Citation Nr: 21004345
Decision Date: 01/26/21	Archive Date: 01/26/21

DOCKET NO. 02-15 263A
DATE: January 26, 2021

ORDER

Entitlement to payment or reimbursement for the cost of nursing home care administered from November 1993 to January 1998 is dismissed.

FINDING OF FACT

In April 1998, VA was notified that the Veteran died in March 1998. 

CONCLUSION OF LAW

Due to the death of the appellant, the Board has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this appeal at this time. 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a); 38 C.F.R. § 20.1302. 

REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION

The Veteran served on active duty in the United States Army from October 1940 to October 1961.  The Veteran died in March 1998, and his surviving spouse is the appellant.

This matter comes before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) on appeal from a rating decision from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO).  In December 2003 and in April 2007, the Board remanded the case for further development.

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The appellant seeks payment or reimbursement for the cost of nursing home care administered from November 1993 to January 1998 is dismissed.  Unfortunately, the Veteran died during the pendency of the appeal.  As a matter of law, appellants’ claims do not survive their deaths.  Zevalkink v. Brown, 102 F.3d 1236, 1243-44 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Smith v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 330, 333- 34 (1997); Landicho v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 42, 47 (1994).  This appeal on the merits has become moot by virtue of the death of the appellant and must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a); 38 C.F.R. § 20.1302. 

In this case, however, the benefits at issue are not periodic monthly benefits, but rather a one-time lump sum payment or reimbursement of medical expenses.  Accordingly, the benefits in this case cannot be considered accrued benefits, as such is defined as “periodic monetary benefits . . . authorized under law administered by [VA], to which a payee was entitled at his or her death under existing ratings for decisions or those based on evidence in the file at the date of death, and due and unpaid.”  38 U.S.C. § 5121(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.1000(a); see Pappalardo v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 63, 65 (1993) (a one-time payment for assistance for specially adapted housing does not qualify as a ‘periodic monetary benefit’ for purposes of 38 U.S.C. § 5121 and, therefore, is not payable as an accrued benefit); Gillis v. West, 11 Vet. App. 441 (1998) (holding that automobile purchase assistance is not an accrued benefit as a matter of law).

 

 

STEVEN D. REISS

Veterans Law Judge

Board of Veterans’ Appeals

Attorney for the Board	Joshua R. Castillo, Counsel

The Board’s decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.