly probative. Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295, 304 (2008). The Board acknowledges that the examiner did not consider the two buddy statements submitted in February 2020 as they were not associated with the claims file until after the examination. See May 2020 VA 646. However, the two February 2020 buddy statements generally reiterate the information contained in the previously submitted buddy statements, i.e. that the Veteran snored and had trouble/stopped breathing while sleeping in service. To the extent that M.K. provided new information regarding the Veteran’s sleep problems in service, such information is not relevant to the Veteran’s claim for sleep apnea but rather relevant to his psychiatric condition. See February 2020 statement from M.K. (noting the Veteran experienced nightmares and associated sleep problems in service). Therefore, the fact that the examiner did not have an opportunity to consider these statements does not detract from the probative value of the opinion as the information contained in the statements was duplicative of evidence the examiner already considered. The Board also acknowledges that the representative emphasizes that the Veteran’s wife and fellow soldiers are competent to make statements regarding the Veteran’s loud snoring and cessation of breathing while sleeping. See May 2020 646. While the lay witnesses are competent to report symptomatology that they observed, they are not competent to report that such symptomatology is a manifestation of OSA. Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Thus, while their statements are highly probative in establishing the second element of service connection, they are of limited probative value in determining whether a nexus exists between the Veteran’s sleep apnea and in-service symptomatology. In addition, the February 2020 examiner considered the statements but concluded that the reported symptomatology was not conclusive of OSA. Additionally, the Board acknowledges that at the March 2019 hearing, the Veteran testified that he believed that his OSA began in service due to environmental exposures in SWA such as burning trash and human feces as well as sandstorm inhalation. It is likely that the Veteran was exposed to environmental hazards while stationed in SWA. While the examiner did not specifically address environmental exposures in SWA, the examiner nonetheless essentially found that it was less likely than not that the Veteran’s OSA began during his active service. Thus, if the Veteran’s OSA did not begin during his active service, then it necessarily follows that it did not begin during his active service due to any environmental exposures. While the Veteran believes his OSA manifested during his active service, he is not competent to provide a nexus opinion in this case. This issue is medically complex, as it involves internal disease processes and requires knowledge of interpretation of complicated diagnostic medical testing. Jandreau, 492 F.3d at 1377 n.4. Moreover, in the May 2020 VA 646, the Veteran’s representative contends that the Veteran’s combat status should be accepted as sufficient proof of service connection pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(d). As noted above, the Veteran’s combat status is conceded but the provisions of 38 U.S.C. § 1154(b) are not applicable to the Veteran’s current claim. However, even if Section 1154(b) was applicable, it does not create a statutory presumption that a combat veteran’s alleged disease or injury is service connected. Collette v. Brown, 82 F.3d 389, 392 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Rather, it aids the combat veteran by relaxing the adjudicative evidentiary requirements for determining what happened in service. Id. Section 1154(b) addresses the combat veteran’s ability to allege that an event occurred in service while engaging in combat. See Beausoleil v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 459, 464 (1996). Thus, even if the provisions of 38 U.S.C. § 1154(b) applied here, the Veteran would still have to show a nexus between his current OSA and service. Reeves, 682 F.3d at 998-99. Given the foregoing, the Board finds the most competent and probative evidence of record weighs against a finding of service connection for the Veteran’s sleep apnea. As such, service connection is not warranted. In reaching this conclusion, the Board has considered the applicability of the benefit of the doubt doctrine. However, as the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran’s claim, that doctrine is not applicable. See 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b); Ortiz v. Principi, 274 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 55-57 (1990). C. CRAWFORD Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals Attorney for the Board E. Mortimer, Associate Counsel The Board’s decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.