Citation Nr: 20060802 Decision Date: 09/15/20 Archive Date: 09/15/20 DOCKET NO. 15-27 470 DATE: September 15, 2020 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is denied. REMANDED Entitlement to service connection for abdominal disabilities, to include a ventral hernia and/or diastasis recti, is remanded. FINDING OF FACT The Veteran’s identified in-service stressor is not corroborated by credible supporting evidence. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for entitlement to service connection for PTSD have not been met. 38 U.S.C. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304, 4.125. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty from May 1999 through September 2003. These matters come to the Board of Veterans Appeals (Board) on appeal from an August 2013 rating decision issued by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Montgomery, Alabama. The Board previously remanded these matters in August 2019 for additional development including a VA examination to determine the nature and etiology of any PTSD or any acquired psychiatric disorder other than PTSD as well as the nature and etiology of any abdominal disabilities. See August 2019 Board Remand. As will be discussed in more detail below, substantial compliance with the August 2019 remand directives has been met with regards to only PTSD and other psychiatric disorders. See Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268, 271 (1998) (holding when a remand is issued, the Veteran is entitled, as a matter of law, the right to compliance with the remanded order). Following the VA examinations, the RO issued a June 2020 rating decision granting service connection for unspecified depressive disorder with a 50 percent rating. See June 2020 rating decision. The Veteran’s service-connection claims for PTSD and abdominal disabilities remain denied and are now before the Board. The Board has limited the discussion below to the relevant evidence required to support its finding of fact and conclusion of law, as well as to the specific contentions regarding the case as raised directly by the Veteran and those reasonably raised by the record. See Scott v. McDonald, 789 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Robinson v. Peake, 21 Vet. App. 545, 552 (2008). Entitlement to service connection for PTSD. The Veteran contends he has PTSD that was caused by his military service. In particular, he claims in 2001 or 2002 his sergeant threatened him prior to deployment by stating, “friendly fire does happen and will occur.” See March 2015 Statement in Support of Claim for PTSD; see also January 2020 VA examination. The Veteran said that he asked if the sergeant was threatening him, to which the sergeant responded, “Take it however you want.” Id. For the reasons outlined below, the Board finds service connection for PTSD is not warranted. Service connection for PTSD has unique evidentiary requirements. It generally requires (1) medical evidence diagnosing the condition in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a); (2) credible supporting evidence that the in-service stressor occurred; and (3) medical evidence of a link between current symptomatology and the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f); Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128, 138 (1997). Lay testimony regarding non-combat in-service stressors may be sufficient, in some circumstances, to establish the occurrence of a claimed stressor so long as a psychiatrist or psychologist confirms that the testimony is sufficient to support a PTSD diagnosis and that symptoms are related to that stressor. See Ervin v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 318, 320 (2011). 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a), provides that, for VA purposes, all mental disorder diagnoses including PTSD must conform to the Fifth Edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM-5) unless the Veteran’s claim was initially certified for appeal to the Board prior to August 4, 2014, in which case the diagnosis of PTSD must conform to the DSM-IV. Again, the Veteran contends his sergeant verbally threatened him during service. His service treatment records, however, are silent as to any such exchange. Indeed, the Veteran’s service treatment records are silent as to any complaints, treatment, or diagnoses related to PTSD or any psychiatric-related condition. Service treatment records from March 2003 and May 2003 show the Veteran denied feeling depressed. See March 2003 service treatment records; May 2003 service treatment records. His 2003 separation examination, moreover, noted various complaints for physical ailments, but are silent as to any mental complaints or in-service stressful circumstances. After service, the Veteran’s contentions as to how this alleged in-service exchange with his sergeant affected him has varied. In January 2011 VA treatment records, for example, the Veteran conceded that although someone did threaten him with friendly fire, it was said in a passive way and did not leave him feeling threatened. Even so, the Veteran’s VA outpatient treatment records do reflect at least some indication that he has been diagnosed and treated for PTSD in accordance with the DSM-IV criteria. See, e.g., November 2014 VA treatment records. (The Board notes that because the Veteran’s appeal was certified to the Board before August 4, 2014, the Veteran can still be eligible for service connection based on a diagnosis of PTSD under the DSM-IV). In contrast, the Veteran was afforded a VA examination in January 2020 where, at that time, the examiner opined the Veteran’s description of his exchange with his sergeant was insufficient to meet the criteria for a stressor to support PTSD under the DSM-5. See January 2020 VA examination. The Board finds this opinion persuasive because it is based on a thorough examination of the Veteran and a complete review of the claims file. Also compelling, the contended in-service stressor has not been verified. That is, section 3.304(f) sets forth circumstances that are exceptions to this rule and allow a claimant’s lay testimony, alone, to establish the occurrence of the alleged stressor. In the first circumstance, if the evidence establishes a diagnosis of PTSD during service and the claimed stressor is related to that service, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided the stressor is consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of the Veteran’s service, the Veteran’s lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(1). In the second circumstance, if the evidence establishes that the Veteran engaged in combat with the enemy and the claimed stressor is related to that combat, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided the stressor is consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of the Veteran’s service, the Veteran’s lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(2). In the third circumstance, if a stressor claimed by a Veteran is related to his “fear of hostile military or terrorist activity” and a VA psychiatrist or psychologist, or a psychiatrist or psychologist with whom VA has contracted, confirms the claimed stressor is adequate to support a diagnosis of PTSD and that the Veteran’s symptoms are related to the claimed stressor, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided the claimed stressor is consistent with the places, types, and circumstances of the Veteran’s service, the Veteran’s lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3). In the fourth circumstance, if the evidence establishes the Veteran was a prisoner-of-war (POW) under the provisions of section 3.1(y) of the regulations, and the claimed stressor is related to that POW experience, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided the stressor is consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of the Veteran’s service, the Veteran’s lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(4). Lastly, if a PTSD claim is based on in-service personal assault, evidence from sources other than the Veteran’s service records may corroborate the Veteran’s account of the stressor incident. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(5). In this case, the Veteran does not claim nor is there evidence showing that he engaged in combat with the enemy or was a prisoner of war. He has also not identified a stressor related to fear of hostile military or terrorist activity, nor has he alleged occurrence of an in-service personal assault. Finally, the Veteran’s service treatment records (STRs) do not show diagnoses of PTSD. Accordingly, none of the above exceptions under section 3.304(f) apply. Therefore, the Veteran’s statements alone are not sufficient to establish an in-service stressor but must be corroborated by credible supporting evidence. See Dizoglio v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 163, 166 (1996); accord Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389, 394-95 (1996); see also Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. at 146-47. The available evidentiary sources for corroboration of a claimed stressor are not limited to service records (as required prior to the adoption of 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)) but may also include other sources of evidence. See Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. at 143. Corroboration of every detail of the stressor is not required. Pentecost v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 124, 128 (2002). Moreover, a Veteran’s actual presence during the stressor event need not be specifically corroborated if the evidence shows that he was assigned to and stationed with a unit that was present when a reported event, that has otherwise been verified, occurred; such evidence strongly suggests actual exposure to the stressor event. Id. In general, “after-the-fact medical nexus evidence,” such as a VA examiner’s finding that a claimant’s PTSD was caused by the alleged in-service stressor, cannot by itself serve as credible supporting evidence of the claimed in-service stressor. See Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. at 396. In determining whether service connection is warranted for a disability, VA is responsible for determining whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise, with the Veteran prevailing in either event, or whether a preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, in which case the claim is denied. 38 U.S.C. § 5107; Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of the matter, the benefit of the doubt will be given to the veteran. 38 U.S.C. § 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. Here, again, the Veteran contends his in-service stressor occurred in 2001 or 2002 when his sergeant threated him prior to a deployment by stating, “friendly fire does happen and will occur.” See March 2015 Statement in Support of Claim for PTSD; see also January 2020 VA examination. The Veteran said that he asked if the sergeant was threatening him, to which the sergeant responded, “Take it however you want.” Id. There is no verification in the record that this exchange occurred other than the Veteran’s lay statements. His service treatment records lack any mention of this exchange. His service treatment records also lack any indication that he had any in-service complaints, treatment, or diagnoses related to PTSD symptoms. Indeed, he specifically denied feeling depressed in March and May 2003 examinations. After service, as outlined above, the Veteran has been inconsistent as to how this exchange affected him and whether it actually made him feel threatened or caused him any distress in any way. While a 2014 VA outpatient treatment record shows a diagnosis of PTSD pursuant to the DSM-IV criteria, the January 2020 VA examiner found the Veteran’s described in-service stressor, even if confirmed, would be insufficient to support a diagnosis of PTSD. In short, the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran’s claim and, therefore, entitlement to service connection for PTSD is not warranted. REASONS FOR REMAND Entitlement to service connection for abdominal disabilities, to include a ventral hernia and/or diastasis recti. The Veteran contends his abdominal disabilities, including a ventral hernia and diastasis recti, were caused in-service. The Board finds the evidence is insufficient to resolve the Veteran’s claim. The Board’s August 2019 remand directed the examiner to opine whether any currently diagnosed disorder is at least as likely as not related to an in-service injury, event, or disease, including consideration of the symptoms noted in the Veteran’s service treatment records with specifically referenced dates. The examiner failed to address the Veteran’s reported symptoms in-service. Considering the Veteran’s service connection claim includes a contention of direct service connection for abdominal disabilities, the examiner must address in-service symptoms before the Board can properly resolve the Veteran’s claim. Additionally, the January 2020 VA examiner included a notation in the disability benefits questionnaire that the Veteran was diagnosed with a ventral hernia in 2000, but later stated no documentation existed in the file to support a ventral hernia diagnosis in-service. The Board finds the January 2020 VA examination regarding abdominal disabilities not adequate because it did not consider all the relevant evidence of record. See Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268, 271 (1998); see also Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295 (2008). As further medical clarification is needed, a remand for an addendum opinion is appropriate. See Bowling v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 1, 12 (2001) (emphasizing the Board’s duty to return an inadequate examination report “if further evidence or clarification of the evidence... is essential for a proper appellate decision”). The matters are REMANDED for the following action: 1. Forward the claims file to the January 2020 VA examiner, if possible, or to an appropriate examiner, for review and an addendum opinion considering the Veteran’s symptoms noted in his service treatment records, including specifically on January 20, 2000, July 10, 2001, and September 11, 2001 and addressing whether it is at least as likely as not (50 percent or greater probability) any currently diagnosed abdominal disability is related to an in-service injury, event or disease, including said reported symptoms. Provide clarification as to whether the Veteran was diagnosed with a ventral hernia in-service or after separation, and specifically when the diagnosis was made. The examiner must provide a complete rationale for any opinion expressed, based on the examiner’s clinical and medical expertise; established medical principles; and references to the evidence of record, as appropriate. (Continued on the next page)   If any opinion cannot be expressed without resort to speculation, ensure that the examiner so indicates and discusses why an opinion is not possible, to include whether there is additional evidence that could enable an opinion to be provided, or whether the inability to provide the opinion is based on the limits of medical knowledge. 2. After the above development, and any other development deemed necessary, readjudicate the claims. If the benefits sought on appeal remain denied, the Veteran and his representative should be furnished a supplemental statement of the case and given the opportunity to respond thereto. SHEREEN M. MARCUS Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals Attorney for the Board A.C. Allen, Associate Counsel The Board’s decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.